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PART ONE

THE UNITED STATES AND THE OTHER
HFIVE":

AN ANALYTIC COMPARISON
by
L. Hart Wright

CHAPTER I
AN OVERVIEW:

REQUISITE ADMINISTRATIVE
FRAMEWORKS

1.1 Introduction: Why the volume was written
Tax administrators in well developed countries rarely have
either occasion or opportunity to compare experiences or ex
change opinions regarding procedures and practices utilized in
administering complicated tax laws. Moreover, there is little
comparative literature on the subject. Even the tax institutes
which are internationally oriented usually focus on substantive
tax principles, not procedures and practices. Hopefully, there
fore, administrators in highly developed countries will find
useful this analytic comparison of practices and procedures
through which six of their number resolve disputable income
tax questions -administratively and judicially.
Concern for tax administrators in well developed countries,
however, was not the prime motivation for this study. The
initial conception grew out of the belief that administrators in
countries just now developing would find especially useful an
analytic comparison of diverse functioning models which had
evolved out of long experience. Since these now developing
countries differ from one another on many counts, it was im
perative that there be equally wide dissimilarity among the
Thus, the
several experienced countries selected as models.
choice of Belgium, France, West Germany, Great Britain, the
Netherlands, and the United States. These countries differ in
their size and population, the complexity and precision of their
tax statutes, the degree their legislative bodies provide addi
tional guidance through pre-enactment materials, the assess
ment system used (self- versus non-self-assessment systems),
the standards of construction to which their courts traditionally
conform, the theoretical status assigned by each to the doctrine
of precedent, and the types of persons available to handle tax
disputes-both within and without the government. Consequently,
it was possible to determine whether such basic differences
were relevant or irrelevant when choosing, from among the
alternative functioning models, the structural arrangement and
practices most appropriate for each level involved in the con
flict resolution process. Also, the analytic comparison contained
3
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in the first four chapters should enable any given country to
determine the extent to which diverse parts of different wholes
are adaptable to its situation.
The third purpose of this study is a byproduct of the first
two.
Practitioners engaged in international tax practice may
gain a useful insight into the conflict resolution process fol
lowed in each of the six countries covered.
1.2 RelationshiP of procedural goals to organization

Enactment even of a semi-complex income tax statute is
bound to generate substantial uncertainty and a host of disputes.
Uncertainty and disputes alike need to be dealt with in a timely
fashion, uniformly but efficiently and conveniently to taxpayers,
through impartial determinations of high quality.
These objectives cannot be achieved through spontaneous
self-generation.
Nor can they be achieved in a vacuum.
Achievement-if it does take place-must come through the acts
or non-acts of people, operating in the first instance within
some administrative framework. Since the aims themselves
ultimately conflict with each other, the likelihood they can be
achieved in proper balance is affected inevitably by the manner
in which the relevant parts of the administration are organized.
In other words, once an administrative organization comes into
being, the die tends to be cast regarding the relative degree
of emphasis each such goal actually will enjoy. Consequently,
the administrator should consider first those diverse goals, not
organizational structures. Only after balancing the goals so
they fit together properly -due account being taken of the per
sonnel available to implement them-is he in a position to con
sider the implementing structure.
In short, the "mix" of
balanced goals should fix the shape of the administrative struc
ture, not vice versa.
1.3 Sequence of this volume

The wide range of considerations relevant to the accom
plishment of that first step (reconciling the goals) and the
impact the resulting mix should have on the details of adminis
trative organization, procedures, and practices, are examined
by Chapters II and III in the course of analytically comparing
the experience of the six countries. A comparable but self
contained analytical comparison of the judicial machinery these
countries use in resolving income tax disputes then follows in
the concluding Chapter IV of this PART.
Succeeding PARTS
TWO through SIX then describe, on a country-by-country basis,
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the five European models (Belgium, France, Germany, Great
Britain, and the Netherlands). These PARTS provide the basis
for the analytical comparison to u.s. experience contained in
this PART. Because PART ONE weaves a description of U.S.
practices and procedures into its comparative study of all six
countries, only its general sequence, not its topic headings,
conform to the common outline to which the five European
authors were requested to adhere in the subsequent PARTS.
The ultimate choices which a country must make in estab
lishing administrative machinery to deal with disputable tax
questions are no more difficult than those involved in setting
up judicial machinery. As between the two, however, there is
far greater variation at the administrative level in the relevant
functions to be performed. Thus this level, viewed en toto,
tends to become substantially more complex than the other.
Because of this peculiar complexity at the administrative level,
this introductory chapter is designed (i) to put briefly in over
all perspective the main outlines of the administrative struc
ture, described in Chapters IT and ITI, which were evolved from
the previously mentioned goals, and {ii) to identify at least the
primary problems of practice and procedure with which each
of the major components of that structure, and those two
chapters, must grapple. ! This overview is accomplished by
focusing separately on the three central themes upon which
the relevant parts of the administrative structure should be
organized.
1.4 First central theme: A centralized interpretative program
Whatever the inherent conflict otherwise existing between
the previously described goals, not one can be effectively im
plemented in the absence of the first organizational require
ment: specifically, a tax administration's National Office should
establish at that same top level an active interpretative pro
gram for the benefit of lower echelons.
A few specialists
concentrated there can produce interpretations of a high quality
which otherwise thousands of less qualified field officials would
need individually to work out for themselves with consequent
prejudice both to uniformity and overall efficiency.

1 Readers interested in detailed treatment of any of the matters
specifically referred to in this Chapter shoul d consult the table of
contents .
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The first problem is whether these interpretative direc
tives should be made accessible to taxpayers through publica
tion.

True,

problems.

such a policy would create many administrative

Illustrative-but only illustrative-are questions per

taining to reliability,
or indeed
ficulties
ship.

the right

to make retroactive changes

prospective changes, to say nothing of inherent dif

associated with

the requisite

But on the affirmative side,

painstaking

publication

draftsman

will contribute

to uniformity even in so-called non-self-assessment countries.
Further, it will help assure proper application of these direc
tives by the field forces.

Only through publication can this

process receive assistance from an adversary-a taxpayer. For
only then will he have a firm basis on which to question the
way in which a given local official applies a directive to his
own situation.

Finally,

publication will minimize uncertainty.

Because these interpretations are centrally evolved, at the least
they should have the stature of reliable advance warnings re
garding the contours

Of

course,

of an

administration's

litigation policy.

all interpretative difficulties can never be an

ticipated as of that point in time immediately following enact
ment of a new statute.

Consequently,

for the National Office

to sustain its control over interpretative policy to the previ
ously cited ends,

it must promulgate,

in addition

to an initial

set of interpretative instructions or regulations, ad hoc rulings
as new questions arise.
Many of the difficulties this policy
-.vould create are similar to those associated
of any initial set of directives.
the problem of providing the

with publication

Distinctive here, however,
"ivory tower"

is

at the National

Office with an effective early warning system, capable of alert
ing it in a timely fashion to the really significant newly emerg

ing practical issues.

The most effective device of this type

actually depends on catering directly to taxpayer self-interest.
The National Office can guarantee receipt of such warning if
it establishes the practice of ruling in advance on the proposed
transactions of individual taxpayers.
produces

many

administrative

procedures must be responsive,

While this practice also

headaches

to

which

detailed

it simultaneously satisfies a

further significant and worthwhile aim: dispelling uncertain
ties for which the tax system itself is otherwise responsible.
Not one of the European countries covered here fosters
major programs involving every one of these different types of
interpretative efforts. Britain does the least,2 though actually
2 See Chap. XVII infra .
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it has the most complex statute of the Five. Normally, on
enactment of a new statute, it does not publish an initial set
of interpretative regulations, thereafter does not rule on pro
posed transactions, and as new issues emerge typically does
not publish rulings thereon.
However, by foresaking goals
which, when viewed in long-run perspective, seem basic to
wise tax administration, Britain has avoided the raft of diffi
culties experienced by the United States, the country which
does the most in this area, and which maintains every one of
the foregoing types of interpretative programs. For purposes
of this overall view, only the two prime difficulties the United
States has encountered need be mentioned.
The first involves certain inherent conflicts. Previously
it was said that, given the doubts and volume of disputes
stemming from a complex tax statute, the consequent goals (to
deal with these doubts in a uniform, timely, efficient, impar
tial, and sophisticated manner) actually united to support es
tablishment of a centrally administered interpretative program.
Within such a program, however, are certain inherent and
difficult-to-resolve conflicts.
For example, in trying to pro
mulgate an initial set of interpretative instructions, it is not
easy to strike the right balance between timeliness, complete
ness, technical accuracy, understandability, and efficiency (in
the sense of avoiding undue expenditure of talented manpower).
As is indicated in Chapter II infra, however, adoption of cer
tain procedures and practices will tend at least to provide a
reasonable degree of assurance that each competing aim will
enjoy the stress appropriate to it.
Another inherent conflict exists between that part of a
program designed to neutralize uncertainty in individual cases
through a private ruling on a taxpayer's proposed transaction
and that part designed to achieve uniformity through publication
of rulings. As to the former, speed is essential, for con
summation of any given taxpayer's proposed transaction cannot
be long postponed. Equally indispensable in the case of pub
lished rulings, however, is the exact opposite pains ta king care
or absolute technical accuracy-for published rulings fix the
nationwide stance of the government, not just the tax conse
quences of an isolated taxpayer's proposed transaction.
Here
again the difficulty lies in devising procedures and practices
which at least tend to assure that each goal (speed v. quality)
will receive that degree of stress appropriate to the purpose
to be served.
-
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The second major problem is to sustain on a continuing
basis the requisite emphasis on each aspect of such a multi
sided interpretative program.
Interpretative directives long
delayed guarantee an interim marked by uncertainty, lack of
uniformity, inefficient use of field forces, or all three. Main
taining an interpretative program at an adequate level, how
ever, can be prejudiced all too easily by a competing pressure
on administrators. For example, a national office official, re
sponsible for manning the typically under-staffed assessment
function's "firing line," is concerned with putting out today's
brush fires. Moreover, he knows that this kind of productivity
That official
is measurable day by day and man by man.
would be under tremendous pressure not to allocate on an ade
quate sustaining basis the talented manpower-i.e., the "think
time"-required to develop interpretations which will be wholly
useless until completed. Also prejudicial is the fact that even
then their exact net utility, however large, can not be recorded
in terms of a precise monetarily expressed plus on his pro
ductivity charts.
One possible remedial step-which simul
taneously will further the goal of impartiality-is to assign
responsibility for the interpretative function to senior officials
who work outside the enforcement function-as in France3 and
the United States.
Chapter TI indicates other arrangements
and procedures which likewise can contribute to the first of
these two ends.
1.5 Second central theme: Decentralization of the enforcement
function

A second structural requirement involves a high decen
tralization of the enforcement function itself, with local ad
ministrative offices resolving the bulk of all actual disputes.
These two activities-enforcement and dispute-resolution-are
certain to engage a large number of personnel, which decen
tralization will spread widely across the nation.
In conse
quence, this arrangement would make unachievable the goal of
uniformity if not complemented by the previously described
centrally administered interpretative program.
Even then, the first and most serious problem is to main
tain-among such a large and decentralized staff-a sufficiently
high level of competence to do the work properly.4 However,
3 See
4 The

Chap. IX infra.
character, and its relevance, of non-governmental tax prac
titioners is considered in Chap . IV, §4.9 infra.
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the overriding imperatives of efficiency and taxpayer conven
ience lead to an inescapable conclusion.
Decentralization is
so essential that the administration itself simply must assume
the added burden of providing, through in-service training, the
requisite professional understanding to otherwise educated per
sons.

Even among the six highly developed countries covered

here,

the educational systems do not produce the particular

type of specialists needed.

Moreover, persons most suited to

the task all too often-though with variations

from country

to

country-are not available for government employment at this
level

in anything like a sufficient

number.

In consequence,

each of the Six, having decentralized its enforcement function

100

among offices numbering from

in France,5

in the Netherlands

has instituted some type

to

1700

of

in-service training

the Six, Belgium does the least.6

Most inspectors in

program.

Of

its local offices came into the system at a lower level, on the
basis of an examination taken after completing secondary edu
cation.

Their subsequent professional development, insofar as

government bears the cost, involves little more than a planned
program of on-the-job training.

They must carry out on their

own time the contemplated study of tax law,
The most extensive government

regulations,

etc.

sponsored training pro

7

grams among the European countries are carried on by France
and the Netherlands.S
After passing a general qualifying ex

amination, applicants for the job of inspector or assessor are
subsidized during the period
law degree.

In France,

required

to complete work on a

the applicant previously must have

started work on this degree.

His two-year training program

at the National School for Taxes is arranged
complete the degree requirements.

so that he can

The Netherlands' subsidy

covers all university work leading to a Master's Degree in
tax law

and

be returned

theory.

Both countries require

that the subsidy

should the applicant fail to stay with the govern

ment for a certain number of years.
stantial in-service classroom

courses

Both

also provide sub

for

the employee-rank

5 see § 1 . 4 in Chaps. V , IX, Xill , XVII, and XXI infra.
The u.s.,
while maintaining only 58 district offices, subdivides them into ap
proximately 800 posts of duty.
6 See Chap. V, § 1.5 infra.
But cf. Great Britain, Chap. XVII,
§ 1 .5 infra.
7 See Chap. IX, § 1 . 5 infra.
8 see Chap. XXI, § 1 . 5 infra.

10

OVERVIEW

immediately below inspector or assessor. As to these, Germany
does likewise, with the classroom course there extending over
nine months. 9 Its assessors, however, typically are employed
only after they have graduated from a university, usually with
a law degree. These men then have three months of special
ized training at the Federal Finance College, interspersed with
on-the-job training.
The United States differs from the three European coun
tries just mentioned. Its chief reservoir for the revenue agent
class is made up of college graduates who majored in account
ing.10 However, during their first two years of employment,
in addition to carefully supervised on-the-job training, these
recruits attend in-service regional schools for almost five
months,11 and there the emphasis is on tax law.
The second major problem at the local office level involves
the inherent conflict between its dispute-resolution function
requiring as it does an image of impartiality-and the local
office's competing revenue-producing responsibility. Once again
adoption of compensating procedures peculiar to that level be
comes essential, but from the foregoing conflict and other con
siderations emerges a third organizational theme.
1.6 Third central theme:

Centralization of final administrative
hearings at an intermediate level

To reduce the magnitude of the last mentioned conflict, it
is important to isolate from the local office the highest ad
ministrative official with whom a taxpayer may discuss a dis
puted proposed assessment. Taxpayer convenience, however,
bars assignment of this function to the National Office. Thus,
the need for an intermediate layer, which incidentally will per
mit the concentration of particularly able men to fulfill a most
demanding task. Of the countries covered here, three {Belgium,
France, and the United States) do put the apex of the adminis
trative conflict resolution process in just such an office.
A yet further hard choice emerges in trying to assure ad
ministrative impartiality. The aim is avoidance of unnecessary

9 See Chap. XIII, §1.5 infra.
and gift tax examiners, on the other hand, are law school
graduates.
11 Additional classroom courses are provided those who spend a
substantial part of their time examining special types of returns-such
as those filed by insurance companies or exempt organizations .

10 E state
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litigation,
interest.

with

simultaneous

protection

of

the government's

But this leaves unresolved two perplexing questions :

What l itigation is

unnecessary

and,

prior

to

litigation,

what

interest does the government have in a disputed question ?
As

to the first question,

the tax system

gains

nothing,

apart from prote cting the government's interest in an individual
dispute,

from litigating cases

which

neither

the central offic e 's litigation policy nor are

are essential

to

capable of clari

fying the law to any really s ignificant degre e .

The ans wer to

the sec ond question, however, ultimately means that,

to obtain

a bilateral agreement in many controversies,

the intermediate

office

"settlement"

must be

empowered to exercise

compromise authority,
litigation haz ards

true

geared to a realistic appraisal

each side face s .

Not to be

make mutual concess ions in response

or

of the

empowered

to

to the litigation hazards

deprives the intermediate office of the chance to be truly im 
partial

and to obtain a bilateral agreement in disputes where

the taxpayer has some reasonable chance
tion.

to prevail in litiga

In short, the government 's interest in a controversy not

otherwise worth litigating is worth nothing more than the value
of its relative

chance to prevail should that dispute actually

be

Comparably,

litigated.

the

taxpayer's

competing chance

represents his interest in that same controversy.
administrative level, i . e . ,
not be

impartial

on the basis
s ettlements,

And at the

absent actual litigation, justice can

unless .the total amount

in

issue

is

divided

To permit such
of those chances or interests .
as is done in France, 1 2 the Netherlands, 1 3 and

the United States, 14 will generate certain major problems con

s idered fully
level;

yet

be dealt with,
cedures .

in Chapter III

others

infra.

Some are peculiar to this

pertain to the local office level.

however,

Conversely,

by

appropriate

not to empower

to reach such settlements

instructions

Both

can

and pro

an intermediate office

is bound to result

in an excessive
amount of time- consuming expensive l itigation. 1 5

1 2 See Chap. XI, §§
3. 2 a and 3.4b infra.
13see Chap. XXID, §§ 3 2 a and 3 4 a infra .
14 u.s. Treas. Reg. § 601. 1 06(£), Rule II.
1 5 See Chap. IV infra.
.
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CHAPTER ll
CENTRALLY ADMINISTERE D RULE -MAKING PROGRAMS

Evolution of U. S . Programs

Section A.

2. 1 Introduction

Among the six countries

treated

here,

the

U. S.

tax

ad 

ministration maintains the most c omprehensive set of centrally
administered rule - making programs.

A preliminary de scrip 

tion of the evolution, magnitude, and effect of its programs will
serve two purposes :

first, to identify the consequent problems,

answers to which will fix the major contours of such programs,
and

sec ond,

the

"Six's " diverse reactions to the vital purposes these pro

to facilitate

a

subsequent analytic comparison of

grams serve .
Obviously, the appropriate legis lative body, not the execu
tive, ultimately is respons ible for a nation's tax policy.

substantive

policy

socio-economic

general

considerations,

status

thrust of

its

as to all details.

and

goals,

responsive
alone

income tax statute .

But this

Decisions regarding the latter,

depend

in which the statute

also upon

is

the tax administration.

the

is not

so

such as the

to be incorporated

to be drafted,

the variable extent the

generate uncertainty and controversies

nation's

should determine

number and types of substantive deviations
and the manner

Further,

to the

should

alternatives

would

between taxpayers

and

T he s ignificance the legislature actually

attaches to any differences antic ipated on this count

should be

affected, in turn, by the degree it is e mpowered and willing to
share

a clarifying rule -making function

independent tribunals, or both.

with administrators,

Necessarily, its attitude toward

this must be influenced by the anticipated relative capab ilitie s
of the other two.

Also relevant, however, are its expectations

regarding two other matters :

first, the standards of construc 

tion to which administrators and/ or independent tribunals would
conform and second,

its own willingness and power

pre -enactment materials
to reduce

the unce rtainties

through this me ans
other two.
the

extent

(legislative

to e mploy

committee reports,

reflected

control the range

in the statute itself

etc. )
and

of rule making by the

Finally, in considering at the pre -enactment stage
to

which

the tax administration

12
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counted on to satisfy a clarifying function, the legislative body
should take

acc ount of the degree

administration

to

identify

its

it is willing to permit the

interpretative

position

before

transactions are consummated (through regulations and rulings),
i.e.,

before

arise

controversies

emerge r ather than just

they

after

in the setting of the administration's conflict res olution

procedure s .
Though the U.s. Congre ss should have examined the above

questions

before it chose from among competing statutory ap 

proaches, in fact the answers to many evolved

after

it already

had gone beyond the point of no return in shaping a most com 
plex substantive statutory pattern.
For example,

as

to the

rule -making consequence
trine

anticipated

of the

of precedent undoubtedly

fairly
was

role

strong

generally

of c ourts,
understood

those who enacted the first modern income tax statute in
But

neither the congressional debates

nor the

the

American doc 
by

1913.

committee re 

ports bearing on that act reflect any concern or expectations
regarding either
struction

(i . e . ,

(i) the judic iary 's standard of

statutory con

the degree courts should or would exercise an

active or passive role in the interpretative process) or (ii) its
capac ity to share the rule -making function in a
timely

and convenient to taxpayers.

however,

the

congre ssional

As

sponsors

ately

after that act was passed,

Before,
the

turned

out,

of that act would have

been misled for the future by any findings
with respect to the first of these .

manner both

events

as of that moment
and just immedi

Supre me Court

that the judiciary would follow a passive

role

insisted

in construing

tax statute s :

In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes it is the es
tablished rule not to extend their provisions, by implication,
beyond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge
their operations so as to embrace matters not specifically
pointed out. In case of doubt they are construed most strongly
against the Government, and in favor of the citizen. l
Within two decades,
of

strict

however,

it was to abandon this standard

construction except perhaps -now to the

taxpayer's

1 Gould v. Gould, 245 U .S . 151, 153 (191 7 ). Accord, Benzinger v.
U.S ., 1 92 U.S . 38 (1904) ; American Net & Twine Co. v. Worthington,
141 U.S . 468 (1 891) ; U.S . v. Wigglesworth, 2 S tory 369 (Cir. Ct. D.
Mass. 1 842).
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disadvantage - in the case of deductions . 2

And even as to these

the Court subsequently observed:

We are not impressed by the argument that, as the ques
tion here decided is doubtful, all doubts should be resolved in
favor of the taxpayer. It is the function and duty of courts
to resolve doubts. We know of no reason why that function
should be abdicated in a tax case more than in any other
where the rights of suitors turn on the construction of a
statute and it is our duty to decide what that construction
fairly should be. . . . 3
Shortly thereafter,

the

High Court took the

final major

step,

by making abundantly

clear that it expected the j udiciary to
play a more active role in combating avoidance, 4 though within

the framework
poses

of the

of a notion that
applicable

courts

sections

of the

should "seek the pur 
Code

and adopt that

construction which best gives effect to those purposes . " 5
judic iary,

by this belated step,

The

began to assist the legislative

body in achieving one salutary effect, namely, greater "equality
among taxpayers, 1 1 6 i . e . , "uniform application" 7 of the law by

reference to the "substance " 8 of transactions rather than their
mere "for m. 1 1 9
But these shifts also were responsible for

generating

additional

uncertainty

consequence new controver sie s .

throughout

the

code

and in

In many affected areas, Con

gress then felt called upon to supply le gislative refinements
more complex 1 0 and, because also

which made the basic law

new deviations were added,

yet new uncertainties and contro

versies emerged.
While those who sponsored the first modern act could not
have been expected

to antic ipate

the above shifts in standards

of judicial construction, they could have predicted that the then
constituted federal judiciary pr ovided a forum neither adequate

; New Colonial Ice Co.,

Inc. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 4 35 (19 34).
White v. u.s., 305 u.s. 281, 292 (19 38).
4 E.g., Helvering v. Horst, 311 u.s. 11 2 (1940); Higgins v. Smith,
But cf. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 u.s. 687
3 08 U.S. 473 (1940).
(1966).
5 U.S. v. Benedict, 338 u.s. 692, 696 (19 5 0) .
6 Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. U.S., 320 U.S. 422, 42
5 (1943),
reh. den . 320 U.S. 816 (1944).
7 Burnet v. Harmel, 28 7 u.s. 1 0 3, 1 1 0 (1932).
Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 u.s. 33 1, 334 (1945 ).
Higgins v. Smith, 3 08 u.s. 4 73 , 47 7 (1940).
1 0 E.g., I.R.C., §§ 6 1-6 8.
7
7
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nor

convenient

contr oversies
generate .

in which to resolve

which that and
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all the

uncertainties

succeeding acts

and

were certain to

Within a decade the Congress was forced to cr eate

a specialized independent tribunal
called the Tax Court),

(Board of T ax Appeals, now

both to pr ovide a means of resolving a

tremendous back-log of unres olved controversies and to permit
this to be accomplished with more convenience

to taxpayers,

i . e ., before they had to pay the contested portion of the tax. ll

But even with the addition of that tribunal, the conflict resolu
tion burden was more than the judic ial system
pected to accommodate .

Three years

could be

ex

after that tribunal

was

created, top policy- making officials concluded it was ne cessary
to adopt a compensating
certain

limitations,

ficials

were

geared,

if

the basis

directed

need be,
of their

nuisance values

administrative

procedure which, with

prevails to this day. 12
to

seek

to partial

concess ions

competing str engths

ignored by both.

Administrative of

administrative

As

and

by

"settle ments "
both

sides,

weaknesses,

on

with

the Unde r -Secretary

of

the Treasury described it:
• • • There
are any number of legal questions for which
there are no precedents , that are relatively unimportant, and
where it pays the Government to make concessions to the tax
payer if, in return, the taxpayer will make concessions to the
Government. In other words, we are applying, in the field of
tax administration, the ordinary business methods of adjusting
disputes, because we found that, both for the taxpayer and for
the Government, litigation is unsatisfactory and expensive.
Settlement methods tend to keep tax questions where they
belong : in the administration field, and tend to promote prompt
ness and finality. . . , 1 3

2.2 E volution of U. S. regulations program
T hough the Congress

which passed the

first

modern act

should have foreseen the ens uing substantial degree of uncer 
tainty and contr oversy

such

statutes

generate,

there

is

little

11 Prior thereto, to litigate an issue, the taxpayer had to pay the
entire contested amount and then sue for refund in either a federal
district court or the United States C ourt of Claims . Flora v. u.s., 35 7
U.S. 63 (1958), reh . 362 U.S. 145 (1960).
Refund suits in these two
forums still survive as alternative remedies to the litigate-first-pay
later remedy before the Tax Court.
See Chap. IV infra .
Indeed, out
side the income, estate, and gift tax areas, they are the sole remedies.
1 2 See Chap. m, § 3.4 infra .
13 Mills, " Federal Administration of Tax Law," 5 2 N.Y. State Bar

Assoc . Proc. 495, 503 (1929).
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to suggest it had any real inte ntion of sharing in any s ignificant
degree its rule- making function with administrator s .

It proba

bly believed that it was accommodating only otherwise unpr o 

vided for procedural requirements when, i n three different in

stances, 14 it required certain things to be acc omplished under

rules and re gulations pr escribed by the Commiss ioner with the
approval of the Secretary of the Treasury.
however,
what

on the substantive side,

might be described

as

narrowly focused

regulations .

When establishing a

depletion"

1916,

in

Three years later,

it did authorize the fir st of

legislative -type

"reas onable

it provided that

allowance

"such reasonable

for

allow 

ance " would be determined "under rules and regulations to be
That this
Treasury . " 15

prescribed by the Secretary of the

dele gation of legislative authority was upheld came as no sur 

prise; 16

the Supreme Court previously,

in non-tax areas,

had

s aid it was appropr iate for Congress, after indicating its "will, "
to

"give

to those

who were

to act under such general provi

sions 1p0Wer tO fill Up the detailS I, , , , r r 1 7
I n the next year,
were

1917,

added to a few other

similar legislative -type delegations
isolated substantive provisions . 18

And the se were supplemented by the following catch- all provi
sion which seemed broad enough to accommodate,

as

to the

whole code, both interpretative -type regulations and procedural
problems:
That the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the ap
proval of the Secretary of the Treasury, is hereby authorized
to make all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement
of the provisions of this Act. 19

In

the

years

immediately

limited concern was expressed

following,

only

in Congress

sporadic

re garding

and

its in

cr eas ing though still modest tendency to authorize is suance of
covering specific isolated areas. 20

legislative -type regulations

14 Rev. Act of 1913, §§ IIA, Subdiv. 2, liD, and liE. But cf an older
,
provision in the general law. Rev. Stat. § 3447 (1 87 5 ) .
15 Rev. Act o f 1 9 1 6 , § § 5 (a) Eighth, 6(a) Seventh, and 12 (a) Second.
Cf. § 8(g).
16 Burnet v. Thompson Oil & Gas Co. 2 8 3 u.s. 301 (1931).
1 7 u.s. v. Grimaud, 220 u.s. 5 06, 517 (1911).
18 E. . , Rev. Act of Oct. 3, 1917, §§ 205 (a) and 210.
g
19 Id. § 1005. Cj. Rev. Act of Mar. 3, 1917, § 207 .
2 0 For a fairly current compilation of specific delegations , see
Balter, "Relief from Abuse of Administrative Discretion," 46 Marq. L .
Rev. 176, 182 n . 27 (1962).
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Even a leader of the minority s ide of the sponsoring congres
s ional committee defended the practice, arguing that the language
of the bill in the se instances was "so obscure and almost non
understandable that somebody
minister ing its provis ions . " 21
Far greater
and on

ought to have discretion in ad 

concern was expressed repeatedly,

several counts,

regarding administrative

implementing the catch-all provision dealing with

type

regulations

and

rulings.

From the

however,

practices

in

interpretative 

re sponses to

these

concerns, emerged the main outlines of the pre sent regulations
program, the end product of which, as to the income tax,
could fill a volume of

3,000

pages at

400

The first such concern, exposed to light in
of the administration's own belief that its
not attain automatically the force

of law

now

words per page .

1921,

grew out

interpretations
merely

did

through the

process of be ing incorporated in regulations issued under this

It felt it was legally obligated not only to

general provision.

correct by amendment any previously issued regulation deemed
by it to contain an err oneous interpretation, but in consequence
to reopen all cases previously closed on the basis of the earlier
"err one ous" interpretation.
of taxpayers,

the

Frequently, from the vantage point

earlier ver sion,

characterized belatedly by

the administration as err oneous, proved to be the more favor 
able of the two.
the bas is

But the practice of reopening these cases on

of the later interpretation was defended by

ministr ation before a congress ional committee
that a

mere administrative officer

but ordinarily

as

a

the ad 
on the grounds

not only legally could not,

matter of policy should not,

be permitted

"to waive a tax le gally imposed"

(i. e . ,

imposed by the statute

itself when properly interpreted) .

It added, however, that Con

gr ess itself might want to make room for a limited exception,
by adopting a procedure

enabling the administration to

avoid

any "great hardship " resulting from belated administrative r e 
Congress
vision of interpretative regulations o r rulings. 2 2

proceeded to adopt such an arr angement, 23 the modern statutory
counterpart of which 24 per mits the administration- within its
discr etion-to fix the extent to which
applied

without retroactive effect.

any regulation

In currently

is

to be

implementing

21 Statement of Senator Walsh, 61 Cong. Rec. 6 5 7 6 (1921).
22 Notes on the Revenue Act of 1 918, submitted
by the Secretary of
the Treasury to the Committee on Ways and Means, 48-49 (1919).
23 Rev. Act of 1921, § 1 314.
24 I.R .C., § 80 (b).
7 5
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this discretion, the administration according to a top offic ial 
has

tried

to

pr inciples .

confor m

to

Amendments

three

sometimes -difficult-to- apply

which actually

change

the thr ust

of

the regulations to the detriment of taxpayers are made pro 
spective only. 25
Where such a change is of benefit to tax
payers,

it is applied retroactively to all open years .

the practice

also where

the

amendment deals

not previously covered or clarifies an ambiguity
ously issued regulation. 26
In

1924,

was made,

This is

with a matter
in the previ

just three years after the above statutory change

certain congressional quarters

administration's

interpretative regulations

complained that the
actually tended,

on

the whole,

to stretch the statutory law to the disadvantage of
taxpayers. 27
The House proposed to attack this problem by

adding to the general author ization a limitation which pr ovided
that

"such regulations

shall not enlarge or modify any provi

sions of this act . " 28
The Senate, however, rej ected the pro
posed amendment 29 after be ing assured by the Chairman of the
Senate Finance Committee that no administrative off icial could
ever

"make any rule or any regulation in violation

itself with any binding force . " 30

Of

course,

of the law

literally neither

this comment nor the proposed amendment were responsive to
the only real and infinitely more subtle question:
tent should the

administration's

garding a statutory

ambiguity

gain additional

incorporated in its own regulations ?
question-the subject matter of
the Congress itself almost
own effort to contain,

view

re 

we ight because

In the end,

while this

infra-was left to the courts,

immediately began to

by a flanking manuever,

would have been a larger
rule making.

2.4

To what ex

own interpretative

potential range for

step

up

its

what otherwise
administrative

It began to supplement newly proposed statutory

25 Rogovin, " The Four R' s :
Regulations, Rulings, Reliance and
Retroactivity," 4 3 Taxes 75 6, 7 62 (1965 ) .
This was not always ad
E. g., see Manhattan General Equipment
hered to at an earlier time.
Co. v. Commissioner, 29 7 u.s. 129 (1936).
Further, if the earlier
regulation itself was a reasonable interpretation, retroactive change
may be beyond the Commissioner' s power. Helvering v. R . J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. , 306 U.S. 1 1 0 (1939),
26 E. g ., see Helvering v. Reynolds, 31 3 u.s. 428 (1941).
2 7 See Statements of Representative Deal and Senator McKellar, 65
Cong. Rec . 3333 and 7 140 (1924).
28 6 5 Cong. Rec. 3334 (1924).
29 Id. at 140.
7
30 Id. at 141. Statement of Senator Smoot.
7
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with more fully developed congre s s ional committee

reports which clar ified and reflected more precisely the inten
tion to be attributed to otherwise ambigious statutory terms .
Both then 31 and now, 32 courts deemed state ments in such r e 
ports, explic itly revealing the congr ess ional intention, t o b e of
controlling importance in interpreting the statute .

2.3 E volution of U. S. private and published rulings programs
Almost coincident with the foregoing 1924 debate pertaining
to

administrative

tendencies

in drafting regulations

the first public expression of

appeared

a frequently recurr ing congr e s 

sional concern regarding pr ivate rulings

which,

at that time,

could be obtained by individual taxpayers only from the National
Office and then only as to completed transactions . 33
At an

earlier point, in 1919, the administration had begun to publish
some of these, 34 though with names and other identifying char 

acteristics

omitted .

However,

in

1924

a

c ongress ional

sub

committee then investigating tax administration 35 observed that

most pr ivate rulings remained secret.

It contended that uni 

form treatment of all taxpayers could be assured only if all
these rulings were published. 36 Apparently, it was in re sponse
to this charge and contention that the

tax

administration pub 

licly committed itself to publish, after nece ssary revision, all
rulings of general interest having precedent value . 37
Two
years later,

however,

with this commitment.

the Senate

indicated

it

was not content

This was not j ust because the adminis 

tration had failed to fulfill its own pledge .

Interested Senator s

recognized that the nature of that commitment actually left the

31

McLean v. u.s., 226 u.s. 37 4 (1942).
32 Commis sioner v. Bilder, 369 U.s. 499 (1962). The report issued
by the Senate Finance Committee in connection with the major statutory
revision in 1954 contained 614 pages.
s. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong. ,
2d Sess. (1954).
33 Mim. 2 880, Cumulative Bulletin [hereinafter cited as
C .B.] 1-1,
400 (19 21).
34 C .B. 1-1 (1919).
35 Pursuant to S. Res. 168, 68th Cong., 1st Sess . , Mar. 12, 1924. See
65 Cong. Rec. 4014-4023 (1924).
36 Hearings before the Senate Select Committee on Investigation of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, 68th Cong., 30-31, 5 6-5 7 (1924) and
more generally discussed in 3630-3661 (1925).
For a more complete
statement justifying publication, see s. Rep. No. 27, 69th Cong., 1st
Sess. 229-234 (1926).
37 See fly-leaf, C .B . III- 1 (1924).
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administration free, in any given case,

to turn the question of

publication on the often all too s ubtle difference between what
is a new pre cedent and what is merely a new application of a
previously published precedent. 38 In an attempt to force pub 
lication of both new precedents and new applications of earlier
published precedents, the Senate
general provision,

passed an amendment to the

requiring the Commiss ioner to

rules, practices, principles, and formulas

applied

"publish all
or

in the interpretation and application of any revenue act
A conference committee,
chambers,

dr ained this

composed of representative s

followed
u 39

.

•

.

.

of both

of much of its vitality by reducing

it

to two words 40 which, upon subsequent enactment, required the
Commissioner "to prescribe
re gulations

and publish all needful rules and
4
for the enfor cement of this act. " 1
Nevertheless,

the administration itself also continued, in the fly-leaf of each
Cumulative

Bulletin thereafter

published,

earlier self-assumed comm itment. 4 2

1953,

to

repeat

its

own

Years later, however, in

the administration openly acknowledged to

a second in

vestigating subcommittee that it had not lived up to this com 
mitment; proportionately, of the precedent-type rulings issued,
"very few" had been published .4 3
Senior administr ative offi 
c ials agreed, however , that this failure was not i n the interest
of wise

tax administration,

tion. 44

The number published annually the n j umped from

in the preceding year,

ning in

under

1960,

however,

1952,

and promised
t o a peak o f

immediate correc

801

in

a sharp decline set in;

1955.

115

Begin

only 3 8 8 - well

percent of the pr ivate substantive rulings issued-were
published in 1 964. 4 5
By then, because many outs ide the gov

5

ernment felt that federal agencies
38

in general

held back from

Hearings, Rev. Act of 1926, Senate Finance Committee, 69th Cong. ,
1st Sess. 93-96 and 1 36-14 5 (1926).
67 Cong. Rec . 3879 (1925).
H. Rep. No . 356, 6 9th Cong., 1 st Sess. 55 (1926).
4 1 Rev. Act of 1926, § 1 1 01 . Italics added.
42 E
. g., see fly-leaf, C .B. 1951-2 (1952).
43 Hearings on Administration of the Internal Revenue Laws Before
a Subcommittee of the House C ommittee on Ways and Means, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1340 (19 5 3) .
44 Jd . at 1564 .
Also, Hearings on Administration of the Internal
Revenue Laws Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Ways
and Means, 83d Cong. , 2 d Sess. 51 (1954) .
45 Of course, many of the private rulings had no precedent value.
See note 5 0 infra .
Nevertheless, to assure accuracy and integrity of
the private rulings program, and to acquaint Congress with the manner
in which the Commissioner exercised his interpretative function, a bill

!�
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the public far more information than could be justified, a statu
tory remedy was being sought 46 - a so- called "Freedom of In
formation Act . "

For a var iety of reasons, includ ing the argu 

ment that the proposals would require publication of all pr ivate
rulings, and thus cr ipple the latter program, 47 the tax admin
istration opposed these efforts . 4 8
I n 1966, however, one such

proposal was enacted by Congr e s s . 49

While

the intent

of the

act was clear, to increase public knowledge and access to ma
terial not theretofore available, the language of the act was
not. 50 In consequence, the tax administration now argue s that,
to determine

congr ess ional intention,

recourse

must be made

to the relevant congress ional committee reports.

And to sup

port the propos ition that it need not publish all private letter
rulings, 51 it relies on the following statement in the sponsor 
ing committe e 's report:

• • • under
§ 1160, an agency may not be required to make
available for public inspection and copying any advisory in
terpretation on a specific set of facts which is requested by
and addressed to a particular person, provided that such in
terpretation is not cited or relied upon by any officer or
employee of the agency as a precedent in the disposition of
other cases • . • , 5 2

(footnote continued)
intro duced but not enacte d in 1965 would have required the administra
tion to publish within ten days all rulings involving potential tax lia
bilities exceeding $100,000, S. 2 047, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). See
Statement of Senator Gore, 111 Cong. Rec. 1 1 810, 11 814 (1965).
46 See S. 1 666, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963),
47 See Statement of G . d' Andelot Belin, Hearings before the Sub
committee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 88th C ong. , 1st Sess. 1 76 and 268 (1963)
and id . 88th Cong. , 2 d Sess. 168, 1 7 7E (1964).
48 Ibid. Also see Statement of E dwin Rains in hearings before the
same subcommittee, op . cit. supra note 47, 89th Cong. , 1st Sess. 30
(1965) and Treasury Department exhibit, id. at 441 .
49 Pub. Law 89-487, 80 Stat. 2 5 0 (1966).
50 See Panel Discussion on Freedom of Information Act, XX Bulle
tin, Taxation Section, A.B.A., No. 3, 43 (April 1 9 67) ; Bennett, "The
Freedom of Information Act, Is It a Clear Public Records Law ? "
34
Brooklyn L . Rev. 72 (1967) ; Sexton, "New Law Changes Rules on What
Information IRS Must Disclose ; C onfusion Likely," 2 6 J. Taxation 120
(1967).
51 See Panel Discussion, op . cit. supra note 50, Statements of
Messrs. Rogovin and Uretz.
Also, Uretz, "Freedom of Information
and the IRS," 20 Ark . L . Rev. 2 83 (1967).
52 H. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2 d Sess. 7 (1966).
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A

sec ond

prospective

major problem

transactions .

in

In

the

1921,

a

rulings

area

concerned

Commiss ioner had ex

plained that the administration was not equipped to do
than

"advise

aris ing out of

more

taxpayers

past

pr omptly of their present liabilities
transactions . " 5 3 In 1938, however, to avoid

delay or abandonment of legitimate transactions because of tax
uncertainties, both the Treasury 54 and a congress ional sub
comm ittee 55 proposed to e mpower the Commissioner to issue
binding advance rulings on prospective transactions where this
appeared to be in the interest of wise tax administration.
Congress, however, substituted the more cumbersome
closing agreement arrangement,

The

bilateral

with the signature of at least

an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury being required in each
case. 5 6 Sharp r ate increases and the explosion of the economy
accompanying

the

enormous increase
To

outbreak

of

in requests

meet the demand,

the

World War II
for

administration-acting

initiative -substituted the less cumbersome
ruling

arrangement.

By

re sulted

these closing

the

1 9609s,

on

unilateral

the

in an

agreements .

number

its

own

advance 
annually

of which about 10, 000 in
volved substantive income tax questions . 57
Generally speaking,

processed

always exceeded

30,000,

none of these involved either

factual questions or tr ansactions

53
Mim. 2880, C .B. I-1 400 (1921). Italics added.
54 Statement of Under-Secretary of the Treasury, Hearings Before
the House Committee on Ways and Means, 75th Cong. , 3d Sess. 109
(1938).
55 Report of a Subcommittee of the Committee on Ways and Means ,
7 5th Cong., 3d Sess. 55 and 79 (1938).
5 6 Rev. Act of 1938, § 802.
The statute itself no longer requires
the signature of such a high official. I.R.C., § 7121.
57 E.g., see C ommissioner of Internal Revenue, Annual Report 1966,
6.
A large proportion of the balance are requests for permission to
change accounting methods or years for federal tax purposes . Further,
of the 10,000 requests for substantive income tax rulings, not all spring
from known doubts or real interpretative issues ; in effect, some simply
request what is tantamount to an "insurance policy" to protect the
taxpayer-because of the large sums involved-from unanticipated or
unrecognized doubts or uncertainties.
For conflicting views regarding
the propriety of this practice, see Rogovin, op . cit. supra note 25,
Finally, a majority of the 1 0 , 000 actually concerned
at 7 65 n. 48.
exempt organizations. Quite apart from this, however, district offices
issued 14,330 determination letters to organizations seeking exemp
tions, 15,515 determination letters affirming qualification of pension
and profit sharing plans covering employees, and 7 , 231 determination
letters covering pension plans for self-employed persons.
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well

publicized

practice renders both ineligible . 5 8

administrative

Finally, there is a difference between pr ivate and published
rulings

re garding

thereon.

the extent

to

which

taxpayers

may

rely

Implicit in the first public announcement that the

National Office would issue pr ivate rulings on prospe ctive
transactions, 59 was a limitation-later expressly stated 6 0 _to
the effect that a pr ivate ruling issued to a taxpayer on a par
ticular

transaction applied, generally speaking,

transaction and to that particular

taxpayer .

only

to

that

In other words,

the government expressly sought to exclude the poss ibility that
such a ruling could be relied upon e ither by the same taxpayer
as

to other

volved,

similar

say,

transactions

in the same

or

industry. 61

by

other

taxpayers

in

It acknowledged, how

ever, that the limitation would be appropriately adjusted where
the ruling itself expressly either covered a serie s of identical
transactions,

as

in the

case

of a taxpayer 's

covered all parties to a given transaction,
has

tax,

or

It is only be cause this limita

of two or more corporations .
tion ordinarily

excise

such as a merger

been respe cted by the

courts 6 2

that the

National Office

has been willing to permit the great majority
of these rulings to be issued by its own j unior staff officials 6 3
- an absolute

reasonably
reque sts . 64

essential

timely

if it

manner

is

the

to accommodate
tremendous

in an even

number

In contrast to the limited r ange

of

such

attributed to

a

58 See §§
2.13 and 2.15 infra .
59 Rev. Rul. 54-172, C .B . 1954-1, 394.
6 0 Rev. Proc. 62-28, C.B. 1962-2, 496, superseded by Rev. Proc.
67-1.1 Internal Revenue Bulletin [ hereinafter cited as I.R.B.] 1967-1, 5 .
6 .1 France, on the other hand, tends to issue rulings on prospective
transactions only to industrial, trade, professional, or labor groups.
See Chapter XIV, § 2.7 infra .
62 E. g ., Goodstein v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1959).
But cf. International Business Machines C orp. v. u.s., 343 F.2d 914
(Ct. Cl. 1965).
63 See Rogovin, op . cit. supra note 2 5 .
Within the National Office ,
more than 75% are issued at the Branch level; proportionately few go
above the higher Division level, and not over 2% are reviewed by the
legal staff in the Chief C ounsel's Office. For a more detailed break
down, see Caplin, "Taxpayer Rulings Policy of the Internal Revenue
Service," N.Y.U. 20th Inst . on Fed. Tax. 1, 28 (19 6 2).
64 Even so, of those issued in fiscal 1965, 58% took from two to six
months, and of these almost one-third took more than six months.
Rogovin, op . cit. supra note 25, at 767 n. 59,
Not all of this delay
is due, however, to excess inventory coupled with the actual time taken
to resolve a given question; initial submissions by taxpayers often are
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private ruling,

the above mentioned public announce ment made

it equally clear that the

more

carefully processed published

rulings were addre ssed to all taxpayers .
quence,

that

a given

ruling applying the

taxpayer

principles

"need not
of the

reque st a

published

facts of the taxpayer's particular case
cable . r r 65
However,

It added, in conse 

specific

ruling to the

where otherwise appli

such a taxpayer does assume

some risk,

apart

from that ne cessarily involved in determining whether the prin
ciple of a given published ruling applies to his own facts .

Not

all of the 14, 7 7 6 substantive rulings p ublished since 1 91 9 con
tinue

to have vitality .

Some

expressly

modified or reversed

earlier one s .

Others, however, have been affe cted b y subs e 
quent legislation, 6 6 regulations, o r court decis ions without any
attempt by

the Service

to alert taxpayers

And,

to this fact.

thus, the taxpayer assumes the risk.
tice

governing

each taxpayer

the published
the

burden

In other words, the prac 
rulings program 67 imposes on

of determining

whether

any

such

events affected an earlier published ruling on which
proposes to rely in consummating a transaction. 68
In

subsequent

he

theory, to overcome the particular hazard implicit in this prac 
tice, he need only research and carefully analyze relevant de 
cisions, etc.,

post-dating

that published ruling.

But no matter how carefully a taxpayer researched a que s 
tion, he still could not protect himself
a

if,

transaction in reliance on that ruling,

thereafter
change

changed

its

having consummated
the

administration

interpretative pos ition and applied the

retroactively to his

case.

In consequence,

statutory limitations on its authority,

given the

the administration itself

has stretched a long way in trying to minimize this risk.
type of protection it accords differs slightly,

however,

The

as be 

tween the two different types of rulings.

(footnote continued)
inadequate, and thus delay the ruling until adequately supplemented.
See Rose, "The Rulings Program of the Internal Revenue Service," 35
Taxes 907 (1957),
6 5 Rev. Rul. 54-172, C .B. 1954-1, 394, 401.
66 E. g ., of the 14,776 rulings issued between 1919 and 1965, 9,234
were issued before the revision of the code in 1954.
67 See Rev. Rul. 54-172, C .B. 1954-2, 394, 401 ; Rev. Proc. 62-28,
C .B. 1962-2, 496, 5 06,
. 68 In 1967, the administration announced that it planned to re-examine
all pre- 1954 rulings, to the end of identifying publicly those it deems
to be obsolete.
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Relevant to the sweep of the protection accorded in the
case of

private

rul ings

is the fact that the tax administration,

without congressional bless ing, itself extended this program to
prospective transactions at the beginning of World War II.

This

action was taken in spite of the fact that the statute itself, en
acted

immediately

prior

thereto,

literally

author ized the ad

m inistration to bind itself only by bilateral clos ing agree 
ments. 69 However, at an earlier time when the National Office
confined rulings to completed transactions,

a previously men

tioned statute , giving the Commiss ioner discretion to prescribe
the extent a regulation would be applied without retr oactive
effect, 70 was amended so as literally to include also "any
ruling. " 71
In the first public announcement e xtending the pri 
vate rulings program t o prospe ctive transactions, the admini s 

tration sought in two ways t o reconcile the two foregoing statu 
tory provis ions :

first,

ruling retroactively,
policy" was

not

by asserting

and

to do

so

sec ond,

by

its

r ight to revoke

declaring

its

any

"general

(absent a retroactive change in the

law itself) if the taxpayer had c onsummated a prospective trans 
action in good faith reliance on the ruling and retroactive revo
cation would be to his detriment. 7 2
As applied to a s ituation
of this type,

the administration

later

sought to strengthen the

image of its so- called

"general policy, " by noting that devia
tions would be limited to "rare and unusual circumstanc e s . " 73
As to modifications of earlier published rulings,
public announce ment mentioned above

to be an even more sweeping immunity, for
attached

expressly

to the asserted

the

first

laid down what appeared

no

"general

conditions were
practice

of the

69 That the administration has the power to revoke both published
and private rulings retroactively is not open to serious question.
Dixon v . U.S., 381 U.S. 68 (1965) ; Automobile Club of Michigan v.
Commissioner, 35 3 U.S. 180 (1957) ; Helvering v. Reynolds, 31 3 U.S.
For one exception regarding excise taxes, see Rev. Act
428 (1941).
of 1926, § 1108(b) and Treas. Reg. § 601 . 2 01 (1) (8).
Also cj. Interna
tional Business Machines v. u.s. , 343 F.2d 914 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
70 Rev. Act of 1 921, § 1314, now I.R . C . , § 7 805 (b).
71 Rev. Act of 1934, § 506, amending Rev. Act of 1926, § 1108(a).
Italics added.
72 Rev. Rul. 54-172, C.B. 1954-1, 394, 401.
The limitation would
not apply, of course, if the taxpayer had misrepresented the trans
action.
73 Rev. Rul. 62-28, C .B. 1962-2, 496, 5 05 . An administration hardly
could go beyond this, given the fact that C ongress expected each Com
missioner to exercise discretion in each case.
See Caplin, op . cit.
supra note 63, at 21.
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Service to make such revocation or modification prospective
Presumably, a taxpayer favor ed by an earlier pub
only . , 7 4
lished ruling would be

pr otected

whether

or

not he actually

had relied on that ruling to his detr iment, such as by reliance
There

thereon before entering into a prospective transaction.

is nothing to suggest that the administration meant to change
this policy when, in a later substitute announcement, it put the
matter differently, saying that such rulings "ordinarily are not

revoked or modified retroactively. " 75

That taxpayers place considerable

reliance

on the policy

not to revoke retroactively either type of ruling is evident from
the fact that, in fiscal 1964, only four asked for closing agree 
ments, 7 6 in contrast to the thousands who se cured pr ivate rul
ings or relied on published rulings .

2 . 4 Weight normally accorded U. S. interpretative regulations
and published rulings
Related to the matter
tion:

just considered

is a br oader

ques 

just how much stature does an administrative interpreta

tion gain from the mere fact, in a given case,

it is housed in

an interpr etative regulation or rul ing pre viously published by
the National

Office ?

Field pers onne l

would be bound, of course,
cal control.7 7
T axpayers,

however,

examine

on challenging

these before the independent judiciary,
to a different view.

who

returns

by both -as a matter of hierar chi
find

that

either

of

it subscribes

T o re gulations, it attaches substantial but

not binding s ignificance, 7 8

and ordinarily even this is not ex

tended to rulings as such.

74 Rev. Rul. 54-1 7 2 , C .B . 1 954-l, 3 94, 401 .
75 Rev. Rul. 62-28, C .B. 1962-2, 496, 5 06 (1962).
That a top offi
cial thought no such change was contemplated, see Rogovin, op . cit.
supra note 25 , at 7 69.
7 6 Rogovin, op. cit . supra note 25, at 77 0.
77 As to the limited power of certain regional officials, on exercis
ing their "settlement" function, to compromise private rulings , see
Chap, Ill, § 3.4 infra .
7 8 For comprehensive early discus sions regarding the effect of
regulations, see Eisenstein, "The Clifford Regulations and the Heavenly
City of Legislative Intention," 2 Tax L . Rev . 32 7 (194 7 ) ; G riswold, "A
Summary of the Regulations Problem, 11 54 Harv , L . Rev. 398 (1941) ;
Surrey, "The Scope and Effect of Treasury Regulations Under the In
come, E state, and Gift Taxes," 88 U. Pa . L . Rev. 55 6 (1940).
For a
less comprehensive but more recent analysis , see Rogovin, op . cit.
supra note 2 5 , at 7 59 .
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is that an interpretative regu
ambiguous

statute,

ordinarily

entitled to "respectful consideration, , 7 9 indeed, to "great
we ight, r r 80 and that an "assertion of its invalidity must be pre 
is

dicated either upon its be ing incons istent with the statutes or
Depend
its be ing in itself unreas onable or inappropr iate . " 81
ing on the circumstances,
more

the Court has relied upon one

or

of three different rationale s to justify this special sig 

nificance.

The first

involves

the c ir cumstances

original pr omulgation of
rently,

they

which

surround the

most but not all r egulations.

Cur 

are drafted shortly after a statute is e nacted,

in-service

personnel who also

gressional

committee s

worked

closely with the

through which the

by

con

bill was processed

(furnishing drafting assistance both as to it and the committe e s '
explanatory reports ) . 82
Given their intimate acquaintance with
the specific congress ional purposes,

their "wide experience in

tax matters, " 8 3 and the administration's own general " 'respon
s ibility of setting

•

.

•

[ the ]

machinery

in

motion,

of

making

the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet un
tried and new, ' " 84 their "contemporaneous construction" 85 of
the statute undoubtedly warrants the respectful consideration it
enjoys.

Of course,

not survive

a regulation though conte mporaneous

if deemed inconsistent with a

statute

will

not thought

7 9 Fawcus Machine Co. v. u.s., 282 u.s. 37 5 , 37 8 (1931 ) .
80 See Koshland v. Helvering, 298 u.s. 441, 445 (1936).
81 U.S. v. Morehead, 243 u.s. 60 , 614 (191 ).
The Court has not
7
7
always been careful to note a distinction between legislative and inter
pretative regulations; it even suggested in Koshland v. Helvering, 298
u.s. 441, 446 (1936) that they were governed by the "same principle."
Elsewhere, however, it has indicated that the special delegation of
power associated with legislative-type regulations provides "added
reasons why
regulations under it should not be overruled by Courts
unless clearly contrary to the will of Congress."
Commissioner v.
South Texas Lumber Co., 333 u.s. 496, 5 03 (1948).
82 Indeed the division of the Service's legal staff housing draftsmen
of income tax regulations is called the "Legislation and Regulations
Division."
Further, policy reviews are performed by lawyers in the
Office of the T ax Legislative Counsel-a constituent of the Treasury
Department.
83 C olgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. U.S., 320 U.S. 422, 426 (1943).
84 Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. u.s., 2 88 u.s. 294, 315 (1933)
quoted with approval in U.S, v. Leslie Salt C o . , 350 U.S. 383, 396
(1956).
85 Fawcus Machine Co. v. U.S., 282 U.S, 37 5, 37 8 (1931).
Italics
added.
.
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to be ambiguous . 86 Conversely, the fact a given regulatory
interpretation was not promulgated contemporaneously with en
actment of the statute is not in itself necessarily fatal to its
claim for respectful consideration; 87 a second or third rationale
may be invoked to justify attributing substantial weight to it.
The second possible j ustification is bottomed on the Supreme
Court's long-standing conviction that uniform application of tax
laws is one of the positive goals warranting encouragement.
The implementation by the Court of this conviction began when
long before the first modern income tax act was passed - it
stated with respect to a tax regulation, in force for many
years:
But when there has been a long acquiescence in a
regulation, and by it rights of parties for many years have
been determined and adjusted, it is not to be disregarded
without the most cogent and persuasive reasons. 88
•

•

•

According to this theory, in any given case, the extent to which
the previous uninterrupted life span of a regulation will tip the
j udicial scales in favor of the regulatory interpretation neces 
sarily is affected by the relative length of that life span. That
the regulation will benefit substantially from this argument
where the period is forty years 89 hardly means that it will
benefit in like degree if only a relatively few years are in
volved.90
But again, that a given regulation has been out
standing only a relatively short time when first challenged,
does not mean it will have no special significance . Though
challenged promptly, it may be entitled to special we ight by
reference to the first-mentioned rationale, i.e ., because the
regulation reflected the construction of experts contemporaneous
with the enactment of the statutory provision. 91 Or it may
derive special weight from a third r ationale 92 which is of such
a nature, however, that-as a practical matter - it is more likely
to serve only as a complementary factor adding yet further
86 U.S. v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351 (1957) ; Koshland v. Helvering,
298 u.s. 441 (1935).
87 Lykes v. U.S., 343 U . S , 11 8 (1952).
88 Robertson v. Downing, 127 U.S. 607, 613 (1888),
89 Cammarano v. U . S . , 358 U . S . 498 (1959),
90 U.S, v. Calamaro, 354 U ,S, 351 (1957).
91 Colgate- Palmolive-Feet Co. v. U.S., 320 U . S , 422 (1943). Cf. the
fate of a belated amendment in u . s . v. Leslie ·salt Co. , 350 U.S. 383
(1956).
92 Lykes v. u.s., 343 U.S. 11 8 (1952).
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weight to regulations otherwise entitled to respectful consid
eration because of their fairly long life .
This third rationale emerged out of the High Court's con
viction that taxation is essentially statutory in character; there 
fore it is not too much to expect Congress, having itself ex
pressly authorized regulations, to exercise -perhaps "through
its committees " 93 -some measure of legislative oversight, to
which the judiciary could then attach significance. Even at a
point before the first modern income tax statute was adopted,
the foregoing premise had led the Supreme Court to the follow
ing conclusion:
. . . And we have decided that the re-enactment by Con
gre ss , without change, of a statute, which had p reviously re
ceived long continued executive construction, is an adoption by
Congress of such construction. 94

This rationale proved to be of particular significance to the
host of regulatory interpretations promulgated during the first
twenty-five -year period (191 3 - 1 93 8) immediately following adop 
tion of the first modern income tax act. In that period, each
Congress-usually on a biennial basis -re-enacted the whole of
the income tax law, making only such changes as it deemed
appropr iate . Thus, by reference to the above -quoted theory,
any regulation promulgated during the early part of that period
was certain to derive great vitality from the consequent re 
peated re -enactments of the underlying statutory provision. 95
The added possibility that, in the interval between re-enact
ments, a regulation actually was challenged by taxpayers but
sustained by the lower courts, served only to reinforce the
Supreme Court's conviction that Congress, upon re-enactment,
should be deemed to have acquiesced in the earlier regulatory
interpretation. 96
In 1939 the environmental setting changed drastically .
Congress adopted a permanent tax code, the intention being
that this law would survive ad infinitum .
Each subsequent
Congress, instead of making isolated revisions in the course
of an otherwise wholesale re -enactment, was expected to do
93 See Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 308 U.S, 389, 399 (1940).
94 U.S. v. Cerecedo Hermanos y Compania, 209 U.S, 337, 339 (1908).

Italics added.
95 U.S. v. Leslie Salt Co., 350 U.S, 383 (1956); Commissioner v.
Flowers, 326 U.S, 465 (1946).
96 Cammarano v. U.S., 358 U,S. 498 (1959).
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nothing more than amend the particular statutory prov1S1ons
warranting change . Not until 19 54 did Congress again r e -enact
the whole code in the course of a maj or revision.
T he vitality which pre - 1 939 regulatory interpretations de 
rived from the biennial re-enactments of the pre - 1 939 period
survived, of course, the codifications in 1939 and 1 954, pro
vided the underlying statutory provision itself remained un..,
changed . However, the 1939 change in congressional procedure
regarding tax legislation did pose the threat that newly pro
mulgated post-1939 interpretations would have no chance to
benefit from this third alternative rationale, and would have to
justify their claim to substantial weight solely by reference to
one or both of the two rationales first discussed. This threat
did not materialize at once, however . For a time, a divided
Supreme Court appeared willing to go a long way in reshaping
its "re -enactment" theory to accommodate this environmental
change. In one case, the Court attributed "substantial weight"
to a post - 1 93 9 regulation though the underlying statutory pro
vision had not been re -enacted even once . It observed that,
after the regulation had been issued, Congress had amended
many provisions of the code without amending the particular
statutory provision interpreted by this regulation. 97 From this
congressional inaction, a majority of the Court apparently was
prepared to presume congressional acquiescence to the regu 
latory interpretation. More recently, however, it appears that
the Court has become more sensitive to reality and intends at
least to back away from so sweeping a view regarding con
gressional acquiescence.
Indeed, as to a post- 1 9 54 taxable
year of one taxpayer , the Court refused to apply the re -enact
ment theory even to a regulation which had been promulgated
three years before the 1 954 code was substituted for the 1 9 3 9
code . It reasoned as follows :
The regulation had been in effect for only three years,
and there is nothing to indicate that it was ever called to the
attention of Congress . The re-enactment of § 3290 in the 1954
Code was not accompanied by any congressional discussion
which throws light on its intended scope. In such circum
stances, we consider the 1 954 re-enactment to be without
significance. 9 8
•

.

•

97 Lykes v. U.S., 343 u . s . 1 1 8, 127 (1952).
Also see Costanzo v .
Tillinghast, 2 87 U.S. 341 (1932) ; McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate C o. ,
2 8 3 u.s. 4 8 8 (19 31) .
9 8 u.s. v. Calamaro, 354 U.s. 351, 359 (1957). Cf. Commissioner
v. A cker, 361 u.s. 87 (1959).
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This, of course, represented just a retrenchment, not an aban
donment of the re -enactment theory. 99 And it left completely
unaffected the vitality of either of the first two previously dis 
cussed reasons which courts have invoked to justify special
consideration for an interpretative regulation. Observe further
that in fact both these reasons would support most currently
existing interpretative regulations, and that the first of them
alone would warrant respectful consideration of future regula
tions if promulgated more or less contemporaneously with new
statutory amendments .
However, this latter justification (that the interpretation is
contemporaneous, and is made by expert officials whose agency
is responsible for enforcement and who worked closely with
the legislative processing of the underlying provision) would
seldom if ever warrant special consideration for the usual
published ruling, as distinguished from the typical regulation.
Most published rulings, as well as the private rulings from
which they e merge, are issued long after, not more or less
coincident with, adoption of the relevant statutory provision,
and are drafted by personnel who did not work with the con
gressional committees at the earlier point when the statutory
provision was being processed . 100 Moreover, Treasury offi
cials (as distinguished from those of the Internal Revenue
Service), to whom Congress assigned final administrative au
thority in the case of interpretative regulations, 1 01 ordinarily
make no review of a private ruling and at best assume only a
modest role regarding published versions .1 02
These differ 
ences undoubtedly contributed to the Service 's initial position,
expre ssed in its first volume of published rulings, that the
latter were intended to reflect only "the trend and tendency of
official opinion in the administration of the income and profits
tax provisions of the Revenue Acts. The rulings have none of
the force or effect of Treasury Decisions [ i.e., regulations ]
99 Fribourg N avigation Co., Inc. v. C ommissioner, 383
(1966).
100 While the published version ordinarily is reviewed by

u.s.

272

the Chief
C ounsel's Office, the review is carried out by the Interpretative Divi
sion, not by the Legislation and Regulations Division which drafted the
re lations.
01 I.R . C . , § 7 805.
102 The Treasury receives a syllabus of proposed published rulings,
and even this just immediately prior to publication.
Its attention is
called specifically only to published rulings involving policy issues of
a high order. See Rogovin, op . cit. supra note 25, at 766 n. 50.

f8:
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and do not commit the Department [ i.e ., the Treasury ] to any
interpretation of law which has not been formally approved and
promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury. n 103 Implicit in
this was the suggestion that the government itself ordinarily
did not expect courts -- by reference at least to the circum 
s tances exis ting at the point a ruling was published-to give
any greater weight to a published ruling than that accorded a
brief submitted by the government at the point of litigation.
Later, however, the Commissioner did seek to induce the
Supre me Court to extend the re -enactment theory to published
rulings . The facts involved a ruling published between adop 
tion of the 1921 and 1 924 acts and applied by him in interpret
ing a provision in the latter which was common to both. The
court refused, however, to apply the re -enactment theory to
this situation, partly because of the government's own previ
ously published disclaimer limiting the intended significance of
published rulings . It stated:
The Commissioner' s suggestion that, by retaining the same
definition in the 1924 Act, Congress approved the construction
for which he contends is without merit. The definition had not
been construed in any Treasury Decision [ i . e . , in a regula
tion] , by the Board of Tax Appeals or by any court prior to
that enactment. . . . The rulings, I. T . 1 37 9, 1660 and 1 889,
cited by the Commissioner were made before the passage of
the 1924 Act but they "have none of the force or effect of
Tre asury Decisions and do not commit the Department to any
interpretation of the law." See cautionary notice published in
the bulletins containing these rulings. It does not appear that
the attention of C ongress had been called to any such con
struction.
There is no ground on which to infer that by the
1924 Act Congress intended to approve it. 1 04

Later efforts to induce the High Court to reconsider the
applicability of the r e -enactment theory to published rulings
always originated with taxpayers, not with the Commissioner .
In each such instance, a taxpayer challenged an assessment
which conflicted with a previously published ruling, claimed by
him to have achieved irrevocable vitality through congressional
acquie scence . With the parties thus reversed, twice the High
Court seemed to find some attraction in the taxpayer 's posi
tion, as distinguished from its own earlier view as quoted
above .
In both cases however, it first expressed its own
103 Fly-leaf, C ,B. 1-1 (1919).
1 04 Helvering v. New York Trust Co. , 292 U.S. 455, 468 (1934).
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conviction that the initial published rulings properly interpreted
the act; then, by way of dictum, it merely added that Congress '
repeated re-enactment of the underlying provision indicated its
acquiescence also to that administrative interpretation.105
This dictum has not yet "blossomed into full fruition. "
However, a favorable environment for this was not provided
by the cases subsequently arising before the High Court. In
each such case except the most recent, the Court's own con
viction, regarding the correctness of the ruling itself, was op 
posite to that reached in the two cases just described. In other
words, in the subsequent situations, the initial published ruling
each taxpayer sought to sustain was believed by the Court to
reflect a clearly erroneous interpretation of the act. After
expressing this conviction, the Court was to add that only in
extreme c ircumstances could such rulings, of "less dignity "
than regulations, be saved by the re-enactment theory. In one
case, it put the matter as follows :
. . . Unless the administrative practice is long continued
and substantially uniform in the Bureau and without challenge
by the Government in the Board and courts, it should not be
assumed, from rulings of this class, that Congressional re
enactment of the language which they construed was an adop
tion of their interpretation. 1 0 6

Any practical assessment of this judicial position would require
the addition of one further fact: once the more or less perma
nent codes replaced the earlier biennally adopted revenue acts,
there was much less chance that Congress would ever r e -enact
any given statutory provision. Equally important because of
this changed c ircumstance is the Court's recent refusal, in the
case of published rulings deemed clearly erroneous, to equate
congressional inaction with congressional acquiescence. In one
such case, the Court again pointed to the "ample notice " con
tained in the rulings volume, that published rulings lack the
105 Helvering v. Blis s , 293 U.S. 144 (1934) ; McFeely v.
296 u.s. 1 02 (19 35).
106 Higgins v . Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212, 216 (1941).

Commissioner,

Italics added.
The Court also noted that the quoted comment in the two previously
discussed cases was only dictum.
Id . In circumstances similar to
the Higgins case (earlier published ruling deemed clearly erroneous),
the Supreme Court refused even to apply the re-enactment theory to
11
[ t] wo rulings [ published] • . • twenty-five years ago , [ though] not re
peated in the intervening quarter-century. . . . "
Manning v. Seeley
Tube & Box Co . , 338 U.S. 561, 571 (1950).
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"force or effect of Treasury Decisions, " and do not commit
the Treasury. Its holding, that a revised or corrected inter 
pretation could be applied retroactively even though a taxpayer
may have relied to his detriment on the Commissioner 's earlier
mistake, then was explained as follows :
• • . This
principle is no more than a reflection of the
fact that Congress, not the Commis sioner, prescribes the tax
laws.
The Commis sioner' s rulings have only such force as
Congress chooses to give them, and Congres s has not given
them the force of law.
C onsequently it would appear that the
Commissioner' s acquiescence in an erroneous decision pub
lished as a ruling, cannot in and of itself bar the United States
from collecting a tax otherwise lawfully due. 107

In conclusion, of the three different rationales used to
j ustify the special we ight accorded by the Supreme Court to
most regulations, two (so-called "contemporaneous -construction"
and "re -e nactment" theories) currently fail to generate any
special standing for rulings as such. However, as to the third,
because of the High Court's interest in maintaining uniformity,
there is reason to believe that a previously untested, long con
tinued and consistent, administrative interpretation, of which
published rulings may be evidence, will enjoy the judiciary 's
respectful consideration when interpreting an otherwise am 
b iguous statutory provision. 108

Section B. Analytic Comparison: The "Six 's "
Reactions to Vital Purpo ses Served
by Centrally Administered
Interp re tative Programs
Introduction: Programs of the Six compared
There is no uniformity in the extent to which the central
administrative offices of the six countries covered by this study
e ngage in substantive rule -making activity.
2.5

107 Dixon v. u.s., 381 U.S. 6 8, 73 (1965). However, where published
rulings merely support the Court' s own view regarding the clear im
port of an interpretative regulation, this reinforces the applicability
of the re-enactment theory as applied to regulations.
Fribourg Navi
gation C o. , Inc. v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 2 7 2 (1966).
108 See E state of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 u.s. 39 (1939).
Cf.
Fribourg Navigation C o . , Inc. v. Commis sioner, 383 U.S. 2 7 2 (1966);
Higgins v. Commis sioner, 312 u.s. 212 (1941).
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Under some limited circumstances, authority to engage in
such activity has been extended specifically to all s ix offices .
Each national legislature has encountered at least a few income
tax problems which it believed could be resolved effectively
only by a type of detailed rule making for which the otherwise
burdened legislative process was deemed ill adapted . And in
that situation, all six legislative bodies have chosen to com 
plement statutory expression of a ge neral objective with a spe 
cific delegation of legislative authority enabling the executive
arm to fix the technical standards governing that isolated
Since these gap-filling administrative promulgations
area. 1 ° 9
do much more than merely interpret statutory language and, if
not ultra vires, generally have the force of law, n o they pre 
viously have been characterized as legislative -type regulations .
The frequency with which the six administrations exercise
But
this particular type of rule making varies, of course .
there is a far more substantial range of variation in the mag
nitude and types of interpretative programs they centrally ad 
minister for the benefit of taxpayers as well as field person
nel. No doubt national tradition and basic philosophical dif
ferences regarding the role appropriate to administrators are
partially responsible for this. That this diver sity in attitude
(whether legislative, administrative, or both), regarding the
need for full blown centralized interpretative programs, has
survived in an area as complex as taxation may also be due to
yet other differences peculiar to these individual tax systems .
Most relevant to this are their differences in (i) assessment
techniques, (ii) the types of income tax statutes being adminis 
tered, and (iii) the standards of statutory construction to which
their respective judiciaries adhere.
As to the relevance of the first of these, observe that the
most comprehensive interpretative program is carried on by
the one country (United States) which relies on the so-called
self-assessment system.
In effect, in the first instance , each of its sixty - s even
million taxpayers must assess himself, for returns prepared
and filed personally constitute the sole basis for initial lia
bility -fixing assessments . The other five countries e mploy the
109 See § 2 . 4 in C haps . VI, X , XIV, XVIII, and XXII infra . In France
power to issue regulatory texts is also derived by the Prime Minister
directly from the C onstitution itself. See Chap. X, § 2.4 infra .
ll O see § 2.4 as in note 1 09 supra .
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so-called non-self-assessment system , 111 In theory, the tax
payer himself is relieved of question-resolution burdens . The
government assessor determines each assessment, theoretically
on the basis of his examination.
As to the relevance of the second (type of statute), if every
one of the sixty- seven million U.S. taxpayers was required to
fix his individual liability unassisted by administratively fostered
interpretations, in theory each would have to rely primarily on
his own interpretation 112 of what clearly is the longest, most
complex statute of the six. The U . S. code 's substantive income
tax provisions, if spread at the rate of 400 words per page,
would cover an awesome 7 54 page s . l 13 Uncertainty persists,
however, despite the meticulous care and supposedly finespun
precision with which the provisions are drafted. Transactions
in the United States vary from one another in every possible
degree. To this, add the fact that most of the words used in
that longest of all statutes are more likely than not to have
multiple shades of meaning. The se factors react cumulatively
upon each other to produce countless interpretative difficulties,
which are complicated further by a related factor, which in
itself contr ibutes further to the statute 's length and complexity.
T he basic principles of this statute have been subjected to a
multitude of deviations which have spawned their own sub
deviations, and even deviations from sub -deviations, thereby
creating additional interpretative difficulties with stress and
pressure at many j oints . Not just a few taxpayers are poten
tially affected by many of these. Indeed, of the total 7 54 pages,
only 138 deal with tax patterns confined to peculiar types of
enterprises such as cooperatives, insurance companies, exempt
organizations, estates and trusts .
In contrast to the situation in the United States, the Parlia
ments of the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, and France not
only assign full responsibility for determining initial assess
ments to the government's own trained personnel, but also
confine statutory provisions of a substantive character to
abstract principles, which, if spread on the same basis as
that indicated above, would cover, respectively, only 40, 114
§ 3. 2 , Chaps . VII, XI, XV, XIX, and XXIII, infra .
doubt, they or their representatives actually would rely on
interpretations appearing in texts written by experts but devoid of the
harmonizing effect of interpretative regulations .
113 As of 1 964.
·
114 Section 2.1 Chap . XXII infra, refers to 57 pages , but of these 30%
are devoted to administrative or procedural provisions .
111 see

112 No
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50, 115 1 00, 116 and 1 2 0 117 page s . While the variation between
the types of statutory techniques employed by these four coun
tries, and those employed by the United States, may be one
reason why the four have not embarked on a centralized in
terpretative program even approaching the magnitude of that
in the United States, this underlying difference does not ac 
count at all for Britain. Its statute actually resembles that of
the United States more than those of the other four European
countries, be ing both complex and long-exceeding 3 50 pages .118
Yet its administration does not publish interpretative regula
tions at the point a statutory provision is enacted; 119 does not
thereafter ordinarily issue advance private rulings on prospe c 
tive transactions 120 nor publish rulings which explain to one
and all the reasoning behind specific interpretative positions
in-service field personnel will be expected to take in examin
ing returns, l 21 Nor does its Parliament attempt to clarify
the statute by publishing carefully designed interpretative r e 
In final analysis, of the five European countries
ports. 122
covered here, it appears, surprisingly, that administrations in
the four having the shortest and most abstract tax statutes
(Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands) actually carry
on more comprehensive interpretative programs than does the
fifth (Britain), which has a long and complex statute somewhat
like that of the United States . The four, with Belgium tradi
tionally at the head,123 publish for one and all to see more of
115 Section 2.1 Chap. XIV infra, indicates that the corporate and in
divi dual taxes combined require 95 pages when spread at the different
rate of 300 words per page, but of these about one-third are devoted
to administrative or procedural provisions.
116 See § 2.1, Chap. VI infra .
117 Section 2.1 Chap. X infra, refers to 80 pages , calculated, how
ever, at the different rate of 600 words per page.
118 Section 2.1 C hap . XVIII infra, indicates that of the 511 pages,
approximately 30 percent are devoted to administrative and procedural
matte rs.
119 See C hap. XVIII, § 2.4 infra . Interpretative instructions are dis
tributed internally, however.
1 2 0 Jd . § 2.7 .
121 Jd . § 2. 1 0.

While a series of pamphlets covering many different
areas is published, these usually are devoid of the legal reasoning on
which the indicated results were reached.
122 Id . § 2. 2. The Belgian P arliament stands alone among the five
See
European countries in making even modest use of this device.
VI, § 2.2 infra . Cf. the use of P arliamentary debates in France,
Chap, X, § 2.2 infra .
123 However, official commentaries on the recent tax reform law of
1962 are much less complete than those on the earlier law. See Chap.

38

RULE-MAKING PROGRAMS COMPARED

their administratively engineered interpretative instructions,
with at least the expectation that field personnel will be bound
as a matter of hierarchical control. Further, Ger many and
the Netherlands also sporadically publish some rulings and -as
to prospective transactions -give much advance advice, though
usually through local offices, which, in practice, do respect the
advice thus given. 124
There is a third difference among the six countr ie s, how
ever, which may partially account for the fact that Britain ap 
pears to feel the least pressure to develop a substantial pub
lished interpretative program. At least it is not surprising
that the least comprehensive administrative program is carried
on in the one country (Britain) whose judiciary apparently tends
to interpret the tax statute most strictly. 125 Given this cir 
cumstance, it could be argued that Britain has less room for,
and thus less need for, a large scale, published, administra
tive interpretative program.
But this conclusion is relative in character . The fact is
that differences in methods of assessment, in statutory ap
proaches, and in the judiciary's standards of statutory con
struction, taken together, actually do not provide sufficient
reason for the substantial differences existing in the Six's ad 
ministrative interpretative programs . Other relevant charac
teristics, common to the Six, suggest that properly adminis 
tered programs of this type would achieve purposes vital,
whether or not equally so, to each country's tax system.
Each of the Six has millions of taxpayers, a highly de 
centralized administration bottomed on thousands of geographi
cally dispersed field officials, a statute relatively inprecise
and mysterious to everyone but the specialist and, finally, very
high rates . These characteristics, taken together , should have
led each of the six systems to include among its administrative
goals three which are almost impossible to accomplish-given
(footnote continued)
Further, even the voluminous regulations interpreting
VI, § 2.5 infra .
the e arlier law were, in substantial part, a compilation of results
Finally, Belgian administers neither a
previously reached by courts.
formal private nor a published rulings program. Advance rulings ordi
narily take the form only of informal advice or-as in France-of P'lb
lished answers to oral questions put to the Ministry on the floor of
Parliament for the benefit of a taxpayer-constituent.
See Chap. VI,
§ 2.7 et seq ., infra .
,
124 See C haps . XIV and XXII, § 2. 7 et seq ., infra .
125 Cf. C hap. XVIII, § 2. 3 infra, with § 2. 3 in Chaps. VI , X, XIV, and
XXII infra, and-as to the United States-with § 2.1 supra .
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those same characteristics --without substantial centralized
published interpretative programs, namely :
(i) Achieving timely nationwide uniformity in application
of the law, efficiently and fairly;
(ii) Choosing the wisest possible interpretative positions ;
(iii) Preventing uncertain tax effects from impeding, un
necessarily, consummation of legitimate prospective
transactions.
Each of these three goals, and the general relationship of
centralized rule making to each, is considered separately in the
immediately succeeding sub-topic s . Thereafter attention shifts
to precise methods of implementation and difficulties to be
c ircumvented.
A chie ving timely uniformity, efficiently and fairly
Because all six of the statutes under consideration here
involve national taxes and high rates, country-wide uniformity
in applying the law is an absolute essential. This is difficult
to achieve when income tax statutes are superimposed on, and
hence must take account of the nice distinctions inherent in,
s ophisticated systems of pr ivate law and complex e conomie s .
In the application of each such tax statute a host-albeit a
varying number -of interpretative difficulties will be generated
whether that statute expresses abstract pr inciples, as in Ger 
many, or e mploys great detail, as in the United States . Nation
wide uniformity in resolving these doubts can be achieved in
adequate degree, efficiently, fairly, and in a timely manner,
only if the central office administers an adequate interpreta
tive program.
In both self - and non- self -assessment systems, many an
interpretative difficulty, whether or not foreseen by the central
office, actually becomes a "live " issue only at the point an
examining official in the field faces the question of whether
there is sufficient merit on the government 's side to warrant
pressing the matter as to a given taxpayer . Since that ques 
tion ne cessar ily includes the other s ide of the coin, i.e., whether
to abandon the issue, nationwide uniformity will be achieved
among similarly situated taxpayers only if all these lower eche 
lon officials conform to a uniform interpretation. Left to their
own device s, however, this goal will not be attained.
These
officials are seldom legally trained, 126 their number is large,
2.6

126 see § 1,5 in Chaps. V , IX , XID, XVII, and XXI infra .
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and they are scattered through many widely dispersed local of
fices -ranging from 1 00 in the Netherlands to 1700 in France . 127
Their individual analysis and research, however painstaking,
in attempting to resolve interpretative problems of common
concern to many, guarantees only duplication of effort, not uni
However, a centralized interpre 
formity in results reached.
tative pr ogram, administered by officials more expert in analy 
sis and research, not only efficiently avoids the duplication
otherwise generated by this ne cessary decentralization, but
also in itself assures a far greater degree of uniformity.
To attain the maximum possible degree of uniformity, and
to accomplish this with efficiency and fairness, it is not enough
to disseminate centrally-arrived-at interpretations only among
the government' s own field per sonnel. 12"8
Public access to
these interpretations, even in countries employing the non-self 
assessment system, contributes efficiently t o greater uniformity
because knowledgeable voluntary compliance with the law is
Even now, to assist assessors in those
thereby encouraged.
countries, taxpayers are required to file information returns . 129
However, neither in those countries nor in a self -assessment
country such as the United States, is it wise or even possible
to de sign a form which requires taxpayers to r eflect their af
fairs on a transaction-by -transaction basis. Details ordinarily
are reflected only by subtotals, each covering transactions
alleged to be of the same class . Obviously even under the
non- self-assessment systems, assessors cannot possibly as 
certain, with respect to each return, the true nature of each
transaction affecting each subtotal.130 Thus, by trying to make
the taxpaying public as knowledgeable as possible, albeit in
directly through published interpretations, the tax system effi
c iently furthers uniformity at least among the honest segment.
The aim is to increase the likelihood that subtotals initially
submitted by that segment will conform to what the tax ad
ministration believes to be the proper treatment of the under 
lying transactions, with exceptions anticipated where honest tax
payers believe the administration to be in error. Further, it
is only fair to taxpayers, and responsive to the administration's
12 7 Id . § 1.4. While the U.S. is divided into 58 districts , these spread
audit personnel across approximately 800 posts of duty.
128 All five of the European countries maintain at least this restricted
type of program.
See §§ 2 .4 and 2.9, C haps. VI, X , XIV, XVIII, and
xxn infra .
.
129 See § 3. 2, Chaps. VII, XI, XV, XIX, and XXITI infra .
1 30 Id.
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own interest in having its interpretations applied correctly,
that these centrally-arrived-at interpretations be exposed to
the public ' s view. This exposure enables a taxpayer to deter
mine whether the examiner has correctly interpreted the cen
tral office ' s regulation or ruling when applying it to that tax
payer's situation.
The foregoing analysis cannot be shunted aside by the argu
ment that statutory interpretative difficulties should be re solved,
not by tax administrations, but by tribunals independent of
them . Such argument itself necessarily assumes that, on proper
occasions, someone somewhere in the tax administration must
adopt interpretative positions antagonistic to given taxpayer s ;
otherwise such matters would never reach the independent tri
bunal .
Thus, mere adoption of a centralized interpretative
program, without more, need neither subtract from, nor add
to, the ultimate role of independent tribunals.
Further, even
where the independent tribunals are not expected to attach any
special weight to administratively adopted published positions,
a centrally administered program of that type is still vital to
the maintenance of uniformity. Without such a program, in
terpretative anarchy will prevail until long after the interpr e 
tative difficulties are exposed t o light, i.e ., until that typically
much later point in time when an independent appellate tribunal
has had an opportunity to respond to the issue in an adversary
proceeding initiated by some taxpayer .
Of course, in theory,
uniformity in an equally timely manner also could be secured
by requiring the central administrative office, immediately upon
discovering a significant interpretative difficulty, to seek bind
ing advice from a so-called independent tribunal. 1 31 But, dis 
regarding other shortcomings of this arrangement, if the sole
aim is to avoid the administrative character of the interpreta
tion's sponsorship, the arrangement would be self -defeating.
The so-called independent tribunal no longer would be independ 
ent of administration, for the tr ibunal itself would have be 
come the administrator in fact, if not in name .
1 31 Cj. the French practice wherein the government can seek advis ory
opinions from the s eparate Council of State. C hap. X, § 2.4 infra . In
the United states , a declaratory judgment regarding the tax effect of
a prospective transaction cannot be obtained in the regular federal
courts.
See Goodman, "The Availability and R eviewability of Rulings
of the Internal R evenue Service," 113 U. Pa . L . Rev . 81, 97 (1964). It
appears, however, that the T ax Court has the discretion to enter a
declaratory order in such a situation. Id . at 109.
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2 .7

Choosing the wisest possible interpretative positions
Centralized interpretative programs are essential, not just
to achieve uniformity in a timely and efficient manner, but
also to facilitate wise selection of those interpretative posi
tions as to which uniformity is t o be sought. And this is true
whether the controlling statutory datum is cast in quite br oad
terms or, as such things go, is fairly precise .
In the case of broad statutory language, frequently it would
be equally reasonable, solely by reference to technical con
siderations, to draw the interpretative line at any one of two,
three, or more competing places . In net effect, the ultimate
choice must be based on non-technical or policy considera
tions .
Ordinarily, however , the scattered local offices are
staffed only with technicians. In addition to their difficulty in
achieving uniformity if left without guidance, they obviously
are ill-prepared to make the type of policy choice required
here . Wiser selections can be expected from policy-oriented
officials in the central office, using a centralized interpretative
program as their medium.
Even in the setting also, relatively speaking, of fairly pre 
c ise statutory language , diverse factual patterns can generate
doubt-in every conceivable degree -regarding the correct tech
nical answer . This is because, prior to litigation, the truly
correct technical answer can be nothing more than a predic 
tion. While the very nature of a prediction precludes cer 
tainty, often it is clear that technical arguments favoring the
government's side are sufficiently persuasive to require a mere
administrative official to adopt that position solely on the basis
of technical considerations. On other occasions, however, the
converse is true ; it simply is not clear whether the technical
arguments favoring that side are sufficiently persuasive to
warrant forcing the matter to litigation if the taxpayer will not
yield. In striking the balance here, account should be taken
administratively of other var iables , such as the degree to which
a given answer could be effectively administered or the im
p ortance of the question to the tax system. Again, because of
their broader administrative perspective, central office offi
cials are better suited to this task, and uniform compliance
with their decision can be achieved best through a compre 
hensive centralized interpretative program.

2 . 8 Neutralizing risks re prospective transactions

Tax systems have the capacity, though hot always adequate
authority, to neutralize legal uncertainties regarding the tax
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effects of prospective transactions. Such a program (i) satis 
fies a real need and (ii) enables the tax system to realize on
a unique opportunity of benefit to itself. These two considera
tions provide distinct additional reasons for maintaining cen
tralized interpretative programs.
As to the first, substantive tax uncertainties adversely
affect the country as a whole, as well as individual taxpayer s .
Both suffer if, because of tax uncertainty, legitimate prospec 
tive business transactions are delayed or abandoned. More
over, a tax system's own image also suffers. It will be held
responsible not only for the consequent delay or abandonment
of transactions but for complaints generated later if a tax
payer -having consummated the transaction-finds he must liti
gate the tax question to defend the personal interpretation on
which he proceeded but which the tax system belatedly claims
to have been erroneous . That it is the tax system, and not the
individual taxpayer, which produces the tax uncertainty seems
clear in the case of prospective transactions supported by le
gitimate business purposes . In consequence, where feasible,
the system should bear the cost of neutralizing that uncertainty
through some sort of advance ruling. And if the need really
springs from uncertainty or doubt, this in itself is a reason
for resolving it through a centrally administered interpretative
program, rather than at the local office level. As previously
explained, this centralization will provide greater uniformity 
more efficiently and fairly -and simultaneously yield a wiser
selection of those interpretative positions as to which uni
formity is sought.
Second, requests from taxpayers regarding rulings on
prospective transactions serve better than any other device to
alert the central office immediately as new interpretative prob 
lems arise . They give that office the opportunity to develop
and publish its position in a timely manner, for the benefit of
field personnel as well as other taxpayers. In the United States,
despite efforts to encourage field personnel to seek the central
office 's advice on difficult matters, the fact is that requests
which originate with taxpayers are ten times as great. l 32

1 32 E. g ., Commissioner of Internal Revenue, op . cit. supra note 57,

at 6.
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Section

c.

Implementing an Inte rpre ta tive
Regulations Program

2 . 9 Introduction: Inherent conflict among the goals

A program, responsible for promulgating interpretative
regulations of Proper quality, in a timely manner, without un 
due expenditure of talented manpower, cannot hope to succeed
unle ss the se goals are considered in proper perspective . T o
this end, the first need i s t o analyze the specifics which make
for proper quality, to maximize the likelihood that, in practice,
the right balance will be reached between inherently conflicting
constituents of that one goal. The essential second step is to
take suitable account of yet another inherent conflict: the one
between that goal- viewed as a whole-and the other two goals
of timeline ss and efficiency. The solution here is to so design
the procedures (through which drafts will be processed) that
they will avoid undue c ompromise of any one of the three goals.

2 . 10 The goal of proper quality

To say that interpretative regulations will be of proper
quality if they are complete, technically correct, and under
standable 133 is to say much but not enough. So simplistic a
standard tends to obscure the complexity of each constituent
and the inherent conflict among them.
If regulations alone discharged the entire interpretative
function, then to be complete they would have to deal Precisely
with every significant ambiguity in the statute . Yet to seek
absolute prec ision in an initial regulation issued more or less
simultaneously with the enactment of the underlying statute
involves great risk. With every precise line drawn at this
e mbryo stage come increased risks of reaching unintended re 
sults in unanticipated situations and of committing technical
error in the eyes of the judiciary .
There is, of course, a
competing risk. Overzealousness in trying to achieve absolute
accuracy can produce regulations which are nothing more than
purposeless sterile echoes of the statute itself and, thus, well
below any meaningful level of completeness and under stand
ability .
Technical accuracy, nevertheless, not perfect precision,
does stand foremost among the constituents insuring proper
133 See Williams, " Preparation and Promulgation of Treasury De
p artment R egulations Under Internal Revenue Code of 1 9 54," So . Calif.
8th Tax Inst . 733 (1 95 6).
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quality. If inaccurate, a regulation achieves the opposite of
its sole purpose . Typically, after promulgation, several years
will pass before the judiciary can make a final determination
regarding a regulation. And if the courts belatedly disapprove
the regulation, it alone bears responsibility for the injustice
suffered by those who voluntarily complied and for the result
ing nonuniformity between this group and those who success
fully resisted. Further, recurr ing invalidation of regulatory
interpretations, if by a judiciary which-in principle -custom 
arily gives respectful consideration to regulatory interpreta
tions, can tend only to shorten the life span of that customary
practice . And too frequent invalidation even by a j udiciary not
so committed tends to lead taxpayers also to lose respect for
the whole regulations program, and this will tend to produce
wholesale nonconformity .
In attempting to achieve the right balance between two
competing standards, technical accuracy and completeness in
the sense of precise interpretations, three considerations should
lead to a rather obvious conclusion. First, at the point when
a statutory provision is enacted, those who must draft the in
terpretative regulation cannot possibly envisage the actual
shape of e very potentially affected transaction. In effect, from
the vantage point of transactions not foreseen, any perfectly
precise regulatory line would have been drawn by draftsmen
who were ''blindfolded . " Second, to help alert the draftsman
to factual situations not imagined, and also to test the logic
behind his proposed interpretation and his choice of language
in trying to reflect his intention, some type of public hearings,
formal or informal, should be held after publication of a tenta
Third, while
tive draft 134 and before its formal adoption. 1 35
this practice will help educate the draftsman, 136 neither public
hearings at this early stage in the life of the statute nor the
1 34 Fairness to taxpayers also requires the government to take this
type of meticulous care, given the fact that regulations, once formally
adopted, bind employees at least as a matter of hierarchical control
and can be tested, where adverse to a taxpayer, only by litigation.
135 Of the countries covered by this study, only the United States
holds formal hearings where any taxpayer may appear in person or
submit statements in writing. However, most of the others do receive
pre- adoption comments from interested professional, industri al, and
While the U.S.
labor groups. See § 2.6, Chaps. VI, X, and XIV infra .
practice, as it relates to interpretative as distinguished from legisla
tive regulations, may not be required by statute , it is consistently
followed.
See Rogovin, op . cit. supra note 25, at 759 n. 6.
136 See Williams, op . cit. supra note 133, at 753.
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draftsman's own study, can be expected to alert him to more
than a fraction of all the diverse factual s ituations his attempt
at a precise line would affect. 1 37 In consequence, the drafts
man should be made to understand that a new regulation is not
expected to discharge the whole interpretative function.
A
rulings pr ogram should assume part of the burden. After the
regulation is issued, sporadic requests from taxpayers for
rulings will further educate the central office regarding the
factual patterns of the really marginal cases, thus removing
additional bits of its blindfold and enabling it intelligently,
through individual rulings, to "pinprick" its way toward a more
precise line . 138
These cons iderations suggest that an interpretative regu
lation which clarifies a statutory ambiguity by the use of a
gener al definition or principle - supplemented by illustrative
concrete applications to the most frequently recurring but
seemingly not marginal situations - is the only method which
can balance properly completeness (in the sense of precision)
and the paramount aim of technical accuracy. By hypothesis,
such a regulation is more likely to survive judicial s crutiny
than one which establishes a perfectly precise line . For ab 
sent a precise line, the courts remain free, when testing sub 
sequent r ulings in seemingly more marginal cases, t o edge
toward the exact location of the dividing line without prejudice
to the regulation's general definition or to the large measure
of uniformity achieved by its illustrative concrete responses
to the more frequently recurring but seemingly less marginal
cases.
Finally, to be of proper quality, a regulation must be
understandable . Hence, draftsmen have the further burden of
determining the intellectual level of the expected audienc e .
137 This i s amply demonstrated by U.S. experience, where, though
such hearings always are held, post-promulgation requests for rulings
continue to expose problems in previously unanticipated situations.
1 38 This opportunity to pinprick toward a line is also the reason
why, generally speaking, it is wise to use a series of narrowly tailored
published rulings, rather than a general amendment to the regulations,
to deal with situations not anticipated when the original regulations
were drafted.
There is a yet further reason for conforming to this practice in
countries such as the United States , where regulations , but not rulings ,
are given great weight by the judiciary.
In good conscience, the
government ought not try, through the amending proce ss, to "boot
strap" what essentially are just belatedly arrived at litigation positions .
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This will differ, not just from country to country, but also
from regulation t o regulation. To illustrate , the U.S. pr ogram
assumes that the regulations will not be used by the typical
individual taxpayer who usually is completely unaware of their
existence. The administration attempts to resolve the ques 
tions of such a taxpayer in 1 8 pages of instructions which ac 
company his return . As to other relatively small U.S. tax
payers for whom those instructions are inadequate (farmers,
small business men, and employees with some outside inter 
ests), over two and a half million pay a few cents for a much
detailed booklet distributed by the government_ l 39
Millions
more purchase an inexpensive commer cial counterpart of those
booklets . Yet other millions of taxpayers in the same bracket
e mploy one of the many thousands of persons who, usually on
a part-time basis and for only a few dollars, prepare these
relatively simple returns . Further, these groups can consult
field personnel associated with the taxpayers-assistance pro
gram which each local office maintains throughout the year
(though the great bulk of its activity is concentrated in the
filing season) . During fiscal 1 966, for example, this program
manned by the lowest grade technicians in the local office -re
sponded to 16.6 million inquiries made by telephone and to
questions raised by 9.1 million taxpayers who visited the local
offices . 140 T hus, those per sons who use portions of the regu
lations affecting relatively simple returns include widely di
verse groups . They range from tax professionals, who draft
the instructions attached to returns and write the government's
booklets or their commercial counterparts, to the far less well
trained individuals who e ither man the local offices ' taxpayers 
assistance program or, a s part-time practitioners, prepare un
complicated returns for small fees. And it is to these less
less capable individuals that draftsmen of such regulations
address their efforts.
At the other extreme , regulations affecting, say, depletion
or consolidated returns, have an audience as sophisticated as
1 39 See C ommissioner of Internal Revenue, op . cit. supra note 57, at
Of the large ones, the three most widely used are Your Federal
Income Tax, Tax Guide for Small Business (the 1965 editions of which,
in both cases, ran to 160 pages) , and the Farmer' s Tax Guide (164
pages). Approximately 60 other more narrowly focused pamphlets are
distributed.
Altogether, the total taxpayers' assistance program in
fiscal 1965 required an expenditure of 1,298 man-years.
See Com
missioner of Internal Revenue, Annual Report 1965, 4.
140 See Commissioner of Internal R evenue, op . cit. supra note 57,
at 4.
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the business enterprises affected. Thus these regulations, in
the interest both of technical accuracy and brevity, can use
terms of art incomprehensible to those not intimately familiar
with the affairs of such enterprises, and still conform to an
acceptable level of under standability .
The understandability of a regulation is affected also by
whether it is expected to respond to anything more than the
anticipated ambiguities in a given statutory provision.
Un
questionably, the interpretation accorded these, and its signifi
cance, will be both more readily understood and easier to
draft if put in the context of a comprehensive regulation suffi
c iently self-contained to serve for most purposes as a substi
tute for the statutory provision itse1f. 141
This approach, to
which the United States conforms, also enables the draftsman
to rephrase otherwise unambiguous parts of the statute to com
pensate, where ne cessary, for the formal legalistic mode of
express ion. 142 But this is not without risk; to change language
not otherwise ambiguous may change the me aning, however
slightly.

2 . 1 1 Processing regulations :

Reconciling the goal of proper
quality with competing goals of timeliness and efficiency
To design a regulation of proper quality (striking the r ight
balance as to technical accuracy, completeness, and under 
standability) takes both time and talented manpower . In con
sequence, stress inevitably emerges between that goal and the
competing need for regulations to be issued in a timely man
ner, without undue expenditure of precious talented manpower .
A draftsman may invest substantial time just to identify
the significant ambiguities in a new statutory provision and to
learn something about the diver se types of transactions each
such ambiguity affects . Then comes the painstaking effort to
find language that is technically accurate, that is responsive
both to the views of policy makers and to the administrative
need of easy application, that is sufficiently precise to resolve
141 Persons

who have some doubt about either the meaning of the
regulation or its validity necess arily must have recourse to the statute
itself, pre-enactment materials, and court decisions.
142 Of the four European countries which issue interpretative regula
tions, apparently G ermany is the only one which makes no attempt to
rephrase the statute into the language of laymen, its premise appar
ently being that the regulations are intended to guide only in-service
Cf. Chap. XIV, § 2 .5 with § 2.5 in Chaps. VI and XXII
profe ssionals .
infra, and with § 2.4, Chap. X infra ,
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most recurring situations but not so precise as to create great
r isk of pr oducing unintended re sults in unanticipated situations,
and that clar ifies the "legalese " in the unambiguous part of
the statute without changing the meaning. Any public hear ing,
if scheduled to insure the public adequate time to react thought
fully to a published tentative draft, will contribute to yet
further delay, but also to an improved draft, as will any r e 
sulting revisions and necessary reviews by higher officials.
Nevertheless, if a regulation is to begin to fulfill its pur 
poses in a timely manner, it should be promulgated, as in
Belgium, 1 4 3 not later than the effective date of the new statu
tory provision. Delay beyond this, as is the case so frequently
in the United States, is unfair to the type of frequently re 
curring prospective transactions to which the regulation itself
should have been a dependable guide . In the event of such
delay, on any comparative basis, it is grossly inefficient to try
to accommodate these cases through individual pr ivate rulings.
Prospective transactions more marginal or doubtful in charac 
ter would be even more certain to suffer, for it would be both
inefficient and often unwise to try to rule on these before
finalizing the general principles of the regulation. Finally, if
a regulation is not promulgated at least by the filing date of
the first returns affected by the new statutory provision, then
in both self- and non-self -assessment countries it will default
pro tanto on all its remaining purposes.
While all tax administrations tend to suffer, whether more
or less, from a perpetual shortage of talented drafting per 
sonnel, the magnitude of any given statutory revision itself
will determine the actual difficulty generated by the inherent
conflict between the goals of p roper quality and timeliness. In
any circumstance, however, measures which properly reconcile
these competing goals will tend also to secure the r ight balance
in the efficient use of talented manpower .
Countries covered by this study which do issue interpre 
tative regulations lodge the drafting responsib ility in offices
which maintain close contact with the legislative processing of
the new statutory provision. 144
Given this essential c ontact,
if historically diverse U.S. practices furnish a trustworthy
guide, promulgation of a regulation will be expedited if three
additional arrangements are built into the process.
143 See Chap.
144 See § 2.6
note

82 supra .

VI, § 2.6 infra .
in Chaps. VI, X, XIV, XVIII,

and XXII

infra .

Also,
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First, responsibility for the proposed draft should be
lodged at the outset in the type of tax professional whose
prior training is most likely to produce skilled, imaginative
draftsmen. Second, they should be accorded timely access to
policy-level personnel, as well as to technicians familiar with
both administrative necessities and taxpayer concerns in the
specific substantive area. Third, in proper circumstances, a
regulation should be published piecemeal.
Unfortunately, at one time or another , practice in the United
States has failed to employ one or more of these techniques .
During the 1 9 50's, most initial drafts were prepared and ini
tially reviewed by technicians academically trained primarily
as accountants. These drafts then were re-reviewed by both
spadework and senior personnel academically trained as law
yers . Finally, the cumulative product was given a super 
review by both spadework and senior personnel in the policy
making echelons . All too frequently, this arrangement resulted
in superfluous duplication of effort on two counts, both of which
contributed to substantial and unnecessary delay.
First, the reviewing lawyers tended to treat initial drafts
prepared by those academically trained primarily as account
ants much as they would have treated the proposed draft of a
will submitted by a lay client. The lawyers tended to believe
their technical review would be more effective if they started
by preparing what was tantamount to an entirely new draft.
In consequence, much of the original draftsman's efforts, and
thus considerable time , was wasted. It took a change in pro
cedure to remedy this . Initial drafting responsibility for in
come tax regulations was shifted to the lawyers who, with
timely access to administrative technicians, could be alerted
to administrative and taxpayer concerns as work on a regula
tion progressed.
Second, also in the 1950's, because the policy-making
echelon ordinarily was not involved until after a completed
draft had been refined and polished, any redirection on policy
grounds, coming belatedly and sometimes requiring a more or
less complete overhaul, wasted the time spent previously but
futilely on refinements and polishing. 145 This too can be pre 
vented by affording more timely access to the policy-making
145 The comparatively small policy- making group contributed to yet
additional delay because of its tendency to fly-speck each regulation,
in terms of its completeness, technical accuracy, and understandability.
See Williams, op . cit. supra note 133, at 751 .
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echelon. Initial contact with this level should occur not later
than the point when the drafting office has isolated the maj or
ambiguities in the statute , is alert to the more frequently re
curring situations potentially affected by each, and has thought
out the competing principles, if any, which would be techni
cally defensible and administratively feasible to implement.
The purposes of the two foregoing arrangements also can
be satisfied, and not infrequently are in the United States, by
assigning a regulations project at the outset to a three-man
team composed of a lawyer, a technician, and a policy-making
This completely avoids the time -consuming
representative.
seriatum nature of their respective involvements as it existed
during the fifties .
The third desired arrangement affects those instance s
where all of a regulation interpreting a given statutory provi
sion is complete except for one isolatable and particularly
difficult matter . If completion of that one aspect would unduly
postpone the timeliness of the completed portion, the latter
should be promulgated without further delay.
The omitted
paragraphs need only carry a notice that they will be published
upon completion.
Section D.

Implementing Private and Published
Rulings Programs

2 . 12 Introduction:

Resolving inherent conflict between respec 
tive goals of private and published rulings programs

The first imperative in implementing separate programs
covering private and published rulings is to insure that each
takes proper account of the inherent conflict which exists be 
tween their respective goals. Otherwise neither goal can be
adequately achieved .
As previously indicated, the principal goal of the private
rulings program is to provide advance guidance to legitimate
prospective transactions. To accomplish this objective, a pri
vate ruling must be timely, i.e ., available before the deadline
for consummation of the prospective transaction. Because in
a fast moving economy, consummation of many prospective
transactions cannot be long delayed, speed is an essential in
gredient of the program. Published rulings, on the other hand,
are intended as a supplement to the regulations program; their
principal goal is nationwide uniformity, among both taxpayers
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and field personnel. And precisely because these rulings do
fix the nationwide position of the government, rather than just
the tax effect of a single transaction, abso lute correctness is
their most important character istic . In consequence, the in
herent conflict between the respective essential attributes of
the two different programs can be summarized in terms of
speed v. quality -i.e., absolute correctness. The potential con
sequences of this conflict can be awesomely serious .
On the one hand, in some instances, failure to publish
immediately the result of the first pr ivate ruling in a given
area, thus permitting time for further study prior to publica
tion, may lead only to a loss of efficiency. Each local audit
or assessing official will have to take the time, in the case
of other taxpayers similarly situated, at least to think through
a problem with which National Office rulings personnel already
have dealt. But much more ser ious is the prospect that the
widely scattered officials may reach nonuniform results, there 
by depr iving other similarly situated taxpayers of equal treat
ment under the law. On the other hand, immediate publication
of the result speedily reached in a private ruling covering only
a single case can extend across the entire nation a conclu
sion, possibly incorrect. The private ruling may have been
incorrectly decided, not just because it had to be issued in a
timely fashion, but because, rulings personnel in the National
Office were not then aware of all the potential applications and
implications of that ruling, i.e., of the diverse factual situa
tions the ruling inevitably would affect. When subsequent
analysis of later requests for private rulings on somewhat
s imilar situations discloses error in the previously published
ruling, the administration-to be logical-must e ither enlarge
that error or reverse it. In the United States, there is a
tendency to try to avoid this dilemma by postponing issuance
of a private ruling until rulings personnel, working at the level
at which the given type of ruling normally would be issued,
conclude the result reached is one which safely could be pub 
lished, 146
But because of this caution, too frequently the
146 Even so, private rulings sometimes are issued before the total
implications are recognized.
E. g., see Knetsch v. u.s. , 348 F . 2 d 932
(Ct. Cl. 1 9 65 ) ; "Warwick Fund Ruling Withdrawn; I.R.S. Policy Ques
tioned," 19 J. Taxation 1 9 7 (1 963).
Prior to issuance of a published
version, the error is likely to be recognized, however. In substantial
part, this is because published versions, as distinct from private rul
ings, always are reviewed at a high level, involving usually the Assist
ant C ommissioner {Technical) , the Director of the appropriate Division,
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private ruling covering a prospective transaction is not timely
and consequently this program defaults pro tanto on its sepa
rate purpose . 147
Obviously the inherent conflict between the goals of the
two programs needs resolution-and in a manner which ordi
narily permits each effectively to accomplish its own separate
mission. Personnel working on private rulings should under 
stand (i) that the tax system itself-not the taxpayer - is re 
sponsible for any tax uncertainty suffered by a legitimate pro
spective transaction and (ii) that in consequence of the fore
going they are expected to reach the wisest decision possible,
subject ordinarily , however , to an overriding responsibility :
to respond within a fairly timely manner . Conversely, per 
sonnel working on the published version of a ruling should
understand that absolute correctness is their most essential
goal. 148 Publication, if need be, is to be postponed until there
is sufficient acquaintance with the total factual terrain to in
sure correctness. With this overriding limitation, at least the
subject matter (as distinguished from the exact result) of all
precedent-type private rulings should become, in due c ourse,
the subject of a published ruling.
(footnote continued)
and a senior official in the Chief C ounsel' s office.
On major policy
issues, the Commissioner himself and policy officials at Treasury' s
headquarters also become involved.
See Rogovin, op . cit. supra note
25, at 766 n. 49, and C aplin, op . cit. supra note 63, at 27. Further,
because often there is a substantial time lag between issuance of the
first private ruling in an area and publication itself, several requests
for rulings in that area will have been received and perhap s answered.
In consequence, the senior officials who review proposed published
rulings have the chance at least to become more fully acquainted with
the total factual terrain than did the lower ranking official who issued
the first private ruling.
In further consequence, the actual result
reached in the first published ruling may not coincide with the result
actually reached in the first private ruling, in contrast to the supposed
theory governing the relationship between the two programs as outlined
in § 2.3 supra .
147 In fiscal 1965, 37% of the rulings required more than 60 days but
less than 6 months, and another 21% required more than 6 months .
See Rogovin, op . cit . supra note 25, at 767 n. 59.
An e arlier Chief
Counsel put blame for much of this delay on taxpayers themselves ,
citing their failure to present the facts fully, to pinpoint the issue, and
to submit an adequate analysis of the authorities. Rose, "The Rulings
Program of the Internal Revenue Service," 35 Taxes 907 (1957) .
148 This i s not intended to imply that different personnel should be
used in carrying out the two different functions .
As to the short
comings of that arrangement, see § 2.17 supra .
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There is one exceptional type of case, however, where a
private ruling should be withheld until personnel are certain
they have reached that result they would be willing, by publi
cation, to apply on a nationwide basis . This withholding should
occur in any case where it is recognized that a subsequent
change in position, if applied to that taxpayer 's competitors,
would substantially affect the business struggle between them.
This limitation, however, probably applies more broadly to
excise taxes with their direct effect on prices 149 than to in
come taxes .
Observe, finally, that if each program otherwise i s to
focus on its own separate function as suggested here, publica
tion will not serve to police the integrity of the private rulings
program. 150
But that need can be satisfied by appropriate
internal reviews .
2 . 13 Confining private rulings to legal questions :

R equiring

s tatements of fact and a brief

The central office would assume a burden for which it is
ill-suited as well as make wasteful use of local office talents,
should it ordinarily attempt to rule on prospective transactions
149 For a dramatic illustration, see International Busines s Machines
Corp. v. u.s., 343 F .2d 914 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
T he abuse in that case
was deemed to be so great that the court, in effect, extended an e arlier
favorable private ruling received by one taxpayer to a competing tax
payer who later had received an adverse ruling.
For an argument
that this should be the universal practice, even as to income tax ques
tions, see Kragon, " The Private Ruling, " 45 Taxes 331 (1967).
For
a contrary view, see Rogovin, op . cit. supra note 25, at 7 6 7 . That the
general practice actually is to the contrary, see § 2 . 3, supra notes 535 5 , and Kragen, id., at 3 34 n. 13. If the earlier erroneous ruling had
continuing effect because concerned with an excise tax matter, it could
be revoked prospectively, of course. This was done, though belatedly,
in the above cited case.
150 In the United States , preservation of such clearly was one of the
intended purposes of the publication program.
See Hearings on Ad
ministration of the Internal Revenue Laws, Before a Subcommittee of
the House Committee on Ways and Means, 83d Cong. , 1st Sess. 1564
and 1570 (1 953). In furtherance of that purpose, if S. 2 04 7 , 89th Cong.,
1st Ses s . (1965) had been enacted, the administration would have been
required to publish within ten days any ruling involving a potential tax
liability exceeding $100,000. For reasons previously related, however,
both the private and published rulings programs, and thus the tax sys
tem itself, would suffer from enactment of any proposal locking pub
lication to the actual results reached in private rulings.
See Rogovin,
op . cit. supra note 25, at 7 67 n. 60.
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involving mere questions of fact. 151 Such questions frequently
require on-s ite inspections and the weight accorded much of
the evidence often turns on the credibility of witnesses. More 
over, as a practical matter, the central office, precisely be 
cause it is central, would have to make its determination on
the basis of a cold record. Thus, a local office would have
to conduct an examination and certify that the record contained
all the evidence and its own finding regarding credibility.
Further , whether the central or local office actually issued
the ruling, after the taxpayer had filed the return covering
the affected transaction, the local office would have to conduct
another examination to insure that neither the evidence nor
facts had changed prior to the consummation itself.
This wasteful duplication of effort will be avoided, how
ever, and the central office will be peculiarly well suited to
the task if, as is generally true in the United States, it con
fines rulings to questions of law 152 and holds the taxpayer
responsible for submission of a written statement reflecting
all relevant facts - including a copy of all documents to be exe 
cuted when the transaction is consummated. 153 Then, later 
after the ruling has been issued, the transaction consummated,
and the return filed-the local office , in its first and sole ex
amination, need only ascertain whether the actual facts cor 
responded to those previously submitted by the taxpayer _ 154 If
they do correspond, the local office need not e ven make a
legal analysis of the problem; that was done by the central
office before issuing the ruling.
In effect, labor has been
divided between the two echelons, and all duplication avoided.
On occasion, of course-particularly where unrepresented tax
payers submit self-prepared requests -rulings personnel may
find an essential fact has been omitted and thus be unable to
rule . Where feasible , the taxpayer should be alerted to the
151 C/. Goodman, op . cit . supra note 131.
152 see Rev. Proc. 64-31, C .B. 1964-2, 947, amplified in Rev. Proc.
66-34, I.R.B. 1966-34, 22, which lists the no- rulings areas. C ertain
mixed questions are accommodated.
Also, in a very few instances
where the statute itself literally turns the tax on the presence of a
tax avoidance purpose (e.g., I.R . C . , §§ 367 and 1492), the administration
will give advance rulings on this essentially factual question.
E.g.,
In a somewhat similar statutory setting,
see Treas. Reg. § 367-1.
England follows a similar practice.
See Chapter XVill, § 2. 7 infra .
153 Rev. Proc. 67-1, Sec. 6.02, I.R.B. 1967-1, 9.
154 In the United State s, the letter ruling itself will include a state
ment of all facts to which the result is addressed.
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difficulty, 155 but without prejudice to the overriding rule that,
ultimately, he alone is responsible for exposing to light all
relevant facts . If, upon later examination of his return, it
appears that his request for the earlier ruling did omit a
material fact or included material assertions at variance with
the ultimate facts, the ruling will lack any force or effect.
In the interest of efficiency, taxpayers also should be r e 
quired as in the United States , 156 or i n fairness at least b e
encouraged, t o accompany their request with a second state 
ment which both identifies the precise statutory issue in doubt 157
and analyzes the legal data (authorities, etc.) s upporting the
taxpayer 's particular contention. Exception should be made,
of course, where the question in issue involves an amount so
small that it would be against the taxpayer 's economic self
interest to e mploy a private practitioner . These cases aside,
however, requirement of such a statement would contr ibute to
efficiency by relieving the rulings specialist from one of the
three demanding roles he otherwise must fulfill (advocate for
the taxpayer, advocate for the government , and j udge ) . Mor e 
over, since the taxpayer 's own representative typically is best
suited to develop the arguments which support his side, this
requirement would insure that the taxpayer's position would be
presented fully. Thus, while contributing to efficiency , the
greater interest of e quity also would be fostered: the tax
payer 's statement serving not only himself but also the gov
ernment, which should have the single aim of reaching the
truly correct result .
2.14

Organization, conferences, review, and appeals re private
rulings

Comparably for the reason just indicated, it serves the
interest of administration and taxpayer alike to grant an oral
155 This accords with u.s. practice. Rev. Proc. 67-1, Sec. 6, 07 ,
I.R.B. 1967-1, 11. On occasion, where this i s not feasible, a n informa
tion letter, describing but not applying the law, will be issued. Rev.
Proc. 67-1, Sec. 5,01, op . cit ., at 9.
156 Rev. Proc. 67-1, Sec. 6,03, I.R.B. 1 967-1, 10.
157 The United States permits local District Directors t o issue so
called determination letters as to non-doubtful situations clearly covered
by statute, regulation, or previously published rulings.
But because
this practice generally is limited to completed transactions (Rev. Proc.
67-1, Sec. 4. 01, I. R.B, 1967-1, 7), the national office itself receives
many requests for rulings on prospective transactions which, while
complex or involving large sums, are not believed by the taxpayer to
involve any tax uncertainty.
He simply wants an " insurance policy."
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conference upon request. But this is so only if the specialist
responsible for the problem tentatively decides to r ule ad
versely to the taxpayer's contention. A practitioner, preparing
the earlier submitted written brief, hardly can be expected to
anticipate every nuance of every court decision, etc., about
which rulings specialists may develop some concern. Because
both sides will benefit most if the conference focuses on the
specific concerns which have emerged from the specialist's
own considered study of the matter, taxpayers should be at
least discouraged from seeking a conference at an earlier
point, before the specialist has had a chance to study the
matter and to determine the particular points he believes
troublesome . 1 5 8
Relevant to the choice of the government's r epresentative
at such conferences is the fact that, as requests for rulings
increase, so too must rulings personnel. illustratively, the
U.S. program now absorbs the time of several hundred techni
cians . Moreover, if reasonable standards of efficiency are to
be maintained, sizeable programs require a given division of
labor . Most rulings personnel should specialize in a s ubject
matter area with spadework on most rulings undertaken by the
least experienced personnel, whose tentative conclusions will
be reviewed by those more able and experienced to whom au
thority has been delegated to s ign the ruling, yea or nay.
When this division of labor has evolved, a reviewer in the
latter actual decision-making category-if at all feasible - should
attend any conference accorded a taxpayer, to explore at first
hand, rather than hear second hand through an underling, the
taxpayer 's rebuttal to the actual decision-maker 's concerns .
In responding to the need for efficient, fair, and informed
discharge of the rulings function, rulings personnel in the
United States have been spread among eight different special
ized branches 159 and the branch chief himself, or a reviewer
e mpowered to sign his name , ordinarily is required to attend
any conference. 160 Such personnel at the branch level actually
158 This is the import of the U.S. procedure. Rev. Proc. 67-1, Sees.
6 . 08 and 7 . 02 , I.R.B. 1967-1, 11 and 1 2 .
1 5 9 Six of the se involve income taxation (corporation, corporate re
organizations, individual, depreciation, exempt o rganiz ations, and pen
sion trusts ) .
The other two deal, respectively, with excise and with
estate and gift taxation.
Yet other branches deal with actuarial and
administrative matters .
A given branch also may further subdivide
its personnel into more narrow specialities.
160 Rev. Proc. 67-1, Sec. 7 . 02, I.R.B. 1 967 -1 , 1 2 .
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issue more than 7 5 percent of the rulings. 161 Situations occur,
however, where a broader -based expertise is needed. Illus 
tratively, a particular factual situation falling within the com
petence of one specialized branch actually may raise an inter 
pretative issue of common concern to two or more branches .
And even where this is not so, the importance of some que s 
tions merits the attention, not just of specialists , but also of
the most talented generalists . To accommodate these prob
lems, the eight branches have been divided among three divi
s ions, dealing respectively with income taxes, exempt organi
Each
zations and pension trusts, and miscellaneous taxes .
Division Director has a very small staff of reviewers (most
of whom are generalists) and is responsible to the Assistant
Commissioner (Technical) .
This three -layer organizational arrangement (branch, di
vision, Assistant Commissioner) causes some taxpayers, on
receiving an adverse ruling at the branch level, to wish a fur 
ther appeal were available -i.e ., an appeal to the appropriate
Division Director and, if need be , to the Assistant Commis
s ione r . While no doubt such appeals would produce different
r esults in at least a few cases, attempts at perfection must be
tempered by recognition of the possible. The hard fact is that
the Division Director and his staff could not possibly review
in detail all adverse decisions issued by his branches .
In
consequence, instead of giving taxpayers a "right" to appeal to
his office, the branches have been instructed to forward to it
for further review, prior to issuance, any ruling the branch
itself deems to be sufficiently doubtful or important to warrant
such attention. Actually, well over three-fourths of all rulings
are issued without such a review. And as to the remainder,
it is physically possible to give affected taxpayers a "right"
to a further oral conference in the Division Director 's office
only if that office tentatively decides either to reverse a ruling
which the branch would have decided favorably to the tax
payer 's contention, or to sustain an adverse ruling but on a
new or different ground than that on which the branch r e 
lied. 162

161 See

R ogovin, op . cit. supra note 2 5 , at 766 n. 49.
162 Rev. Proc. 67-1, Sec. 7 . 02, I.R.B. 1967-1, 1 2 .
Only a small per
cent of those reaching the division level are referred also to the In
terpretative Division in the Chief Counsel' s Office.
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2 . 1 5 Priorities re advance rulings ; and grounds for refusal to
rule
Any private rulings program, if responsive to prospective

transactions, will encounter two different types of priority
problems. One involves the order in which requests should be
handled; the other, the areas which should be excluded from
the scope of the program.
The first will become a problem even if, in the face of
typically tight budgetary limitations, an adequate number of
talented personnel can be assigned to the program. Requests
for rulings do not come in throughout the year at a regular
rate . Instead they tend in the opposite, with the United States,
for example, showing a fairly consistent seasonal variation.
Because this variation is an expected phenomenon, personnel
working exclusively on rulings can use their time efficiently
throughout the entire year only if there is at least a modest
inventory or backlog to carry them through the slack periods .
Inadequate staffing not infrequently causes that essential back
log to increase beyond the essential level. Taken in conjunc 
tion with the work backlog, the varying amount of effort in
dividual cases r equire typically will prevent taxpayers from
receiving a ruling by return mail. Indeed, in the United States,
not more than half the rulings usually can be issued within the
first two months after the requests are received. 163 In fair 
ness, since most requests will involve prospective transactions,
they normally should be disposed of, as they are in the United
States, according to the order of their receipt. But situations
will arise where a given taxpayer, without fault, clearly shows
great need for extraordinary speed in resolving his problem.
However, only if these requests for special priority are a very
s mall fraction of the total should procedures be left sufficiently
flexible to accommodate them. 164 Otherwise, disposition of
cases received earlier will be unduly postponed.
A second and more broadly ranging priority principle , of
concern to management at the highest level, should contribute
to a delimitation on the scope of the program. In deciding the
extent to which talented personnel can be made available to
this particular program, the administration must take proper
account of other important but inevitably unmet needs typically
spanning the entire spectrum of its responsibilities .
Given
163 See note 147 supra for other reasons contributing to this delay.
164 This is the import of U.S. practice. Rev. Proc. 67-1, Sec. 6,09,
I.R.B. 1967-1, 11.
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these competing needs, any administration would be hard put
to justify staifing this one program so adequately that its man
power will be available to extend the advance ruling program
to cover types of transactions which at best can be covered
only with gross inefficiency . The argument in 2 . 13, supra, for
denying advance rulings to mere factual questions, was bottomed
solely on this priority principle. 165 The existence within the
Service of various unmet needs also should be one reason for
precluding this program, as is the case in the United States,
from being so well staifed that it can take time to respond to
prospective transactions deemed lacking in business purpose .166
Indeed, in further support of this position, the only argument
for launching an advance rulings program was that tax uncer 
tainties should not be allowed to force delay or abandonment
of transactions which would have been purposeful had no tax
law existed. 167 The proscription regarding transactions lack
ing in business purpose will not be easy to administer, how
ever . Only at the extremes is it easy to distinguish between
proposed transactions which are motivated solely by tax con
siderations -and hence should fall in the no-rulings area-and
others which would have a legitimate purpose in the absence
of the tax law but are shaped to take advantage of the less
costly of two or more different tax routes . Though the line
between these two categories becomes less discernible as
transactions move toward the center, an attempt to distinguish
between them must be made , for ordinarily those falling in the
second category should be granted advance rulings. Not to
rule on transactions falling within the latter category would
leave those responsible only for administration of a tax law
open to a proper charge that, having established a rulings pro
gram, they now have transcended their administrative function.
That is, by discriminating through refusal to rule, they pre s 
ently hope , i n terms of practical effect, either t o regulate the
165 The prospect that effort might be wasted no doubt i s also one
reason why estate tax questions posed by living persons are beyond
the ambit of the U.S . rulings program. See R ev. Proc. 67-1, Sec, 3,02,
I.R.B. 1 967-1, 7.
The prospect of waste here relates to the substan
tial chance that the recipient' s circumstances or the law may change
during the possibly long period between the date of the ruling and the
recipient' s death.
166 Rev. Rul. 64-31, C .B. 1 9 64-2, 947 , amplified in Rev. Proc. 6634, I.R.B. 1966-34, 22, puts these in the no-rulings c ategory. Germany
does likewise. See C hapter XIV, § 2 . 7 infra .
167 Cf. C aplin, op . cit . supra note 63.
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shape of, or to deny a benefit accorded by the tax law to,
transactions which would have been purposeful had the tax law
not existed. Of course , the responsibility of a mere adminis 
trator to rule in this circumstance can be modified with per 
fect propriety expressly or implicitly by the legislature itself.
For example, it may be implicit in a given statutory provision
that the legislature specifically intended to use a loosely woven
statutory standard (oftentimes subjective in character) as an
en terrorem weapon to police the integrity, and hopefully in
practice to fence in the range , of a given tax idea. An ad
vance ruling in this circumstance obviously would frustrate the
legislative intention. 168
2 . 1 6 Completed transactions :
technical advice

Private rulings and in -service

Again, e mploying a standard of priority , the absence of
reliable tax guidance usually is less serious to a taxpayer
whose transaction has been completed than to one facing a
prospective transaction. Nevertheless, before filing a return
covering a completed transaction, at least those taxpayers who
live in self-assessment countries should be able -in a rela
tively routine manner -to obtain national office rulings on legal
issues, to the end of enabling them to file proper returns and
thereby self-assess the proper liability. And, generally speak
ing, this is U.S. practice . Indeed, if the question is not open
to doubt and does not involve an industry-wide problem, even
a local District Director can make the necessary binding com
mitment. 1 69
Once the return is filed, however , in both self- and non
self-assessment countries, the cumulative effect of three con
siderations furnishes a substantial r eason why, from that point
on, the taxpayer himself should be denied free access to the
central rulings office . First, because both types of countries
168 On the other hand, in a yet different proviSion, the legislature
may imply that the administration is expected to rule in advance re
garding the motivation behind a given transaction, motivation being the
A
crucial issue.
E. g., see I.R . C ., § 367 and Treas. Reg. § 1.367-1.
similar example can be found in England.
See Chapter XVIII, § 2. 7
infra .

169 His commitment is called a " determination letter" rather than a
See Rev. Proc. 67-1, Sec. 4, I.R.B. 1967-1, 7, and supra notes
ruling.
57 and 157 . His authority ordinarily does not extend to prospective
trans actions, however.
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must undertake an enormous number of examinations , 170 effec 
tive administration is possible only if initial authority over
filed returns is decentralized and lodged in local offices. 171
Second, because many, many issue s will emerge from these
examinations, a decentralized system of administrative appeal,
geographically convenient to taxpayers-large and small-must
be established. Third and finally, to preserve this indispensa
ble decentralization and to prevent the system from being in
verted and thus becoming top-heavy, every effort must be made
to resolve at the lowest possible level as many issues as
properly can be resolved there . To give taxpayers who had
filed their returns complete freedom to deflect self-selected
questions to the central rulings office, thereby enabling them
to bypass the decentralized field procedures, would be totally
inconsistent with this fundamental objective.
On the other hand, unifor mity would be served and served
efficiently if, at the earliest possible moment, legal issues of
wide import and open to serious doubt (not having been re 
solved previously by court decisions or published rulings) could
be identified, removed from the total mass of issues, and re 
ferred immediately to the central rulings office . Assuming
that only the central rulings office can assure nationwide uni
formity as to such properly selected issues, the greatest effi
ciency can be achieved if local offices can be trusted to exer 
cise the screening function effectively; for then they also can
be e mpowered to seek the requisite technical advice directly
from the central r ulings office , without involving intermediate
or regional offices. l72 Nevertheless, of the countries covered
by this study which have placed intermediate regional offices
170 In theory, non-self- assessment countries examine each taxpayer.
But even the United States , in policing the integrity of its self-assess
ment system, annually examines about three and a half million returns.
See Commissioner of Internal Revenue , op . cit . supra note 57, at 23.
171 These range from 103 in the Netherlands to 17 00 in France.
While the u.s. is divided into only 5 8 districts, audit personnel are
sc attered among 800 posts of duty.
172 Under this arrangement, the latter offices need never be involved
with any issue the central rulings office decides in favor of an affected
taxpayer.
Except in one instance, those offices also could be freed
from the need to hear administrative appeals regarding items in a re
turn controlled by an adverse private ruling previously issued to that
taxpayer by the central office.
The exception would apply in any
country which, as an administrative settlement practice, wants to em
power the intermediate office to split or trade the less signific ant of
these debatable legal issues in order to avoid litigation.
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between the local and national echelons (England being the sole
exception), 173 only in the United States does a local (district)
office normally bypass the intermediate office in seeking tech
nical advice from the national office. l74 This country thereby
avoids the inevitable and substantial duplication of effort which
otherwise could follow if its intermediate regional offices
sought to rescreen the 2, 5 00 to 3, 000 difficult questions local
offices refer annually to the central r ulings office.
In some of the other countries, the taxpayer himself may
not even know that, in effect, the local office has yielded juris 
diction over an issue to a higher office . 175 In contrast, through
published formal procedure s, the United States not only r e 
quire s the local office t o inform the taxpayer of the referr..-.1
but also gives the taxpayer the "right" at that point to file
with the central office a memorandum analyzing the law, and
later to be orally heard 176 by the latter office before it can
decide adversely to him. 177 On these counts, the procedure
is the same as that previously described in connection with
rulings on prospective transactions, 178 Further, before a local
office can refer a question, the taxpayer is entitled to see the
document in which that office presents its view of the facts,
to the end that he can s ubmit his own version if the two dis 
agree . 179 Of course, no taxpayer can prevent a local office
from referring a question to the central rulings office; nor in
an earlier day could a taxpayer who requested such a referral
appeal that mere procedural question if the local office chose
not to refer the matter , 1 80 In short, at that time it had ex
clusive jurisdiction over the s creening function, presumably in
the interest both of efficiency and of preserving the integrity
of the decentralized field procedures. The taxpayer then had
only one method of recourse : to appeal the substantive issue
173 See C hap. XVIT, § 1.3 infra .
174 Cf. § 2.9 in Chaps. VI, X, XIV ,

and XXIT infra .
In England, of
course, direct recourse is essential. See C hap. XVIII, § 2,9 infra .
175 See § 2,9 in Chaps. VI and X infra .
176 While typically such a conference is also available in Belgium,
Chap. VI, § 2.9 infra, it is otherwise in Germany and Great Britain.
See § 2. 9 in Chaps. XIV and XVIIT infra .
177 Rev. Proc. 67-2, Sees. 4,0 8 and 4,09, I.R.B. 1967-1, 19,
178 See § 2.14 supra .
179 Rev. Proc. 67-2, Sec. 4.06, I.R.B. 1967-1, 19.
1 80 Rev. Proc. 5 8-14, C .B. 1958-2, 1125. However, within the local
office, he could appeal an adverse determination by lesser officials to
the Chief of the local office ' s (district) Audit Division.
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to the intermediate regional settlement office and, if not satis 
fied with the result reached there , to litigate that substantive
issue . Now, however , if the Chief of the local district's Audit
Division rejects a taxpayer is request to refer an issue to the
central rulings office , a written explanation of the reason must
be given the taxpayer . If he disagrees and submits his rea
sons therefor in writing, these documents, together with all
data bearing on the issue automatically are referred, not to
the rulings office, but to the Director of the national office 's
Audit Division. In effect, the latter performs a rescreening
function. He decide s, not the substantive issue, but rather the
procedural question of whether the issue is sufficiently impor 
tant and doubtful to warrant referral to the rulings office . 181
As is more fully explained in Chapter III, infra, even if
the rulings office ultimately directs a local office to decide a
substantive issue against the taxpayer, that taxpayer still is
free to try to "settle " the dispute by entering an administra
tive appeal to the regional settlement office and then, if need
be, to litigate .
2 . 17 Publication of rulings and in-service technical advice

If u. s. experience proves anything, 182 it is that the pre 
viously described prime purposes of a published rulings pro
gram183 will be achieved year after year only if the program
contains certain built-in arrangements which at least tend to
assure its sustained compliance with two standards.
The first major need is to insure that the quality of each
published ruling is responsive to the peculiar purposes of the
program; While each, of course, must reach a technically
proper result, this alone will not achieve uniform treatment
for other similar transactions or provide reliable guidance
for prospective transactions. To provide such uniformity and
guidance , each ruling must be so structured that its scope will
be understood readily both by taxpayers and field officials. A
bare statement of the material facts and the result reached
is not enough. If other interested individuals are to deter mine
what actually was decided, the ruling itself must orient the
legal issue. Further, since no two cases are exactly alike, if
the ruling is to be applied properly to other cases -which is
the sole reason for its publication-the legal reasoning on which
181 Rev. Proc. 67-2, Sec. 4. 03, I.R.B. 1967-1, 1 8.
182 See § 2. 3 supra .
183 See §§ 2.6 through 2 . 8 supra .
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the result is based must be set forth. In short, a published
r uling should take the form of an abbreviated judicial decision.
The statement of the pivotal facts, legal orientation of the
problem, the stated result and the legal reasons therefor all
are essential if taxpayers and field officials are to determine
with precision what was and what was not decided and be in a
position, by analogy, to apply that ruling properly to other
cases . 1 84
To insure also that each ruling reaches a technically
proper result, and that the language chosen goes far enough
but not too far in fixing that ruling's affirmative thrust, it is
indispensable that the draftsman exchange ideas with others .
The requisite exchange is accomplished best by having his
draft reviewed from four distinctly different vantage points.
The first review would come from an exceptionally able tech
nical reviewer specializing in that particular area of income
tax law.
The second, from an exceptionally able technical
generalist who understands thoroughly the whole body of in
come tax law and thus the way the pieces technically fit to
gether. The third, from a policy -oriented generalist, for often 
times -since the courts have not yet spoken-actually there is
no one technically correct result but rather, at this stage of
prediction, competing technically proper results, with the ulti
mate choice of position properly dependent upon administrative
and policy considerations. And fourth, from outside the tax
administration, from the market place, i.e., the taxpayers
themselves. 1 85 The latter will serve two purposes . The
publicis very diversity equips it uniquely to focus the adminis 
tration's attention on unanticipated situations affected, though
unintentionally so, by the particular choice of words used in
the ruling. Further, since the published ruling at the least
will bind administrative echelons , it is only fair , before its
formal and final adoption, that the public have a chance to be
1 84 This is essential, not just because of their need to determine the
direct scope of the ruling but also because they will tend to use the
ruling at the least as a clue pointing in one direction or the other in
more remote situations, on the assumption that the rulings office itself
will proceed thereafter in a logical legal manner. By way of contrast,
a private ruling, if favorable to the taxpayer, need only state the facts
and the result, for that will s atisfy his concern and it is not intended
that this private ruling be applied to any other case. See § 2 .3, supra
notes 60-62.
1 85 Only the first three types of review are utilized in the United
States. See supra note 146.
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heard, if only in writing. otherwise, affected taxpayers across
the nation are deprived of a procedural safeguard which even
a private rulings program (through a conference arrangement)
should accord an individual taxpayer who has requested a
r uling, and which administrative appeal systems in all coun
trie s covered by this study do accord an individual taxpayer
who, at the point of examination, protests an asserted liability.
The fact that a given taxpayer will have the belated right to
be heard in this latter circumstance is not an adequate sub 
stitute for the proposal made here. The chance t o b e heard
at the point of examination comes too late and will be mean
ingless if a previously published r uling-regarding which the
taxpayer had no chance to be heard-covers the issue. That
r uling binds the action of examining officials with whom he
must confer.
From the foregoing, it should be obvious that time is a
further factor in attaining a proper standard of quality for any
given published ruling. And this is precisely the reason, as
explained earlier, 1 8 6 why an essential attribute of this pro 
gram conflicts directly with one equally essential to the pri
vate rulings program (quality v. speed). As explained there,
to assure each program a proper chance to fulfill its own
separate purpose, rulings personnel themselves must under 
stand that the result ultimately e mbodied in a published r uling
need not follow blindly a result previously and more hurriedly
reached in a private ruling.
The second major need, once a publication program is
adopted, is to build in arrangements which at the least tend to
prevent the central r ulings office from defaulting pro tanto on
the program's purpose by foregoing publication on some im
portant precedent -type situations to which it has been alerted
through requests received either for private rulings or in
service technical advice. Matters of integrity aside, U.S. ex
perience of an earlier day serves to indicate that there are
three circumstances most likely to contribute to such non
publication.
One such circumstance will arise inadvertently; the failure
of rulings personnel to appreciate the range of situations which,
if covered by published rulings , would contribute significantly
to the purposes of this program. While sophisticated lawyers
might question the distinction which follows, not all rulings
personnel are likely to be sophisticated lawyers . They must
186 See § 2.12 supra .
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be made to understand that the purposes of this program are
significantly served not only by publication of positions for all
important precedent-type situations but also important new
applications of earlier precedent-type rulings . 187
A second adverse circumstance will exist so long as the
national office is permitted to send confidential communica
tions to all field offices stating its views on substantive iss ue s .
Typically in a tax administration, only the head, and perhaps
his deputy, bears an ultimate responsibility which extends both
to the decentralized enforcement function carried out by field
offices and to the centralized rulings function. l88 If his staff
can use confidential communications to guide the field forces,
he will have less interest in having his rulings office maintain
a proper publication standard. 189 To generate greater inter 
est in him regarding the latter, a subcommittee of the u.s.
Congress extracted from the U.S. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue a promise that no confidential communications cover 
ing substantive issues would be circular ized by the national
office to field offices . 190 Thus the publication program be 
came the exclusive vehicle through which the Commissioner
could insure that field officials received their guidance. 191
The non-use of confidential communications had another salu
tory effect: no longer could a field official merely cite the
reference number of a secret national office instruction in re 
j e cting a taxpayer 's contention. The self-interest which trig
gers a taxpayer into reading the relevant published commu
nication enables him to discuss intelligently with the field
1 87 A U.S. congressional committee felt the second of these c ate
gories was ignored too often. See § 2. 3 supra .
188 In the United States, the Assistant Commissioner (Compliance) is
responsible for the first of these, the second being under the jurisdic
tion of the Assistant Commissioner (Technical) .
The Commissioner
and Deputy Commissioner oversee both.
189 This no doubt is one reason why England' s Board of Inland Reve
nue feel s no great pressure to develop a full- sc ale rulings program.
See Chap. XVIII, §§ 2. 7 and 2.9 infra .
190 Statement of Commissioner Andrews, Hearings on Administration
of the Internal Revenue Laws, before a subcommittee of the House
Committee on Ways and Means, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1954).
191 In keeping with his promise to the congressional subcommittee,
the semiannual volume containing all published rulings specifically pro
vides that no unpublished ruling or technical advice may be relied
upon by field officials in resolving other cases. E. g., see the fly-leaf
in C .B . 1966-1.
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official the question of whether the latter was applying properly
the national office 's substantive instruction.
A third likely circumstance, adversely affecting adminis 
trative adherence to a proper publication standard, will be the
failure of that lesser but senior official, alone responsible for
the private and the published rulings programs, to attach a
sufficiently high relative priority to the publication function.
Typically, he lives with two facts : adequate staffing lags be
hind the workload of the two programs and outside pressure
on him for work completion relates almost exclusively to pri
vate rulings which interested individual taxpayers want ex
pedited because they involve prospective transactions . Left to
his own devices, the official's understandable inclination will
be to respond to this constant pressure, rather than to the
abstract requirements of wise administration. He will spread
disproportionately between the two programs the inadequate
absolute amount of man-hours available to him, to the relative
prejudice of the publication function. Without disparaging the
vital function of private rulings, including the fact that the
national office learns of new problems primarily from these
requests, wise administration requires a fair balance of atten
tion between the two programs. A private ruling, after all,
solves but one case; a published ruling covering an important
precedent-type situation not only resolves that problem uni
formly and efficiently on a nationwide basis but simultaneously
provides guidance regarding future transactions . The U.S. tax
administration, at an earlier point in its history, divided its
rulings personnel between the two functions, assigning them
to separate subunits 1 92 -each being assigned its own review
staff and subordinate director . It was hoped that this division
would assure permanently both a more balanced application of
manpower and proper application of the standard used in de 
termining whether publication of a position was warranted.
This device, however, proved to be both ineffective and in
efficient in solving the first of these problems. At best, it
assured only that some man-hours -not a fair proportion-would
be devoted to development of published positions . The constant
outside pressure to expedite private rulings tended to keep
disproportionately large the inventory backlog of the subunit
charged with the publication function when compared with that
of the office handling private rulings. In other words, division
192 Then characterized respectively as the Tax Rulings Division and
the Bulletin B ranch.
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of the functions between two subunits did not guarantee that
the official overseeing both would respond to their relative
needs when allocating manpower between them. Further, the
division was inefficient. Automatically it doubled the people
who had to deal with any problem warranting a published posi
tion. Spadework personnel in the publication unit, and later
its review staff, had to acquaint themselves with the total
ramifications of a problem to which both spadework and re 
view personnel in the private rulings office previously had
directed considerable attention. Ultimately it was recognized
that fewer total manhours would be needed if the latter, after
issuing a private ruling, were given the time to develop prop
erly a published version.
There is only one effective and effecient way to achieve a
fair balance in the attention given to the two intimately re 
lated efforts. The head of the tax administration himself must
provide inside pressure favoring a proper distribution of at
tention, to counteract outside pressure focusing exclusively on
pr ivate rulings . As in other situations, he can use a survey
team composed of personnel outside the rulings function periodi
cally to determine, on a sample basis, whether attention is
divided properly between these two efforts and whether rulings
personnel are making a genuine effort to comply with the
proper publication standard.

CHAPTER

III

ASSESSMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE
APPEAL PROCEDURES !
Section A.

Analytic Comparison of the "Six ":
R equirements of a Tax Administration 's
Own Conflict Resolution Procedures,
Viewed in Aggregate

3 . 1 Introduction: Comparative profiles of the entire conflict
resolution process

Because the character of the tax administration's own con
flict resolution process should depend upon the relative role it
is expected to play in a country 's entire tax dispute resolving
process, certain of the latter 's essential attributes and the
relative roles each of the "Six" assigns to independent tribunals
must first be mentioned. 2
Viewed as a whole , the dispute resolving process of a
country should be designed to insure it has a reasonable chance
to be both fair and efficient. For that process to be fair, at
some point taxpayers must have a readily realizable right, as
they do have in the six countries covered by this study, 3 to
lay their sides of disputes before a tribunal wholly independent
of the tax administration. However, it is relatively inefficient
to rely on such tribunals to resolve large numbers of tax con
troversies . Further, their use for such purpose either results
in an expensive drain on talented and rare manpower or in
vites reliance on inexpert personnel.
This is because in
creased reliance on this method of disposition brings an in
evitable increase in the required degree of decentralization;
1 For a thoughtful comparative analysis of this subj ect in the setting
of developing countrie s , see Liker, " The Legal and Institutional Frame
work of Tax Administration in Developing Countire s , " 14 U. C .L.A.L .
Rev,. 240 , 262-324 (1966). For an earlier study, see Surrey, "Tax Ad
ministration in Underdeveloped Countrie s , 11 12 U. Miami L . Rev. 158
(1958) .
2 See

Chap. IV infra regarding details of the conflict resolution
process at the j udicial level.
3 See Chaps. IV, VIII, XII, XVI, XX, and XXIV infra .
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otherwise, the inconvenience of the forum to taxpayers creates
an unfair arrangement.
It is this requisite multiplication of such tribunals , if they
are expertly staffed, that eats into a country's most talented
and expensive manpower . When this consumption is balanced
against a country 's other needs, the probably resulting in
sufficient, albeit expert, staffing will create crowded dockets
and delay as disputes await their turn. And those who repr e 
sent the parties, though once intimately acquainted with all the
niceties pertaining to a given dispute, must later-after the
p eriod of delay and j ust before the case comes to trial-take
additional time to become reacquainted with those niceties and
then devote yet further time , plus the time of the qualified
j udge, to educate that judge in all the ramifications.
At least less costly to such a country is the alternative
device of staffing its host of decentralized, outside, independent
tribunals -operating at the lowest level-with unremunerated
Great Britain has long followed the
and inexpert citizens .
practice of deflecting directly to just such tribunals income
tax disputes which a local assessment office is unable to r e 
solve . 4 Now 7 0 0 such tribunals (General Commissioners), with
two part-time lay citizens constituting a quorum for each case ,
Only the
are spread geographically throughout that island.
clerk is paid and has legal training. 5 This arrangement , how
ever convenient, invites three obvious risks if transplanted
elsewhere .
Except where appointment is deemed a distinct
honor , unpaid lay members may not give adequate time and
thought to their demanding function. Second, even if they do,
problems of any complexity may still baffle them. Finally,
given the large number of such tribunals, their lack of ex
pertise, and the fact their decisions are not published, a high
level of uniformity cannot be anticipated. 6 Apparently these
were the risks the British Parliament sought to avoid 7 when,
as distinct from income tax questions, jurisdiction over sur 
tax matters was lodged in a separate body of Special
4 see Chap. XIX, § 3.3 and Chap. XX, § 4 1 infra .
5 See Chap. XX, § 4. 1 infra .
6 According to a new but yet unpublished study of Michigan tax
procedures , all three consequences resulted from that state 's use of
approximately 1800 such tribunals to hear appeals of property tax
Also see the earlier legislatively sponsored Michigan
assessments.
.

Tax Study Staff Papers

7

214

et seq.

See Chap. XX , § 4.1 infra .

(1958).
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Commissioners composed of eight full-time, paid professionals
who ride circuit to the major metropolitan centers . 8 Further,
by giving these two distinct types of tribunals concurrent
jurisdiction over many but not all income tax questions , 9 some
taxpayers were granted what is tantamount to an election be 
tween them. Nevertheless, the widely scattered, uncoordinated
General Commissioners decide from 7, 000 to 8, 000 cases
annually , compared with approximately 1, 000 decided by the
Special Commissioners. l O In either case, further appeal to
the regular courts is available only with respect to questions
of law. ll
In contrast, because relatively few German taxpayers in
voked a previously existing option to lay their cases before
local lay committees, Germany recently abandoned that ar 
rangement. 12
Now a taxpayer who is unable to resolve a
dispute with local examining officials carries the case directly
to one of the specialized fiscal courts staffed predominantly
with professionals.l3 These necessarily are decentralized to
accommodate the yearly volume of 2 0, 000 tax disputes , of which
from 6, 000 to 8, 000 involve individual and corporate income
tax matters. l4 The Netherlands follows a similar practice,
utilizing specialized chambers within their regularly decentral
ized court system 1 5 to accommodate an annually recurring
2, 000 tax disputes which their local assessment office s ar e
unable t o resolve. Approximately seventy percent of these in
volve individual and corporate income tax matters. 16
Belgium and France, however, like Britain, make some
use of decentralized independent tribunals staffed, predominantly
but not exclusively , with outside laymen, to hear disputes be
tween taxpayers and local assessment officials, though in these
two countries these particular tribunals function solely in an
8 Id. at § 4 . 2 b infra .
9 Id . at § 4.1 infra .
10 Ap art from so-called "delay " cases.

infra .

ll id at § 4. 1 infra .
12 See Chap. XV, § 3.4a
13 See Chap. XVI, § 4. 1

Id. at

§§

4.3a and 4,3b

.

infra .
infra .

However, before such action is taken ,
on filing a protest (in the case of substantive issues) with the local
office , the individual taxpayer does obtain a hearing with the assess
ment official. See Chap. XV, § 3.4a infra .
14 see Chap. XVI, § 4. 3 infra .
1 5 See Chap. XXIV, § 4. 1 infra .
16 Id . at § 4.3 infra .
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advisory capacity . 17 The lack of expertise on the part of the
lay members presumably is responsible for denying to these
advisory tribunals, in contrast to the Br itish arrangement, any
jurisdiction over questions of law. 18 And to assure some ex
pertise regarding factual matters pertaining to a particular
taxpayer 's profession or business, each tribunal consists of a
large panel, and the lay members for any given case are
drawn from those having familiarity with the petitioning tax
payer 's vocation. 19 A final contrast to British practice is
most important. Taxpayers in Belgium and France may by 
pass these lay tribunals , 20 carrying their disputes with local
assessment offices directly to a higher in -service administra
tive appeal office (regional level), the jurisdiction of which
must be exhausted in any event 21 before the taxpayer can lay
his case before an outside professionally staffed independent
tribunal. In one recent year, compared with the 1 3 5 , 3 1 2 Bel gians who carried their disputes with a l ocal assessment office
to one of the higher but decentralized offices handling admin
istrative appeals, only 1 107 required a final decision from a
Corresponding
professionally staffed independent tribunal. 22
numbers in France were, respectively, 3 6 5, 000 and less than
5, 000. 23

The in-service appeal arrangement in the United States is
similar to that of Belgium and France in that the apex is also
at a higher regional level, rather than at the local district
level. However, to handle its administrative appeals, the
United States actually maintains formally constituted appeal
offices at both levels , each of which has decentralized sub
offices. 24
When a dispute cannot be resolved by a local

17 See

18 Ibid .
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid .

Chap. VII,

§ 3.2a infra and Chap. XI,

§§ 3.3 and 3.4a infra .

In Belgium, the assessor also can refuse to refer the case
to the lay group if he believes the referral will not contribute to a
proper determination of income. See Chap. VII, § 3.2a infra .
2 1 see Chap. VII, § 3 . 4 , Chap. VIII, § 4.1, and Chap. XI, § 3.4b infra .
22 See Chap. VII, § 3.4 and Chap. VIII, § 4.3 infra .
23 See Chap. XI, § 3.4b and Chap. XII , § 4. 3 infra .
24 Each of the 58 di stricts has a District Conference Office. Sub
offices actually are maintained only in the larger districts. Each of
the seven regions , among which the 58 districts are divided, main
tains an office known as the Appellate Division and, together, the seven
of these have about 40 geographically spread suboffices.

74

ASSESSMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS COMPARED

examining official, 25 the taxpayer is encouraged by letter from
the internal review staff to take the dispute to one or the
other of the administrative appeal offices, the review staff's
choice in a given case being determined by the character of
the underlying issue and by the amount involved. 2 6
Typically, small cases and cases which can be resolved
without special compromise authority (e.g. , valuation questions )
are encouraged to move to the lower of the two offices, i.e.,
to the appeal office operating at the district level. However,
any taxpayer may avail himself of both offices on a seriatum
basis before entering the litigation stage, or if encouraged to
go to the district level appeal office, he may bypass it, going
straightaway to the higher office, 27 or -contrary to the Belgian
and French practices-he may, bypassing both, carry his case
directly into the litigation stage . 28
At this latter point,
whether reached either after going through one or both of the
2 5 Basically , these fall into two categories.
Revenue agents are
the more highly trained of the two (see § 3.6 infra ) and in each district
are assigned to the Field Audit Branch of the local Audit Division. In
fiscal 1966, these branches examined 7 6 7 ,000 returns of which 590 ,000
were income tax returns and of these 166 ,000 were filed by corpora
tions, 411 ,000 by individuals and fiduciaries, and 13 ,000 by exempt
organizations.
Including supervisory personnel , this field force ex
pended 12 ,473 man-years in fulfilling this mission. The second category,
composed of tax technicians or office auditors , is situated in the Office
Audit Branch of each local Audit Division. Together these consumed
3 ,093 man-years in examining 2 ,6 8 1 ,000 of the less complicated in
dividual returns. Much of this work was accomplished by correspond
ence.
See Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Annual Report 1966,
23 and 6 8 .
The 58 district Audit Divisions spread personnel among 800
different posts of duty.
2 6 Rev. Proc. 6 7 -2 7 , I.R.B. 1967-2 0 , 45. See § 3. 7 infra . The tax

payer simultaneously receives a written report, prepared by the
examining officer but internally reviewed by a separate review staff,
explaining the adjustments which the examining official proposed. In
cases handled by examiners in the Field Audit Branch, these adjust
ments will have been orally discussed with the taxpayer at an earlier
point when the examiner sought to get the taxpayer to accept the ad
justments by executing Form 870. See U.S. Treas. Reg. § 601. 105 (c) (2) .
In the smaller cases handled by the Office Audit Branch, at least half
the cases are dealt with by correspondence, and the taxpayer's first
chance to indicate his acceptance of an adjustment may be at that point
when, by letter , he is invited to appeal to a given office and he does
not accept the adjustment. See U.S. Treas. Reg. § 601.105(c) (1).
2 7 U.S. Treas. Reg. §§ 6 0 1 . 105 and 601.106.
2 8 See Chap. IV infra .
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administrative appeal levels or after bypassing both, U.S.
practice differs on two principal counts from that of the other
countries described above .
First, at the moment a case is docketed initially with an
outside independent tribunal, the United States is the only coun
try to shift substantial administrative control and the litigation
representation function to yet different government offices,
composed entirely of lawyer s . 29 Since these separate offices
(legal staffs) settle, 30 before trial, over eighty percent of all
tax cases docketed with the independent tribunals, 31 they prop
erly should be considered as a third level of administrative
appeal . Second, the taxpayer at the litigation stage has three
choices , two of which are substantially different. By paying
the contested amount and suing for refund, the taxpayer may
take his case into a nonspecialist federal district court of
general jurisdiction. Only here-that is, subsequent to admin
istrative appeals and in the course of trial before this one
tribunal -are outside laymen used: in U.S. district court tax
cases, either party may ask that a jury find the facts, though
the judge will resolve all questions of law. As an alternative
to the district court route , the taxpayer, before paying the
contested amount, may docket his case with a specialized court
(Tax Court of the United States) which rides circuit, with the
judges finding the facts and deciding all questions of law. 32
29 In cases docketed with the Tax Court, the Chief Counsel of the
Internal Revenue Service performs the litigation-representation func
tion through his several Regional Counsels who maintain approximately
40 suboffices.
Should the taxpayer , instead of taking the case to the
Tax Court, pay the contested amount and sue for refund before either
or
the Court of Claims , the litigation
a federal district court
representation function will be performed by the legal staff of the
centralized Tax Division of the Justice Department.
30 In cases docketed with the Tax Court, settlement authority actually
is shared jointly by the Regional Counsels ' and Regional Appellate
D ivision' s suboffices.
Exclusive settlement jurisdiction passes to
the Regional Counsels' offices only when the court calls the calendar.
Rev. Proc. 60-18, C.B. 1960-2 , 988.
In cases filed either with a
federal district court or the Court of Claims , the centralized Tax
Division of the Justice Department has settlement authority but it
consults with the centralized Refund Litigation Division of the Service 's
Chief Counsel' s Office before settling important cases.
See Chap. IV
infra .
3 1 commissioner of Internal Revenue , op . cit. supra note 2 5 , Tables
17 and 2 0 at 134 and 135.
32 The third alternative is to pay the contested amount and sue for
refund in the Court of Claims. This court uses legally trained Com
missioners to find the facts.
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In one recent year , approximately 60, 000 cases were ap
pealed to at least one of the three administrative appeal levels
described above . Of this number, approximately 42, 000 were
routed by the district review staffs to the District Conference
Offices . 33 Cases not agreed to there (13, 792) 34 represented
about half the 27, 994 disputes which were appealed to the higher
regional conference offices (Appellate Divisions) . 35 The other
half of that 27, 9 94 went to those regional offices in the first
instance, either on recommendation of the district review staffs
or at the election of the taxpayer . Cases in which agreement
was not reached at the regional level, together with the some 
what fewer than 5, 000 which bypassed that same level, 36 made
up the approximately 8, 400 cases which were docketed with
independent tribunals (courts). 37 These outside tribunals, how
ever , actually decided fewer than 1, 300 cases; 38 practically
all the others 39 were settled, before trial, by the government's
legal staffs, 4 0 which for that reason were characterized here 
tofore as the third administrative appeal level.
In summary, it is at least clear from the foregoing that
income tax laws of small countries as well as large can gen
erate a large number of disputes between taxpayers and local
examining officials . Further, should a now developing country
decide, for the first time, to resolve this entire mass of ex
pected conflicts by forcing taxpayer reliance on a host of new
outside or independent decentralized tribunals, that type of
country in particular invites serious risks and problems whether
it tries to staff those tribunals with professionals or inexpert
laymen. Thus, there would be a distinct advantage in relying
instead on properly designed internal administrative appeal
procedures and, only where need be , on outside professionally
staffed tribunals. However , even this arrangement will not be
efficient unless the administrative machinery itself actually
33 commissioner of Internal Revenue , op . cit . supra note 2 5 , at 25.
34 [bid.
35 Id ., Tables 15 and 16 at 133.
36 Id ., Table 17 at 134. These were based on final statutory notices
of deficiency issued at the district level.
37 0f these 6 ,874 were docketed with the Tax Court, 1 ,383 with
federal district courts , and 125 with the Court of Claims. Id ., Tables 17
and 20 , at 134 and 135.
38 0f these, the Tax Court decided 726 , district courts 488 , and the
Court of Claims 58 . Ibid .
39[bid.
40 see note 3 0 supra .
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has a reasonable chance t o dispose , by bilateral agreement,
of the great preponderance of these disputes. And it will have
that reasonable chance only if it simultaneously possesses a
reasonable chance both to be and appear to be fair. In those
circumstances alone will taxpayers in sufficient numbers be
willing, on a bilateral basis, to accept results achieved at that
level. The administrative machinery itself also should have a
reasonable chance to accomplish these dispositions efficiently ;
this, after all, is the primary aim in trying to reach agree 
ment in as many disputes as possible without resort to an
outside tribunal.
The administrative process , viewed in aggregate, will have
a more reasonable chance both to be and appear to be fair,
and also to be efficient in disposing of these disputes, if all
parties know that at some point a specific office (i) is required
to look at each dispute with a proper degree of impartiality,
(ii) has a reasonable chance to become fully acquainted with
the taxpayer 's side of the story, and (iii) can assure "justice, "
which prior to litigation means that some such office is en
dowed with "complete settlement" authority. Each of these
matters is separately discussed below.
3 . 2 Assuring impartiality of administrative conflict resolution
machinery
If the administration's own conflict resolution machinery
is to have a reasonable chance both to be and appear to be

fair, it should be freed from the conflict of interest which al
most inherently exists where the same person bears the two
fold responsibility : to resolve tax disputes impartially and to
produce revenue . One device alone will tend to eliminate, at
least from the vantage point of ordinary taxpayers, both the
appearance and actual existence of this conflict.
However,
sophisticated practitioners should acknowledge that a second
device at the least will minimize the adverse effect of that
conflict.
The first and preferred device is to separate, organiza
tionally, personnel who hear at least the final administrative
appeal from personnel immediately responsible for the original
examination and assessment function. 41 Obviously also, the
4 l n would logically follow from this that appeal personnel-while
trying to resolve an existing dispute-would not then be expected to
look for new affirmative issues.
To do so invites both the fact and
appearance of the previously mentioned conflict, for raising issues is
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Belgium,
former should be free of the latter's control. 42
France, and the United States do divorce these two groups of
personnel. While local district offices carry on the basic ex
amination function, 4 3 the apex of the administrative -appeal
function is at a higher regional office . 44 As previously noted,
however, the United States, by a published procedure, also
makes possible an administrative appeal within the local district

(footnote continued)
an examination or revenue producing function.
So complete a bill of
divorcement within the administration itself becomes less logical ,
however, if the administration otherwise extends the examination func 
tion right up to the courthouse step s , by raising new issues at that yet
later point when a controversy regarding old issues is laid before a
completely independent quasi-judicial or judicial body. In other words,
if at the litigation stage the administration both can and does follow
the practice of raising new issue s , the argument for foregoing that
practice at the earlier point when the case reached the apex of the
administrative conflict resolution procedure is drained of much of
its vitality.
In the United states , a deficiency asserted by the government is
presumptively correct at that point when a taxpayer takes that issue to
While the government' s answer
the Tax Court of the United States.
to a petition filed by a taxpayer with that court can raise a new issue,
the burden of proof regarding that new issue is borne by the govern
ment, not by the taxpayer. Rule 32 , Tax Court of the United States . It
is widely believed in the United States that this shift tends to dampen
the likelihood that the legal staff (Regional Counsel) will raise new
affirmative issues after the case has been docketed. This belief, coupled
with the fact that the case still can be administratively 1 1settled "
before trial leads many taxpayers to bypass yet another regional settle
ment office (Appellate Division) until after the case is docketed. Relevant
is the fact that if the taxpayer had gone to the Appellate Division first,
but been unable to reach agreement there, the doctrine of presumptive
correctness would have attached to any new issues that division raised
and included in its statutory notice of deficiency.
42 Also at least the appearance of impartiality on the part of the
administrative appeal official will be prejudiced if the original examin
ing official attends the hearing and, indeed, sits at the same conference
table. To avoid this prejudice as well as to save the time of the original
examining official and to put pressure on him in the first instance to
prepare an adequate written explanation of his adjustments (see note 2 6
supra) , U.S. procedures properly provide that ordinarily the examiner
himself will not attend the hearing. Rev. Proc. 67-2 7 , I.R.B. 1967-2 0 , 45.
4 3 See §§ 3. 2 in Chaps. VII and XI infra, and U.S. Treas. Reg.

§ 601. 105.
44 See §§ 3.4
§ 601. 106.

in

Chaps. VII

and

XI infra,

and

U.S. Treas. Reg.
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itself (District Conference Office). 45 In the early 1 9 5 0's, these
appeals were heard by the immediate supervisor of the par 
ticular examining officer who had proposed the contested de 
ficiency adjustment to the taxpayer 's return.
Most practi
tioners, however, pointedly objected to this arrangement. They
believed the relationship and resulting daily contact between
the supervisor and the examining officer prejudiced the likeli
hood the former would be impartial.
For this reason, many
practitioners elected to bypass this particular appeal, taking
their disputes with examining officers directly to the higher
regional level. 46 The administration responded to this bypass
pattern by a series of steps taken in the late 1 950's and early
1 960's. 47 Among other things, it divorced the district appeal
function from the district examination function by shifting
jurisdiction over appeals at the district level from the imme 
diate supervisors of examining officers to a separate intra
district office 48 created and staffed solely to carry on this
function. 49
In contrast to the foregoing, the one administrative appeal
allowed in Germany and the Netherlands is heard by the same
office which originally proposed the assessment from which
In most cases, a similar but not
the dispute e merged. 5 0
45 See U.S. Treas. Reg. § 60 1. 10 5 (c) and Rev. Proc. 67-2 7 , I.R.B.
1967 -2 0 , 45.
46 For another reason why so many practitioners bypassed the
district office , see § 3. 7 infra ..
47 See Rev. Proc. 56-34, C.B . 1956-2 , 1396; Rev. Proc. 60-16, C.B.
1960-2 , 940 ; Rev. Proc. 60-2 4 , C.B. 1960-2 , 998 ; Rev. Proc. 62-8,
C.B. 1962 - 1 , 431; and Rev. Proc. 64- 3 8 , 1964-2 , 965 , superseded by
Rev. Proc. 67-27 , I.R.B. 1967-2 0 , 45.
48 The head of this office ( Chief, Conference Staff) is not under the
control or supervision of the chiefs of the two separate branches which
conduct field and office audits. While all three do report to the Chief
of the district' s Audit Division, in theory the latter does not become
involved in the appeal process. In other words, the Chief of the Con
ference Staff reports to the Chief of the Audit Division only for ad
Appeal from a district Conference Staff s
ministrative purposes.
determination goes to the higher regional Appellate Division.
49 The United States also finally reversed its attitude toward the
bypass problem.
In 1964 , it actively began to encourage taxpayers
to bypass the District Conference Office in certain types of cases and
to take them directly to the higher regional office.
Rev. Proc. 64-3 8 ,
C . B . 1964-2 , 965, superseded by , but to the same effect, Rev. Pro c .
67-2 7 , I.R.B. , 1967-2 0 , 45.
See § 3 . 7 infra for the reasons which
led to this change and for a description of the types of cases to which
the changed attitude was applied.
50 See §§ 3 . 3 and 3. 4 in Chaps. XV and XXIII infra.
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formally constituted practice prevails in Britain. 51 In these
countries a taxpayer, who understandably might prefer not to
discuss the issue again with the same person who actually
proposed the original assessment, at best ordinarily can ex
pect to discuss the issue only with an official in that same
office who is senior to the examiner . 52
However, each of the se three European countries, in further
contrast to U.S. practice, does employ a second but less effe c 
tive device which tends at least to reduce the adverse effect
of the underlying conflict between the hearing -officer's appeal
and revenue -producing responsibilities . The likelihood that the
office will view appeals with a proper degree of impartiality
is enhanced by the fact that it-that is, one of its inspectors 
also actually must fulfill the trial litigation-representation
function for the government if agreement is not reached and
if the taxpayer dockets the dispute with an outside independent
trial tribunal. 53
Human natur e being what it is, no local in
spector wants to build up a record of losses in fulfilling his
litigation function.
This inevitable concern at the minimum
puts some pressure on the local office, during the earlier ad
ministrative appeal, to conform to a proper degree of impar 
tiality. Indeed, many practitioners in the United States believe
that the absence of just this type of pressure on the two U.S.
offices constituted solely to hear administrative appeals (Dis
trict Conference Office and Regional Appellate Division) de 
tracts from the prospect they will exercise an adequate degree
of impartiality. 54 As previously noted, once a tax case in the
51 Because not formally provided for and because the reconsideration
is by the examiner 's own senior, the arrangement actually is deemed
to be a mere extension of the examination , rather than an appeal. See
Chap. XIX, §§ 3.3 and 3.4 infra .
Also because the procedure is not
formally provided for, some dissatisfied taxpayers write directly to
the national office and it intervenes.
52 In support of an argument that this p rocedure does provide a fair
re-examination in Germany , see Chap. XV, § 3.4 infra . Also, as to an
alternative possibility in Britain, see note 51.
53 See § 4.3 in Chaps. XVI and XXIV infra .
In Britain, however ,
this is consistently s o only a s to income o r profits taxes appealed to
the independent General Commissioners. In the case of appeals to the
Special Commissioners , a local inspector may and often does represent
the government if the question involves income or profits taxe s , but
never if it involves the surtax. A separate Solicitors ' Office represents
the government in all surtax cases. See Chap. XX, §§ 4.3a and b infra .
54 E g., see Hobbet and Donaldson , "A Practitioner ' s Guide to
Making a Good Settlement Within the IRS, 11
15 J. Taxation 2 3 0 , 2 3 3
..

(1961).
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United States is docketed, say, with the Tax Court, the litiga
tion-representation function is handled by a third office (Re 
gional Counsel) .
Because this third office also shares the
power to settle cases administratively once they are docketed
with the T ax Court, 55 many practitioners believe it de sirable
to bypass the first two offices and seek an administrative
settlement only after their cases have been docketed. 56 One
reason is that these particular practitioners believe the third
office's litigation-representation responsibility leads it to be
more "realistic " than the first two in consider ing possible
administrative settlements. 57
Implicit in this is the suggestion that a tax administration,
to enhance both the fact and appearance of impartiality on the
part of its administrative appeal process, should implement
b oth of the arrangements considered here . 5 8 I n short, person
nel who hear the final administrative appeal should be sepa
r ated, organizationally, from those immediately responsible
for the initial examination and assessment function, and should
fulfill the litigation-representation function at the trial level if
agree ment is not reached.
Certainly the second of these,
standing alone, would contribute little to impartiality in any
case where the relatively small amount in dispute leads the
official to conclude that it would be against the given taxpayer 's
economic self-interest to assume the direct and indirect costs
associated with litigation. 59 Not one of the countries covered
55 See
5 6 See

note 3 0 supra .
Hobbet and Donaldson, op . cit. supra note 54. Also see U . S.
Treasury Department, " Tax Practitioner Attitude Survey ," 17 Bull .
Tax . Section, A . B . A . 29 at 52 , questions 17 and 18 (Oct. 1964). For
another factor contributing to the bypass problem , see note 41 supra .
In fiscal 1966 , 4 ,489 cases were docketed by taxpayers before any
effort was made to settle with the higher regional offices. However ,
in some of these cases , the taxpayer had no choice. For the district
director himself, because the statute of limitations was about to run
on the case , may have issued a final statutory notice of deficiency ,
thus forcing the taxpayer to docket his case with the Tax Court before
trying to arrange an administrative settlement at the regional level.
57 Id . Where the first two offices had the opportunity but were unable
to achieve agreement with the taxpayer and the case then is tried and
lost, they at least unconsciously can take refuge in the possibility that
the loss resulted , not from overreaching on their part, but rather from
the failure of the third office to perform its representation function
skillfully.
58 See § 3.4 infra for discussion of a third arrangement which will
contribute substantially to this same end.
5 9 See note 74 infra for an arrangement designed at least to cushion
this prospect.
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by this study employs both of the previously described devices .
France, however, comes close. It maintains a regional office
to which a taxpayer can appeal a local office 's determination,
and that higher office is responsible at least for final prepa
ration of the government's memorandum of law if litigation
ensue s . However, in such event, it appoints an inspector from
the particular local office where the outside tribunal sits, to
appear for the government at the hearing. 6 0
3 . 3 Assuring adminis trative machinery a reasonable chance to
become fully acquainted with the taxpayer's side
An inherent conflict exists also between the need to give
the administrative appeal procedure a reasonable chance to
dispose of most disputes by bilateral agreement and the com 
peting need to avoid laying undue formal burdens o n taxpayers.
On the one hand, a typical taxpayer under standably wants
to spend only the m inimum time, effort, and money he con
s ider s necessary to convince the administration his position
is correct. On the other hand, in theory, the chance of an
administrative appeal office to be fair will be as good as that
of an outside tribunal only if, before the former office hears
an appeal, the taxpayer devotes as much time, effort, and
money in developing his case (marshaling evidence regarding
facts and arguments regarding legal issues) as he would if the
matter were to be heard instead by the outside tribunal. At
the administrative level, however, many taxpayers will not
devote that amount of energy to developing their cases. There
is an obvious reason: at this level, a taxpayer is not yet "up
against the gun" ; recourse to an outside tribunal remains
available if need be, and only then will he suffer the felt pres 
sure to "button up " his side of the case from top t o bottom.
In consequence, an administrative office just does not have as
good a chance to reach the truly correct result as does an
outside tribunal, and this reduces the former's ability to obtain
taxpayer acceptance of its determinations .
Merely to require the taxpayer, as do certain European
countries, 61 but not the United States, 6 2 to exhaust the
60 See Chap. XII, § 4 . 3 infra .
61 For example , Belgium (see Chap. VII, § 4. 1 infra) and France
(see Chap. XI, § 3 .4b infra).
62 A U.s. taxpayer who disagrees with the adjustments an examiner
proposes to make in the taxpayer's return can bypass the administrative
appeal offices en route to litigation in either of two ways.
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administrative remedy before invoking the jurisdiction of an
outside tribunal, will not as sure the administrative office's ex
posure to a fully developed case on the taxpayer 's side . "Hit
and-run" tactics could satisfy this formal requirement. 63
Comprehensive development and indoctrination at the adminis 
trative level can b e assured absolutely only b y a requirement
that puts each taxpayer "up against the gun" prior at least to
completing his administrative hearing before the highe st in
service office to which he can appeal. In effect, it would be
necessary to provide that a taxpayer could introduce later as
evidence - in litigation before an outside independent tribunal
only that evidence which he had submitted to the highe st
(footnote continued)
First, the initial letter he receives explaining the adjustment (or ,
in small cases , a second letter, if the initial letter invited him to a
district conference) will invite him, should he reject the adjustments ,
to enter an administrative appeal to the regional Appellate Division
by filing a written protest. His default on this invitation will lead the
district director to issue a statutorily required "notice of deficiency"
(so-called 90 -day letter). This informs the taxpayer that the deficiency
will be assessed in 90 days should the taxpayer fail to file a petition
during that period with the Tax Court of the United States. By filing
such a petition within that time, the taxpayer postpones the ass e s sment
and the need to pay the asserted deficiency, though interest will run if
the government ultimately prevails.
Second, taxpayers who plan to bypass the administrative appeal
offices but p refer to litigate before a federal district court or the
Court of Claims , may accomplish this by agreeing with the examiner' s
proposed adjustment (executing Form 870) and by paying the entire
asserted deficiency.
Flora v. u.s., 362 U.S. 145 (196 0 ) . The tax
payer then files a claim for refund. In theory , the administrative appeal
procedures applicable to refund claims disallowed by an examiner
ordinarily conform to those applied to disputed deficiencies , the prime
exception being that an administrative refund exceeding $100 ,000 must
be reviewed by the congressional Joint Committee on Internal Revenue
Taxation.
See I.R.C. § 6405 (a) ; U.S. Treas. Reg. §§ 6 0 1. 10 5 (e) (2 ) and
6 0 1. 10 8 ; Woodworth, " The New Joint Committee Refund Procedure,"
19 Bull . Tax . Section, A .B .A . 9 (Oct. 1965). However , the hypothetical
taxpayer in this case does not intend to take advantage of the available
administrative appeals and, upon final rejection of his claim, may sue
for refund before either of the two previously mentioned courts.
63 To illustrate , before 19 64 , when all U.S. taxpayers were encouraged
to take their disputes first to the lower of the two administrative appeal
offices (District Conference Office) , officials working at that level
indicated they often encountered this " hit-and-run" tactic from tax
payers who invoked their jurisdiction but intended from the outset to
take their cases to the higher regional appeal office the moment they
determined that, to obtain a satisfactory disposition, they would have
to develop their cases fully. Also see note 64 infra .
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in-service echelon.64 Logically, he further would be required
to submit the same brief on the law. 65
Unquestionably, these formal requirements could be im
posed in a manner that would achieve their aim without de 
priving taxpayers of a preliminary chance to reach agreement
at a more informal hearing before that same high level in
service office . Proceedings there could be divided into two
successive stages. The formal requirements would apply solely
to the second stage . This itself would encourage taxpayers to
develop their cases at least to a reasonable point prior to the
first and more informal stage, for those who reached agree 
ment there would be completely freed from the burdens and
r isks associated with the formal requirements. Only those un
able to achieve agreement in that first stage would have to
assume these burdens in preparation for the second stage . 66
64 The United States does not impose any such requirement. See
In consequence, some administrative officials working
note 62 supra .
in the regional Appellate Divisions have indicated that some taxpayers
who did appeal to that office and , on failing to achieve agreement there,
then did docket their cases with the Tax Court, fully developed their
cases only at the latter point. In effect, it was said that the complexion
of the taxpayer's case actually changed between the two different stages.
This was said to be at least one reason why many dispute s , though not
resolved by bilateral agreement during the first administrative appeal
to the Appellate Division, were administratively settled to the satis
faction of both sides after the case had been docketed with the court
but before it was tried. Indeed, for this and other reasons , well over
a maj ority of the docketed cases are administratively settled before
trial.
See Commissioner of Internal Revenue , op . cit. supra note 2 5 ,
Table 1 7 B at 134.
For a detailed explanation regarding the proposal, see Traynor ,
"Administrative and Judicial Procedure for Federal Income , Estate ,
and Gift Tax Case s , " 38 Colum . L . Rev . 1393 (1938 ) ; Surrey, " The
Traynor Plan- What It Is ," 1 7 Taxes 393 (1939 ). Mr. Traynor properly
suggests that the independent tribunal itself would need some latitude
in providing for exceptions to accommodate situations where the tax
payer actually was not at fault in failing, at the earlier administrative
hearing, to submit certain evidence.
65 With provision for the same type of exception as that suggested
in note 64 supra regarding evidence.
66 See Traynor , op . cit. supra note 64. Absent the two-stage divi
sion , the formal requirements would rob the entire procedure before
that office of its informality. If there is but a single stage , with these
formal requirements applying to it, many taxpayers would believe at
the outset that they could afford to do no less than the perfect j ob and
actually would expend more time , effort, and money than was necessary
in arriving at a satisfactory disposition.
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Just as unquestionably, even with this division, many tax
payers -required to go through the second stage -would deem
these formal requirements to be in their case s both onerous
and superfluous. From the beginning, they had expected the
administrative appeal office (local or regional) to react ad 
versely in resolving the debatable que stions in their cases if
only because the national office itself had previously published
its own adverse position. Thus, these taxpayers, if given a
free choice and if guided by self-interest, might prefer to by
pass completely the administrative appeal machinery, and place
their cases before an outside tribunal as quickly as possible .
Their situation also illustrates the principal yet distinctly dif
ferent reason why these for mal requirements, without more,
would not achieve their ultimate purpose in the case of many
other taxpayers whose need to resort to an outside tribunal
would remain. An adverse administrative determination in any
case really open to ser ious doubt will not convince any given
taxpayer that an outside tr ibunal necessarily would reach the
same adverse result even though exposed to the same evidence
and the same brief. In all such truly debatable cases, a tax
payer 's incentive to duplicate his effort by resorting to an out
side tribunal would remain high.
But this incentive could be dramatically reduced in the
type of truly debatable cases which a court necessarily would
decide entirely for one side or the other if a country adopts
the policy of having the administrative office in question com
promise such cases by reference to the litigation hazards, test
case s aside. This practice alone, without the above formal
require ments, would tend to induce these taxpayers, Prior to
such administrative hearings, to expend the time and effort
essential to proper development of their cases if only because,
at that point, they would be "up against the gun" with respect
to this type of justice (compromise).
Because -absent this
practice -the previously discussed formal requirements would
be onerous to so many, because the compromise practice alone
will go a long way in achieving the aims of those for mal re 
quirements, and because this compromise practice is otherwise
intrinsically justified for the reasons explained in the next
subtopic, the formal requirements themselves should not be
imposed by any country until it has determined from its own
experience that they are indispensable in maintaining an orderly
administrative process and in keeping outside tribunals from
be ing inundated with tax disputes .
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3.4 Assuring justice : Need for complete "settlement" authority
The nature of the question appealed to an administrative
office can affect adversely its ability to be fair and, thus, its
opportunity to dispose of the issues by bilateral agreement.
This is not a problem if the controversy involves, say, the
valuation of property. In such a case, the office, in fairness,
may find that the original examiner's proposed valuation actu
ally was too high though the taxpayer 's was too low. Officials
hearing this type of appeal in any one of the six countries
covered by this study possess adequate authority to reach an
agreement with the taxpayer on the basis of what the officials
believe to be an appropriate intermediate figure .
This, after
all, is the result a court might reach if the matter were liti
gated.
But these administrative officials also often encounter the
type of issue which, if litigated, a court-to conform to the
statute -necessarily must decide entirely for one side or the
other. 6 7 At the prelitigation point of an administrative appeal,
however, the right answer, albeit yes or no, actually may be
open to serious doubt. This is because, at that point, the truly
"correct" answer can be nothing more than a prediction of the
likely decision by an outside independent tr ibunal if litigation
actually ensued. If the official at the administrative hearing
believes that, if litigation ensues, the odds regarding the
67 In determining the frequency with which these arise , vis-a-vis
disputes regarding a mere amount, it must be remembered that a given
subtotal on a return actually may cover many of the former. The fact
that a court would find the taxpayer right as to some, but wrong as to
others , and thus in effect require a change in the subtotal , does not
mean that the dispute concerned a mere amount. To illustrate , con
sider a country which allows a current deduction for true 1 1repair 11
expense s , but requires capitalization of expenditures for " improve
ments " in the nature of capital expenditures. The subtotal on a return
reflecting so-called "repair expenses" actually may include a number
of separate projects and, as to each of these, a court-viewing the
projects separately-necessarily may have to decide the issue of de
ductibility entirely for one side or the other. The fact that the tax
payer might win as to three proj ects , with the government winning
on five , hardly means that there was but one issue involving merely
an amount.
There were eight issues. One or more of many separate
items hidden in a subtotal may raise both types of questions. For
example , there may be an issue as to whether a given trip was pri
marily a deductible business trip or primarily a nondeductible personal
trip , and even if it is the former , there may be an additional issue
regarding the amount actually expended for business purposes.
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government's chance of success are r oughly fifty -fifty, pre 
sumably the real worth or value of the government's equity in
the case is, as of that moment, only fifty percent of the pre 
viously proposed adjustment. However , in only three of the
six countries (France, the Netherlands, and the United States)
is it ever possible at the administrative level to compromise,
by reference to these litigation hazards, this type of issue . 68
In the United States, appeal offices now situated at the
regional level received initial authority to exercise this com
plete type of settlement authority 69 four decades ago, in the
1 920's. By then, policy-making officials had learned, the "hard
way, " the first of five reasons which cumulatively justify this
practice. They had found it was fruitless to expect a well
represented taxpayer to make an outright concession if he be 
lieved he had, say, anything approaching a fifty percent chance
to succeed in litigation. Indeed, by the time the administra 
tion decided to permit appeal office s now s ituated at the r e 
gional level to exercise complete settlement authority, the
then fairly new Tax Court 7 0 already had become inundated
with petitions from unsatisfied taxpayer s and, in consequence,
struggled with a tremendous backlog of unresolved tax dis 
putes .71
Second, U.S. policy-making officials believed it actually
was unfair for an administrative office to expect the particu
lar taxpayer described above voluntarily to pay one hundred
percent and thereby forfeit his valuable possibility (say, fifty
percent) to prevail in litigation.
A compromise, based on
68 See

Chap. XI, §§ 3 .2a and 3 .4b, and Chap. XXIII, §§ 3 .2a and 3 .4a
Also U.S. Treas. Reg. § 601.106 (f) , Rule II. That such is not
permitted in Belgium , see Chap. VII, § 3.4 infra; in Germany, see
Chap. XV, § 3.4a infra ; or in Great Britain, see Chap. XIX, §§ 3.2 and
3.4 infra .
It is widely recognized among U .S. practitioners that these
compromises may be effected by splitting a single issue, by trading
issues-sometimes subtly , sometimes otherwise , or by a package settle
ment.
In the United States , the basic delegation is from the Commis
sioner directly to certain officials in the regional Appellate Division,
not to the Regional Commissioner who otherwise exercises adminis
trative
jurisdiction
over
the
latter officials. U.S. Treas. Reg.
§ 601.10 6 (a) .
69 For limitations on this authority, see U .S. Treas. Reg. § 60 1 . 106 (a)
(2) (iii) , (iv) , and (v) ; and notes 73 and 74 infra . Regarding the extent
this authority is shared with the legal staff once a case is docketed in
court, see note 30 supra .
70 But at that time called the Board of Tax Appeals.
.
71 Its docket included 22 ,000 cases. See Mill s , "Federal Adminis
tration of Tax Law," 52 N.Y. State Bar Ass oc . Proc . 495 at 500 (1929 ) .

infra.
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b ilateral concessions suitably responsive to the competing
weaknesses and strengths of the two opposing sides, was thought
to achieve the most appropr iate measure of "justice " if the
parties agreed to forego litigation.
Third, it was recognized that, in many such disputes,
actual litigation would not really help the tax system, i.e .,
would not contribute t o needed clarification of the law. 72 For
example, s ome purely legal issues are unlikely to recur with
any frequency, if at all.
Again, other more frequently re 
curring issues, though of a type which a court necessarily
would decide entirely for one side or the other, actually may
involve mixed questions of law and fact and too many decisions
by diverse decentralized trial tr ibunals may serve to confuse ,
not t o clarify, the area. Finally, litigation o f purely factual
questions of this type would have little, if any, precedent value .
On the other hand, the u.s. tax administration recently has
made it exceedingly clear that a legal issue expected to recur
frequently should not be compromised, for in this circumstance
early litigation of a test case would.contribute to needed clari
fication of the law. 73
otherwise, however, a U .S. taxpayer
e njoys what is tantamount to an election. On appealing to the
regional level, he can seek to compromise a debatable issue
by reference to the litigation hazards. If he does not agree
with the official's supposedly impartial appraisal of those
hazards, he can force the matter to litigation, in which event
in the type of case under discussion here -a court will decide
entirely for one side or the other .
Fourth, to authorize an administrative appeal office to
exercise complete settlement authority over issues a court
72 See Mills , op . cit. supra note 7 1 , at 497 and 501.
7 3 see Cohen, " Current Developments in the Chief C ounsel ' s Office ,"
42 Taxes 663 (1964). These test cases will be chosen by the National
Office through a more-or-less computerized information retrieval
system which ultimately will cover all cases reaching the regional
level.
Also, implicit in the fact that the National Office previously
has published a revenue ruling on a given issue is the supposition that
this issue is sufficiently important to warrant being tested in court,
though this hardly could mean that every case touching that issue would
be a good test case.
By way of contrast, not every private ruling in
volves a matter sufficiently important to the tax system to warrant
litigation.
Thus , some adverse private rulings , issued at a point when
a transaction was prospective , should be subject to compromise by
reference to the litigation hazards if the taxpayer actually consumates
the transaction.
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would decide entirely for one side or the other tends also� as
to those issues, to satisfy an important need of that office .
The delegation increases that office 's opportunity to become
fully acquainted with the taxpayer 's side . In many such cases,
of course, the official still may conclude that the issue is not
open to any real doubt and will refuse to compromise in the
belief that the government almost certainly would win if litiga
tion ensues. 74 But taxpayers will not necessarily know this
in advanc e .
Thus, at least those who initially believe they
have a significant argument but prefer, if possible, to avoid
expensive, time -consuming litigation which also exposes their
financial affairs to public view, will be induced by the possible
chance to compromise -available if at all only at the adminis 
trative level-to develop their cases fully before the hearing
at that level. And this increases the likelihood administrative
officials will be able to appraise all cases fairly and, con
sequently, to secure more bilateral agreements.
Fifth and finally, the compromises so achieved no doubt will
produce more genuine uniformity among taxpayers concerned
74 In the United States , the authority of the regional Appellate Divi
sions to compromise by reference to the litigation hazards is subject
to the limitation that "no settlement will be countenanced based upon
nuisance
value
of
the case to either party. " U.S. Treas. Reg.
Italics added.
§ 601.10 6 (f) , Rule II.
A former senior official of the
Appellate Division in New York has suggested that offers of 20 percent
of the asserted deficiency , if truly responsive to the litigation hazards ,
should not be deemed a mere nuisance value , but that offers below that
Rosenweig, ' ' Pre- Trial Strategy in a
figure should be so treated.
Tax Case: Techniques and Limitations in Dealing with the Appellate
Division , " N.Y. U, 22d Inst . on Fed. Tax 10 9 , 123 (1964).
In other
word s , as to a doubtful issue which a court necessarily would decide
entirely for one side or the other, if the taxpayer holds what the gov
ernment' s settlement official believes to be les s than a one out of five
chance to prevail if the matter were litigated but refuses to concede,
the government should force the matter to litigation rather than accept
less than the full amount.
And if the government is the party holding
such a small chance, the general instructions to its settlement official
should contemplate that he would concede the issue.
However , as to small doubtful cases of the type under considera
tion here, it is believed that the government' s instruction s to its settle
ment officials regarding its own concession policy should take into
account the cost of litigation to the taxpayer. In short, it ought not
expect any payment unles s the settlement official believes it has a
better than even chance to prevail should litigation ensue. To expect
a 20 percent payment, for a one out of five chance , in a case where,
solely because of the cost of litigation, it is against the taxpayer' s
economic self-interest to litigate , is tantamount to extortion.
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with the type of debatable issues under discussion here than
would an attempt, by the substantial number of widely scattered
administrative officials necessar ily involved, to decide each
such case entirely for one side or the other .
Some would
abandon an issue which others would force to litigation.
Section B .

Analytic Comparison of Additional

Requirements :
Echelon by Echelon View
of Assessment and Administrative
Conflict R esolution Procedures
Examining officer level
In b oth self- and non-self-assessment systems, practically
all tax disputes are triggered at the examining officer level.
It is imperative, therefore, that each administration identify
the precise role of examining officials in the conflict resolu
tion proce s s .
This presents no problem at all for certain types of po
tential disputes, such as those involving a valuation question.
E ach country obviously should instruct its examiners to ap 
proach this type of inherently disputable question with the im
partiality of a judge . Nor should there be any doubt about an
examiner's function where he is at least fairly clear that the
government is in the r ight regarding the distinctly different
type of queE>tion which, if litigated, a court necessarily would
decide entirely for one side or the other . But if, after objec
tive and careful analysis, he concludes the correct answer to
this type of question is open to serious doubt, delimitation of
his function becomes somewhat more complex. His function
should vary, depending on whether his country, as to these de 
batable cases, has adopted compromise as its ultimate standard
of administrative justice, test cases aside .
While a country's adoption of this practice should affect
the function of these lower level examiners, this is not to say
that they themselves should be empowered to exercise com
promise authority. Typically, they are far too numerous, too
lacking in sophistication, too far removed from the litigation
process itself and thus know too little about it, to be able to
compromise wisely by reference to the litigation hazards. But
where more experienced or higher officials have been so em
powered, an examiner at the lowest level should be instructed,
if in substantial doubt regarding the correct answer to this
3. 5
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type of substantive question, to do simultaneously two things :
to set up an assessment and to acknowledge his doubt to the
taxpayer . 75 This acknowledgment will make it clear that he
actually is not trying to resolve definitively the difficult ques 
tion in the impartial manner of a judge . Judge -like re solution
of these apparently marginal questions would cause, all too
often, one examiner to set up an assessment which, as to a
similar dispute with a different taxpayer, another examiner
would abandon. To avoid this, and further to facilitate a chance
for b oth cases to be uniformly treated by reference to this
country 's hypothetical ultimate standard of administrative
justice (compromise), assessments should be set up for the
entire amount in both cases, 7 6 but only to set the stage for
an administrative appeal by the taxpayer, eventually to an offi
c ial possessing complete settlement authority. The latter , if
convinced also that the correct answer is open to serious
doubt, then either should compromise the issue by reference
to his appraisal of litigation hazards or ask the national office
for technical advice .77
Should he think it likely that the cen
tral office will wish to litigate a test case on this substantive
issue, his choice should be for the technical advice route.
Where a country empowers no official to exercise com
promise authority over the particular types of truly debatable
issue under discussion here, a different procedural pattern
should be employed. To be fair, each such official of such
country, including those who examine returns, should be in
structed to resolve all such debatable questions in the impar 
tial manner of a judge .
Since each of these questions, by
7 5 Unless specifically instructed to acknowledge openly his doubts ,
if any , the felt pressure to obtain a bilateral agreement is likely to
lead many examiners to propose adjustments without indicating their
own doubts, if any.
76 Presumably this is the intention of U . S . procedures. On the nega
tive side, examining officers themselves are denied the right, in doubt
ful situations , to attempt to resolve cases by reference to the litigation
hazards , this being reserved exclusively to the administrative appeal
offices.
See § 3. 7 infra : U.S. Treas. Reg. § 60 1 . 10 6 (f) , Rule II; and
Rev. Proc. 6 7 -2 7 , I.R.B. 1967 -20 , 45.
On the affirmative side , ex
aminers are instructed as follows:
"Issues should only be raised by
examining officers when they have merit, never arbitrarily or for
At the same time, the examining officer should
trading purposes.
never hesitate to raise a meritorious issue . " Rev. Proc. 64 -22 , C . B.
1964- 1 , 689.
77 For details regarding a centrally administered technical advice
program , see Chap. II, § 2 . 16 supra .
As to cases covered by previous
central office rulings, see note 7 3 supra .
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definition, will have to be decided entirely for one side or the
other, the administration hardly can anticipate uniform deci
sions by the large host of examiners who work at the lowest
level. But that is a price the country must pay for choosing
to rely exclusively on a type of administrative justice com
parable to the approach of the judiciary itself.
Having exer 
cised this preference, apart from administrative appeals initi
ated by dissatisfied taxpayers, there are only two further
procedures whereby such countries can increase the prospect
of uniformity at the examination level. A coroparison of these
follows .
3 . 6 Mandatory internal review

v. self-initiated requests for
technical advice
Whether, in theory, a given country ought to provide for
internal review of all determinations made by its large ex
amining force should turn on the cumulative effect of several
considerations. However, whether it realistically can afford
to meet that talent-absorbing need, assuming that need exists,
turns on a yet different factor .
Maintenance of integrity is a relevant but not the most
important consideration in appraising the need for an all
e mbracing review program. If this were the prime aim, a
sampling procedure would suffice. Further, an internal re 
view-relying as it does on the administrative file -will not
ne cessarily indicate that the original examiner was or was not
hone st. Particularly in the case of business returns, such a
review necessarily focuses pr imarily on the examiner 's own
wr itten report. While this report should disclose all matter s
he thought at all questionable -whether ultimately resolved by
him in favor of the taxpayer or the government-the file itself
may leave no "tell-tale " tracks should he, in a given case,
omit reference to those decided favorably to the taxpayer .
This is why, in addition to its regular internal review pro
gram, the United States maintains a completely separate In
spection Service which typically probes behind and beyond the
administrative file in atte mpting to expose in- service dis 
hone sty. 78
The very existence of internal reviews does tend,
however, to put some pressure on examiners to be honest.
And if this were the sole consideration, countries such as
E ngland and the Netherlands, given their civil services ' long
78 See Trainor,

" Functioning of the Inspection Service ,"

17th Inst . on Fed. Tax 495 (1959).

N.Y. U.
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and widely recognized tradition of integrity, could justify easily
their practice of not automatically reviewing internally the
deter minations made by their examining force s . 7 9
Nevertheless, the fact remains that, in measuring the need
for internal review, the most important consideration involves
the frequency with which the examining force is likely- in utter
innocence -to commit te chnical error s .
This likelihood in
evitably is affected by the quality of personnel recruited for
this force and of the in-service technical training program
conducted for its benefit.
On these counts, the United States
compares favorably with both England and the Netherlands, as
well as with the other Eur opean countries, 80 though it alone
maintains a fairly broad-ranging, automatic, internal review
program.
Recruits to its revenue -agent classification (and
they constitute approximately eighty percent of the entire ex
amining force 81 ) must be college graduates with a substantial
major in accounting. Further, practically all will have had at
least one college-level course in federal tax law. Finally, at
the point of recruitment, each also must attend on a full-time
basis comprehe nsive in- service classroom courses covering
not only federal tax law but other subjects as well. Given
these standards, however, any comparison of error - incidence
by this force with that of its European counterparts, must take
account of the relative complexity of the different tax laws
these various groups apply. Looking at this factor alone, the
relative chance for error would be greatest in the United States .
Its law, as noted earlier, is b y all odds the most complex. 82
Moreover, the thousands of built - in deviations obviously are
capable of spawning a multitude of interpretative difficulties .
But a further factor tends at least to mitigate the apparent
relative difficulty of the U.S. examiner 's task.
The United States, in implementing the notion of justice it
deems most appropriate at the administrative level, has dele 
gated to high level regional officials complete "settlement" (or
compromise) authority over all truly debatable issues, test
case s aside . In consequence, whatever the difficulties of an
79 However, in both countrie s , inspectors who visit local offices
may sample previously examined returns ; but as in many other coun
tries , this is to enable the higher official to appraise the overall quality
of the work done , rather than to detect errors as such. See § 3 . 2 ,
Chaps. XIX and XXIII infra .
80 See § 1 . 5 , Chaps. V, IX , XIII, XVII, and XXI infra .
81 See note 25 supra .
82 See the comparison in Chap. II, § 2.5 supra .
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examiner at the lowest level, an escape-hatch exists .
The
examiner is not expected to make a refined judgment in the
impartial manner of a judge if he conclude s there is substan
tial doubt regarding the correct answer to an issue of the type
which, if litigated, a court necessarily would decide entirely
for one side or the other. In effect, it is enough for the ex
aminer to recognize that the answer is open to serious doubt.
That doubt in itself, at his level, is enough to trigger a tenta
tive decision against the taxpayer 83 who, by an administrative
appeal, can lay the case before a higher official possessing
complete settlement authority. In contrast, performance of a
more demanding task should be expected of examiner s in a
country such as Britain, which denies this type of compromise
authority to all officials. The consequence of this denial should
be the expectation that its examiners will make impartial de 
cisions, i.e ., refined predictions regarding the "correct" answer,
with the consequent greater likelihood of error .
Nevertheless, a further overriding question exists : can
any given administration afford to allocate sufficient personnel
to permit internal review of all determinations made by its
examining force ? So sweeping an effort obviously would ab 
sorb a tremendous amount of talent.
And on this score, the
European countries, all of which utilize the non- self-assess 
ment system, are in a situation quite different from that of
the United States, which relies on the self-assessment system .
These countries necessarily use vast amounts of talent in the
examination function itself, though not one actually makes a
complete examination of every return. 84 Their coverage, how
ever, does extend far beyond that of the United States, which
annually only examine s about three and a half million returns
out of the sixty- seven million annually filed. 85 This compari 
son sugge sts that the difference in basic assessment systems
is the prime reason why, relatively speaking, the United States
finds it easier to spare the talent required to review internally
its examiners ' determinations.
In summary, the non- self
assessment countries tend to expend their technical personnel
in achieving wide co verage at the examination level, whereas
the United States tends to concentrate much more talent on
each return included in the relatively small sample actually
s ubjected to examination. That few administrations are likely
83 See note 76 supra .
84 See § 3.2 , Chaps. VII, XI, XV, XIX, and XXIII infra .
85 See note 25 supra .
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to be able to afford both is evidenced by the fact that even
the United States is able to allocate to the automatic review
function only enough personnel to review somewhat less than
one million of the three and a half million returns annually
examined, 86 despite an obvious chance for error in many of
the other examined returns. The unreviewed category, con
sisting only of "agreed" adjustments to small returns, is
examined by the administration's least talented technicians.
Though the asserted deficiencies were agreed to by the affected
taxpayers, 87 the fact they are even less knowledgeable obvi
ously leaves room for mistakes, no doubt to the detriment of
the affe cted taxpayers in many cases. Nevertheless, only a
small sample of the adjustments to these returns are re
viewed, and then only for quality- control purposes.
Far less costly in talented manpower than the automatic
and fairly broad-ranging internal review program maintained
in the United States is the non-automatic and selective type of
arrangement used by most E ur opean countries.
Examiners
themselves are permitted to decide when they will request the
technical advice of a higher, more able, and experienced offi
cial. 88 No doubt this practice does contr ibute to the prospect
of uniform corre ctness at the examination level; however, the
incidence of err or is deterred in reality only if the examiner
himself re cognized the difficulty. Moreover, this arrangement
can contribute little, if anything, to the maintenance of integrity .
3 . 7 Jurisdictional screening function re administrative appeals

For reasons previously noted, authority to compromise
administratively a debatable issue of the type which, if liti
gated, a court would decide entirely for one side or the other,
should be reserved to a relatively small but fairly decentral
ized cadre of able and experienced officials who understand
and, therefore, can appraise properly the litigation hazards. 89
86 Typically , the number of reviewers on a district review staff
will equal about 10 percent of the number of revenue agents (examiners)
in the district' s Field Audit Branch.
87 Small cases not agreed to at that level are reviewed.
88 As to legal issues deemed open to serious doubt, such countries
would be well-advised to maintain a single centralized technical advice
office at the national level, as described in Chapter II supra, and as
is maintained in the United States. Reliance should be placed on local
senior official s , however , if the examiner' s doubt concerns a question
of fact or mixed questions of law and fact of the type which must be
decided entirely for one side or the other.
89 See § 3 . 5 supra .
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Moreover, where a dispute between an examiner and taxpayer
involves to a s ignificant degree an issue of this type, much
time and effort will be saved by routing the whole case di
rectly to a member of that cadr e. 9 0
Their unique power and particular competence are not
essential, however, to the proper resolution of many types of
questions about which examiners and taxpayers will be in dis 
pute . Illustrative are those issues involving a mere amount,
such as the valu::ttion of property. These fall within the com
petence of any fact finder . Again even as to a legal issue
which a court would decide entirely for one side or the other,
a given taxpayer may be unque stionably in the wrong though
his particular examiner could not convince him of this. Never 
theless, there is nothing to compromise . In such cases as
these, an official more experienced and able than the examiner,
though lacking true compromise authority, frequently can per 
suade the taxpayer to accept a proper disposition of the matter .
Because, proportionately, s o many dispute s will b e of this type,
they should be routed directly from the examiner to just such
an official . Otherwise, either the more talented small cadre
possessing complete compromise authority will become over 
loaded -though only because it receives cases not requiring
special authority or competence -or that cadre must be ex
panded in size and, thus, include less exper ienced and talented
officials . 91
The foregoing suggests that a country which contemplates
e mpowering at least some officials with true compromise
authority may well find, as did the United States, that its ad 
m inistrative appeal process can make effective use, whether a
given appeal 1s formal or infor mal, of two different sets of
90 This is so whether the case raises either a single issue of this
type or multiple issues of which only one or more of the significant
ones are of this type. In the latter circumstance, since the one issue
of this type cannot be accommodated properly by lower levels , both
parties should reserve disposition of the other issues to facilitate a
proper overall disposition.
91 In the United States , during fiscal year 196 6 , this cadre (regional
Appellate Divisions , consisting of 7 17 technically trained conferees)
obtained agreements in 27 ,428 cases.
Tremendous expansion would
have been required had not a lower administrative appeal office (District
Conference Offices , staffed with about half as many technically trained
conferees ) reached an agreed result in another 2 5 ,231 cases which
usually were les s complex and did not require 1 1 settlement 1 1 authority.
See Commissioner of Internal Revenue , op . cit. supra note 2 5 , at 2 5 ,
6 8 , 133 , and 134.
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officials, with only the higher ranking set, in contrast to the
less restrictive practice in France and the Netherlands, 92 ex
ercising true compromise authority.
While United States practice has long employed the se two
levels of officials, 9 3 at one time all U.s . taxpayers who dis 
agreed with their examiners were systematically encouraged,
though not compelled, to take the dispute, first, to the lower
ranking appeal office (District Conference Office ) which lacked
true compromise authority. 94 However, where the case which
went through this lower office involved at least one significant
debatable issue of the type a court would have decided entirely
for one side or the other, substantial duplication of adminis 
trative and taxpayer effort took place. True, in many of these
cases the lower ranking appeal official did help sharpen the
issues . But this gain did not offset the cost of an ensuing
wasteful and predictable duplication. For it was inevitable, in
view of the lower appeal office 's lack of compromise authority,
that a substantial proportion of its adverse decisions would be

9 2 There, i n practice, the inspector who heads the local office, as
well as officials at the regional level, may exercise such authority.
See infra
Chap. XI,
§§ 3.2a and 3.4b, and Chap. XXIII, §§ 3.2a and
3.4a.
However , in the Netherlands the inspector in charge of each
local office does understand, and presumably can appraise properly,
the litigation hazards , for he has at least the equivalent of a law de
gree and performs the representation function at the trial level if
litigation ensues.
In France the law degree possessed by each in
spector and the two years of intensive training at the National School
for Taxes likewise gives him a basis with which to appraise litigation
hazards.
All French inspectors , however, do not perform the repre
sentation function at the trial level.
To represent the government in
litigation before an administrative tribunal, an inspector must be
located in one of the cities where an administrative tribunal sits. No
inspectors from outside such a city are brought in for this purpose.
See § 1.5 of Chaps. IX and XXI, and § 4. 3 in Chaps. XII and XXIV,

infra .

93 In a realistic sense, however , as before noted, the United States
actually has three sets of administrative appeal offices , for the legal
staff which performs the litigation-representation function also shares
authority administratively to compromise cases.
See § 3 . 1 supra,.
This function is performed by Regional Counsel (part of the
note 30.
Chief Counsel's Office) in Tax Court cases and by the Tax Division of
the Justice Department in refund cases before federal district courts
or the Court of Claims.
94 See § 3.2 supra regarding a reorganization completed in the early
1960's, hopefully to discourage the tendency of some p ractitioners to
bypass that office.
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appealed to the yet higher office (Regional Appellate Divis ion)
p ossessing that special authority .
Recently, the United States reversed this earlier practice.
It now seeks to avoid predictable seriatum use of two officials
to hear successive administrative appeals of the same case .
T o this end, distinctly different officials, who internally review
the administrative file in all cases not agreed to at the ex
aminer ' s level, perform the necessary s creening function. They
determine the type of office95 to which the taxpayer should be
encouraged 96 to take the dispute in the first instance . 97 If a
given taxpayer is urged, because of the nature of his dispute,
to take it first to the District Conference Office, he still is
able, if agreement is not achieved there, to invoke the juris
diction of the higher administrative appeal office. 98
Other countries which do not provide for internal review
of cases unagreed at the examiner level, but do propose to use
two sets of appeal officials in the manner described above,
can assign the screening function to the examiners themselves,
imposing on them the responsibility to choose the type of offi
c ial to whom the taxpayer should be encouraged to appeal ini
tially.
95 If their initial determination is to the effect that the taxpayer
should be encouraged to bypass the lower administrative appeal office,
the Chief of the latter office does review that determination before
the invitation letter goes out.
U.S. Treas. Reg. § 60 1. 105 (c) (2) (iv).
96 This encouragement is reflected in a letter which advises the
taxpayer that he has 30 days in which to enter the appeal. Rev. Proc.
64-38 , C.B. 1964-2 , 965, superseded by Rev. Proc. 67 -27 , I.R.B.
For an argument that a taxpayer, in his own interest,
19 6 7 -20 , 45 .
always should process the case first through the district procedure,
see Carey, 1 1 Choosing Tax Procedures for Tactical Advantage," 40

Notre Dame Law.

97 Even

363 (1965 ) .

s o , in fiscal 1966, o f the 39,023 cases dealt with b y the
lower administrative appeal office because encouraged to go there
first, 13,792 ended in disagreement and most of these then were ap
pealed to the higher office.
See Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
op. cit. supra note 25 , at 25.
98 Jbid. U.S. Treas. Reg. § 60 1 . 1 06(b). Indeed, that taxpayer could
have disregarded the advice of the screening office and taken the dispute
to the higher office in the first instance. The important point, how
ever, is that no taxpayer should be denied the right to take his dispute,
at some point, to an official possessing true compromise authority
assuming that there is such an official. The taxpayer, rather than the
screening office, may be right in believing the dispute properly is
compromisable though, to repeat, this can be done only by an official
having the special authority.
·
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The use of two sets of appeal officials, with only the higher
set being given complete settlement authority, may generate a
peculiar burden for small cases. Many such case s do involve
a debatable issue of the type a court necessarily would decide
entirely for one side or the other . And in fairness, these
small taxpayers should be granted the same measure of justice
as large taxpayers. This includes, if equally available to large
taxpayers, a convenient opportunity-test cases aside -to com
promise truly debatable questions by reference to an impartial
appraisal of the litigation hazards .
Because there are so
many disputes of this type, it may be ne cessary to give the
lower ranking appeal officials, to whom complete compromise
authority otherwise is denied, authority to compromise small
cases, a ceiling limitation being fixed by reference to a given
amount of tax in dispute . Indeed, fairness may render this
e ssential if the higher ranking appeal officials to whom that
special authority otherwise is reserved, are assigned, as in
the United States, to the regional level and hold conferences
only in widely separated metropolitan centers. 9 9
otherwise,
small taxpayers may find it is against the ir economic self
interest to hold a conference with the one set of officials to
whom the government has reserved total settlement authority.
While the United States, in disputes not involving more than
$2, 5 00 in tax for any one year, recently extended true com
promise authority to its lower ranking and more conveniently
located set of appeal officials, this authority is limited to
"selected issues, " where the higher regional office previously
had worked out a compromise covering a "substantially identi
cal issue . " 100
3 . 8 Requiring written pro tests

For reasons previously noted, ordinarily a country ought
not require a taxpayer to submit at the administrative -hearing
stage all evidence and arguments he later formally would sub 
On the other hand,
mit if the dispute is taken to court. 1 01
two considerations will render the administrative procedure
grossly inefficient unless a taxpayer is required to submit an
appropriate written document prior to the oral conference held
with the appeal official.
99 These regional offices maintain only about forty geographically
spread posts of duty in the United States and ride circuit to approxi
mately twenty other metropolitan centers.
100 See Rev. Proc. 6 7 - 2 7 , I.R.B. 196 7 -2 0 , 45.
101 See § 3. 3 supra .
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The first consideration relates to the conferee himself. If
he is not forewarned regarding the grounds of the taxpayer 's
objections and the rationale upon which the latter relies, he is
deprived of a chance, in advance, to read all the relevant legal
data (decisions, regulations, rulings, etc .), and to think through
their implications and the questions he should ask regarding
both the legal and the factual sides of the controversy. Lack
ing such preparation, in too many cases the first conference
will be only exploratory, and an otherwise unnecessary and
wasteful second conference will be required to enable the
parties to discuss the refinements of the matter at issue . This
need for a second conference leads also to a frequently un
recognized waste in that the conferee, at the first conference,
must prepare a more detailed record of the points developed
there than otherwise would be necessary. Further, because he
inevitably will deal with many other cases during the interim
between the two conferences, he must take yet further time,
before that second conference, just to re-orient himself with
respect to the earlier exploratory discussion.
The second consideration relates to the taxpayer. If not
required to submit a written document before the conference,
he will tend to handle his side of the dispute less efficiently
and thereby contribute directly to the official 's own inefficiency.
This is particularly true where a taxpayer brings in a practi
tioner for the first time at the point of the first administrative
appeal. Under such cir cumstances - if no advance document is
required-there is the great risk that the practitioner actually
will use the first conference as his starting point, i.e., to
orient himself regarding the nature of the controversy and the
type of showing required if the conferee is to sustain his
client's position.
In spite of these considerations, throughout most of the
1 950's, no advance written document was required oy the United
States in the case of those taxpayers who elected to appeal
first to-and hold an oral conference with-the District Con
ference Office . 102
Such a document ("protest") was required,
however, of taxpayers who elected to bypass that office and
appeal directly to the higher Regional Appellate Division, or
102 See e.g., Kev. Proc. 5 6 -34 , C.B. 1956 -2 , 139 6 , ultimately super
seded by Rev. Proc. 6 7 -2 7 , I.R.B. 1967-20 , 45. The obj ective of that
procedure was to surround that conference arrangement with as few
formalities as possible in the belief this would facilitate resolution
of issues at the earliest pos sible moment.
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who appealed to the latter office after failing to achieve agree 
ment with the district's appeal office. 103 In 1 964, the admin
istration extended this requirement, with an exception noted
b e low, to all appeals lodged initially with the district office . 104
Presumably it believed this would tend to force taxpayers and
their representatives to become more fully informed before
that first district office conference and simultaneously enable
the officials at that level to accommodate more efficiently the
thousands of appeals they rece ived.
Exempted from this general require ment were cases fall
ing in the so-called small category -i.e., where the disputed
amount for any one year did not exceed $ 1, 000. 105 In early
1 967 this ceiling was revised upward-to $2, 50Q 106 _ a revision
which probably would have exempted more than half of the
4 2 , 3 81 cases those district offices received in the preceding
fiscal year . 1 ° 7
Such an e xemption is unnecessary where, as in Germany
and the Netherlands, 108 the taxpayer's document need do noth
ing more than protest the examiner 's deter mination. No argu
ments in support of the protest need be set out. That type of
document, however, does not achieve the purposes heretofore
described. 1 09
Contrariwise, if a country actually intends to
enfor ce a more demanding and informative type of require 
ment, such as that now imposed in the United States, as a
practical matter some small-case category, however defined,
must be exempted. Small taxpayers would find it against their
economic self -interest to incur the expense necessary if the
U.s. requirement were imposed on them; it calls for a written
statement outlining "the facts, law, and arguments upon which
the taxpayer relies . " 110
103 Ibid .
104 Rev. Proc. 64-38 , C.B. 1964-2 , 965.
105 Under the 1964 procedure, the immunity also automatically ex

tended to so-called office-audit cases which, collectively , made up
about 40 percent of the appeals to the District Conference Offices
and typically involved substantially less than $1,000.
106 Rev. Proc. 67-27, I.R.B. 1967-2 0 , 45.
The new dividing line
($2 , 5 00) apparently applies alike to office audit and the typically larger
field-audit cases.
107 See Commissioner of Internal Revenue , op . cit. supra note 2 5 ,
at 2 5 .
108 See § 3 .4a, Chaps. XV and XXIII infra .
109 At most it merely alerts the office to the fact of appeal.
110 Rev. Proc. 6 7 -27 , I.R.B. 1967 -20 , 45 .

CHAPTER IV
CONFLICT RESOLUTION BY INDEPENDE NT TRIBUNALS 1
Section A.

Analytic Comparison:

Judicial

Structures of the "Six "

4 . 1 Introduction:

The goals
An administrator who examines returns cannot avoid taking
some position on a given issue even though he may believe the
truly "correct" substantive answer is open to substantial doubt.
In consequence, errors inevitably will be made even by ad
ministrators who strive to be objective -and not all will or
And some such erroneous results inevitably will be
can be.
adverse to the affected taxpayers, whether due to the laws of
chance or to an administrative belief that the government's
interest in cases deemed marginal should not be conceded
since separate tribunals exist to resolve just such cases. How
ever, whether any given administrative determination actually
is erroneous cannot be known at that stage . The administrator
may hold one view and the taxpayer another, but in essence
b oth views are mere predictions regarding the result an in
dependent tribunal would reach if the matter were litigated.
The only feasible method of ascertaining precisely which
of the many administrative determinations actually are errone 
ous is to assure all taxpayers who disagree with the adminis
tration, e ither as to the facts or the law, that they then can
submit the case to a tribunal which is completely impartial.
This is the essence of "living under law." Moreover, escape
valves of this type are the only means of assuring an equally
e ssential byproduct.
The mere existence of that type of tri 
bunal provides the best possible guarantee that the administra
tion itself, during the earlier administrative stage, at least
will try to be fair in resolving conflicts .
This r ight of taxpayers, to invoke the jurisdiction of im
partial tribunals, will be meaningful in practice, however, only
1 For a recent comparative treatment of this subject in the setting
of countries now developing, see Liker, " The Legal and Institutional
Framework of Tax Administration in Developing Countrie s / '
14
U. C . L . A . L . Rev . 240, 325-45 (1966).
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if structural arr angements enable the latter to provide con
venient forums . Also, in the interest of the whole tax system,
those arrangements should facilitate decisions of high quality
and interpretations having fairly lasting effect. Finally, they
should per mit efficient fulfillment of all these criteria-thereby
avoiding undue drain on the totality of a nation's resources
and talented manpower.
Unfortunately, no structural arrangement can assure, though
it can foster, impartiality on the part of a tribunal. Further,
neither this impartiality nor decisions of high and durable
quality can be promoted in the fullest sense if efficiency be 
comes so much an end in itself that man-hours expended per
case must be held to the bare minimum, or if the forum must
These com
provide convenient access in an absolute sense .
peting cr iteria are in inherent conflict, and arrangements
which tend to stress one tend to slight another . Consequently
any given structural arrangement can hope only to achieve
some reasonable balance among these competing interests.
Because this presents a problem of degree, it is not surpris 
ing that, among the six countries covered by this study, dif
ferences exist regarding the relative emphasis placed on e ach
of these criteria.
Reflections of these differences appear
throughout the judicial structures : in the appointing procedures;
in the types of persons who fulfill the decision-making function
at the trial and appellate levels; in the extent decisions are
made not by single persons but instead- as to the law, facts,
or both-by a deliberative body; in the scope of review at the
appellate level; in the arrangements which affect uniformity
and certainty, including the r ole of precedent; and finally in
the degree convenient access is accorded both small and large
taxpayer s .

4 . 2 Trial tribunals : Impartiality and the relevance of a spe 
cialized bench 's perspectives
Looking solely at the standard of impartiality, tradition in
any one of these countries actually may compensate for par 
ticular excessive deficiencies in its structural arrangements.
But these structural shortcomings should be shunned by other
countries, for the structure , on transplant, will not be accom
panied automatically by the compensating tradition.
Further,
a mere image of impartiality, whatever be the fact, in itself
is important to taxpayer morale, and structural deficiencies
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can impair that image . 2 For both these reasons, countrie s
now evolving or reconsider ing their structural arrangements
should adopt plans which at a minimum tend to preclude the
tax administration itself from having any control over the ap
pointment, tenure, or future promotions of those named to such
Other methods of appointment, less likely to im
tr ibunals.
p inge on the tribunal's impartiality, are numerous, too obvious
to recite, and have been invoked by four of the six countries
covered here . 3
And as to a fifth, though Br itain's Treasury
does make the appointments to one of that country's two pri
mary trial level tax tribunals, 4 the Lord Chancellor {Minister
of Justice) contr ols appointments to the other . 5 Only in Ger 
many do finance officials appoint all of the technically trained
trial judges who s it on tax cases . 6
Bias does not spring, however, solely from self-interest.
The sum of a pr ospective appointee' s past exper iences ine s 
capably affects the perspective h e brings t o such a tribunal
and, consequently, his attitude toward the interpretative process .
T hus, it could be argued, to the extent profe ssionals are used,
that individuals who have devoted their live s almost exclusively
to the tax administration itself should be rendered ineligible
for appointment to the separate trial tribunal s .
But this
2 Indeed, proponents of a bill to shift the otherwise independent
U .S . Tax Court from the executive branch to the judicial branch rely
upon the above argument as one reason justifying the change. See
remarks of Senator Long, 113 Cong. Rec . S90 3 5 (daily ed. June 2 8 ,
1967). Also , Gribbon, " Should the Judicial Character o f the Tax Court
Be Recognized? " 24 Geo . Was h . L . Rev. 619, 626 (19 5 6).
3 In Belgium, where the courts of appeal sit as trial forums in
tax cases , the King makes the appointment from two lists of nominees
submitted respectively by the courts of appeal themselves and by the
conseillers provinciaux. See Belgium Constitution, Art. 99. In France ,
most judges on its trial tribunals are drawn from the civil service.
See Chap. XII, § 4.2 infra .
As to the Netherlands , see Chap. XXIV,
§ 4. 2 infra .
The U.s. Declaration of Independence criticized King
George III because he had ' ' made Judges dependent on his will alone ,
for the tenure of their offices , and the amount and payment o f their
salaries."
Not surprisingly , therefore, while the President appoints
the judges on all U.S. trial forums , the nominations must be approved
by the Senate. See U.S. Constitution Art. II, § 2.
4 See Chap. XX , § 4.2b infra .
5 Except in Scotland, where a city or county council makes the
appointment. See Chap. XX , § 4. 2a infra .
6 See Chap. XVI, § 4.2 infra . Finance officials there also exercise
a veto over possible promotion of these same judges to the appellate
fiscal court. Id . § 4 . 4 infra .
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argument, if valid, cuts two ways, for there are two parties
to every tax controversy . Thus, a reasonable application of
the same standard would render ineligible any profe ss ional
who consistently had opposed the administration, always having
represented taxpayer s . And in practice, as to a given country,
the two prohibitions together could preclude appointment of any
professional possessed of tax expertise, thereby rendering the
tr ibunals less efficient and in the view of some -given the
complexitie s of tax law-less capable of handing down high
quality decisions .
Certain critics take issue on this latter
count; indeed, believing that specialization make s it more diffi
cvlt to maintain an "impartial" per spective and to reach deci
s ions of "proper" quality, they also oppose granting exclusive
jur isdiction over tax affairs to specialized tribunals. 7 Other 
wise, so one argument goes, the profe ssionals appointed, what
ever be their backgrounds, will become too far removed from
the general law, will become overly devoted to the tax code
itself and to its perfection, and -for judges-will become too
zealous in trying, through the interpretative process, to give
the whole code a somewhat more symmetrical impact by ref
erence to the substance of transactions than the legislatively
inspired language of the code 's diverse parts deserve, usually
to the advantage of the tax administration.
It is one thing to contend, as do these critics, that pro
fessionals on a specialized tribunal, if not otherwise restrained,
ultimately would tend to go too jar in this particular direction.
It is quite another to acknowledge that these professionals
would have the opportunity, in contrast to those on courts of
general jurisdiction, to develop a more complete understanding
and a deeper "concern" for the total implications of the tax
code.
In consequence, profes sionals on specialized tribunals,
as a group but not ne cessarily so in any single instance ,
7 See Sutherland, " New Roads to the Settlement of Tax Contro
versie s : A Critical Comment, " 7 Law ; & Contemp . Frob . 359 (1940) ;
Angell, " Procedural Reform in the Judicial Review of Controversies
Under the Internal Revenue Statutes : An Answer to a Proposal, 11 34
Ill . L. Rev. 151 (1939); Prettyman, 1 1 A Comment on the Traynor Plan
for Revision of Federal Tax Procedures ," 27 Ceo . L .,J. 1038 (1939).
That the ultimate obj ective of the Hoover Commission Report was to
prevent this, see Guy , "An Administrative Labor Court: Some Ob
servations of the Hoover Commission Report," 24 Ceo. Wash. L . Rev .
Also in general, see Rifkind, 11 A Special Court for
6 5 6 , 666 (1956).
Patent Litigation: The Danger of a Specialized Judiciary , 1 1 37 A B. A. J.
425 (1951).
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should be more inclined than judges on the other type of tr i
bunal to interpret the diverse substantive provisions of the
code to achieve results responsive -from a policy standpoint
to the multiple but often competing purposes of the whole code
and, to that end, be more inclined to consider the substance
of transactions, not just their mere legal form.
These modest projections do not indicate that profess ionals
on specialized tribunals are likely to go too far, or conversely
not far enough, in this direction. They indicate only a mere
"Probability, " not otherwise measurable on any count, that as
between the two types of tribunals, specialized types at least
will tend to go somewhat further in that direction. As so de 
fined, this "probability" should be viewed by a legislature as
one of the positive factor s supporting assignment of some sig
nificant tax role to a profess ionally staffed specialized trial
tribunal .
Relevant to the positive quality of this one factor is the
awesome function of a tax code. These codes, alone among
all p ublic laws, must respond, one way or another, to almost
the whole factual terrain covered by the entire private law.
Given this all encompassing quality and the inherent limitations
of the legislative process, a legislature's own substantive ef
forts all too often will fall far short of achieving equity in a
timely fashion if the interpretative machinery, because lacking
in tax expertise, does not have the capacity, in individual
cases, to take account of the multiple but often competing pur
poses of the whole tax code and, in consequence, gives scant
attention to the substance of transactions . Avoidance of this
latter consequence should be of real concern to the legislature
itself, for taxation is peculiarly and essentially a legislative
function. Unfortunately, however, apart from careful use of
substantive language, there is only one practical way in which
a legislature can attack that consequence, namely, by assign
ing s ome significant role to a professionally staffed special
tr ibunal.
A further alternative does exist but only in theory . The
legislature could try to complement its substantive language by
indicating, as has been done in legislation much more limited
in thrust, S its own expectations regarding the standards of ju
dicial construction to be applied.
But it would be extre mely
BE. g., New York, Alternative County Government Law , § 7 00, and
Private Housing Finance Law, § 600.

JUDICIAL STRUCTURES

107

unwise to undertake such a de lineation of standards in the
setting of a comprehensive tax code. 9
Such a code contains
No one standard of
countless competing substantive ideas .
construction could suffice. To help sharpen understanding re 
garding the relative vitalities of each s ingle competing idea,
the legislature would have to indicate the particular standard
The resulting product
to be applied in each single instance .
would be appallingly cumbersome .
Further, the legislature 's
human inability t o anticipate the shape of countless factual
situations means, to this extent, that however carefully it
sought, by enacting standards of construction, to clar ify the
relative vitality of its competing tax ideas, it actually would
be trying to respond to the unknown. Finally, s ince the weight
which the legislature might want to attach to substance will
vary depending upon the competing tax ideas in issue, the im
precision of the type of language associated with standards of
construction suggests that appr opriate substantive language ac
tually could define the legislaturevs intention more precisely,
though not so precisely as to eliminate the need for technically
competent, concerned, and efficient interpretative machinery .
Whether or not the countries covered by this study actually
looked upon the above discussed "probability" as a positive
factor, each one in fact has chosen, at least at the trial level,
to make some use of the potentially greater competence, con
cern, and efficiency of a specialized or semi- spe cialized tr i
b unal, composed entirely or predominantly of persons having
s ome type of profe ssional training or experience. Britain has
its Special Commissioners, 1 0 Germany its fiscal courts, ll and
the United States its T ax Court. 12 Belgium 1 3 and the Nether
lands 14 differ only slightly; they use specialized chambers in
their regular courts of appeal as trial forums . And France
9 As to the utility of canons of construction generally , cf. Frank
furter , "Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes," 47 Colum . L . Rev.
527 , 544 (1947 ) with Jackson, " The Memory of Statutes : What Congress
Says or What the Court Says," 34 A.B. A. J . 535 (1948).
1 0 See Chap. XX, § 4.2b infra .
11 See Chap. XVI, § 4.2 infra .
12 I.R.C., §§ 7441-87.
Of the three different types of trial forums
used by the United States , a second-the Court of Claims-should be
put in the semi-specialized category.
About one-third of its docket
concerns federal tax cases.
See Kipps , " A Unique National Court:
The United States Court of Claim s ," 53 A. B. A J. 1025, 1 026 (1 967 ).
1 3 see Chap. VIII, § 4.2 infra .
14 See Chap. XXIV, § 4.2 infra .
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assigns to special administrative tribunals three types of ac 
tions to which the government is a party; included are fiscal
cases . 15
Relevant also to the perspectives of these tribunals are
differences in the backgrounds of their more or less permanent
personnel . In contrast to Belgium, Germany, and the United
State s, not all of Britain's eight Special Commissioners pos 
sess legal training. 16 The latter are drawn in roughly equal
proportions from practising barristers and from non-legally
trained but senior Inland Revenue officials who on appointment
sever their connections with the administration. 17 As to this
matter of prior association with the tax administration, both
the Netherlands and the United States tend to maintain a some
what similar balance on their specialized tribunals.
About
half the sixteen legally trained persons on the U . S. Tax Court
usually will have had some prior connection with the tax ad 
ministration's legal staff, oftentimes in addition to outside ex
perience as a practitioner . In the Netherlands, of the three
judges who serve each of the specialized tax chambers, typi
cally one previously served as a tax inspector, another first
gained tax expertise on the outside, and the third served as a
No such
jur ist on a yet lower nonspecialized tribunal. 18
balance exists, however, in Germany or France . These two
illustrate the competing extreme s .
All permanent German
appointees, though legally trained, are drawn from the various
state finance ministries from which they too sever their con
nection. 19 French administrative tribunals, on the other hand,
include no counseillors who possessed tax expertise at the
time of appointment. The great majority, however, will have
received legal training. This follows because most appoint
ments are made from graduates of the National School of Ad
ministration, and only a relatively small minority of these did
not obtain a law degree before being admitted to that school.
Moreover, while nongraduates of that s chool who are appointed
to the administrative tribunals must have a law degree, in the
intere�t of impartiality and independence these are drawn

15 See Chap. XII, § 4. 1 infra .
1 6 That the Netherlands ' departure from this requirement is temporary , see Chap. XXIV, § 4.2 infra .
17 See note 10 supra .
18 See note 14 supra .
19 See note 6 supra .
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from the Ministrie s of Inter ior or Justice, not from the tax
administration. 20
4 . 3 Trial tribunals :

Other factors relevant to the goals
The potentially greater technical competence, concern, and
efficiency of specialized tribunals are not the only considera
tions to which a nation properly might accord weight in decid
ing whether, how, or the degree to which it will utilize such
tribunals.
Involved also is the matter of convenience and factors
which compete with it. A practical dilemma may ar ise . If
such a tribunal is available to the more complex and larger
cases, where geographical convenience is a relatively minor
problem, equitably speaking it should be equally available in
fact to the host of smaller cases certain to arise, where geo
graphical convenience is a major problem. However, such a
wholesale requirement of c onvenience, with the consequent ex
pense and drain on a nation's reservoir of able professionals,
may present insur mountable difficulties to some countr ie s,
particularly those now developing.
A professionally staffed
specialized trial tribunal, nevertheless, is relevant to the needs
of a small case -though admittedly the peculiar nature of such
a tribunal 's contribution in this circumstance does differ from
that associated with complex case s . In the setting of a s mall
case, the tribunal itself should assume the duty of assuring a
fair deal for the taxpayer . In all cases, the government itself
will be represented by a person expert in tax affairs . In a
small case, however, the taxpayer simply cannot afford that
type of representation.
The consequent unreliability of the
adversary system to promote justice in this circumstance re 
quires that the tr ibunal be sufficiently expert to assist the
taxpayer in presenting his case effectively and efficiently. 21
For a government not to accommodate this need is peculiarly
unbecoming in tax cases, for the government itself always is
a party and, as before noted, typically is well represented. To
grant small taxpayers access t o such a tr ibunal will have little
practical meaning, however, if they are required to travel a
substantial distance to have their cases heard. In the absence
2 0 See Chap. XII, § 4.2 n. 6 infra .
21 This consideration, while relevant here and actually responsible
for introduction of a bill in the U. S. Senate to establish a Small Tax
Division within the u.s. Tax C ourt, relates primarily to practices and
procedures and is, therefore, dealt with more fully in § 4 . 9 infra .
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of geographical convenience, the s mall taxpayer, previously
having taken time away from his job to process the case
through the administrative stage, may find it is against his
economic self-interest to spend additional time on the road.
The expense and drain in providing genuinely convenient
access to a specialized tribunal will be multiplied further if,
pursuant to the otherwise justified belief that a deliberative
body provides the best means of reaching decisions of proper
quality, a given country also prefers to use more than one
judge in each case be it large or small.
Of concern also is the type of person who should be em
powered to find the facts and the related question of whether
the deliberative process should be extended to this function.
Some believe, relevant to this, that there is an important dif
ference between a full-time tax -case jurist and a judge who
sits on a court of general jur isdiction where tax cases con
stitute only a small part of the docket.
The full-time tax
jurist, so the argument goes, is more likely, because he will
more frequently encounter somewhat similar fact patterns, to
develop preconceptions about these and, in consequence, more
frequently will prejudge the facts of a particular case . 22 Some
also argue that even judges on courts of general jur isdiction
tend, on hearing case after case, year after year, to become
somewhat bored and thus less attentive than persons who hear
only a few cases and for whom each such case is an interest
ing new venture .
These two suppositions argue for ad hoc
infusion of ordinary laymen into the fact finding process. 2 3
This position gains further support if the comparison i s be 
tween a panel of lay fact finders and a single judge who alone
would decide questions b oth of fact and law. The panel ar 
r angement itself creates the additional prospect, at least as to
the fact finding process, that preconceptions of one man will
tend to be neutralized through the inter change arising from the
panel's deliberative proces s . 24 Further, a panel of laymen, if
at all representative of the community, may be more sensitive
than any judge or panel of judges to the community 's sense of
what is reasonable, 25 and factual controversies in tax cases
as in other case s - often turn on just that . Further, from any
2 2 See Joiner , Civil Justice and the Jury 66 (1962).
23 An empirically based analysis o f the American jury appears in
Kalven & 2eisel, The American Jury (1966).
24 See Joiner, op . cit . supra note 22 , at 66.
25 See id. at 65.
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s uch division of power between judges and laymen eme rge s a
system of checks and balances which alone may inspire tax
payer confidence in the fairnes s of the system. 26
Finally, a given legislature, though impressed by the po
tentially greater technical competence and concern of a spe 
cialized tribunal, may fear, as do the previously mentioned
cr itics, that such a tribunal, absent some checkrein, might be 
come too far removed from the general law and indulge "too
much" in what s ome call judicial legislation. And this fear of
the unknown may lead that legislature to cast about for suitable
restraints, to be applied at either the trial or appellate levels
or at both.
E ach of the countries dealt with here, while making some
use of a specialized or semi-specialized trial tribunal staffed
entirely or predominantly with persons of profe ssional training
or experience, has responded also, though in diverse ways and
degrees, to most of the additional considerations recited above .
Presumably to assure convenient access with a minimum
of taxpayer travel, four of the Six (Belgium, France, Ger many,
and the Netherlands) have decentralized their specialized trial
tribunals . 27 The Netherlands located these courts in five dif
ferent cities, Belgium in three, France in twenty-four, and
Germany in fifteen. 2 8 E ach court in the Netherlands, on the
average, accommodates 2, 570 square miles which, if the court
were located in the center of that hypothetical square , would
place it only twenty- six miles from taxpayers residing in the
remote corners of the squar e .
The comparable number of
miles in Belgium would be forty-five, in Germany fifty- seven,
and in France s ixty-seven. In contrast to this decentralized
approach, Special Commissioners in Great Britain 29 and judges
who sit on the U. S . Tax Court are centrally located, but miti
gate the taxpayer 's travel burden by r iding circuit. The U . S .
court has the more serious problem, for the territory it must
26 See id. at 64 and 67 ; Angell , op . cit. supra note 7 , at 154 . For
conflicting views regarding the use of the j ury system in tax cases ,
compare Walston, " The Use o f Juries in Federal Civil Income Tax
cases , "
39 Taxes 144 (1961 ) with Glaser, " Taxation-Is the Tax
payer Neglecting the Jury ?"
In
28 U. Cine . L . Rev . 3 52 (1959).
" Jurisdictional Problems in Federal Tax
general, see Ferguson,
Controversie s ," 48 Ia . L . Rev . 312 ( 1963 ) .
27 For consideration o f convenience a s affected by procedural re
quirements and use of counsel , see §§ 4 . 9 and 4. 10 infra .
28 See § 4. 2 , Chaps. XXIV, VIII, XII, and XVI infra .
29 See Chap. XX, § 4 . 2b infra .
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cover is fifteen times as great as the entire territory of the
largest of the Western European countrie s . Further, because
it holds hearings in only fifty cities, 30 geographically speak
ing it is a substantially less convenient forum than any of its
European counterparts . 31
The United States taxpayer, however, is not limited to the
T ax Court. Two other alternative types of trial forum are pro
vided, one of which is highly accessible. In fact, this country,
compared to the other five, offers taxpayers the widest choice
of forums from among the most varied types of trial tribunal s .
Their differences g o beyond ordinary procedures 3 2 to include
important structural differences which affect much more than
mere convenience of access. These structural differences run
the gamut, for they evidence extreme forms of both spe cializa
tion and reliance on the deliberative process.
The T ax Court is the most specialized of these tribunals;
there typically one judge alone decides questions both of fact
and law. However, about one -third of the officially published
decisions, because they involve pe culiarly important or mar 
ginal questions of law, are subjected to the deliberative process
through internal review b y the whole court. But this practice
is triggered internally , usually on order of the Chief Judge, 33
not upon request by the taxpayer .
A geographically more convenient hearing is available to
the U . S. taxpayer if he elects to utilize a regular federal dis 
trict c ourt of general jurisdiction 34 where his case will be
tried before a single nonspecialized legally trained judge .
These courts are spread across the country and sit in over
three hundred and eighty cities, seven times the number visited
30 See Appendix to Tax Court Rules , implementing the broad direc
tive in I.R.C. § 7446.
31 The figure for this court, comparable to those cited above re
garding other countrie s , is 192 miles.
32 As to these , see Ferguson, op . cit . supra note 26, and Brown &
Whitmire, " Forum Reform: Tax Litigation," 3 5 U. Cine . L . R e v . 644
(1966 ). Also see § 4. 10 infra .
33 Pursuant to I.R.C, § 7 460 (b). Internal practices of this court are
considered in articles by three of its judges. See Kern , " The Process
of Decision in the United States Tax Court," 8 N. Y. U. lns t . on Fed. Tax .
1013 (1950); Murdock, " What Has the Tax Court o f the United States
Been Doing?"
31 A. B.A. J. 297 (1945); Raum, " Tax Court Litiga
tion, " 1957 So. Calif. Tax lnst . 631.
34 2 8 U.S.C. §§ 1 346, 1491, and I.R.C. § 7402 (a). For a summary of all
the features peculiar to these courts , see Brown & Whitmire, op . cit.
supra note 3 2 ; Ferguson , op . cit. supra note 26.
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by the Tax Court. 3 5 Peculiar to this election is the comple 
mentary right of e ither party to have the facts found by a
deliberative body, a jury of laymen impanelled on an ad hoc
basis for this purpose . To invoke the jurisdiction of a district
court, however, the taxpayer suffers an encumbrance -often
times at very great inconvenience-not encountered in litigation
before the Tax Court. 36 He must pay the asserted deficiency
in advance, for a tax can be challenged in a district court only
through a suit for refund. 37
By invoking a yet third alternative, which again is avail
able only if payment is made in advance, a U. S. taxpayer can
be sure that questions of law also will be decided by a de 
liberative body-the multijudge Court of Claims. 38 This is a
semi-specialized tr ibunal. Despite the sweep of its j urisdic
tion-covering any claim running against the United States ex
cept those founded on tort-it has developed considerable tax
expertise if only because a significant part of its docket (34
percent in one recent year) concerns federal tax questions. 39
One of fifteen legally trained, circuit-riding commissioners 40
will make preliminary findings of fact and submit recommen
dations regarding the legal questions .
The actual decision,
however, will be rendered by legally trained judges of whom
there are seven, concurrence by four being required in cases
where the court sits en bane, though recent legislation permits
it to sit in divisions composed of two or three j udges . 41
35 Register, Department of Justice and the Courts of the United
States 2 1-111 (1966).
36 The latter court acquires j urisdiction after a deficiency has been
proposed, but prior to assessment, provided the taxpayer files a peti
tion with the court within 90 days after receiving a formal notice of de
ficiency.
I.R. C. §§ 6212 and 6213.
In general, therefore, it has no
jurisdiction over refund suits.
37 Flora v. U.S., 357 U.S. 63 (1958 ) , aff'd on reh . , 362 U.S, 145
(1960).
38 2 8 U.S. C. § 1491.
For a survey of features peculiar to this
court, see Kipps , op . cit . supra note 12 ; Miller , "Tax Litigation in
Ferguson, op . cit.
the Court of Claims ," 55 Ceo. L .J . 454 (1966) ;
supra note 26; Pavenstedt, " The United States Court of Claims as a
Forum for Tax Cases," 15 Tax L , Rev . 1 201 (1959, 1 960).
39 Kipp s , op . cit. supra note 12 , at n. 10.
40 Even so, the bar in Washington, D.C., where the judges sit, tends
to dominate litigation before this court. See Pavenstedt, op . cit , supra
note 38 , at 12.
41 2 8 U. S. C. § 175(d) and (e). Many practitioners before that court
are urging it to continue to sit en bane. Kipps, op . cit. supra note 1 2 ,
at 1025 n . 5 ,
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That the specialized Tax Court's jurisdiction is shared
both with the semi-specialized multijudge Court of Claims,
and with the regular nonspecialized single -judge district courts
where a deliberative body of laymen may be invoked to find
the facts, inevitably gives rise to forum shopping. This prac 
tice is further stimulated by other differences in their ordi
nary procedures 42 and also by the subsequently discussed ab 
sence, for all practical purposes, of a common or centralized
court of appeal. 43 And from this forum-shopping opportunity,
certain unfortunate effects, examined later in § 4.6, admittedly
do follow. As noted there, however, it is the absence of a
common court of appeal, not the opportunity to choose from
among different types of trial tribunals, that is the pivotal de 
fect. No one trial judge or jury (or set of such) can hear
every cas e . Therefore, except for the difficulty noted at the
appellate level, spreading litigation through these different
types of trial tribunals, instead of forcing resort to a common
type, has great merit. By offering Americans a choice (sub
ject to the unfortunate previously noted encumbrance regarding
prior payment) from among all of what many deem to be really
meaningful alternatives, this structure has the advantage of
building confidence in the system. Further, this trial-level
structure enables the tax system itself to benefit from the po
tentially greater technical competence, concern, and efficiency
of a specialized tribunal, while incorporating also what some
view to be the first of two worthwhile restraints 44 on that
tribunal of specialists . At least the proponents of this view
argue that the Tax Court's own awareness of the right of tax
payers to choose other forums tends to place a subtle and
meaningful, though quite unmeasurable, restraint on that tri
Whether this be an actual restraint or simply a
bunal. 45
42 As to these , see Ferguson, op . cit. supra note 26, and Brown &
Whitmire, op . cit . supra note 32. Also see § 4. 10 infra .
43 See § 4. 6 infra .
44 The second is at the appellate level and relates to the fact that
the j udges there are generalists. See § 4. 5 infra .
45 See Sutherland, op . cit . supra note 7 , at 360. For a conflicting
view, to the effect that only specialized tribunals should be used at the
trial level , the one restraint being that "judges of general outlook "
should sit on appeal, see Miller, " Can Tax Appeals Be Centralized?"
23 Taxes 303, 306 (1945). To the effect that both should be spe
cialized, see Traynor, " Administrative and Judicial Procedure for
Federal Income , Estate , and Gift Taxes - A Criticism and a Proposal, "
38 Colum . L . Rev . 1393 (193 8 ). To the effect that the present choice
of forum should be left intact at the trial level, with appeals from all
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belief of taxpayers, the fact is-given this structure with its
alternative choices-a large proportion of litigants do choose
the specialized tribunal. It decides over one and a half times
as many substantive tax cases as all the other trial tribunals
combined. 46 This might suggest that taxpayers have a rela
tively high degree of confidence in that one tribunal. Their
choice, of it, however, may be due in part to their opportunity,
peculiar to that one court, to litigate before paying the amount
in contest. And to this must be added the fact that taxpayers
now know also, should they lose, that they can appeal as a
matter of right to nonspecialized appellate courts . 47
Both of these latter considerations, however, are presently
under attack. An important group of American practitioners
believe it is unfair to confine the litigate -first-pay -later privi
lege to those taxpayers willing to submit their cases to this
specialized body . This group favors extending the same privi
lege to those taxpayers who prefer to try their cases before
generalists who sit on the federal district courts. 48 Yet
(footnote continued)
three to go to a specialized Court of Tax Appeals, see Griswold, " The
Need for a Court of Tax Appeal s , "
57 Harv . L . Rev . 1153 (1944).
Each of these writers is aware that a decision as to whether the appellate
function should be centralized in a specialized court, or left to judges
with a "generalist' s outlook ," involves much more than the question
of whether the latter is needed as a restraint on lower specialized trial
tribunals. As observed in the discussion of appellate tribunals in § 4.6
infra, central to the issue is the problem of obtaining reliable interpre
tative guidelines having uniform significance acro s s the nation.
In
general , see Ferguson, op . cit. supra note 26.
46 In fiscal 1966, for example , the Tax Court decided 726 cases on
the merits , the district courts 448 , and the Court of Claims 58. See
Commissioner of Internal Revenue , Annual Report 1966, 134 (Table 17 B)
and 135 (Table 20 n. 1).
47 In the same year in which the Tax Court decided 726 cases on the
merits, of which the government won outright or in part a substantial
majority , taxpayers alone filed appeals in 257 and were j oined by the
government in appealing another 34 cases, a total of 2 9 1. The govern 
ment alone initiated only 41 appeals.
However, of all the tax cases
originating with the Tax Court and finally decided on appeal in that year
(total , 2 50 ) , taxpayers prevailed entirely or in part in only 47 , or in
18 . 8%. See Commissioner of Internal Revenue , op . cit. supra note 46 ,
at 44 , 134 (Table 17B) , and 135 ( Tables 19 and 2 1).
48 Proposal of the Committee on Court Procedure, Taxation Section ,
American Bar Association.
See Program and Committee Reports ,
Twenty- Third Annual Meeting, Taxation Section, A . B . A . , at 55 (1962) .
For competing views , see articles by Miller and by Traynor, op . cit.
supra note 45.
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others have proposed that appellate j urisdiction be shifted from
courts having general jurisdiction to a specialized court of tax
appeals, 49 a matter dealt with more fully in §§ 4 . 5 and 4 . 6
infra. B e that as it may, given the large number of American
taxpayers, the aggregate number of substantive tax cases ac
tually decided by all three types of trial tribunals is rela
tively-and in absolute terms is among-the s mallest of the
six countrie s . In n o recent year has the total reached 1, 3 00
case s . 5 0
Britain's volume of decided cases at the trial level is at
the other extreme, on the high side-with the caseload being
from 8, 000 to 9, 000 a year . 5 1 It is, however, the only other
country among the Six which provides even a limited choice of
forum. Given the heavy caseload, not surprisingly most de 
cided cases involve relatively small amounts and concern
To provide
Britain's standard income tax, not its surtax.
convenient access for this large volume of small cases, Britain
maintains 7 00 different geographically dispersed sets of General
Commissioners . 5 2 This far exceeds, of course, the number
of tribunals maintained by any one of the other five countries .
Necessarily it involves a substantial sacrifice in professional
quality. Indeed, two unpaid laymen, domiciled in the local
finance district in which the taxpayer lives, constitute a de
liberative quorum for any given case, though frequently more
than two sit and a paid clerk-often legally trained-is always
there to assist. 5 3 Given their background, they obviously are
not well equipped to resolve questions of law,5 4 as occasionally
they must. However, the great preponderence of these small
cases actually turn on questions of fact and to this extent the
use of such personnel is as commendable, or at least can be
as easily defended, as the American jury .
For the typically larger and more complex surtax cases,
the British Parliament created the earlier mentioned circuit49 See articles by Traynor and Griswold , op . cit. supra note 2 6 .
5 0 For example , s e e text accompanying note 1 2 1 infra .
5 1 Excluding so-called "delay " cases.
See Chap. XX §§ 4.3a and
4.3b.
5 2 For a full description of these tribunals, see Chap. XX §§ 4 . 1 ,
4.2a-d, and 4.3a.
5 3 see id. , § 4.2a.
5 4 The writer' s belief that every practice has its exceptions was
borne out here when he learned by mere happenstance that one of the
world' s great lawyer s , Professor Otto Kahn- Freund, serves as a lay
Commissioner for the district which includes Oxford University.
,

,
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riding, professionally trained or experienced Special Commis 
s ioners . 55 While these Special Commissioners alone exercise
exclusive j urisdiction over surtax cases, 56 a quorum of two
again being a minimum for each case, 57 this is not their sole
responsibility. They share with the lay General Commissioners
concurrent jurisdiction over a fairly wide range of income tax
questions. 58 In this respect, the British taxpayer enjoys a
privilege s imilar to that of an American: he may elect be 
tween alternative types of trial tribunals. 59
This r ight in
Britain to choose between generalists and specialists is not
burdened, however, as it is in the United States, by any en
cumbrance : in neither case need the Br itish taxpayer pay the
disputed amount in advance of the tribunal's determination. 60
Also in contrast to U .S . practice, far more cases ar e taken to
the generalists . than to the specialists . Out of the total large
volume of tax cases decided annually by British trial tribunals,
8, 000 to 9, 000, the Special Commissioners decide less than
1, 000. 61
Presumably, therefore, taxpayer willingness to resort to
the General Commissioners has not been affected adversely by
the fact that every such election alerts at least two ordinary
locally domiciled citizens to that taxpayer 's financial affairs .
The community at large i s not alerted, however; rules pro
hibiting administrative disclosure of a taxpayer 's financial
affairs extend both to the General and Special Commissioners. 62
It is otherwise in the United States : the findings of fact and
decisions of all its trial tribunals are published .
Germany 's experience with disclosure of private financial
affairs, even to a small group of local private citizens, appears
to differ from Britain's. Until recently, a German taxpayer
had an election somewhat s imilar to that existing in Britain.
As he now can, he could have his protest l.eard first by local
assessing officials 63 and, if dissatisfied, could appeal de novo
55 For a full description, see id ., §§ 4. 1 , 4.2b, and 4. 3b.
56 See id ., § 4.1 infra .
57 See id., § 4.2b infra .
58 see id., § 4. 1.
59 For a description of two other types of trial tribunals (Board of
Referees and the 1960 Act Tribunal) , the jurisdiction of which is very
narrow, see id ., §§ 4.2c , 4.2d, 4.3c, and 4.3d infra .
60 see id ., §§ 4.3a and 4. 3b.
61 Excluding delay cases. See id., § 4 .3b infra ,
62 See id ., §§ 4. 3a and 4. 3b infra .
63 See Chap. XV, § 3 . 4a infra .
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to one of the specialized fiscal courts. 64 Alternatively, in
stead of having the protest heard by a local assessing official,
he could have had the dispute referred to a tax committee
composed predominantly of private citizens drawn from the
local finance office 's district. While the local assessor served
as chairman, the presence of at least two private citizens was
required to constitute a quorum, and all members voted on
questions both of fact and law. 65 Should the taxpayer have
been dissatisfied with the result reached by the tax committee,
he still could have appealed de novo to the appropriate fiscal
court. 66
Proportionately, only about one percent of those German
taxpayers who filed protests elected to have their disputes
heard first by the appropriate lay committee ; 67 the remainder
chose local assessing officials . Apparently it was not enough,
in the eyes of German taxpayers, that the rule of secrecy at
the administrative level extended, like the British rule, to
these lay bodie s . 68 And because j urisdiction of the latter was
invoked by so few taxpayers, Germany recently ceased using
Lay
these committees in the conflict resolution process. 69
citizens nevertheless, do continue to play a role, albeit re 
duced, in resolving tax conflicts.
Laymen involved now, however, typically are less likely
to reside close to the taxpayer . They are drawn from a pre 
viously selected panel to sit on the fifteen fiscal courts, al
though no one citizen will sit for more than twelve days in any
given year . 70 In contrast to the U.S. jury, these laymen help
decide questions of law as well as of fact, constituting two of
a deliberative quorum of five, the other three being legally
trained with specialized experience -having been appointed from
the state 's finance ministry from which they then severed con
nection. 71
As before noted, these fiscal courts are spread
geographically, being divided among and maintained by the in
dividual German states . Because of different case-load levels,
64 see Chap. XVI, §§ 4.2 and 4. 3 infra .
65 see Chap. XV, § 3.4a n. 23 infra .
66 See ibid.
67 See id ., § 3.4a infra .
68 see ibid.
69 See id., § 3.4a n. 24.
70 For a full description of these courts, see Chap. XVI,

§§ 4.2 and
4.3 infra .
71 Until recently, the ratio was reversed, with lay members making
up a majority. See Chap. XVI, § 4.2 n. 6 infra .
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the courts themselves range in size. Each has two to eight
Senates, the respective jurisdictions of which are fixed by vari
ous criteria, including geography as well as types or subjects
of tax. These courts decide a volume of income cases far ex
ceeding their counterparts in the United States, the number
being almost equal to the total decided in Britain. Their yearly
work-load of 2 0, 000 tax . disputes of all types includes from
6, 000 to 8, 000 involving individual and corporate income tax
matters . 72
Belgium, France, and the Netherlands are similar to Ger 
many i n one respect: in the litigation stage, the taxpayer is
not given a choice between different types of tribunals. These
three countries differ from Germany , however, and also from
Britain and the United States, in that at this stage ordinary
lay citizens have no participation whatsoever in the decision
making process. Each assigns exclusive trial jurisdiction to
a specialized or semi-specialized tribunal composed of persons
possessing some type of professional training or experience.
While these j udges ordinarily are generalists at the time of
appointment, they develop tax expertise in the course of their
work. In two of these three countries (Belgium and France),
ordinary laymen may be allocated a limited responsibility dur 
ing the earlier administrative stage . 73 Midpoint in that stage,
i.e . , before a dispute is taken by the taxpayer to the tax ad
ministration's own regional e chelon, the dispute could be re 
ferred to an outside body staffed primarily with laymen. 74 But
e ven here, those panels act in an advisory capacity alone , with
the further limitation that, like the American j ury and unlike
Britain's General Commissioners, they decide only questions
of fact and never questions of law. As before noted, once the
litigation stage is reached, both Belgium and the Netherlands
rely on specialized tax chambers in their regular courts of
Belgium has three
appeal to perform the trial function. 75
such geographically dispersed courts, each having either one,
two, or three tax chambers composed respectively of three
legally trained judges who deliberate in each case . While they
decide, in aggregate, far fewer income tax cases than do their
counterparts in E ngland or Ger many, they do render almost
72 See id .. § 4.3.
7 3 For a full description of their role , see Chap. VII, § 3.2a infra
and Chap. XII, §§ 3.3 and 3.4a infra .
74 see Chap. VII, § 3.2a infra, and Chap. XI, §§ 3. 3 and 3.4a infra .
75 For a full description, see § 4.2 in Chaps. VIII and XXIV infra .
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as many income tax decisions ( 1107 in one recent year) 76 as
do all of the federal trial tribunals in the United States, the
population of which is 1 8 times as large . In the Netherlands,
aggregating income, profits and wage tax cases, a roughly
comparable total number of trial decisions 77 is handed down
by the special tax chambers included in each of its five geo
graphically dispersed courts of appeal, two of which have two
such chambers . In contrast to Belgium, however, the maj ority
of all cases in the Netherlands are heard by a single judge,
though ordinarily each chamber will honor a request that all
three members sit on a given case . 7 8 Franceis twenty-four
geographically dispersed administrative tribunals, of which two
have been sectionalized, bear a much heavier tax caseload.
Each of these tribunals or sections is composed of five mem
bers, with three s itting as a deliberative body in each 'case . 79
In one recent year, they decided an overall total of 4, 5 7 8 in
come tax cases. S O
4 .4 Appellate tribunals:

The right and scope of review

The multiplicity of trial tribunals in each of these coun
tries requires some unifying means to correct their error s .
The aim should b e t o provide an impartial 81 review body which
will limit itself to those corrective efforts it can carry out
effectively and efficiently, through high quality decisions likely
to pr oduce fairly durable interpretations . However, if these
76 See Chap. VIII, § 4. 3 infra .
77 Approximately 70 % of the 1900

tax decisions in one recent year
fell in these categories. See Chap. XXIV, § 4.3 infra .
78 See id., § 4.2 infra .
79 See Chap. XII, § 4.2 infra .
80 See id ., § 4.3 infra .
81 Impartiality in this area requires , just as it did in the case of
trial tribunals, that the tax administration be denied a voice in the
appointment or tenure of the judges.
Given the existence of so many
other alternative methods of selection, this criterion-as a formal
matter-could be satisfied easily by any country. However, the continu
ing task of conforming actual practice to this standard no doubt is less
difficult in countries where the app ellate tribunals are courts of general
jurisdiction , as in the United States , than in countries where the tribunal
specializes solely in tax appeals , as in Germany. Indeed there, even as
a formal matter , the judges are elected by a twenty-three member
committee composed of the Federal Finance Minister, the eleven State
Finance Ministers, and eleven persons named by the Bundestag. While
the Federal Finance Minister has no vote , he does exercise a veto
power.
One redeeming feature is that judges thus elected are then
appointed for life, by the President.
See Chap. XVI, § 4.4 infra .
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latter purposes do not coincide perfectly with a given country 's
practice in non-tax cases, such fact will make their implemen
tation in tax cases more difficult and well-nigh impossible if
the country 's regular appellate structure is used .
To give aggrieved parties an absolute right to appeal is
the only effective, feasible, and efficient method of ferreting
out errors at the trial level. Laying aside subsequently con
sidered limitations relating to the scope of review, this right
is accorded taxpayers with respect to decisions of au 82 but
one of the previously discussed trial tribunals, specifically
the U . S . Court of Claims . Its decisions are reviewable by
the Supreme Court, but only upon the latter 's seldom-granted
leave . 8 3 And over the last twenty years, leave actually was
obtained in less than twenty cases. 84 Indeed, during, the most
recent five -and-one -half years of that period, it was allowed
in only three of the approximately two hundred tax cases de 
cided by the Court of Claims. 85
This one apparent exception to the otherwise prevailing
practice of granting review as a matter of right is less real,
however, than it appears . In part, this is because, when a
U . S. taxpayer decides to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court
of Claims, he elects, voluntarily, not to have his case tried by
either of two other trial forums (the Tax Court or a regular
federal district court) from which there would have been an
absolute right to appeal. Of even more significance, the Court
of Claims itself actually has the dual characteristics of both
a trial and a review tribunal. 86 As previously noted, legally
trained trial commissioners make preliminary findings of fact
and submit recommendations regarding questions of law. E ither
party may file exceptions thereto, and these always are r e 
viewed internally by a panel of the court's legally trained
In practice, this panel is larger, and in theory,
judges . 87
82 See §§ 4.4 and 4.5 of Chaps . VIII, XII, XVI, XX , and XXIV.
8 3 An official but general statement regarding appropriate grounds
appears in Supreme Court Rule 19.
84 See Miller, op . cit. supra note 3 8, at 458.
85 Brown and Whitmire, op . cit . supra note 32 , at 652.
86 See Kipps , op . cit. supra note 12.
87 Since the judges on the Court of Claims also review the deter

mination of a commissioner even in cases where neither party filed
an exception, in practice, reviews there are automatic . See Miller,
op . cit. supra note 3 8 , at 461.
This contrasts sharply with the theo
retically more efficient procedure applied to federal district courts
where review by an appellate body is limited to appeals filed by a party
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never less, 88 than regular appellate tribunal panels to which
appeals would lie from the other two trial forums . 89
And
many practitioners choose the Court of Claims precisely be 
cause they can telescope the whole conflict into one proceeding
and still be assured that the legal issue will be dealt with by
a legally trained deliberative body, 90 rather than by a single
judge who typically would render the trial decision in cases
filed with the T ax Court or a federal district court.
Both efficiency and quality of the total conflict-resolution
effort will be enhanced if a reviewing body restricts its cor 
rective efforts to those it can carry out effectively . Assuming
that body is properly constituted, this limitation would permit
it to substitute freely its judgment for that of the trial tribunal
(footnote continued)
who feels aggrieved. The difference in this instance , however, is largely
theoretical; little real waste actually ensues from the automatic review
by the j udges of the Court of Claims. The fact is that exceptions to
their trial commissioners' determinations are filed in the great pre
ponderence of cases , the proportion in 1966 being 8 2 . 5 % of the decided
cases. Moreover the j udges of that court undoubtedly devote much more
energy per case to cases where an exception has been filed than to the
others. In the latter , the court typically hands down a short per curiam
decision adopting the Commissioner's determination, explaining that it
does so because 11it agrees with the trial commissioner' s findings,
opinion , and recommended conclusion of law, as hereinafter set forth."
For example, see Dodge v. U . S . , 362 F.2d 810 (Ct. Cl. 1966). No doubt
also , taxpayers who invoke this court' s jurisdiction realistically antici
pate at the outset that the side adversely affected by a trial commis
sioner' s determination probably will file exceptions thereto, if only
because the average amount involved in cases which are filed with this
court involves a far larger sum than the average in cases filed with the
other two trial forums.
See Kipps , op . cit . supra note 12 , at 1026.
As noted elsewhere, because the third trial forum (Tax Court) is
a multijudge court but employs only a single judge to hear a case, it
too has developed an internal review procedure.
In contrast to the
Court of Claims , however , not every case is subj ected to an internal
review. Prior to release of a decision, the Chief Judge is empowered
to refer it to the whole court. And for thirty days after release, any
j udge on the Tax Court can request such a referral. See Kern, op. cit.,
Murdock, op . cit ., and Raum, op . cit. supra note 33. Typically, about
one-third of the decisions are reviewed.
88 That the court traditionally has sat en bane, all seven participat
ing, see § 4.3 supra .
89 Typically a division of three sit, though a maj ority of a court' s
j udges on regular active service can require the court to sit en bane.
2 8 U.S.C. § 46 (c).
9 0 see Kipps , op . cit . supra note 12 , at 1026 ; Miller, op . cit . supra
note 38 , at 459.
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with respect to all questions of law, though most certainly not
as to all questions of fact.
Completely at odds with this latter limitation is the re 
view arrangement within the U.S. Court of Claims . True, that
court does treat its own commissioners ' factual findings as
"Prima facie correct . . . in the absence of exceptions thereto. u 91
However, in case of an exception, that court believes "the law
casts the ultimate burden of making findings on the judges of
the court, and wherever we are convinced that the weight of
the testimony is contrary to the finding of the [ trial ] com
missioner, it is our duty to substitute for the commissioner 's
finding what we consider to be the correct finding. " 9 2
This all e mbracing view has led the judges on that court,
in the face of conflicting evidence, to reverse the finding of a
trial commissioner even with respect to a subjective factual
matter where the credibility of the taxpayer - witness was at
issue and where no one but the trial commissioner had occa
sion to observe him. In that particular case, the question,
involving only the taxpayer 's initial intention, was whether he
had "purchased land for the purpose of farming it. " 9 3 Perhaps
less open to criticism was the j udges ' action in the case of a
given officer -stockholder . There in the face of conflicting evi
dence, they reversed a commissioner's finding regarding the
precise amount of salary deemed "reasonable " for deduction
purposes . 94 At least this action is defensible if limitations
on the scope of review actually are imposed only because of
the inherent difficulty of a review body confined to a written
record. But even in this type of case, free substitution of
judgment is a questionable practice if overall efficiency also
is to be stressed, to the end of enabling the review body to
focus primarily on significant and relatively durable interpre 
tations .
Surveying all the trial tribunals covered by this study,
there is wide variation in the scope of review severally avail
able on appeal .
The sweeping character of review applied
within the Court of Claims is at one extreme, shared only by
France . Though the latter 's appellate tribunal is physically
91 See Miller v. u.s. , 3 39 F.2d
92 Id . at 662. Italics added.
9 3 Id. at 662.
Cf. the dissent
cited therein. Italics added.
94 Bringwald, Inc. v. U.S., 3 34
Co. v. U.S. 296 F.2d 476 (Ct. Cl.

661, 662 (Ct. Cl. 1 9 64 ) . Italics added.
of Davis , J. , at 664 and the cases
F.2d 639 (Ct. Cl. 1964 ) ; Gordy Tire
1961).
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distinct from the trial echelon, questions of fact may be raised
In
on appeal and even new evidence may be presented. 95
short, both bodies approach the case anew, though the nature
of the question submitted originally to the trial tribunal cannot
be changed on appeal. 96
At mid-point between that position and the other extreme
are the fairly restrictive standards applied to the regular U.S.
courts of appeal on reviewing cases originating in the other
two U.S. trial forums. If a jury of laymen, after being in
structed correctly by the trial judge regarding questions of
law, decides a federal district court case, an appellate tribunal
cannot reverse if "reasonable men could reach differing con
clusions on the issue . " 97 And if a trial is conducted by a
federal district court judge without a jury, or by a judge of
the Tax Court which never uses a jury, the lower court's
findings of fact must stand on appeal unless "clearly errone 
ous . " 9 8 Unquestionably these standards , when compared to
those applied within the U.S. Court of Claims, do gauge more
accurately the limited capability of a review body confined to
a written record. Hopefully, they also have some restraining
effect on the number of appeals-thereby, enabling the regular
U.s. appellate tribunals to spend more of their time on legal
questions which are better suited to their peculiar competence .
But even these restrictive standards can accomplish their aim
only if the types of determinations to which they apply are
clearly defined. In the United States, they obviously apply to
pure questions of fact which are readily discernible .
Also
covered are "factual inferences from undisputed basic facts" 99
95 See Chap. XII, § 4.5 infra .
96 Ibid .
97 Commissioner v. Duberstein , 363 U.S. 27 8 , 291 (1960).
98 Ibid . Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 52 (a) ; I.R.C. § 7482 (a). A "finding is
'clearly erroneous ' when although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed." U.S. v. United States
Gypsum Co. , 333 U . S. 364, 395 (1948) , quoted with approval in the
Duberstein case, id. at 291. Italics added.
Appeals from Tax Court decisions are to be distinguished from the
internal review that court may choose to give its own trial judge's
decision. See note 87 supra . There are instance s , for example, where
the Tax Court reversed its own trial judge's findings of fact and was
sustained on appeal because its findings were not deemed clearly er
roneous. See Latchis Theatres of Keene, Inc. v. Commissioner, 2 14 F.2d
834 (1st Cir. 1954).
99 Id., note 97 supnl .
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though, as before noted, not legal conclusions. Here difficulty
does arise because, in a statutory tax setting, the line be 
tween the latter two categorie s is not always easily discerni
ble . In consequence, courts of appeal occasionally disagree
as to whether a given situation turns on a "factual inference
from undisputed basic facts " (subject to the "clearly errone 
ous " limitation) or instead involves an indivisible mixed que s 
tion of law and fact (where a court feels entirely free to sub 
stitute its judgment) ,l OO
Finally, at the opposite pole from the sweeping review
conducted within the U . s . Court of Claims and by the French
Conseil d'Etat is the Belgian practice . There the Appellate
Court may not consider anything other than a pure question of
law; appeal of a so-called mixed question of law and fact
would be dismissed. 101 The same is true in Great Britain.
There, however, the concept of a pure question of law is br oad
e nough to permit an appellate tribunal to reverse if it appears
that the trial tribunal could not have drawn from the evidence
before it the inferences of fact upon which it relied in reach
ing its final decision. 102
4 . 5 Appellate tribunals : Quality of review
Obviously bearing on the quality of appellate decisions is
the quality of the bench itself. In practice, neither of the only
two countries (England and Germany) which make some use of
ordinary lay citizens as judges at the trial level utilizes such
persons on the appellate courts which hear tax cases . 103 In
deed, only in France and Germany is it even likely that pro
fessional persons without legal tr aining might be appointed . 1 04
In the rare circumstance where this occurs in France, the
appointee would have been at least one of the top gr aduates of
the National School of Administration.1 °5
In Ger many, the
1 00 For example , compare Mathews v. Commissioner, 315 F.2d 101
(6th Cir. 1963) and Rubino v. Commissioner, 186 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.
1951) , cert . den . 342 U .S. 814 (195 1) with Fahs v. Taylor, 2 3 9 F.2d
224 (5th Cir. 1 9 5 6 ) , cert . den . 353 U.S. 936 (1957 ) , and Goldberg v.
Commissioner, 223 F.2d 7 09 (5th Cir. 1955).
101 See Chap. VIII, § 4. 5 infra .
102 See Chap. XX, § 4. 5 infra and Ferguson, op . cit . supra note 2 6 ,
A s to the Netherlands , see Chap. XXIV, § 4 . 4 infra .
at 3 64 n. 273.
1 0 3 see § 4.3 supra and § 4.4 of Chaps. XVI and XX infra .
1 04 As to Belgium and the Netherlands , see § 4.4 of Chaps. VIII and
XXIV infra .
1 05 See Chap. XII, § 4. 4 infra .
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exceptional nonlegally trained appointee typically has had pre 
vious experience in tax affairs and has sat for a minimum of
thre e years on one of the spe cialized trial tribunals . l 06
As a further quality control device, all six countries uti
lize the deliberative process . Typically, the number of appel 
late judges who sit o n a given case equals or exceeds the
number who sat on the trial tribunal. 1 07 The two exceptions
to this are Great Britain, though only for cases arising in
England and Wales, and the United States, but only in the case
of appeals from certain Tax Court decisions . With respect to
the former, the exception is more shadow than substance : it
pertains only to the first appeal, and England and Wales stand
alone in allowing as a matter of right appeals to two different
appellate levels .
There, l 08 decisions of both the General
Commissioners (where two ordinary laymen constitute a quorum)
and the Special Commissioners (where a minimum of two per 
s ons with professional training or experience is required), are
appealed first to the High Court of Judicature, where one
legally trained judge of the Chancery Division, sitting alone,
will decide the cas e . Further appeal may then be taken to the
Court of Appeals, where typically three legally trained jur ists
constitute a panel, though from two to five may sit. Also, by
leave of that court or of the House of Lords, the trial tribu
nal's decision may be reviewed a third time, before a bench
of up to five legally trained Lords of Appeal.
The United
States, as an exception, is such only in a very limited sense,
s ince most appeals are heard by a larger bench than was in
volved at the trial level. This follows from the fact that the
great preponderance of tr ial decisions are rendered by judges
sitting alone, e ither on the Tax Court or a federal district
court, 109 and appeals from both courts go to a court of appeal,
where typically three judges hear the case . ll O
This latter
number, however, is substantially exceeded by the number of
1 06 See Chap. XVI, § 4.4 infra .
1 07 See text accompanying notes 12 8 , 130, 132 , and 135 infra .
108See Chap. XX, § 4.4 infra and Jackson, The Machinery of Justice
in England 84 (4th ed. 1964).
1 09 See note 46 supra .
1 1 0 The eleven courts of appeal have a varying number of judges , de
pending on workload, and each does have the power, by order of a
majority of a court in regular active service, to order that the court
sit en bane on a particular case. 28 U.S.C. § 46 (c). It was anticipated,
however, that this practice would be invoked only in rare cases. See
H. Rep. No. 124 6 , 77 th Cong. , 1st sess. 1 (1941).
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tr ial judges involved in those Tax Court cases where, prior
to any appeal, the decisions of single Tax Court judges are
reviewed internally by that sixteen member court 111 _ as about
one -third are . Following an appeal to a court of appeal, it
also is possible in the United States to secure an additional
hearing before the nine -member Supreme Court, but only by
its leave which seldom is granted. 112
Germany is the third and final country among the six to
permit two appellate reviews of a trial tr ibunal 's decision, with
the second -like Great Britain and the United States -being to
its High Court, but only in the case of constitutional issues . l1 3
While France and the Netherlands, 114 and perhaps as a prac 
tical matter Belgium also, l 15 permit only one such r eview,
two of the se three, further to promote high quality decisions,
do make use of an additional procedural device unique among
the Six. Belgium requires its Attorney General to submit to
the appellate body l1 6 (as well as to the trial tribunal) 117 his
own impartial view of the case, arrived at independently and
presented separately from the view pressed on the court by
the tax administration's representative . For the same purpose,
France uses an official attached to its appellate body. 118
The perspectives of the appellate bench itself, and in this
limited sense the character of its decisions, will be affected,
of course, by the degree of its specialization in tax affairs - as
was indicated more fully in the earlier discussion regarding
tr ial tribunals. 119
There it also was suggested that, if a
legislature fear s - as do s ome critics-that a newly created
specialized trial tribunal might lose touch with the general law
or indulge too freely in what s ome characterize as judicial
legislation, e stablishment of concurrent trial jurisdiction in
1 1 1 see text accompanying note 33 supra .
1 12 See text accompanying note 123 infra .
1 1 3 see Chap. XVI, § 4. 1 infra .
114 See § 4.4 of Chaps. XII and XXIV infra .
115 While Belgium , in tax case s , employs only two layers of courts ,
the fact that its appellate court ( Court of Cassation) , should it disagree
with a trial tribunal, always remands the case to a yet different lower
court for re-trial , does give rise to more than one appellate review.
See note 143 infra .
However, unless the Court of Cassation itself
changes its mind on a yet second appeal to it, the view it took on
the first appeal ultimately prevails.
1 1 6 Chap. VIII, § 4.4.
117Id ., § 4.2.
1 1 8 Chap. XII, § 4.4.
1 19see § 4.2 supra .
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both a specialized tribunal and a general court might reduce
this risk without forfeiting completely the benefit of the spe 
cialized tribunal 's potentially greater competence, concern, and
efficiency. This has been done, as before noted, by two of the
countries covered here, the United States and, though to a
lesser degree, Britain. Alternatively, or as an additional more
direct restraint on the specialized trial tribunals, appeals
therefrom can be lodged, as in Britain and the United States,
in appellate courts of general jurisdiction. The latter, on re 
viewing cases, hardly would ignore completely the expertise of
the lower specialized tribunal and, in any event, would benefit
s ubstantially from exposure to its views . Hence, the peculiar
contribution this type of trial tribunal can make to a tax sys 
tem would not be totally dissipated. 120
In deciding upon the type of appellate court to be used,
however, legislators cannot cater just to their own peculiar
preferences as between the perspective and competence which
an appellate court would acquire from constant exercise of
general jurisdiction and those which it would derive from spe 
cializing in tax cases. Relevant also to their choice are the
interrelated factors of workload and the question of whether
the requisite certainty and uniformity can be achieved if juris 
diction is lodged in other than a single court.
The significance of the relationship between these two
factors is best illustrated by the contrasting circumstances in
the United States and Britain. These two countries, it will be
recalled, were at opposite ends of the six- country spectrum
with respect to the actual number of trial decisions handed
down each year with Britain on the high side .
Their relative
positions are just the reverse, however, with respect to the
proportion of trial determinations appealed. For example, the
various U.s. trial forums together resolved by dec ision only
During that
1,232 substantive tax cases in fiscal 1966. 121
s ame period, the eleven geographically spread u.s. appellate
courts of general jurisdiction had to decide 373 civil tax

1 2 0 Even in reversing the U.s. Tax Court on a question of law, one
American court of appeals said: "Indeed, the only thing which would
give us pause is the unanimous decision of the Tax Court, whose expert
view is always entitled to respectful consideration." Commissioner v.
Whitney, 169 F.2d 562 , 565 (2d Cir. 1948), cert . den . 335 U.S. 892 (1948).
121 See Commissioner of Internal Revenue, op . c it . supra note 4 6 , at
134 and 135 (Tables 17B and 2 0 ) .
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case s . 122 This was the highest proportion (approximately 3 0
percent) among the Six. Numerically, it was great enough, if
all these cases were assigned to one appellate court, to re 
strict that court to the r ole of a specialized tr ibunal operating
under the U.S. Supreme Court which, in that same year, de 
c ided only 10 tax cases 123 - all of which reached it with its
individually - granted consent (writ of certiorar i) .
Britain is a complete contrast. Its General and Special
Commissioners annually decide from 8, 000 to 9, 000 tax cases
at the trial level. However, in 1965, the first appellate level
for E ngland and Wales (High Court of Judicature) issued deci
s ions in only 14 such cases. 124 Also in that year, the second
such level (Court of Appeal) - even if account is taken of deci
sions by the distinct but single levels to which appeal could be
taken as a matter of r ight in Scotland (Court of Sessions) 125
and Northern Ireland (Court of Appeal) -decided only 7 . 126 The
House of Lords - on the basis of discretionary jurisdiction ex
ercised over the whole of the United Kingdom-re solved 8. 12 7
Appeals to the intermediate British courts represent by far
the smallest proportion of trial determinations among the Six.
Numerically, they obviously are not sufficient to keep one court
occupied even if all such appeals were assigned to it. Since
a large proportion of its docket would have to come from out
side the income tax field, centralization, if otherwise justified,
would not be accompanied, by either expectation or fear that
the centralized court would develop the peculiar competence
or perspective of a specialized tribunal.
122 Id. at 135 ( Table 21). Little variance appears between the propor
tion of cases appealed from the district courts and from the Tax Court.
In fiscal 196 6 , during which the district courts handed down 448 sub
stantive tax decisions , the appellate courts decided 12 3 cases originating
Corresponding figures for the Tax Court were,
with district courts.
respectively , 726 and 250. Ibid. As previously noted, however, none of
the 57 cases resolved by the third trial forum (Court of Claims) could
be appealed as a matter of right, though all decisions recommended by
that court' s trial commissioners were reviewed by the judges of that
court. See note 87 supra .
123 Of these, 4 originated with the Tax Court and 6 with the district
courts. Op . cit. supra note 122.
124 0f these , 4 originated with the General Commissioners and 10
with the Special Commissioners.
125 As to this one court, it was necessary to use figures for 1964.
126 Of these, 6 were decided by the Court of Appeal for England and
Wales , 1 by the Court of Appeal for Northern Ireland, and none by the
Court of Sessions in Scotland.
127 All figures based on the writer' s count. Cj. Chap. XX, § 4. 5 infra .
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In each of the other four countrie s, the proportion of ap
pellate decisions to trial determinations falls far short of the
U . S. 30 percent figur e - always being nearer 1 0 percent. Yet
the proportion is far larger than in Britain and numerically
speaking would permit some degree of specialization if those
countries were so minded. All four are . In three (Belgium,
France, and the Netherlands), the appellate tr ibunal which hears
tax cases also hears other types of cases. However, these
tribunals are multi-chambered with one or more assuming
prime responsibility for tax cases. In Belgium, one of the two
chambers into which its highest court (Court of Cassation) is
divided performs this function, with five Counseillers sitting
on each case . 128 In 1965, 57 of its decisions involved impOts
sur les revenus. 12 9 The Netherlands Supreme Court has three
Here too one chamber is re
chambers of five judges each.
sponsible for t ax appeals. l30
Over a fairly recent two-year
period, this chamber handed down 4 86 decisions involving vari
ous types of taxes and of these, 340 involved the wage tax and
corporate and individual income taxes . 1 31 The French govern
ment has entrusted to its Council of State a judicial as well
as a consultative function. One of its five sections handles
appeals from decisions in the various types of cases against
the government originating in the 24 so- called administrative
tribunals. This section du contenieux has nine subsections, 1 32
each having three Conseillers.
Three of these subsections
specialize in tax cases. 1 3 3 In one recent year, they decided
6 0 8 cases involving direct taxe s, and of these 3 1 6 involved
corporate and individual income taxes . 1 34
Germany alone
among the Six utilizes a physically distinct specialized court
for tax appeals.
In 1964, with five judges sitting on each
case, seven different chambers (Senates) of its Federal Fiscal
Court 135 dealt with a total of 2, 000 tax cases of which 7 80
128 See Chap. VIII, § 4.4 infra .
129 By the writer's count of cases published in the Pacicrisie Belge.
1 30 See Chap. XXIV, § 4.4.
1 31 Id., § 4. 5 .
1 32 Decret 63-766, Art. 38 (July 3 0 , 1 9 63). Formerly there were 11.
See Chap. XII, § 4.4 infra .
1 33 While these sit separately , a reorganization decree (id . � note 132

supra\ apparently anticipates that at some future time they will begin

to sit together in tax cases. See Drago, " Some Recent Reforms of the
French Counseil D ' Etat," 13 Int . & Comp . L.., Q . 1282 , 12 9 6 (1 9 64).
1 34 See Chap. XII, § 4.5 infra .
1 35 See Chap. XVI, § 4.4.
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concerned corporate and individual income taxes.
However,
out of the 2, 000 tax cases of all types, final decisions were
rendered in only 3 80. 1 36 The largest proportion of the balance
was dismissed, being deemed without mer it.
4 . 6 Appellate tribunals : Unifying interpretations
The final consideration in shap ing the appellate structure
to be used in tax cases involves the need that it be capable
of producing unifying and fairly durable interpretations.
Such
capability markedly affects the fairness and efficiency with
which thousands of administrators can be expected to adminis 
ter a tax system. Alsc, especially in self-assessment sys 
te ms, it affects the extent to which taxpayers themselves can
be expected to respond with an acceptable degree of uniformity .
The ultimate question is whether interpretations of the requi
site quality can be achieved adequately at the judicial level
without vesting appellate jur isdiction in a single appellate
court- or chamber, i.e., a division. Such a court would tend
to become spec ialized should the anticipated appellate work
load in a given country equal that in any one of five of these
six countries .
Observe preliminarily that, whether the appellate tribunal
be specialized or generalist, publication of its decisions (facts,
conclusion, and supporting r ationale) is an absolute prerequisite
if taxpayers and administrations alike hope to possess guides
for the future or any chance to question the applicability of
past decisions in the context of other factual situations . 1 37
This initial requirement is completely s atisfied, however, in
four of the six countries covered here (Belgium, France, Great
Britain, 138 and the United States) through publication of all
appellate decisions .
And, in the other two (Germany and the
Netherlands), at least those appellate decisions deemed im
portant or of general interest 1 39 are published ,l40
1 36 [d ., § 4. 5.
1 37 Publication

also helps preserve integrity and enhances the disci
pline with which the court approaches its work, for only by publication
can a court be subject to the critical views of writers.
1 38 See § 4. 5 , Chaps. VIII, XII, and XX infra .
1 39 See § 4. 5 of Chaps. XVI and XXIV infra .
140 Publication of trial decisions in these six countries ranges , how
ever, from none in Britain to practically all such decisions in the
United States.
In between, a few are published in France and, in the
three other continental countries , those deemed important are published.
See § 4 . 3 of Chaps. VIII, XII, XVI, XX and XXIV infra .
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Publication in itself, however, does not bring unification
unles s appellate court decisions bind lower courts for the
future . Nor will the desired degree of certainty follow unless,
in practice, appellate courts the mselves tend to follow their
own decisions .
Since final decisions of appellate tribunals in
the four continental countries covered here bind formally
ne ither the lower courts nor the appellate tribunals them
selves, theoretically their decisions have no precedent value . l 41
In theory, they bind neither the administration nor taxpayers
with respect to future situations . Fortunately, however, prac 
tice and theory differ somewhat. 142 It is generally recognized
that, in fact, these appellate tribunals ordinarily do follow
their own prior decisions. And the lower tr ibunals, therefore,
do tend to treat the appellate decisions as pre cedents-though
a fairly complicated procedure is required in Belgium to ac 
complish this . 143 A further practical consequence is that the
tax administrations in these continental countries ordinarily
do adhere to the principles decided at the appellate level and
seldom force relitigation of an issue in a yet different cas e .144
But this, no doubt, is due in substantial part to one par 
ticular structural feature of their appellate courts not shared
by the United States and, in theory, not by Britain. And this
differe::-.ce is one of the prime causes for the not insubstantial
degree of uncertainty which does exist in the United State s .
Whereas e ach of the four continental countries lodge s ordinary
tax appeals in one tribunal, 145 the United States employs eleven
141 See § 4. 5 of
142 [bid.
143 The Belgian

judicata .

Chaps. VIII, XII, XVI, and XXIV, infra .

difficulty actually relates to the doctrine of res
In theory, its High Court (Court of Cassation) does not hand

down a final decision on appeals to it. If the chamber which handles
tax appeals concludes that the lower court erred in law, the latter' s
decision is quashed and the case is referred to another lower court for
retrial on both the facts and law.
That court is completely free to
differ with the chamber of the High Court. But should it do so as to
the legal question, on a second appeal by the aggrieved party , both
chambers of the Court of Cassation sit in judgment. If the two chambers
together agree with the single chamber which dealt with the earlier
appeal, the case again is referred to another lower court which now,
however, is bound to enter judgment in accordance with the views of
the High Court. See Chapter VII, § 4 . 5 .
144 op . cit . supra note 141 .
145 See § 4.4 of Chaps. VIII, XII, XVI, and XXIV infra . Constitutional
issues in Germany, however , may be carried yet another step , i.e. , to
its Supreme Court. See Chap. XVI, §§ 4 .4 and 4. 5 infra .
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coordinate courts of appeal.
E ach has jurisdiction over a
given ge ographical area, 146 with its decisions reviewable by a
single High Court only with its le ave . Because of the latter 's
heavy non-tax docket, over a recent ten-year period, it granted
such leave and rendered a full opinion in only 7 8 cases (aver 
aging 7 . 8 a year). 147 Moreover, far more typically than not,
such leave was granted only after a conflict had emerged be 
tween two or more of the inter mediate appellate courts. 148
Before such a conflict emerges, however, i.e., where only one
inter mediate court has passed on an issue, uncertainty con
tinues . The possibility always exists that in some future case,
on petition e ither of the commissioner or another taxpayer, a
second appellate court might reach a contrary view which the
Supre me Court might then adopt as it often has -proportionately
speaking 149 -after granting certiorari. Because the geographi
cally spread intermediate appellate courts are coordinate, the
precedents of one do not bind the other, 150 though each does
treat the decisions of the others with respect - apparently in
lesser degree, however, than do Britain's three inter mediate
courts of appeal. 151
146 That, in effect, there is a twelfth which actually is coordinate on a
nationwide basis, see text accompanying note 161 infra .
147 See Brown and Whitmire, op . cit. supra note 32, at 658. In fiscal
19 66, the High Court approved only 4 of the government' s 8 petitions for
certiorari and only 8 of the 82 requested by taxpayers. See Attorney
General of the U .s . , Annual Report 1966, 335 .
148 See Brown and Whitmire , op . cit . supra note 32. That study in
dicates that over a ten-year period, in two-thirds (52) of the federal
civil tax cases decided by a full opinion of the High Court, a conflict
between courts of appeal was cited as a reason for hearing the case.
In 6 of the remaining 2 6 , such a conflict existed though it was not
referred to by the High Court. Thus, on the average, only in 2 civil tax
cases a year was the Court able, in view of the demands of other areas ,
to assume jurisdiction merely because an issue was important to the
tax system.
149 A study, Brown and Whitmire, op. cit. supra note 32, at 6 5 9,
indicated that in one-half of the High Court opinions involving conflicts
between the lower appellate courts , the first appellate decision was found
to be incorrect.
1 5 0 It is precisely because of this that the Supreme Court views , as one
of its important functions , resolution of conflicts that arise among these
appellate courts. As to the frequency with which this does serve as a
ground for Supreme Court review, see Brown and Whitmire, op . cit .
supra note 32.
151 Cf. Chap. XX, § 4. 5 with the results of the U.S . study reflected in
Brown and Whitmire, op. cit. supra note 32. The chance that conflicts
will emerge in the U.S. is relatively greater also becaus e , compared to
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France and Germany, though employing only one appellate
tribunal for ordinary tax litigation, 152 could have encountered
the same difficulty as the United States, because their tax de 
cisions are handed down by each of several coordinate divi
sions (three in France, seven in Germany) within their respec
tive tribunals. l53 These two countr ies, however, faced up to
the obvious problem generated by this structure ; they e stab 
lished compensatory and s omewhat similar internal referral
arrangements . In Germany, 154 when one Senate (a division)
of the Federal Fiscal Court encounters an appeal deemed to
involve one or more important new issues of law, it may refer
the case, in advance of a decision, to the Great Senate, a body
c omposed of representative s from the separate Senates and
presided over by the President of the Court. About five such
referrals occur each year . 1 55 Further, should a given Senate,
in considering a case, tentatively decide against following an
earlier decision of another Senate, it must refer that case to
the Great Senate for decision. In France, 156 though tax cases
are dealt with by only three of the nine subsections which
make up the judicial section of the Council of State, the Presi
de nts of all nine subsections together with representatives of
the consultative sections of the Council, sit as a plenary as 
sembly, to which problems can be referred. So constituted,
this plenary assembly considers important new tax questions
as well as cases which may lead the Council to alter its posi
tion regarding an earlier enunciated tax principle . l57
(footnote continued)
Britain, it has four times as many intermediate appellate courts and far
more cases reach that level. See text accompanying notes 122 and 12 7
supra . U.S. district courts (trial tribunals) in the geographical circuit
of a given intermediate appellate court are expected, however , to follow
the decisions of the latter. But, that the other two trial forums do not
feel bound by prior decisions of any particular court of appeal s , see text
accompanying notes 161 and 162 infra .
152 That constitutional issues in Germany may be further appealed,
however, to its Supreme Court, see Chap. XVI, § 4.4 infra .
15 3 See § 4.4 of Chaps. XII and XVI infra .
154 See Chap. XVI, §§ 4 .4 and 4. 5 infra .
155 A similar internal referral system is employed at the trial level by
the U.s. Tax Court.
See text accompanying note 33 supra . As noted
there, however , the Tax Court internally reviews a much larger share of
its cases , no doubt because of a tradition that the Chief Judge is expected
to resolve " doubts in favor of court review." See Murdock, op . cit .
supra note 3 3 , at 298.
156 See Chap. XII, §§ 4.4 and 4. 5 infra, and note 132 supra .
157 For other devices used to secure uniformity in France , see Chapter
XII, § 4.4. Also, see note 123 supra .
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Obviously, such referral arrangements can neither elimi
nate uncertainty completely nor guarantee absolute uniformity
among divisions .
For example, not all important issues of
first impression will be recognized as such and be referred
in advance of a decision. Further, a given division may de 
cide improperly that an earlier decision by another division
is not in point and, quite logically though incorrectly, conclude
referral to be unwarranted.
Far less perfect, however, is the device which links to
No
gether the various intermediate U . s. courts of appeal.
arrangement exists enabling one such separate court to consult
with the others before rendering a decision. Nor, as before
noted, do the decisions of one bind the other. Further, it is
unlikely the Supreme Court will involve itself, to the end of
fixing a nationwide rule, until at least two circuits are in con
flict.
Consequently, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
having nationwide responsibility for tax administration, feels
that he must be free, on losing before one court of appeals,
to test the issue before yet another , 158 In the interval, which
can run to several years, 159 uncertainty re igns . But the ulti
It is inherent in
mate fault is not that of the Commissioner .
the courts - of- appeals structure itself. The above mentioned
se cond taxpayer also would have been free, had the theory of
the court in the other cir cuit favored the Commissioner, to
require his own court of appeals to address itself to the matter
as one of first impression ,l 60 This particular consequence
of the multi-courts - of - appeals arrangement takes on a yet dif 
ferent dimension when account is taken of one further feature
of the appellate structure . One of the alternative trial forums
having nationwide jurisdiction-the Court of Claims-has no al
legiance to the decisions of any p articular court of appeals .l 61
158 His decision not to conform to a given court of appeals decision is
often reflected in a published Technical Information Release.
159 A study of Supreme Court decisions from 1955 to 1959 shows , as to
these cases, that the median time involved in the development of con
flicts between the circuits was 50 months. See Del Cotto, " The Need
for a Court of Tax Appeals: An Argument and a Study," 12 Buffalo L .
Rev . 5, 29-30 (1962).
For a survey of other studie s , see Brown and
Whitmire, op . cit . supra note 32, at 669.
160 For a statistical analysis , based on one assumption and to the effect
that history indicates the courts of appeal will not agree on 25% of the
cases involving a difficult substantive issue, see Brown and Whitmire,
op . cit . supra note 32,
161 The significant degree to which it has exhibited independence is
analyzed in Pavenstedt, op . cit . supra note 38 . See also note 16 6 infra .
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It considers itself coordinate to the regular courts of appeal
because it too is reviewable only by leave of the Supreme
Court. In consequence, a taxpayer who believes a previous
decision of his own court of appeals is unfavorable to his
cause, from the very beginning has the option, if the Court of
Claims has not considered the issue, to invoke the latter ' s
j urisdiction. And where the Court of Claims alone has spoken
on an issue, no one -whether taxpayers or the Commissioner 
is bound as to future situations . After all, this tribunal is
only one of twelve coordinate courts . It has nationwide jur is 
diction but the entire nation is subdivided geographically among
the other eleven coordinates .
In further aggravation, though not attributable to the ap
pellate structure itself, is the fact that another trial forum,
the T ax Court, e s sentially just because of its nationwide juris 
diction, also denies allegiance to any particular court of ap
peals. 162 And this is s o, though in contrast to the Court of
Claims, Tax Court decisions are appealable, illustratively in
the case of an individual, to the particular court of appeals
having jurisdiction over the area where the particular taxpayer
reside s . Precisely because of this, neither the Commissioner
nor other taxpayers, as to future situations, feel bound by Tax
Court decisions . 163
In summary, neither the Commiss ioner, nor any of these
tribunals, nor taxpayers themselve s accord binding precedent
to any decisions other than those of the Supreme Court. 1 64
Yet that Court seldom involves itself until one court of appeals
differs fr om the previous decision of another . To some ex
tent, however, the problem is mitigated by the Commiss ioner 's
usual practice of conceding an issue should he lose before two
courts of appeal. For the uncertainty which prevails in the
interim, however, the appellate structure bears the prime
162 0ther reasons are also advanced in Lawrence v. Commissioner,
For an ex
27 T.C. 7 13 (1957 ) , rev ' d 258 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1958).
tended analysis, see Ferguson, op . cit . supra note 2 6 , at 366. As noted
there, at 367 n. 2 8 5 , a federal district court, on the other hand, is ex
pected not only to follow decisions of the court of appeals for its circuit
but, in the absence of any such controlling decision , tends also to attach
great weight to appellate decisions of other circuits.
163 Typically, his reaction to adverse decisions is published, either as
an acquiescence or non-acquiescence in the Internal Revenue Bulletin
which is available to taxpayers.
164 That the one exception is a federal district court, see note 162

supra .
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blame, though the above mentioned Tax Court practice at the
trial level is a significant aggravation. Together, these two
circumstances lead (i) taxpayers to shop for the most "appro
priate" forum 16 5 and (ii) the Commissioner to test an adverse
result in yet another coordinate forum. Both the "shopping"
and period of uncertainty are affected also by the prospect
that a second coordinate court, perhaps because of slight fac
tual variations, may be willing to distinguish the previous de 
c ision of another and thus avoid even the appearance of a
conflict. If it does distinguish, and if the forums are alterna
tives, yet other taxpayers will be affected in their choice of a
forum by what then are deemed to be differences in judicial
attitude -if only in degree . 166
Certain individuals propose, through legislation, to handle
the problem by requiring the Commissioner to follow the de 
cisions of courts according to a given sequence . 16 7 Others
would establish a centralized court of tax appeals, with some
of these proponents content to leave the tribunal subordinate
to the Supreme Court, 16 8 while some would make its decisions
Qt;her reformers would start at the bottom, at the
final. 169
trial level, by eliminating the existing right of taxpayers to
choose between a specialized court and courts of general
jurisdiction.
They would put exclusive trial jurisdiction in
specialized courts, 170 thereby also removing the right of jury
tr ial, 171 with appeals from these courts going to a single spe 
cialized court. 172 A completely opposite approach is taken by
those who would eliminate at the trial level the encumbrance
165 Literally dozens of articles have been published to educate practi
tioners regarding the considerations they should take into account in
choosing a forum.
For collection of a large sample, see Brown and
Whitmire, op . cit. supra note 3 2 , at 650 n. 52.
166 Pavenstedt, in op . cit . supra note 38 , identified 17 areas where
the Court of Claims was the more favorable forum and 7 where it was
less favorable.
16 7 See H.R. 6 9 14 , 89th Cong. , 2d sess. (1966).
168 See, e.g. , Griswold, " The ·Need for a Court of Tax Appeals," 57
Harv . L , Rev . 1153 (1944).
16 9 Lowndes, " Federal Taxation and the Supreme Court," 1960 Sup .
Ct. Rev. 222 , 2 57 .

170 For example, see Traynor, op . cit. supra note 45 , at 142 5 . But
cf. text following note 43 supra .
17 1 Id . , at 1426. However , the architect of this proposal would pre
serve the deliberative process by having decisions of a single j udge in
ternally reviewed by the other judges on a court.
172Id . , at 1426.
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taxpayers now suffer should they prefer t o try the case before
a federal district court of general jurisdiction, perhaps with
a jury, rather than before the specialized Tax Court. This
group would establish true concurrent jurisdiction by e nabling
a taxpayer who prefers the former type of court to litigate
there before paying the amount in dispute, as he now can do
should he choose the Tax Court. 173
The ultimate controversy is between two groups.
One
places a high premium on efficiency, certainty, uniformity, and
the peculiar competence and concern of specialized tribunals .
The other values more highly both the per spective associated
with courts of general jurisdiction (including jur ies) and the
wholesome effect of permitting intermediate coordinate courts
of this type to examine the same issue to the end, should they
differ, of placing before the Supreme Court well reasoned but
competing views of objectively oriented appellate court judge s .
The whole matter, a s it relates t o the United States, is now
the subject of a comprehensive study by a colleague 1 74 of this
writer.
Section B.

Analytic Comparison: Litigation
P ractices of the "Six "

4 . 7 Introduction
In conducting trial litigation, each party has certain le 
gitimate concerns peculiar to it. Practices particularly im
portant to the tax administration, and those primarily of
interest to taxpayers, are considered separately in the suc 
ceeding two subtopics .
Thereafter the focus shifts t o yet
other practices -of common concern and basic to the entire
conflict resolution process.
4 . 8 Practices peculiarly important to the tax administration
Each of the six tax administrations covered here must
deal individually with thousands of suits initiated at many
different locations across each nation. 175
In consequence,
1 7 3 See

Committee

on Court Procedure , Taxation Section, A.B.A . ,

op . cit. supra note 48. Cf, Sutherland, op . cit . supra note 7 .

174 Professor Alan Polasky, under the auspices of the American Bar
Foundation.
1 75 As to the number of suits actually tried, see § 4. 3 supra . How
ever, in most of these countries many other docketed cases required
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their most important administrative problems emerge from an
inherent conflict between two competing administrative needs :
to handle this extremely burdensome effort efficiently, and to
preserve for top policy maker s the opportunity to formulate
litigation policy. Whereas the latter necessitates at least some
degree of centralization, maximum efficiency in handling the
The problem is
litigation function requires decentralization.
to strike a proper balance between the two.
Consider ing only efficiency, the aims should be to avoid
{i) duplicating, in the litigation stage, work that had to be done
during the last administrative stage, and (ii) duplication of
effort within the litigation process itself.
The first of thes'3 two ends obviously is best served by
holding litigation to the ne cessary minimum, i.e ., by closing
out through reasonable settlements as many controversies as
possible during the administrative stage itself. Practices most
likely to achieve this were fully considered in Chapter III
supra.
As explained there, the foregoing objective cannot be
re ached merely by requiring taxpayers to exhaust their ad
ministrative remedies before invoking the jurisdiction of an
independent tr ibunal. Far more important is the imperative
of maintaining an image of impartiality at the administrative
level. And, as further explained in an earlier chapter, this
image of impartiality ultimately is enhanced inter alia by
imposing on the per son who hears the final administrative
appeal the further responsibility of representing the govern
ment at the trial level should litigation ensue . l 7 6 This poten
tial responsibility would remind him dur ing the earlier ad
ministrative phase that it is he (in a representative capacity)
who faces the risk of loss if the dispute is not settled ad
ministratively . Such a reminder should contribute to his sense
of reasonablenes s and facilitate administrative settlement. And
as to any cases 1Wf s o settled, the proposed arrangement would
(footnote continued)
attention but were settled before trial. For example, of the 6 ,234 U.S.
Tax Court cases disposed of in fiscal 19 66, 5 , 195 were settled before
trial, and only 7 26 actually were tried on the merits. The remaining
See Commissioner of Internal
3 13 were withdrawn or dismissed.
Of the 1 ,504
Revenue, op . cit . supra note 46 , at 134 ( Table 17 B).
refund suits filed that same year with the district courts and the Court
of Claims (Attorney General, Annual Report 1966, 326 and 339 n. 20),
previous experience would indicate that at least 1 ,000 will b e settled
before trial.
17 6 See Chap. III, § 3 . 2 supra .
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further the cause of efficiency. It avoids the expensive dupli
cation of effort which otherwise follows when, at the point of
litigation, one more profess ional employee must master com
plexities and nuances of a contr oversy. Implementation of this
plan demands as a corollary that the official who hears the
final administrative appeal possess the requisite skill to repre
sent the government properly before the appropriate independ
ent tribunal. This skill, however, is not irrelevant to the task
His
he performed during the earlier administrative phase.
actions at that time should have been affe cted, in the interest
of administrative fairness, by a careful appraisal of the antici
pated litigation hazards .
And assuming proper training, per 
sonal experience of such hazards provides the best possible
preparation for making such appraisals .
The Netherlands actually utilizes the arrangement proposed
here . The local inspector who dealt with the taxpayer in the
last administrative stage ordinarily represents the government
before the trial tribunal . 177 His training, formerly in the ad 
ministration's own academy but now entrusted on a subsidized
b as is to law faculties , is intended to equip him for this re 
sponsib ility . 178 Likewise the British Inland Revenue, in those
cases -typically small-tried before General Commissioners ,
i s represented by the inspector who heads the local office or
by his assistant. 179
For surtax cases tried before Special
Commissioners, however, the responsibility for the represen
tation ordinarily does not remain with the Surtax Office but
France use s
shifts to the centralized Solicitor 's Office . 180
yet another device t o s ave, for the benefit of the litigation
stage, much of the effort that went into the administrative
stage . There the taxpayer 's final administrative appeal is at
the regional level (Departmental Director 's Office), not the
If litigation ensues, the responsible official at
local level.
that higher office typically prepares the memorandum of law
which will be filed with the independent tribunal, though the
administration actually is represented in court by an ordinary
inspector residing in the city where the tribunal s its . 1 81
177 See
17 8 See
179 See
180 Id . ,
181 See

Chap. XXIV, § 4.3 infra .
Chap. XXI , § 1. 5 infra .
Chap. XX, § 4.3a infra .
§ 4.3b infra .
Chap. XII, § 4. 3 infra . Its inspectors typically do have legal
training. See Chap. IX, § 1. 5 infra .
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In contrast, Belgium and the United States, though in in
verse order, prob ably suffer the greatest duplication of pro
fessional effort when a controversy shifts from the final ad
m inistrative phase to the litigation phase.
Belgium, alone
among the Six, shifts trial responsibility outside the govern
ment, turning it over to a regular practicing member of the
b ar to whom the Minister of Finance has given a permanent
part-time appointment to defend the government at this level. 1 82
In the United States, the shift takes place within the govern
ment.
Trial responsibility moves to the government's own
full-time legal staffs . But the resulting duplication of effort
is further compounded, irrespective of whether the taxpayer
invokes the jurisdiction of the T ax Court or one of the other
two trial forums.
When a case is docketed with the Tax Court, the adminis 
trative official (Appellate Division) who heard what in theory
was the final administrative appeal continues, after docketing,
to share j ointly -with an attorney from the separate Chief
Counsel 's office -the responsibility to seek an administrative
settle ment of the case before the Court convenes for the ses
sion during which the case otherwise would be tried. 183 Where
settlement is not achieved, that s ame attorney will represent
the government in the Tax Court. 1 84 However, because almost
VIII, § 4 . 3 infra .
60 -18 , C. B. 1960-2 , 988. Once the court convenes and
the calendar is called, settlement authority then vests exclusively in the
Chief Counsel' s office. Typically, as in fiscal 196 6 , about 7 0 % of all
docketed cases actually bypass the last administrative stage. See Com
missioner of Internal Revenue , op . cit . supra note 46 , at 134 ( Table
17 A).
However, as to these cases also, the two separate offices
(Appellate Division and Chief Counsel) continue, as above, to share j oint
settlement responsibility.
184 Under present conditions it would not be feasible to avoid his dup
lication of the study and analysis previously put into the problem by the
administrative official who heard the last administrative appeal.
Too frequently, the latter official is not in a position to handle the
trial if one ensues. Many of these officials are not legally trained. Be
cause of the procedures followed by the Tax Court, typically only persons
with legal training appear before it. See § 4. 9 infra .
Nor at the moment would it be feasible to avoid the consequent
duplication by having the attorneys in the Chief Counsel's office take over
the entire settlement function. A substantial proportion of those attor
neys are recent law school graduates who stay with that office only
during the four years for which they make a moral commitment. While
there is no doubt about the quality of their work, not having the long ex
perience enjoyed by the technically oriented administrative officials in

1 82 See Chap.
183 Rev. Rul.
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85 percent of all docketed cases are settled dur ing the pretrial
period, 185 this phase of the litigation process should be, and
in practice is, viewed as yet another administrative appeal,
though now with two quite separate government office s -e ach
having its own internal review arrangement- sharing the r e 
sponsibility for settlement.
When a refund case is filed, whether with a U.S. federal
district court or the Court of Claims, responsibility shifts
from the administrative officials, not to the office of the ad 
ministration's own Chief Counsel, but to other lawyers in the
even more separate Tax Division of the Justice Department. 1 86
Here too, of the cases filed, well over a majority will be
settled before trial. l 87 But once again, as to a s ignificant
proportion of these, yet another office becomes involved. To
help preserve a uniform litigation policy, many but not nearly
all of the proposed s ettlements are cleared by the Justice
Department with the tax administration's own Chief Counsel's
Office . 188 Consequently, this latter office also must acquaint
itself with the details of these cases.
Germany, among the Six, prob ably achieves the maximum
degree of efficiency, by giving local finance offices the greatest
possible autonomy . It even avoids duplicating in the appellate
(footnote continued)
the Appellate Division, they would not be nearly as efficient in settling
the far greater number of cases which are and must be resolved admin
istratively even before petitions are filed with a court. There were
over 22 ,000 such dispositions at the Appellate Division level in fiscal
196 6. See Commissioner of Internal Revenue , op . cit . supra note 46 , at
133 (Tables 15B and 16B) . In short, to consolidate the two functions in
one office would require very different staffing arrangements than those
now utilized by either office.
185 See Commissioner of Internal Revenue, op . cit. supra note 4 6 , at
134 (Table 17B).
186 While this shift took place pursuant to an executive order issued
under the Economy Act of 1932 , the Justice Department itself defends
it on substantive merit. See note 208 infra and Statement of Honorable
Mitchell Rogovin , Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division, Department
Before the Subcommittee on Improvements of
of Justice , on S. 2041.
the Senate Judiciary Committee, 90th Cong. , 1st sess. (1967).
187 See note 175 supra .
1 88 And for this purpose , the Chief Counsel's office maintains a special
division-the Refund Litigation Division.
A " Settlement Option Pro
cedure" instituted in 1964 permits the Justice Department to settle many
of the less important cases without this referral. See Attorney General,
Annual Report 1964, 320. By fiscal 1965 , this covered 43% of the cases.
See Attorney General, Annual Report 1965, 307.
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phase of the litigation stage the professional effort invested in
the earlier or trial phase of that stage . If litigation doe s take
place, the inspector who heads the local office or a senior
s ubordinate who had dealt with the dispute typically continues
to handle the case; he represents the government before both
Further, ordinarily he
the trial and appellate tribunals . 189
alone decides whether to appeal an adverse decision of the
tr ial tribunal .
Indeed, should either the state or Federal
Finance Ministry or both decide to intervene in the appeal,
whether voluntarily or at the invitation of the appellate tri
bunal, a Ministry-intervenor appears as a separate independent
party to the action, using its own representatives and not in
terfering with the local office 's presentation of its case . 1 9 0
If feasible, it is desirable, of course, to minimize dupli
cation of effort by having the same professional appear before
It is quite another matter to stress effi
both tribunals . 1 9 1
c iency or a local office 's autonomy to a point that precludes
National Office involve ment and, thus, some duplication of effort
regarding the question of whether to appeal a trial determina
tion. Most countries covered here, however, actually experi
ence duplication on both counts, i.e., the representation function
does shift to a yet different professional at the point of appeal,
and the National Office does involve itself in the question of
whether to appeal.
As to the matter of representation, Belgium, for example,
instead of having the trial attorney handle any subsequent ap
peal, employs a regular member of the Court of Cas sation's
own bar . 192 In the United State s, at the point of appeal the
representation function shifts from the government's own trial
attorney to appellate attorneys who work full time in the Justice
Department's Appellate Section. 1 9 3
Much more easily defended is that duplication required of
the National Office in trying to control litigation policies ac 
tually carried out at lower levels . In the last analysis, formu
lation of litigation policy is another form of administrative
189 See Chap. XVI, §§ 4.3 and 4. 5 infra . Ordinarily this senior class
local official does have legal training. Ibid. Also see Chap. XIII, § 1.5
infra .

190See
191 The

Chap. XVI, § 4. 5 infra .
prime problem here is that some persons who make excellent
trial advocates are less able in the appellate setting, and vice versa .
t92 See Chap. VIII, § 4.5 infra .
1 93 If the case goes to the Supreme Court, the representation function
understandably shifts again to a high official-the Solicitor General.
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rule making.
Where the latter is accomplished through more
typical forms, such as rulings, Chapter II supra 1 94 argued
that the tax administration's own central office should assume
final responsibility, primarily to achieve uniformity and to
assure that the more important policy choices required by the
interpretative process actually are made by senior officials
having some Policy orientation, not by technically oriented
personnel who staff the lower echelons . The same rationale
applies to litigation policy. Consequently, generally speaking,
the central office itself should have at least the opportunity to
decide whether or not a given trial determination should be
appealed.
Britain adheres to this practice, even though its
central office otherwise does not carry on a major, published
interpretative rule -making program. 1 9 5 The Board of Inland
Revenue itself decides whether a trial decision will be ap
pealed, but only after its secretariat has consulted with ad
ministrative experts in the affected substantive area and, if
need be, its Solicitor 's Office _ l9 6 Roughly similar practices
are followed in Belgium, France, and the Netherlands . l 97
In sharp theoretical contrast, the U.S. tax administration's
own central- office officials do not decide the · question of
whether to appeal. Ultimate authority rests with lawyers in
the centralized but wholly s eparate Justice Department , 1 9 8
Any assessment of this arrangement must take into considera
tion the fact that U.S. appellate courts are courts of general
They must be able to accommodate all types of
j urisdiction.
cases. A department with concerns extending far beyond the
tax area is better able to take appropriate account of ove r 
crowded appellate court dockets - if any . Moreover in practice,
the Justice Department does try to be sensitive to policy con
cerns expressed by the office of the tax administration's own
Chief Counsel. 1 99 And the latter's subordinates normally are
194 See §§ 2.6 and 2. 7 .
1 95 See Chap. XVIII infra and, for comparative purposes ,
§ 2. 5 supra .
1 9 6 See Chap. XX, § 4.5 infra .
1 9 7 See § 4. 5 in Chaps. VIII, XII, and XXIV infra .
1 9 8 This is a function of the Solicitor General. See Attorney

Annual Report 1965, 300.

Chap. II,

General,

1 9 9 Typically, the file which reaches the Justice Department' s Tax Di
vision includes a memorandum from the Chief Counsel' s office explain
ing why an adverse lower court decision should be appealed. Before for
warding the file to the Solicitor General for a final decision , a reviewer
in the Tax Division' s Appellate Section will add a memorandum reflecting
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expe cted to try to preserve the administration's own interpre 
tative policies as reflected in its administrative regulations,
rulings, and other official pronouncements . 200
In some of the countrie s covered here, central-office con
trol over litigation policy begins not at the point of appeal but
earlier, at the inception of the trial stage . In Belgium, for
example, three centralized administrative branches are re 
sponsible for tax litigation. The appropriate one works closely
with the appointed private practitioner who actually represents
the government before the trial court. 201 In France, while
both control and conduct of trial litigation ordinarily are de 
centralized, exceptions as to the former do exist. The r egional
Departmental Director whose office prepares the memorandum
of law to be filed with the trial tribunal is expected, prior to
the preparation thereof, to consult with the Director General
of Direct Taxes at the national office in any one of four cir 
cumstances .
And these circumstances include the s ituation
where an issue is not covered either by case law or adminis 
trative instructions. 202
The United States, which likewise decentralize s the actual
representation function in trial litigation before the Tax Court,
goes beyond France in centralizing policy control at the incep 
tion of that stage .
To this end, the administration's Chief
Counsel maintains a mechanized two-way reporting system
(Reports and Information Retrieval Activity ) between his central
office and his 40 field offices which handle those cases even
tually to be tried before the circuit-riding Tax Court. This
system, known as RIRA, provides his central office with an
indexed inventory of issues involved in all pending Tax Court
litigation complemented by an abstract of the facts in each
case . RIRA performs two functions vital to central office con
trol of litigation policy, and a third purpose important to effi
cient exercise of such control. 203
(footnote continued)
his own views. While officials in the Tax Division are expected to make
an "independent review" of the litigation possibilities , they also are
expected by the head of that Division to be as "fully responsive as possi
ble to the policy direction of the Internal Revenue Service.' ' See Attorney
General, Annual Report 1965, 298 , 3 00 , and 3 07.
200 See Cohen, "Current Developments in the Chief Counsel' s Office,"

42 Taxes 663 (1964).
201 See Chap. VIII, § 4.3 infra .
202 See Chap. XII, § 4.3 infra .
203 See note 200 supra , and Link, " RIRA-A Legal Information
in the Internal Revenue Service," 4 3 Taxes 231 (1965).

System
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The first two functions coincide with those of the above
mentioned but less sweeping reporting r equirements imposed
by the French administration. RIRA enables the central office
to assure that geographically spread trial counsel take con
sistent positions across the nation. Further, it assures that
any position thus taken is sound from a Policy standpoint.
Assurance that policywise -sound positions will be adopted
even at this e arly trial stage has long-run significance not
always recognized. The at least defens ible te chnical position
which technically oriented local offices can develop as to a
disputable issue may in fact be indefensible in terms of tax
policy. To urge such a position even at the trial stage can
have unfortunate long -range consequences. A given trial judge
may adopt that position and the taxpayer then may lodge an
appeal . If it is not until this stage that the central office be 
comes involved, the likelihood is reduced that it will give the
full policy implications of that technical position their just due.
This is under standable . Once a trial court "has approved the
Government's position in a case, the reconsideration of that
position at the national office level is complicated by a natural
reluctance to repudiate a view successfully urged upon a
court. " 2 04 Not irrelevant is the risk of affecting the future
attitude of the trial bench toward the government's local trial
representatives . Confidence the trial bench otherwise might
have in future arguments advanced by those representatives
may be shaken should a central office, making its first ap 
praisal of a question at the belated point of appeal, confess
e rror before the appellate court regarding a position the local
trial representative had urged successfully upon that trial
bench. Trial judges are human. Both the foregoing r isks as
they relate to U.S. Tax Court cases are avoided, in large part
b ecause RIRA permits the central office to trigger its policy
consideration of a case prior to the trial. Further , to this
s ame end, all briefs prepared by field office s are reviewed in
the Chief Counsel's central office before submission to the
T ax Court. And subordinates conducting that review are in
structed, as before noted, to maintain positions consistent with
the regulations, rulings, and other official pronouncements
previously approved by · the Service's senior administrative
offic ial s . 205

204 Attorney General , Annual Report 1965, 301.
205 See note 200 supra .

Italics added.
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RIRA, by enabling the central office to identify at an early
point important or frequently recurring issues, also contributes
to efficient and effective implementation of litigation policy .
From the cases raising such an issue, the central office can
select the test case best suited to clar ify the law. 206 The
others can be settled or "put on ice" until the test case has
been resolved.
Central office control over trial litigation pending in the
wide -flung U.S. district courts and in the Court of Claims is
accomplished through a yet different system .
Almost all
lawyers who represent the government in these cases are
based at the office of the Justice Department in Washington. 207
To accommodate the geographically dispersed trials, they ride
circuit. T hus it is easy for the Justice Department to raise
with the administration's Chief Counsel-questions pertaining
to the de sirability or undesirability of maintaining a given
position.
In theory, however, the former-rather than the tax
administration or its Chief Counsel-makes the ultimate de 
c ision. 208
206 Ibid. RIRA also contributes in a yet different way to the efficiency
of decentralized trial counsel. The latter are fed information regarding
the status of similar cases pending in other offices. Thus, should a given
local office find that a similar case, pending elsewhere, has reached a
more advanced stage , it can minimize duplication of effort by soliciting
the relevant memoranda, briefs , etc.
2 07 Of the 202 attorneys in the Justice Department' s Tax Division at the
close of fiscal 1966, only 6 were based elsewhere in a field office sub
ject to central control. See Attorney General, Annual Report 1966, 367.
208 One who headed this activity for the Justice Department described
the actual practice as follows: "Separation of responsibility has proved
successful because it affords an opportunity for a fresh, intensive, and
intelligent reexamination of the Government' s position in each tax con
troversy at the point in time when that controversy emerges from the
administrative level into full public view in Federal court. The Internal
Revenue Service has a responsibility to examine tax returns with a view
to developing arguments which maximize the Government' s revenue in
the specific cases at hand along with its responsibility to establish rules
and policy without regard to their dollar impact in a particular case.
While the Internal Revenue Service leadership has made great strides
toward encouraging a balanced even-handed judgment by its agents, the
administration of justice and the tax laws are well served by the inde
pendent review and direction given by the Tax Division to the tax cases
going into Federal courts. The Tax Division of the Department of Justice
is not free to direct revenue policy. But, when its examination convinces
it that it would be a mistake to argue the position advanced by Internal
Revenue, the matter is taken up with the Chief Counsel and through a
process of conference and persuasion , a mutually acceptable position is
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A final problem confronting an administration relates to
adver se trial determinations not appealed.
Any number of
reasons, in a given case, might cause an administration to
decide against appeal. If for mulation of litigation policy as to
a given issue is another form of administrative rule making,
for the reasons earlier set forth with respect to rulings them 
selves, 209 the government should state openly, at least as to
the more important unappealed trial decisions that are pub 
lished, whether it will conform to such published decisions .
A similar statement of intent should be made, where a country
utilizes an intermediate layer of appellate courts, with respect
to their adverse decisions if published and allowed to become
final without further appeal. In both instances, by publishing
such state ments, the centr al office (i) can contribute to uni
formity-efficiently and fairly, (ii) can assure that administra
tive reactions to such decisions are fixed by senior policy
oriented officials rather than by technically -oriented local
officials, and (iii) can neutralize risks regarding prospective
Accomplishment of the se goals, however, r e 
transactions.
quires two complementary practices .
The first such practice relates to the special care that
must be taken to guard against the possibility that the admin
istration's published reaction will be misleading. This presents
a problem quite distinct from that encountered in publishing
an ordinary ruling.
In the latter circumstance, the adminis 
tration itself can and should identify the facts it deems pivotal
and supply its own rationale . 210 In short, by these means an
administration controls the dimensions of the ruling. In the
case of an adverse trial court decision, however, the adminis 
tr ation may be willing to accept the result but not the totality
of the court's rationale. Or a fact the administration deemed
(footnote continued)
sought. From its independent vantage point the Division is able to per
suade Internal Revenue that, viewed from the standpoint of litigation ,
certain positions should not be pursued in court.
"If this prior examination were not carried out, the resulting re
sponsibility placed on the Federal courts , of making an extensive inves 
tigation into the long-range implications of each Government position
urged before them, would be too great. If the courts can be satisfied that
only carefully considered positions are presented in court, they will have
greater confidence in the Government' s presentation." Attorney General,

Annual Report 1965, 300.

209 See
21 0 See

Chap. II, §§ 2.5 through 2.8 and § 2 . 17 supra .
Chap. II, § 2. 17 supra .
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e s sential in accepting the result may not have been explicitly
treated as such by the tribunal.
In consequence, published
administrative reactions to some adverse trial determinations
e ither must state that the acquie scences or non-acquie scences
relate only to the results themselves or must become what
are at least abbreviated ver sions of complete published rulings .
The second practice relates to reliability . The announce
ment of administrative intent will not achieve all three of the
previously enumerated purposes unles s it is as reliable as
published rulings should be . 211 Absent this, it cannot be de 
pended upon to neutralize risks regarding prospective trans 
actions . However, if an administration is to ass ign to these
announcements the high degree of reliability it should attach
to ordinary published rulings, the two should be processed ap
proximately in the same manner . 212
Among the six countries covered here, only the United
State s carries on an official publication program providing ad
ministrative reactions to adverse but unappealed trial deci
sions, though in the Netherlands something roughly equivalent
to an unofficial program does exist. 213
As to the United States, in the case of unappealed adverse
T ax Court decisions published by the court itself, the admin
istration typically publishes in its own weekly bulletin a bare
acquiescence or non- acquiescence, 214 often with a footnote
stating that the announcement relates only to the result
reached. 215
However, while these acquiescences and non
acquiescences are intended to serve the first two of the three
previously enumerated vital purposes, 216 the administration
211 See Chap. II, §§ 2. 3 , 2.4, 2. 8 , and 2.17 supra .
212 Id. §§ 2.12 and 2. 17 .
2 1 3 See Chap. XXIV, § 4.3 infra .
214 For example, see C .B. 1967- 1 , 1. The Administration

does not
publish its reactions to the court's so-called memorandum decisions.
This may be due to the fact that these decisions are not published by the
court itself, but by private publishing house s , and until recently the Tax
Court itself never cited its own prior memorandum decisions as prece
dents.
215 For example , see id ., at 3 n. 7 .
2 16 However, even those previously enumerated and vital purposes ac
tually were not the original reasons why this program was instituted.
Because of the long period the government once had (one year) in which
to decide whether to appeal an adverse trial decision by what now is the
Tax Court, an acquiescence was issued as a means of informing the tax
payer as to whether the government intended to appeal. See Rogovin ,
" The Four R' s : Regulations , Rulings , Reliance and Retroactivity," 43
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presently is unwilling to assign to them the high degree of
reliability it accords regular published rulings . As to a given
decision, the administration not only reserves the right to
change its published reaction by substituting, for example, a
belated non- acquiescence for a previously published acqui
e scence. 217
It ordinarily actually does so, in contrast to the
practice followed as to published rulings, without exercising
the discretion it also has 21 8 to give the change prospective
effect only . 219
In consequence, in contrast to an ordinary
published ruling, an acquiescence in itself cannot be relied
upon to neutralize the tax risk associated with an important
prospective transaction. 220
The bare quality of these an
nouncements, and the fact they are not processed in the same
painstaking manner as published rulings, are at the root of
the difficulty. And, as observed by a former Chief Counsel
while still in office, to do that which is nece ssary to upgrade
the degree of reliability would require such substantial man
power that, as a practical matter , only the more important
adverse T ax Court decisions could be so processed. 221
Indeed, the tax administration has not even extended the
pre sent program in any comprehensive way to the other two
trial forums (district courts and Court of Claims). However,
on an ever -increasing scale it is tending to publish its reac 
tion to adverse intermediate appellate court decisions (in
cluding Court of Claims decisions), using for this purpose
(footnote continued)

Taxes 756, 771 (1965).

However, the government' s allowable "cogita
tion' ' period was reduced many years ago to three months. Rev. Act. of
1932 , 1101. Since then , it generally has been recognized that the pro
gram was maintained to serve the first two of the previously enumerated
purposes. See Rogovin, supra, at 77 2 and 773 .
217 Dixon v. U.S., 381 U.S. 68 (196 5 ).
218 Under I . R . C. § 7805 (b).
219 See Rogovin, op . cit. supra note 2 16 , at 772 and 773 . It applied
the change retroactively in one case though eleven years elapsed before
the previously published acquiescence
was withdrawn and a non
See Acq. to Caulkins v. Commissioner in
acquiescence substituted.
C . B . 1944 , 5 and the subsequent non-Acq. in C.B. 1955-1, 7 . In another
case involving an interim of twenty years, the change was given prospec
tive effect only.
However, this was characterized by the then Chief
Counsel as an "unusual circumstance" because the substantive issue
was of widespread importance and, during the interval, the Service had
issued a number of private rulings relying on the earlier acquiescence.
See Rogovin , supra, at 773.
220 See Rogovin, op , cit. supra note 216, at 773 .

221 Ibid.
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Technical Information Releases (so- called TIR's) which typically
do resemble exceedingly abbreviated published rulings . It even
follows this practice for a very few district court cases .
4 . 9 Practices peculiarly important to taxpayers
Taxpayers in irreconcilable conflict with a tax adminis 
tration als o have peculiar concerns extending beyond the in
dependent tribunals ' structural arrangements. These pertain
primarily to practices affecting the convenience of litigating a
dispute .
Insofar as affected by geography, the convenience of tax
payer access to a trial tribunal was discussed earlier in con
nection with structural arrangements . Relevant also, however,
to convenient access are other practices relating to (i) the
point in time when the disputed amount must be paid and
(ii) the matter of representation.
If it were true that a " king can do no wrong, " 222 i.e., if
the sovereign never forced to litigation issues other than those
it was sure to win, there would be scant reason to object if
payment of the amount in actual dispute were required before
according access to a trial tribunal . Governments, however,
like private citizens, often are adjudged wrong by trial tribu
nals . For example, of those U.S. Tax Court decisions which,
in fiscal 1 966, became final because not appealed, taxpayers
were held to be wholly r ight in 18 percent and partially right
in another 34 percent, for a total of 5 2 percent. 223 In simi
lar circumstances involving suits between private parties, no
government would dare have the temerity to enact a law which
presumed an alleged debt was owing and which required pay 
ment before a trial court had spoken. I s it not then unbecom
ing for that same government to e stablish a different norm
for cases where it is a party, s olely for its benefit? There
is, moreover, a second consideration: requirement of such
prior payment can seriously inconvenience many taxpayers .
D o not these reasons suggest that no prior payment should be
required ?
Until an independent tribunal has spoken, it is
enough that-as in the case of private litigation- {i) interest
continue to run against the taxpayer should he lose and
�

222 See 3 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 254 (1st
ed. 1768).
223 This meant the government was wholly right in 48% and partially
right in 34%, for a total of 82o/o- See Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
op . cit . supra note 46 , at 44.
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(ii) remedies be available to safeguard the government's chance
to collect if there is reason to believe it otherwise would be
in jeopardy.
The Belgians apparently think this is not enough. As a
matter of law at least, there the duty to pay is not suspended
pending resolution of the controversy by a trial tribunal. 224
The exact contrary is true in Britain: there payment is post
poned when a dispute is carried to either the General or Spe 
cial Commissioners . 225
The United States, as to substantive income tax dispute s,
has never decided which of the two competing practices is
correct. Though it is entitled to interest on unpaid amounts
owing 226 and does possess remedies to safeguard its chance
to collect, 227 it follows the Belgian practice (prior payment)
if the taxpayer prefers to litigate before either the appropr iate
district court or the Court of Claims . But it is content with
the British practice (postponement) if a taxpayer tries his suit
before the U . S . Tax Court. 228 Germany 229 and France, 230
while less equivocal, adopted a yet different practice which
falls between the Belgian and British usages. In Germany, for
example, the local finance office itself generally has discre
tion in the matter . However, postponement must be authorized
in either of two circumstances, both of which can be tested by
summary judicial review even before an action on the substan 
tive issue is filed.
The two circumstances involve cases
where e ither genuine doubt exists regarding the merits of the
government's position or prior payment would have an un
necessarily harsh effect on the taxpayer .
Representation requirements also can affect adversely the
convenience of taxpayer -access to a trial forum.
In small
224 See Chap. VII, § 3 . 4 and Chap. VIII, § 4. 3 infra .
225 See Chap. XX, §§ 4. 3 a and 4.3b infra .
226 See I.R.C. § 6601.
227 Perhaps the most important is the j eopardy assessment.
I.R. C. § 6861 et seq.
228 This i s because b y statute-absent a j eopardy assessment-the

See

dis
puted amount cannot be assessed until the government serves notice of
the taxpayer' s right to appeal to the Tax Court and, assuming a timely
appeal, until the decision of that court becomes final. I.R. C . § 6213.
However, should the taxpayer appeal the Tax Court' s decision, payment
will not be further postponed unless the taxpayer files an appropriate
bond. I.R.C. § 7485. The Tax Court is an available forum, however, only
as to income, estate , and gift taxes.
229 See Chap. XVI, § 4.3 infra .
230 See Chap. XI, § 3 .4b, and Chap. XII, § 4.1 infra .

LITIGATION PRACTICES

153

cases particularly, it actually may be against taxpayer economic
self-interest to employ the particular type of representative
required or, for that matter, any representative at all. How
ever, given the adversary system, every such taxpayer has a
conflicting concern, namely, that his case be presented effec
tively. Trial tribunals themselves have a stake in that con
cern. First, in the interest of their own efficiency, they would
prefer not to waste any time on cases obviously and completely
devoid of merit, but instituted because completely unknowledge 
able taxpayers sought to represent the mselve s . Second, it is
difficult for a tribunal to wear two hats, to try to serve as an
advocate for the taxpayer and be also an objective judge .
In resolving these conflicting concerns, all six of the
countrie s covered here permit a taxpayer to represent him 
self. 2 31
However, in Germany, should the trial tribunal con
clude that a given taxpayer is incapable of this, a new law
permits the court to require him to secure counsel 232 though,
as later observed, not necessar ily a lawyer . In France, the
difficulties which so-called pro -se cases pose for the tribunal
are mitigated by a yet different practice, actually applicable
to all cas e s . A subordinate of the tribunal itself i s required
to submit to it his own objective analysis of a cas e . 233 This
analysis is in addition to and independent of those submitted
by the two competing parties . In the United States, it has been
proposed that a small claims division, with simplified pro
cedures, be added to the Tax Court. In effect, an independent
Commissioner would serve as judge, and often also as the
advocate for taxpayer s subjected to small (le ss than $2, 500)
proposed deficiencies . 2 34
Closely related to the foregoing problem is the question
of whether taxpayer s who do desire representation should be
b arred fr om employing non-lawyers. In the case of general
(non-tax) legal matters, tradition, society 's interest, and af
fected tribunals are served where a country maintains, for the
benefit of those who seek representation or mere legal advice,
2 31 See § 4. 3 , Chaps. VIII, XII, XVI, XX, and XXIV; and 28 U .S . C ,
§ 1654.
2 32 See Chap. XVI, § 4. 3 infra .
233 See Chap. XII, § 4. 3 infra . Belgium, in "public interest" cases ,
follows a similar practice though the role is performed by a member of
the Attorney General' s staff. See Chap. VIII, § 4,2 infra .
234 See s. 18, 90th Gong. , 1st sess. (1967). Also see 113 Cong. Rec .
(daily ed. ) , Jan. 11, 196 7 , S55. The commissioner' s decision would be
subj ect to internal review by a j udge.
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a class of professionals (lawyers) whose prescribed training
I n a given
tends to assure a minimum level of competence .
country, however, circumstances may deprive the legal pro
fession of any justifiable claim to a monopoly over certain
matters that otherwise might be deemed to involve lawyer -like
activity . For example, even in several of the highly developed
Eur opean countries covered here, law schools have almost en
tirely ignored fiscal law. In consequence, given the complexity
of the subject, lawyers as a class did not have the preparation
necessary to pre - e mpt the advisory r ole in tax affair s. As
legally trained individuals were unable to meet an obvious
societal need, the resulting partial vacuum was filled by gradu
ates of other disciplines (accountants or economists), by persons
formerly e mployed and trained by the tax administration, or by
self-educated and self-styled "experts . " 2 35 The se persons not
only prepared returns but, as disputes arose, also represented
taxpayers in their dealings with the tax administration itself.
All the European countrie s covered here except France
r esponded to this extensive use of non-law trained counsel by
permitting non-lawyers who work in this field to represent
And
taxpayers fully before their respective trial tribunals.
France impose s only one limitation. 236 No doubt factors con
tributing to their decision included taxpayer convenience and
the supposition that subject-matter knowledge -not just the skill
qua skill of an advocate -counted for something.
According these considerations special weight and effect
in the tax setting doubtless was facilitated in Germany, the
Since
Netherlands, and Great Britain by one further fact.
these countries utilize separate specialized tribunals or cham
bers for the trial of tax cases, it was possible, without dis 
rupting normal judicial procedures elsewhere, to develop in
formal procedures for these cas e s . The decidedly informal
p etitions and procedures utilized in Germany and the Nether 
lands 237 make it possible to carry on a conflict resolution
process though German and Dutch lawyers rarely appear at
this level. 2 38
It also is very unusual for a British barrister
to appear before England's General Commissioners. Taxpayers
r epresented there typically e mploy accountants or solicitors;
and the government itself is represented by a non-legally
2 35 See §§ 1. 5 and 1.6 in Chap. V, IX, XIII, XVII, and XXI infra .
2 36 See text accompanying note 242 infra .
2 37 See § 4.3 in Chaps. XVI and XXIV infra .
238 Jbid. Also see § 1. 6 , Chaps. XIV and XXI infra .
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trained inspector . 239 Not surprisingly, the procedures followed
there are not as formal as those adhered to by the Special
Commissioners before whom typically only solicitors and bar 
risters appear for taxpayers, with the government usually being
represented by its Solicitor 's Office. 240 Comparably in Bel
gium, though non-lawyers are permitted in tax cases to per 
form the same function as lawyers, the fairly formal pro
cedure s followed taken in conjunction with the fact that the
government itself is represented by a regular practicing mem 
ber of the bar probably help explain why a lawyer customarily
serves as the taxpayer 's representative . 241
France, the only European country of the five to subject
taxpayers to a formal detriment should they employ non
lawyers at the trial stage, does permit such a representative
to prepare petition, brief, or any other essential document.
The only restriction: he may not participate in oral argument
before the tribunal . 242
In actuality, however, French tax
payers most frequently are represented by persons who do
hold a law degree and who, earlier in their careers, served
as government inspectors . And their adversar ie s are of like
quality, i.e., come from the legally trained inspectors presently
employed by the government. 243
Practice at the trial level in the United States differs
from every one of the foregoing usages, though it most nearly
approximates that of Belgium. Pr ior to World War II, U . S.
law schools -like so many of their present European c ounter 
parts-tended to ignore tax law. In consequence, at an early
p oint in time accountants began to perform a substantial ad 
visory role in tax affairs, prepared returns, and-as disputes
ar ose -represented taxpayers in dealing with administrative
officials . Even in that period, however, the heavy turnover
s uffered by the tax administration's legal staffs supplied the
bar with a significant number of pr actitioner s trained in tax
matte rs. Since the war, this continuing reservoir has been
complemented by graduates of law schools, practically all of
which have instituted substantial course programs in taxation.
In consequence of the se two facts, though the bar never has
monopolized e ither the giving of tax advice or taxpayer
2 39 See Chap. XX , § 4.3a infra .
240Id ., § 4.3b. Also see Chap. XVII, § 1.6 infra .
241 See Chap. VIII, § 4.3 infra . Also see Chap. VI, § 1. 6 infra .
242 See Chap. XII, § 4.3 infra . Also see Chap. IX, § 1.6 infra .
243 Ibid.
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representation at the administrative level, it has been able to
maintain in fact, if not in law, a virtual monopoly in repre 
senting taxpayers before trial tribunals . Indeed, before two
of the three alternative trial forums (district courts and Court
of Claims), lawyers alone may appear in a representative
capacity, 244 and each tribunal follows the formal procedural
rules it otherwise applies to non-tax cases. 245 Only before
the Tax Court are non-lawyers permitted to appear in a rep
resentative capacity . 246 While its procedures, in practice, are
not quite as well calculated as those of a district court to
assist the parties in refining the issues and discovering evi 
dence, 247 these same procedures mirror those of a judicial
proceeding, not those of informal administrative hearing.
P artly in consequence of this, appearance even there of a
non-legally trained representative rarely occurs. Even tax
payers who were represented by large accounting firms during
the administrative phase of the conflict resolution process
typically e mploy a lawyer when moving into the litigation stage .
In fact, were it otherwise, the accounting firms themselves
would become entangled in the forum selection process and in
Only
what then becomes tantamount to a conflict of interest.
a lawyer lacks self- interest when advising a taxpayer as to
which of the three alternative trial forums would be most
appropriate for his case. 248
At the appellate level, both Britain and the United States
utilize courts of general jurisdiction to hear tax cases. 249
While Belgium utilizes a semi-spec ialized chamber in its
Court of Cassation, 250 there, as in the United States, even
those taxpayers who employ counsel at the trial level almost
always hire attorney s .
Hence, it is not surprising that all
three countries permit only lawyers to serve in a represen
France and the
tative capacity at the appellate level. 251
Netherlands, on the other hand, permit others to fulfill this
244 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11; Court of Claims Rule s ,
Rule 2.
245 For a comparison of their respective rules, see Ferguson , op . cit.
supra note 2 6 , at 33 9 and 348 , and § 4. 10 infra .
246 Tax Court Rule 2.
247 See Ferguson, op , cit. supra note 26, at 356, and § 4.10 infra ,
248 0nly a lawyer may act in a representative capacity before all three
alternative forums.
249 See § 4. 5 supra and Chap. XX, § 4.4 infra .
250 See § 4. 5 supra and Chap. VIII, § 4.4 infra .
251 See § 4. 5 in Chaps. VIII and XX infra .
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function-s ubject to the limitation that they may not make an
or al argument. 252 Germany doe s not even impose this re 
striction. 2 5 3
4 . 1 0 Practices of common concern
Of the three parties associated with tax litigation at the
tr ial level {taxpayer, administration, and tribunal), at least
two have a common stake in three different goals . Each party
shares an intere st in fostering practices which efficiently and
in a timely manner strip down the issues to the absolute e s 
sential s . Then, a s t o any issues remaining i n dispute, prac 
tices which assure one party of the opportunity to obtain evi
dence under the control of the other become equally important,
most often to the government but sometimes to the taxpayer .
Finally, all three would appear to be benefited, should bilateral
agreement then become possible, by permitting the two con
testing parties themselves to terminate the proceedings .
On
balance, however, a practice of entering into agreements at
this belated stage may be against the long-range procedural
interests of the administration and of the tr ibunal, and of net
benefit only to the particular taxpayer .
Timely refinement of issues is calculated to avoid both
waste and surprise .
The centr al need is to complete the
process well before either party is "up against the gun. " Most
illustrative is the situation where a tribunal schedules oral
hearings quite far in advance with consideration of evidence
limited to that introduced at the hearing itself. Only if the
issues are refined well before that hearing can the parties
avoid the burdensome waste of collecting evidence affecting
matters not actually in dispute, and prepare adequately to deal
with all issues that actually will be put in conflict.
In France, 254 the need for advance warning is less serious
than in most of the other countries . In the adversary sense,
oral hearings in France, as in Belgium, 255 are of less sig
nificance . 256 Further, typically the evidence is in before the
parties are put "up against the gun . " Before the hearing is
252 See § 4.5 in Chaps. XII and XXIV infra .
2 5 3 See Chap. XVI, § 4.5 n. 25 infra .
254 See Chap. XII, § 4.3 infra . Some parallel between French practice
and that of the U.S. Court of Claims is noted in Ferguson, op, cit. supra
note 2 6 , at 348.
255 See Chap. VIII, § 4.3 supra .
256 Cf. § 4. 3 in Chaps. XVI, XX, and XXIV supra .
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scheduled but after the petition and answer have been filed,
the parties continue to sharpen the issues and arguments and
to introduce evidence, by exchanging repeatedly through the
tribunal further memoranda and supporting documents . They
continue this process until one party fails to reply in a timely
manner to the last memorandum submitted by the other . 257
The hearing which then follows consists of little more than
And
oral argument. Ordinary witnes ses do not appear . 2 5 8
should the tribunal itself inquire into a matter which leads a
party to invoke a yet new ground, it must allow the other
party time to prepare a responsive written memorandum and
supporting documents .
The extent of responsibility a tribunal itself assumes
necessarily affects all three of the previously mentioned com
mon concerns . This is best illustrated by the contrasting ex
periences in Germany and the United States, two countries
which do permit oral hearings with witnesses, etc .
The German fiscal courts reserve a more dominant role
for the mselves than do their U. s . counterparts . 25 9 Neither
conte stant bears the burden of proof. The fiscal court itself
has the ultimate responsibility to unearth the truth and to de
In consequence, the
cide the case in accordance with law.
court does not accept formal agreed stipulations of fact.
Further, if either party files a statement lacking sufficient
specificity, the court-to satisfy its own need-may require
submission of another, addressed more precisely to the issues
in controversy. To that s ame end, it may require a party to
submit evidence in response to matter s introduced by the
other . Finally, because it i s the court's responsibility to de 
c ide the case in accordance with law, the parties themselves
cannot terminate the proceedings on reaching a bilateral agree
ment. Only if the court deems the latter to accord with the
tax law, will it be approved and the proceedings terminated.
Thus, even if the parties were so-minded, the proceedings
would not be dismissed should such an agreement attempt to

25 7 If these exchanges are continued unnecessarily, the tribunal can
terminate this stage. See note 26 supra .
258 While the parties may agree upon a nonpartisan " expert" witness
to determine a question of fact, or have the tribunal appoint such a per
son as head of a three-man panel, findings of fact by the expert also are
submitted in writing, See note 26 supra .
259 See Chap. XVI, § 4.3 infra .
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split an issue which the tribunal itself necessarily would have
had to decide entirely for one side or the other . 260
A trial in the United States, on the other hand, tends to
be more adversar y in character, as distinguished from the
inquisitorial type of proceeding.
In litigation before the Tax Court, for example, one of the
parties always has the burden of proof. Generally, it is the
taxpayer . 261 At the least he bears the burden of proving that
the deficiency asserted by the Commissioner was "arbitrary
and excessive . " 262 This, taken in conjunction with two facts,
that the date of the session at which the tr ial will take place
typically is set three months in advance 263 and that the court
frowns on continuance s, 264 emphasizes his need to have the
issues sharpened well in advance .
Ideally, he should have been informed of the administra
tion's precise position before he filed his petition. The final
notice he received from the administration, 265 rejecting his
contention as to a disputed item, should have indicated the
specific ground for so doing.
This is not always possible,
however, and is not a requirement. One recurring reason why
the administration cannot be specific at that point is attributa
ble to the taxpayer himself, and grows out of the fact he need
not exhaust his administrative remedies before filing a petition
with the Tax Court. A taxpayer, who does not invoke the last
administrative appeal (regional Appellate Division) available
before a petition must be filed, in effect forces the adminis 
tration to issue the notice before its most trusted field offi
cials have had a reasonable chance to work out the specific
grounds upon which it ultimately would want to rely .
That
these officials are bypassed at this point in approximately
260 That the German tax administration itself would not be so-minded,
see Chap. XV, § 3 .4a infra .
261 With respect to matters belatedly raised (see text accompanying
note 268 infra ) and the issu�s of fraud and transferee liability, the
government bears the burden. I . R,C. §§ 7454 and 69 02 (a).
262 Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.s. 507, 513 (1934).
However , once
the taxpayer satisfies this burden, the Commissioner has the burden of
establishing the correct but lesser deficiency owing. Ibid. It is other
Mahler v. Commissioner, 11 9 F.2d
wise in the case of a deduction.
869 (2d Cir. 1941) , cert. den. 314 u.s. 660 (1941).
26 3 Tax Court Rule 27 (c).
264 Tax Court Rule 27 (d) .
265 This is a statutorily required notice of deficiency. I.R.C. §§ 62 12
and 62 1 3 .
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two-thirds of all cases petitioned to the Tax Court 266 indi
cates the dimensions of the government's difficulty. Be that
as it may, the final administrative notice is legally sufficient
if it indicates the amount of the asserted deficiency and the
years involved. 267 Indeed, there is a complementary principle
which tends to deter specificity: should the notice set forth a
specific gr ound, later adoption- in the government's answer to
the taxpayer 's petition-of a yet different inconsistent ground
will shift the burden of proof as to that ground from the tax
payer to the administration. 268
While the petition the taxpayer subsequently files must
contain "Clear and concise assignments of each and every
error which the petitioner alleges to have been committed by
the Commissioner, " and "Clear and concise . . . statements of
the facts upon which the petitioner relies as sustaining the
assignments of error, " 269 it include s ne ither evidence nor
Once filed, the petition of course can be
legal arguments .
amended. 2 7 0
2 6 6 Commissioner o f Internal Revenue, op . cit. supra note 46 , at 134
( Table 17 A). The problem of reviewing statutory notices which then must
be issued by lower echelons (District Director) is further complicated by
the fact that approximately 200 ,000 taxpayers annually receive such final
administrative notices only because they defaulted on all mail received
from the tax administration.
267 Luke v. Commissioner, 23 TCM 1022 (1964 ) ; Holmes v. Com
missioner, 22 T.C. 2 14 (1963).
268 Tax Court Rule 32. Tauber v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 179 (1955).
Also see Papineau v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 54 (1959).
Buf, if the
notice merely cites the "Internal Revenue Code, 1 1 without identifying a
specific section, the burden will not shift though the government later
places its reliance on a given section. Sorin v. Commissioner, 2 9 T. C .
959 (1958 ) , aff'd 2 7 1 F.2d 7 4 1 (2d Cir. 1959). Cj. Luke v . Commis
sioner, 23 TCM 1022 (1964) ; Spangler v. Commissioner, 32 T . C . 782
(19 5 9 ) , aff'd 278 F.2d 665 (4th Cir. 1960) , cert . den . 364 U.S. 825
(1960).
269 Tax Court Rule 7.
2 7 0 Tax Court Rule 17. Indeed, should the taxpayer, at the subsequent
hearing, introduce testimony bearing on an ultimate fact not pleaded, he
can make a motion to be permitted to conform the pleadings to the proof
(Tax Court Rule 17 (d) ) , in which case, to avoid surprise, the government
can request an extension of time within which to reply. Tax Court Rule
2 0 . But in contrast to practice before the district courts, should the tax
payer introduce such testimony without amending his pleading, thereby
creating the possibility of misleading the government, that testimony will
not be considered by the court. Factor v. Commissioner, 17 TCM 459
(195 8 ) , aff'd 2 8 1 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1960 ) , cert . den . 364 U.S. 933 (196 1 ) .

LITIGATION PRACTICES

161

Again to avoid surprise, the government's answer to the
petition must indicate "fully . . . the nature of the defense . "
Further, it must contain a "specific admission or denial of
each material allegation of fact . . . and a statement of any
facts upon which the Commissioner relies for defense . . . . " 271
Finally, if the government desires to raise a new issue not
covered by the previously mentioned final administrative notice,
the facts pertaining thereto must be stated. 272 As to these,
as before noted, it assumes the burden of proof.
Either party can test the degree of factual specificity ac 
tually necessary for either the petition or the answer by a
motion that the other party be required to file "a further and
better statement of the nature of his claim, of his defense, or
of any matter stated in any pleading. tt 273 No doubt the court's
attitude toward such a motion in any given case is and should
be affected by two considerations : (i) the extent to which the
non- moving party could be expected at this early point to know
the facts in more specific detail, and (ii) the fact that, by the
time the case is ready for trial, the court "expects," in con
trast to German practice, that the parties will have stipulated
formally "evidence to the fullest extent to which complete or
qualified agree ment can be reached including all material facts
that are not or fairly should not be in dispute . " 274 T o this
latter end, the court expects the parties to commence to dis 
cuss stipulation pos s ibilities not later than that point when
they receive the typical three months ' advance notice setting
the date when the trial session will begin. 275 Until recently,
however, this expectation was toothles s . Not until the trial
began was it necessary for a non-moving party to answer a
motion to show cause why he should not stipulate facts and evi
dence contained in the moving party 's proposed stipulation. 276
271 Tax Court Rule 14.
272 Jbid. Thus if a new

ground is asserted for the first time in the
legal brief which the government files after the hearing is over , it will
not be considered by the court. Weisner v. Commissioner, 20 TCM 1150
(196 1). Cf. Commissioner v. Licavoli, 252 F.2d 268 (6th Cir. 1958).
But cf. Luke v. Commissioner, 23 TCM 1022 (1964) where surprise
was not involved.
2 7 3 Tax Court Rule 17 (c )
274 Tax Court Rule 3 1 (b) (1).
Italics added.
See Commissioner v.
Licavoli, note 272 supra .
275 Tax Court Rule 37 (b)(2).
276 See Epstein, " The New Stipulation Procedures in the Tax Court:
How They Are Working ? " 22 J. Taxation 180, 1 81 (1 9 65) .
.
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By amending its rules in two r espects, however, the Tax Court
put teeth into its expectation. The non-moving party now must
answer the show-cause order not later than ten days before
the session begins . 277 More importantly, the Tax Court has
instituted a pretrial conference procedure 278 somewhat s imi
lar to that district courts have long followed. 279 Upon request
of e ither s ide, a judge will sit with the parties to facilitate
the process of "narrowing issues, stipulating facts, simplifying
the presentation of evidence, or otherwise assisting in the
preparation for trial or possible disposition of the case in
whole or in part without trial . " 280
With respect to one matter, however, the Tax Court has
not caught up with the district courts. The latter s ' procedures
are considerably more helpful in discovering evidence, i.e., in
assisting a given party, in advance of the trial, to obtain evi
dence which is under the control of the other party. District
court and the T ax Court procedures alike enable a party to
take pretrial depositions alone or on written interrogatories . 281
District court procedures also enable a party before trial to
r equest admissions or inspection of documents controlled by
the other party. 282
Be cause it is the taxpayer who usually controls most evi
dence pertaining to his case, comprehensive discovery pro
cedures are of greatest benefit to the government. That it
can be served in two respects, not just one, is best illustrated
by the effect of a change made in the way the Justice Depart
ment deals with tax cases pending in district courts. Until
1961, when a taxpayer filed his complaint in court, the depart
ment tended "to await further moves by the plaintiff . " 283
Since 1 961 , however, it has taken the offensive . Well before
trial, it has used the comprehensive discovery procedures
available in district courts not only to unearth the truth in
277 Ibid. Tax Court Rule 3 1 (b) (5 ) . Even so , because Tax Court j udges
ride circuit and do not arrive in a city until the day before a session is
to commence, it is still inconvenient to obtain a hearing on the show
cause order until the first day of the session.
278 Tax Court Rule 28. See Epstein, op . cit. supra note 276
279 Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. , Rule 16.
280 Id., note 2 78 supra .
281 Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rules 26 through 33; Tax Court Rules 45
and 46. See Ferguson, op . cit. supra note 2 6, and Kamisky, " The Case
for Discovery Procedures in the Tax Court," 36 Taxes 498 (1958).
2 82 Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rules 34 and 36.
283 Attorney General , Annual Report 1966, 366.
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preparing for trial should such ensue but also t o stimulate
more and better settlement offers 284 from taxpayer -adversar ie s
who began t o realize that discovered evidence increased their
hazards of litigation.
This raises the question of whether the government, at
this belated stage, should encourage bilateral settlements . That
the United States does just this is apparent from the fact that
the bulk of all docketed district court and Tax Court case s are
settled before trial285 - as in the Netherlands 286 and in sharp
contrast to France where few cases are settled after docket
ing. 287 Also, there is no doubt but that the effect in the United
States benefits immediately both contestants. Avoidance of a
given trial there, as would be true elsewhere, conserves the
contestants ' time and reduces their costs. Further, in con
trast to the situation in France, 288 Britain, 289 and the Nether 
lands, 290 where even trials in tax cases are not open to the
p ublic, only if a bilateral agreement is reached can the U. S.
taxpayer avoid exposing his financial affairs to public view.
Finally and of imperative importance, the U . S. T ax Court
itself is freed of a caseload it could not possibly decide on
the mer its . In fiscal 1966, of the 6, 2 34 docketed cases closed
out, it was able to decide on the merits only 7 2 6 . 2 91 Practi
cally all the rest were settled. This fact-that the Tax Court
otherwise could not accommodate the case load-is the precise
reason why the U. s. tax administration now actually has no
choice but to encourage bilateral settlements even at this be 
lated stage . The s ame reason explains why the Tax Court, in
contrast to the German courts, has no choice but to accept
each such settlement whether or not it is in strict accordance
with the tax law itself. 2 92 However, given the propriety of
284 Attorney General, Annual Report 1965, 30 8 .
2 85 See note 17 5 supra, and Chap. III, §§ 3 . 1 and 3 . 4 supra .
286 See Chap. XXIV, § 4. 3 infra .
287 See Chap. XII, § 4. 3 infra .
288 See Chap. XII, § 4. 3 infra .
2 89 See Chap. XX, § 4. 3 a infra .
2 90 See Chap. XXIV, § 4.3 infra .

2 9 1 Commissioner of Internal Revenue, op. cit. supra note 4 6.
At
year' s end, 1 0,024 cases were still pending and, of course, most of
these will be settled by agreement.
292 For all practical purposes, the settlements reached at this stage ,
including those which split a single issue, conform to the same policies
as those which are reached during the earlier administrative stage. See
Chap. III, § 3 . 4 supra .
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the aggressive settlement policy the Uo S. tax administration
pursues during the earlier administrative phase, the pivotal
question facing a country just now evolving its procedure s is
Over the long haul, would the U. s. tax system have
this :
worked more smoothly had its administrator s-on first formu
lating its procedures years ago-treated the inception of the
litigation stage as a cut-off point, after which cases would not
be settled bilaterally ?
As things now stand, the United States has neutralized the
otherwise existing taxpayer incentive to make an all out at
tempt to settle a case before docketing it with a court.
Partly in consequence of this, only after a case has been
docketed do many U. S. taxpayer -representatives (4,489 in fiscal
1966 ) 293 make their first attempt at settlement. While certain
advantages in so doing are peculiar to the United State s, 294
an additional advantage would be equally operative elsewher e .
B y delaying discussions until just before the trial date, 295 the
taxpayer rs representative can prepare simultaneously for settle 
ment discussions and the trial-should one actually ensue .
For a var iety of reasons, a second group of taxpayer
representatives will make two trys at settlement, one before a
case is docketed and, if unsuccessful, one afterward . 296 But
2 9 3 Commissioner of Internal Revenue, op . cit. supra note 46 , at 134
(Table 17 A). Some actually had no other choice, for the District Director
had issued a final statutory notice before giving the taxpayer a chance to
enter settlement discussions at the regional level. This circumstance
may arise, for example, where the statute of limitations was about to run
on the proposed deficiency.
294 Most such advantages are discussed in Chap. III, § 3.3 supra .
Further, since the requisite statutory notice of deficiency will have been
issued prior to se�tlement discussions, these taxpayers-should a trial
actually ensue-are freed of the burden of proof regarding any new af
firmative issues raised by the government during the settlement discus
sions. See text accompanying note 268 supra . It would have been other
wise if the affirmative issue had been raised in settlement discussions
which preceded issuance of the statutory notice. See text accompanying
notes 261 and 262 supra .
295 While the U.S. tax administration has tried, as to docketed cases,
to induce taxpayers to hold their settlement discussions before cases
actually are scheduled on a trial calendar (Rev. Proc. 60-18, C.B.
1960-2 , 988), the fact is that a majority of all docketed settlements occur
thereafter.
296 The great preponderance of those who follow this route actually
achieve a settlement during the first of the two stages. In fiscal 196 6 ,
this was true for 2 1,475. However, 4,2 51 failed to reach agreement at
that point.
See Commi ssioner of Internal Revenue, op . cit. supra note
46 , at 133 (Table 15B).
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be cause they know, at the point of the initial attempt, that a
se cond opportunity is available, many do not make an all out
attempt to prepare their cases for the first try . 29 7 In con
sequence of this, the ir first effort did not achieve the type of
settlement which they were willing to accept. Hence, a second
belated try .
Repetitious time drain on the administration 1s per sonnel
The
is the peculiar consequence of this second practice. 2 9 8
practices of b oth groups, however, contribute to delay in
settling old disputes and create, for the administration, an un
becoming image, akin to that of a private litigant "negotiating
right up the courthouse steps . "
A now developing country will have a chance t o avoid the
dilemma in which the U. s. tax administration finds itself only
by de ciding at the outset whether the foregoing consequences
are sufficiently adverse to warrant terminating settlement ac 
tivities at the point a petition is filed with a court. Once such
a country extends its settlement activity beyond that point,
retrenchment may become impossible . T axpayers who other 
wise might have settled prior to the litigation stage will begin
to delay serious attempts at settlement until after the litiga
tion stage is reached.
In due time, this number will be so
great that the practice cannot be ended without overwhelming
the trial tr ibunals.

29 7 See Chap. III, note 6 4 supra .
29 8 Indeed, even a yet different office becomes involved.

supra .

See § 4.8

PART TWO
BELGIUM
by

Jean Van Hontte

CHAPTER V
ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONAL AND
PERSONNE L FRAMEWORKS
Section A. Administrative Organizational
Framewo rk
1 . 1 Introduction
The Belgian Ministry of Finance has three branches charged
with the levying of taxes :
Administration of Customs and Excises , Administration des
douanes et accises: collects customs and excise duties
Administration of Registration and National Property, Ad
ministration de l 'enregistrement et des domaines : col
lects recording and stamp fees , inheritance taxes ,
transfer taxes, and similar levies
Administration of Direct Taxes, Administration des contributions directes: collects the direct taxes
So-called direct taxes fall into two main categories : the income
taxes , properly so-called, and other taxes of somewhat less
importance . 1 The true income taxes 2 include the following:
Individual income tax, ImPot des pe rsonnes physiques
Corporate income tax, ImPot des soc wtes
Income tax on juridical persons, Impot des pe rsonnes
morale s
Nonresident income tax, Impot des non-residents
1 other taxes under the jurisdiction of the Administration of Direct
T axes fall into the two following groups:
(a) Special taxes of which the most important is the tax on motor
vehicle s ' taxe de circulation sur les vehicules a moteur.
(b) Additional taxes for the benefit of provinces and municipalities ,
additionnels provinciaux et communaux, on income from immovable
property , and on the global income of corporations and individuals.
Law of July 31, 1 9 6 3.
2 Law of November 20 , 1 9 6 2 , in force from fiscal year 1 9 63 for
corporations , societes par actions, and from fiscal year 1 964 for in
dividuals , partnerships , and private companie s , socilftis de personnes .
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The bulk of these income taxes are prepaid through a sys 
·
tem of withholding tax , pre compte s :
Withholding o n income from immovable property, precompte
immobilier
Withholding on income from personal property such as se
curities , loans , royalties , bank deposits, precompte
mobilier
Withholding on income from wages, salaries, etc . , pre 
compte projessionel
At the head of the Administration of Direct Taxes is the
Director General of Direct Taxes, Directeur G eneral, who is
responsible to the Minister of Finance . Under the Director
General are (a) the heads of the five divisions , and (b) the
general inspectors , Inspecteurs G eneraux.
These latter , the
general inspectors , have two functions : they maintain liaison
with the offices of the regional directors and they supervise
the Special Office of Direct Taxes to which interpretative ques 
tions posed by the regional directors are referred .
These regional directors, with whom the central adminis
tration maintain liaison through the general inspectors, are
responsible for all revenue activity within their respective re
gions . This includes the resolution of interpretative questions
referred to them by taxpayers in the course of administrative
appeals.
There are fourteen regional directors for direct taxes , dis 
tributed as shown in the following table :
Pro vince
Antwerp
Brabant
East Flanders
Hainaut
Liege
Limbourg
Luxembourg
Namur
West Flanders

Population

Number of
Dire cto rs

1 ,455, 644
2,011,842
1 ,276,803
1 ,249 , 53 6
1 ,007, 516
586,279
2 1 6,9 7 5
3 70,870
1,07 5,949

2
4
1
2
1
1
1
1
1

The office of each regional director maintains liaison with
the field offices through another group of inspectors, inspec 
teurs des contributions . There are two types of field offices :
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the controles and the rece veurs des contributions . The con
troles are concerned primarily with the examination of tax re

turns, assessment, and audit. Some, however, have a particular
area of specialization such as the taxation of corporations
throughout an entire regional area. The offices of the collec
tors, re ce veurs des contributions, handle tax payments and
prosecute delinquent taxpayers.
1 . 2 Organizational framework, national office level
Chart I (pages 172 - 73) reflects the organization of the Cen
tral Administration of Direct Taxes at the national level.
The head of the Central Administration of Direct Taxes ,
the Director General, has under him (a) the heads of the five
divisions plus (b) the general inspectors, Inspe cteurs Genereaux.
Of the five divisions, the first four are organized along both
functional and tax lines . The fifth division' s prime responsi
bilities are administrative in character, covering the areas of
statistics, accounting, personnel, housing, and equipment.
The first division has two subdivisions . The first deals
with legislative matters (i.e . , drafting of bills, assisting the
Ministry of Finance in the course of the legislative process)
and with the implementation of legislation by Royal Decree.
The second subdivision deals primarily with the taxation of non
residents and in consequence conducts tax treaty negotiations .
The first of those two subdivisions is not concerned directly
with the resolution of interpretative questions, but should a
court resolve an interpretative issue adversely to the govern
ment, the Ministry of Finance frequently decides to introduce
corrective legislation. In consequence, the first subdivision,
through its legislative activities, necessarily becomes involved
in matters of interpretation.
The second division deals primarily with the taxation of
corporations, juridical persons, private companies, and partner
ships, as well as with the prepayments of taxes on movable
property, precompte mobilier.
The third division deals with individual income taxes .
The fourth division has five subdivisions . The first three
have two main functions : representing the administration in tax
litigation and in interpreting old tax legislation (i. e . , laws in
force prior to the effective dates of the major reform enacted
November 20, 1962) .
The fourth subdivision supervises the
collection of taxes . The fifth has two areas of concern: pre
payment of tax on income from immovable property, precompte
immobilier, and various minor taxes, such as those on motor
vehicles, taxe de circulation sur les vehicules a moteur.
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The divisions of the Central Administration of Direct Taxes
deal only indirectly with interpretative problems, by reviewing
regional inspectors ' decisions on interpretative issues submit
ted by taxpayers in the course of administrative appeals . In
contrast, the Special Office of Direct Taxes ( staffed by general
inspectors but responsible also to the General Director) deals
directly with interpretative issues . Those interpretative ques 
tions which are laid before regional directors are sent to the
Special Office of Direct Taxes which, lacking a superior office
to which it may refer them, handles them itself.
1. 3 Organizational framework, regional office le vel
Chart II (page 17 5) sets out the structural arrangement of

both regional and local offices concerned with direct taxes .
As noted supra, liaison with the 1 4 regional directors of
direct taxes, distributed through the 9 provinces, is maintained
by the Director General of Direct Taxes ( the head of the Cen
tral Administration of Direct Taxes ) through the general in
spectors . In turn the regional director, the chief administrator
for his area, 3 maintains liaison with the local offices through
the inspecteurs de contributions . This group of inspectors is
subdivided into three groups . The members of the first group,
the accounting inspectors, handle the c ollection of taxes and
supervise the local collection offices, headed by the rece veurs
des contributions . The two other groups, inspectors A and the
inspectors for litigated matters, deal with assessment of taxes .
Inspectors A supervise those local offices which deal with in
quiries and with assessments , controle s . This supervision in
cludes a review of uncontested decisions made by the local
assessing officials . In addition, inspectors A furnish advice to
the local assessing officials in connection with interpretative
issues encountered prior to making the actual assessment.
Inspectors for litigated matters, in contrast to inspectors A,
do not supervise the work of lower officials . They assist the
regional director in resolving administrative appeals lodged
with the regional director by taxpayers following assessment
by the local assessing offices.
Thus, through the two different sets of inspectors, the re
gional director is concerned with the resolution of substantive
interpretative income tax questions at three points : first, when
3 As chief administrator , he is assisted by one or two assistant
directors as to matters such as housing , equipment of offices , and
personnel over all his territory .
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inspectors A are consulted by the local assessing officials prior
to actual assessment; second, indirectly, as inspectors A re
view uncontested decisions made by the local assessing officials ;
and third, directly, when inspectors for litigated matters deal
with administrative appeals lodged by taxpayers with respect
to assessments made by the local assessing officials .
1 . 4 Organizational framework, local office le ve l
In 1 . 3 supra, it was noted that inspectors A, in addition to

other specified duties, supervise the locally situated assessing
offices, controle s . Each inspector A is in charge of some par
ticular part of the region to which he is assigned. Each such
area has a number of local assessing offices.
These local assessment offices are of three kinds : (1 ) typi
cal local assessment offices which deal with income tax returns
of individuals within their respective areas, ( 2) central assess 
ing offices which are located only in more populous areas and
handle the less complex returns of individuals, leaving to the
first mentioned local assessing offices within that same popu
lous area the task of examining and assessing more complex
individual returns, and (3) corporation assessing offices which
are responsible solely for the income tax returns of corpora
tions and private companies .
Irrespective of the type of return with which a particular
assessing office is concerned, the basic pattern of its activity
is similar to that of all other assessing offices. Each assess 
ing office distributes, examines, and corrects returns . An at
tempt is made to iron out differences of opinion with taxpayers .
If such differences cannot be resolved, the head of the local
office, controleur, makes whatever decision he believes to be
correct, including resolution of interpretative issues . On the
basis of such decision, assessment is made . Administrative
appeal from such an assessment is lodged with the controleur's
superior, the regional director.
Belgium has about 3 2 5 local assessment offices to accom
modate the returns of individuals . Where such an office is
located in a city, it is responsible for between 1 5,000 and
20,000 people . Where located in the country, the number rises
to about 30,000. Since the territorial area fixed for a particu
lar local assessment office is governed by population density,
there is considerable variation.
Illustratively, 20 or more
small municipalities may be included within the area for which
one rural assessment office is responsible, while Antwerp and
Brussels, suburbs excluded, have respectively 1 5 and 16 local
assessment offices .
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More populous cities of this type also have central assess
ment offices which are responsible for the more or less routine
examination and assessment of wage-earners ' returns (which
present fewer interpretative questions than do other returns) .
Such central assessment offices also accomplish the prepara
tory work in collecting information about other taxpayers who
fall under the jurisdiction of the various local assessment of
fices in that same area, and also the tax withholding. Thus
local assessing offices within the area covered by the central
assessing office are free to concentrate on a thorough exami
nation of the more complex individual returns .
To increase efficiency in the examination of ordinary indi
vidual income tax returns, the larger local assessment offices
classify such returns on the basis of the business or profes 
sion of the taxpayer. Each such occupational group then will
be assigned to a particular official who specializes in that par
ticular category. Because he becomes familiar with the tax
problems likely to be encountered by such individuals, he can
resolve more readily questions relating to expenses and deduc 
tions .
The duties of the third type of locally situated assessment
offices (those which handle income tax returns of corporations
and private companies) parallel the duties of the offices con
cerned with individual returns. They distribute and examine
returns, resolve differences of opinion with taxpayers, and
make assessments . While these offices concentrate on corpo
rate returns, they necessarily work in close contact with the
central assessment offices.
Throughout Belgium there are
about 80 corporation assessment offices . On the average, each
examines the returns of about 600 corporations or private com
panies. There is no uniformity in size of the territory each
covers, since it depends upon the number of corporations or
companies within a given area. Illustratively, the entire prov
ince of Luxembourg has one corporation assessment office,
while Brussels and its suburbs have twenty-five.
Section B.

Pe rsonne l Framewo rk (Go ve rnmental
and Non -Gove rnmental)

1 . 5 Governmental professional pe rsonnel

All employees of the Administration of Direct Taxes are
subject to a statute covering all government officials or em
ployees . For an individual to be employed at any level in the
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Administration of Direct Taxes, he must pass a competitive
examination, administered by the central government recruiting
office. Such an examination is held when requested by the Ad
ministration of Direct Taxes, usually once a year.
While there are four categories of government employees,
tax administration employees charged with interpretative mat
ters fall into the first two. The first category includes the
heads of assessment offices, controleurs, chief collectors of
taxes, rece veurs principaux, inspectors, directors, and other
higher ranking officials . The second category includes the tech
nical clerks, redacteurs, as well as collectors and verifier
accountants .
Typically personnel dealing with income tax matters enter
the Administration of Direct Taxes at the second category. En
trance at the first category, which requires a university degree,
is very unusual.
Admission to the examination for the second category re
quires that the applicant be between 17 and 30 years of age 4
and have completed a secondary education-i.e . , college, tech
nical school, etc . The examination is designed to measure the
applicant's general knowledge and includes questions on elemen
tary mathematics, geography, and Belgian history. In addition,
each candidate attends a lecture dealing with a topic of general
interest. Without taking notes , he must summarize and com
ment thereon.
Successful candidates are admitted on probation. The pro
bation period, for both the first and second categories, lasts
two years, at the end of which comes a final examination deal
ing only with income tax laws . In case of failure, a second
examination may be taken, but failure here entails dismissal
from the service on three months ' notice.
After at least four years ' satisfactory service in the sec
ond category, officials are eligible for a competitive promotion
examination to qualify for appointment to the first category.
This examination tests knowledge not only of areas included
within the earlier entrance examination but also of tax laws
and regulations, civil and commercial law, accounting, etc .
However, once an individual reaches the first category of gov
ernment employees, promotions no longer depend upon exami
nations .
4 Some members of the metropolitan or former African adminis
tration are excepted from the age limit .
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There is an extensive in-service training program, partly
to prepare probationers for their final examination and partly
for all levels of permanent employees, whether in preparation
for promotion -examinations or in an effort to keep abreast of
current developments in the statutes, decisional law, and ad
ministrative regulations . This training takes place almost en
tirely outside the regular hours of employment; "full-time" in
service training is completely unknown.
The government also pays the full expense of technical
clerks who subscribe to a correspondence course dealing with
commercial, industrial, and corporate accounting and with bal
ance sheet analysis . Under exceptional circumstances -as in
the case of the sweeping tax reform of November 20, 1962-ad
ditional lecture courses are given. Otherwise, in-service train
ing is based primarily on private study of material published
by the Central Administration of Direct Taxes . This material
includes codifications of laws, the regulations, and official in
structions (available to the public as well), and manuals such
as the following: Organization of Public Administration, Rela
tions with the Taxpayer, Public Finance, Elementary Concepts
of Public and Private Law, Auditing Handbook.
1 . 6 Private tax practitione rs
Two classes of private tax practitioners handle the tax af
fairs of individuals or corporations : tax lawyers and tax experts .
The tax lawyer has a university background, with a degree
either as docteur en droit or licencirf en notariat. While he
has passed an examination in tax law, this constitutes insuffi
cient background for tax practice. Typically, a young law grad
uate planning to specialize in tax law spends many years in the
office of one of the very few experienced tax lawyers, first as
s tagiaire and then as assistant. During that period, he gains
practical experience and studies all types of tax materials .
The tax lawyer acts as a barrister in representing a tax
payer in the courts, and also furnishes advice when a taxpayer
has a major difference of opinion with the tax administration
as well as when an important transaction is under considera
tion.
The so-called tax expert, on the other hand, typically is
not an attorney, although a few have graduated from a univer
sity with a degree in law or economics . The majority are
accountants and have acquired their knowledge of taxation
through experience. The government has not established any
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formal rules governing recognition of tax experts ,5 although the
major professional associations act as winnowing agents by
accepting as members only those who have a good reputation
and essential qualifications . If a tax expert is a member of
an accounting firm, the firm usually will handle both the ac
counting and tax affairs of a client. However, some tax ex
perts maintain an office as independent consultants or, at the
other extreme, are employees of a large corporation. Such
corporations expect the heads of their accounting departments
to be knowledgeable and experienced in tax problems . In what
ever capacity a tax expert works, he is likely to be engaged on
a continuing basis in dealing with the current tax matters of
one or more individuals or corporations . He is responsible
not only for the annual preparation of income tax returns with
their supporting documentation, but also represents his client
or clients in resolving those differences of opinion with the
tax administration which do not require a legal opinion.

5 Other than the negative provision of the law of November 2 0 ,
1962 , Art. 60 , which enables the Minister of Finance to deny a t ax ex
pert the right to represent a taxpayer before the tax administration if
he has not observed the ethical standards of his profess ion.

CHAPTER VI
ADMINISTRATIVE RULE -MAKING PROGRAMS
Section A.

Characte r of the Unde rlying Statute

2 . 1 Pre cision of the statute itself

The Code of Income Tax1 is divided into 437 sections cov 
ering about 1 0 0 pages with an average of 400 words a printed
page . Most but not all substantive tax principles are set out
in the Code. Those located outside the code include:
1 . Such laws as temporary tax relief measures, 2 or those
granting provinces and municipalities a restricted power
to tack surcharges on the national income tax, 3
2 . Laws approving international tax treaties, 4 and
3 . Royal decrees which particularize on the Code 's tax

principles , pursuant to a specific delegation of legisla
tive authority in a substantive section of the statute. 5

The Code of Income Tax is divided into ten parts, each
with a varying number of sections totaling 429 . Of these, sec
tions 206 through 3 59 deal primarily with procedural matters .
1 The Royal Decree of February 26, 1964, known as the Code of
Income Tax, coordinates the reform law of 1962 , "the reform of direct
taxation" and the " coordinated laws on income tax" put into effect in
1948.

2 E . g. , enactment of July 15 , 1959 , providing for the partial or total
exemption of capital gains to promote investment s .
3 E g , enactment of July 31, 1963, authorizing municipalities t o levy
a tax of 5% in addition to the regular corporate tax and/or individual
income tax.
4 E .g. , the statute of July 27, 1953, approving the income tax con
vention between Belgium and the United states , s igned at Washington
October 2 8 , 1948, as modified and supplemented by the convention of
September 9 , 1952.
5 The "reform of direct taxes ," November 20, 1962, makes frequent
use of this delegation of power. Decrees so issued must be distin
guished from regulations bearing upon tax administration in a more
precise sense of the term. Regulations of course , are the proper task
of the executive power. Belgian Constitution, Section 67.
,

.
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Part
Number

I

II

III

IV
v

VI
VII
VIII
IX
X

Title of Part

Definition of the income tax
Individual income tax
C orporate tax
Tax on juridical persons
Nonresident tax
Provisions common to the four taxes
such as prepayments , etc .
Assessment and collection of taxes
Allocation to provinces and municipalities
Cadastral income of immovable property
Transitory provisions

Section
Numbe rs
1-2
3- 93
94- 1 3 5
136-138
1 39 - 1 52
1 53 - 20 5
206- 3 50
3 5 1 - 3 59
360-429

Despite its length, the statute itself is not expected to pro
vide clear-cut answers to all problems . 6 Every effort is made
to be as precise as possible and to set out broad rules with a
minimum of deviations . Nevertheless, administrative regula
tions are necessary to supplement the text of the statute itself
and the judiciary also is called upon to settle many interpre
tative issues. 7 Here, however, it is possible only to illustrate
the statutory approach and the variation in the extent to which
the statute anticipates with precise language the range of
problems which arise.
Consider first the methods by which it determines the tax
able base from professional activity.
Article 43 of the Code provides as follows :
From the gross income of each professional activity are
deducted the expenditures [depenses ou charges] allocable to
it. 8

The next section defines deductible professional expendi
tures :
Deductible professional expenditures are those the taxpayer
proves have been made or supported during the taxable period
in order to acquire or preserve the taxable income. 9
6 The only problems susceptible of such ready solution would be
questions such as those relating to the tax rate for a net income of a
given number of francs , or to the final day for submitting a claim.
7 Every other consideration aside, the government, on introducing
the bill or in discussing it before Parliament , cannot be expected to
forecast all possible future developments in the area expected to be
covered by a particular provision.
8 Art. 10 , 1° , law of November 2 0 , 1962 .
9 Art. 1 1 , § 1 , law of November 20 , 1962 .
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It still must b e determined whether an expenditure i s made
"in order to acquire or preserve the taxable income . " While
the statute goes on to enumerate certain deductible items-i.e.,
rent, heat, utilities for professional premises; wages and fringe
benefit costs for employees; "normal" amortization of profes
sional equipment-the list is not conclusive. 10 The tax admin
istration must also permit a deduction for any operational ex
pense reasonably incurred in the course of the taxpayer ' s
business activity. Illustratively, the cost of litigation concern
ing business would qualify, 11 but not fines or punitive dam
ages . 12
A second example of the statutory approach involves amor
tization, as to which the Code contains only two broad provi
sions . It authorizes "necessary amortization" of material and
movable objects used in the business, to the extent such amor
tization corresponds to real depreciation occurring during the
taxable period. 1 3 Prior to 1963 straight line depreciation was
the only authorized method. 14 The officer in charge of the
assessing office computed it by category of assets, in agree
ment with the taxpayer. Beginning in 19 63, however, the Code
authorized the tax administration, at the request of the tax
payer, to prepare a schedule of amortization charges computed
on the declining balance method for assets purchased or con
structed from 19 63 onward. 15 Clearly, these broad statements
of policy do not cover with any precision all amortization prob
lems . 16 While it seems clear that amortization must be based
10 The items are listed in Art . 45 of the Code , originally enacted
as Art. 26 , §§ 2 and 4, Coordinated Laws on Income Tax, Regent' s De
cree of J anuary 2 8 , 1948, which is referred to in Art. 1 1 , § 1 , of the
law of November 20, 1962.
11 Lucrum non intelligitur nisi omni damno deducto . Cas s . July 4,
1865 , Pasicrisie [hereinafter cited as " P." ] , 1865, I , 291. See Jean
Van Houtte , Principes de droit fiscal belge, No. 254.
12 Art. 50, 5° of the Code, Cas s . October 26 , 1954 , p. 1 � , 1 , 167 .
That is the reason why some provisions in the Code make some ex
penditures related to the business activity not deductible, such as-in
contrast to the statute in force prior to the law of November 2 0 , 1962the individual income tax (Art. 50, 3°) or the corporate tax (Art. 109) .
13 Art . 45 , 4° of the Code (Art. 26, § 2 , 40 , Coordinated Laws) .
14 Under straight line depreciation, the basis is deducted in equal
annual installments over the estimated useful life or annual overall
percentage.
15 Art. 49 of the Code (Art. 13, law of November 20, 1962).
16 In considering the scope of the amortization problem , it must be
recalled that all objects used in any productive capacity are subject to
deterioration or obsolescence. This includes not only machinery , in
dustrial buildings , furniture , and office equipment, but also the purchase
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on the cost of an investment and not on the cost of replace 
ment, a large area lies open for interpretative administrative
regulations . Thus , one looks to royal degrees to find that the
declining balance method may be used only in the case of mov
able assets having a useful life of not less than six and not
more than nineteen years. 17 Also, they provide that the al
lowable depreciation percentage is double that used for corre
Thus, the
sponding assets under the straight line method.
basis against which that percentage is applied in any given
year is said to be the original cost less depreciation taken to
date . Further, whichever method is used, the percentage mu
tually agreed upon can be changed whenever economic contin
gencies arising from operation so justify.
A third example of the statutory framework concerns valu
ation of corporate assets . Such valuation is necessary in draw
ing up a balance sheet and, in Belgium, is an integral step in
computing both ordinary gross income and, under certain cir
cumstances, capital gains . 1 8
The Code does not specify a
particular method of valuation to the exclusion of all others. 19
Initially, it lies within the discretion of the tax administration
to determine whether a given valuation is erroneous and serves
to avoid tax. Its determination, however, is subject to judicial
review. Indeed, such a case can reach the Supreme Court,
Cour de Cassation, if a principle is in issue . Illustratively,
in one case a corporate taxpayer had paid 3 . 840 francs per
share for stock of another company. At the close of a later
year, immediately before the taxable year in question, it en
tered these shares on its balance sheet at a value of 3 . 81 0 francs
though the stock at that point was quoted on the market at
1 .9 50 . The corporate taxpayer sought to correct the error in
the succeeding taxable year by showing a year-end valuation of
1 . 9 50, the intention being to take advantage of the earlier year ' s
loss in this later year. T o preserve the integrity of the annual
(footnote continued)
value of a patent , the expenses and premiums paid for issues of stock
and bonds , the preliminary expenses in forming a company , and all the
other true expense items included in the asset valuations appearing on
the balance sheet.
17 Art. 1 , § 3 , Royal Decree of October 8 , 1963.
1 8 Since the tax r eform of November 20 , 1962 , in certain circum
stances , capital gains are subj ect to a special tax of 15% instead of
being subject to the corporate tax of 25% , 30%, or 35%. Code of In
come Tax, Art. 93, § 2 , 20.
19 The valuation must be reasonable. If there is any overvaluation ,
the directors are responsible. Art. 62 of the Company Law.
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accounting concept, however, the High Court determined that,
since no further decline had taken place in the current year,
the shares had to be given the same value as that which had
been used the close of the preceding year . 20 A final example
bearing on the degree of precision found in the statute involves
dividends. Although Article 1 7 1 of the Code provides that a
dividend is taxable when allocated or made payable by the com
pany, it does not specify when a dividend will be deemed "al
located" or " made payable." Ultimately, the courts had to
resolve this ; logically and consistently they held that a dividend
is not earned and the shareholder has no right to it until the
general assembly (board of directors) reached a decision as to
the company' s profit distribution.21 Then, however, to prevent
possible tax evasion, the legislature added a limited exception
under which all sums allocated to working partners in private
companies are taxable to them as of the last day of the com
pany' s fiscal year, whether or not the general assembly had
decided to distribute a dividend. 22
A minority of controversies between taxpayers and the tax
administration involve interpretation of the statutory language . 23
The great majority are purely factual, not developing out of
any question as to the meaning of the statute, but rather re
quiring substantiation of amounts, such as gross income, or the
exact amount of losses incurred, etc . As explained later, 24 in
either type of case, a taxpayer who does not agree with the
"tax-paper" from the local assessor's office may file a peti
tion with the regional director. If the petition is rejected, ap
peal lies to the competent Court of Appeal of which there are
three. 25 Decisions of that court can be appealed to the Supreme
20 Cas s. September 10 (S. A. Overcor) , P. 1964 , I , 35.
2 1 cass. December 1 1 , 1962 (Suz. Van de Velde) , P . 1963, I, 455;
Cas s . June 1 1 , 1963 (Grimard) , P. 1963, I , 1076; Cas s . September 10,
1963 (Steinberg) , P . 1964, I , 42 .
22 Law of April 30 , 1958, Art. 2.
23 Illustratively , the deductible trade or busines s expenses listed in
the statute did not include litigation expenses developing out of the con
duct of the busines s . A court decision established that litigation ex
penses constituted properly deductible expenses.
Decision, C our de
Cassation, 4 July 1865, P. 1 865, I, 1291.
24 see Chap. VII infra .
25 Court of Appeal for Ghent for decisions of regional directors in
the provinces of E ast Flanders and West Flanders; Court of Appeal
for Brussels for decisions of regional directors in the provinces of
Antwerp, Brabant, and Hainaut; Court of Appeal for Liege for deci
s ions of regional directors in the provinces of Liege , Limbourg, Namur ,
and Luxembourg.
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Court only with respect to questions of law. Thus the annual
number of Supreme Court decisions involving direct taxes, as
s et forth in the following table, is some indication of the num
ber of important interpretative issues raised each year :
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING DIRECT TAXES
Claims

Judicial Year

Total

Dismissed

1957-1958
1958-1959
1959-1960
1960-1961
1961-1962
1962-196 3

22 3
212
196
1 39
138
134

27
19
1

Probably Involving
Interpretative Issues

196
193
195
1 39
1 38
1 34

Despite the care exercised to draft precise statutes 26 with
a minimum of deviations, it is considered likely that interpre 
tative controversies will increase in the immediate future be 
cause of the new issues which will arise out of the tax reform
law of November 20, 1962, and the related decrees .
2 . 2 Legislative pre -enactment aids to interpre tation

In interpreting the substantive statutory provisions, docu
ments showing the progress of a statute through the legislative
process can be of material assistance, particularly where the
legislation is complex, as is true of the tax reform law of
November 20, 1962. This does not mean that all stages of the
legislative process are equally significant in providing helpful
background material. Moreover, there will be great variation
in the amount of material available.27 For major tax legisla
tion, such as the 1962 statute, hundreds of printed pages 2 8 are
26 Illustratively , in the discussions preceding the drafting of that
section of the statute allowing deductions from gross income for con
tributions made to the four universities , the original ver s ion allowing
such deductions for contributions to institutions of higher learning was
rej ected as imprecise and the specific names of the several institutions
were inserted. Art. 54 , § 4, Code of Income Tax.
27 The fact that all Belgian parliamentary documents are printed
folio-size in two columns , the Dutch text next to the French, doubles
the amount of printed material.
28 The floor debates are printed in the Annales Parlementaires,
with two series: Chamber of Representatives , Chambre des represen
tants, and Senate , Senat . These are edited by the Government . as a
supplement to the official gazette (Moniteur Belge , published at 40-42 ,
rue de Louvain, Brussels 1 .
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needed to set out the official documents and records of the
draft of the bill, the introductory comments on the draft, the
committee reports, and the floor debates . 29 For minor tax
legislation, it is unlikely that helpful floor debate will precede
the vote, for the scope and technical niceties of the proposed
amendment will have been explained sufficiently in the intro
ductory comments and the committee reports .
The Minister of Finance may introduce a draft of a bill
(proje t de loi) in either the Chamber of Representatives or in
the Senate . All drafts are printed and made available to the
public. After introduction, the bill is turned over to the Com
mittee on Finance of the house where the draft has been intro
duced. There the draft is discussed thoroughly, not only by
the committee 's regular members but also by members ap
pointed by the respective houses, the Minister, members of his
staff, and top-level officials of the central administration of
direct taxes . While the committee does not hold formal public
or private hearings, opportunity for comment and criticism is
afforded to representatives of the various private interests
concerned with the proposed legislation.
Amendments to the draft may be proposed by members of
the committee and by the government's representatives. There
must be an individual vote on each proposed amendment, each
section, and the entire bill. A member of the committee-very
29 Illustrative of the bulk of such pre-enactment materials is the
amount produced in connection with the legislative progress of the law
of November 2 0 , 1962 , the reform of direct taxes . The draft of the
bill ( 89 articles) with the government ' s introductory comments covered
190 folio-size printed pages.
Chamber of Representatives , Session
1961-196 2 , Doc. No. 264/1 . About 400 amendments were introduced by
the Minister of Finance and by members of the Chamber of R epresen
tatives' Committee on Finance. One hundred and ten were approved.
The report of the Finance Committee itself covered 190 folio-size
printed pages together with the three annexes , each about 100 pages ,
containing miscellaneous notes and documents. Chamber of Represen
tatives , Session 1961-1962 , Doc. No. 264/2 . The floor debate is re
corded in 294 folio-size pages of the "Annales Parlementaires ." Meet
ings of June 6 , 7 , 1 2 , 13 , 14 , and 15 , 1962. When the bill was under
consideration by the Committee on Finance of the Senate , about 200
amendments were proposed. Sixty were adopted. The r eport com
prises 418 folio-size pages. Senate, Sess ion 1961-1962 , Doc . No. 263.
The floor debates cover 226 folio-size pages . Meetings of October 2 ,
3 , 4 , 10 , 1 1 , and 16 , 1962 . The bill as amended by the Senate was
passed by the Chamber of Representatives on October 31 , 1962 , after
a two-day debate which was reported in 6 6 pages of the "Annales
Parlementaires ."
Meetings of October 30 , 31, 1962 .
It was finally
promulgated on November 2 0 , 1962.
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rarely two members-then prepares an explanatory report to
accompany the bill. After approval by the committee, the re
port is turned over to the house of origin as an official record
to be printed and made available to the public .
This explanatory report makes every effort to supplement
deliberately the text of the statute and hence to resolve in ad
vance possible interpretative questions .
For example, when
the deduction for child-care expenses was introduced, the re
port made it clear that the deduction was available only for a
child for whom the taxpayer had a legal obligation. It was not
available for a child casually sheltered.
The process of justification and explanation takes place in
large measure within the committee . Nevertheless, the floor
debates (contained verbatim in the official printed record) can
be decisive in later resolving an interpretation dispute. 3 ° For
example, it is not uncommon during the debate for the Minister
of Finance or the reporter for the committee to answer an in
terpretative question.
On approval by the house of origin, the bill goes to the
other, where the foregoing process is repeated: deliberation in
the Finance Committee, report, floor debate, and vote . If the
second house amends the bill, as originally submitted, it must
be resubmitted to the house of origin. Only after both houses
have agreed on the same text of all provisions can the King
promulgate and publish the enactment in the official gazette,
whereupon it becomes a law.
As noted previously, the statutes are supplemented by the
royal decrees . 31 These do not pass through the same process
as do the formal enactments . Absence of official pre- enactment
aids has led, however, to the use of administrative commen
taries to identify the objectives of the degrees and to clarify
the meaning of a principle or of a word. But these have less
stature than legislative pre-enactment materials explaining a
formal statute .
2 . 3 Standards of construction followed by the judiciary in in 
terpreting the statute

The Belgian constitution provides that only the body hold
ing legislative power can enact taxes . 32 Hence the first question
30 See note 2 8 supra .
31 See 2 . 1 supra .
32 This is explicit in the Constitution of February 7 , 1 8 3 1 , Article
1 1 0 . This is not a mere application of the fundamental rule that all
powers are derived from the nation. Constitution, Article 25. R ather ,
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raised in any substantive controversy pertains to the legality
of the principle asserted by the administration, i.e., has it
been formulated in a statute or in a decree pursuant to a spe
cific delegation of power. 33
Belgian courts cannot hold a statute unconstitutional. Even
an unconstitutional law must be applied. The courts , however,
are entitled to determine whether any decree of the executive
power-whether royal or ministerial-is valid, should the ques 
tion of such validity arise in any controversy, whether or not
taxes are involved. Article 107 of the Constitution specifically
provides that courts may not apply any provision of a decree
demonstrated to be illegal.
In a tax controversy, unless the statutory language pre 
cludes any question as to its clear meaning, the judge first
must determine the will of the legislature . The judiciary has
no power to create requirements in addition to those prescribed
in the literal language of the statute. While gaps in a statute
must be filled in, this is the responsibility of the administra
tive authorities acting pursuant to a request from the govern
ment, not a task for the courts . 34 When the language of a
provision is ambiguous or obscure, the judge must try to as 
certain the unquestioned common purpose of all who contributed
to the making of the law: the government which introduced the
bill and both houses of Parliament which discussed it. If, after
using all interpretative methods compatible with the principle
of legality, the judge is still in doubt as to whether the legis 
lature intended to tax a person in the manner asserted by the
administrative agency, the taxpayer must prevail.
(footnote continued)
it is a formal recognition in the written constitution of the principle ,
" no taxation without legislation," a principle found generally in the ori
gin of all parliamentary democracies.
33 Fifty years ago , it was thought that only the legislature itself
could formulate substantive tax provisions. This constitutional deter
r ent to the exercise of power by other than the legislature is no long
er enforced so strictly. On several occasions , substantive tax provi
sions have been formulated by decrees under a specific delegation of
power . While some constitutional law experts consider this delegation
to be incompatible with the Constitution , Article 1 1 0 , even an unconsti
tutional law must be applied by the courts . The Belgian judiciary can
not overturn the work of the legislature . Nevertheless, even in recent
year s , deviations from the constitutional rule are the exception.
34 The Court of Cassation, i.e. , the Supreme Court , has so decided
on several occasions.
See Cass. February 12 , 1940 , p. 1940 , 1 , 48;
Cas s . June 10, 1952, P. 1952 , I , 656.
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Explanation of the legislative history described above 35
often reveals the legislative intention. Nevertheless, contra
diction is possible, illustratively between the clearly stated
text of the statute and, for example, comments made in the
course of the floor debate. In such a situation, the text pre
vails . 36 From time to time, however, the preliminary ma
terials will show that a given statutory term is used to convey
a meaning quite distinct from the meaning conveyed by that
word in common usage or in non-tax sections of the Belgian
statutes . 37
A judge, interpreting a provision of a new tax law, may
refer to the pre-enactment reports concerning an earlier stat
ute, now repealed, on the same subject, provided the text in
the new statute-as debated in Parliament-and the text in the
old one are identical. 38
Section B.

The Regulations P rogram

2 . 4 Types and force of regulations
The Belgian constitution empowers the King-i.e., the execu
tive-to make necessary regulations and decrees for the en
forcement of the laws, an overriding limitation being that the
King may not suspend an act of the legislature or create an
exemption from its application. 39
The tax administration's authority is not limited to issuing
procedural instructions . It also issues substantive interpreta
tive regulations without which all too often the law would mean
little. However, it is not uncommon for procedural or admin
istrative regulations and interpretative regulations to be com
mingled in one particular publication, whatever be the form in
which it is issued-i. e . , ministerial decree, in- service order,
or published instruction.
The administration of direct taxes issues many interpreta
tive regulations . Illustratively, the Income Tax Code provides :
35 See 2.2 supra .
36 Court of Appeal Ghent, June 5 , 1951, Revue Juridique , Financi€we
et Fiscale 321 (1951) .
37 Concerning the sense of the words " suspension of the period of
normal legislation," see Cass. February 23 , 1955 (Aerts) P . 1955, I ,
693.
38 Concerning the deduction of professional losses , s e e Cass. June
1 5 , 1956 (Jockin) , P. 1956, I, 1 133.
39 Constitution, Art. 67.
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Deductible professional expenses are those the taxpayer
proves to have made or supported during the taxable period
in order to acquire or preserve the taxable income . 40

The statute itself furnishes a few examples to amplify this bare
statement of the rule. To aid both taxpayers and ass essing
officers, the tax administration goes beyond these, using about
300 pages of 400 words each to comment on the foregoing stat
utory language and to list those expenses deemed "professional. "
This type of regulation, issued b y the tax authorities without
specific legislative delegation, ordinarily contains numerous ex
amples, most of which are drawn from court decisions . When
such regulations are challenged before the courts, the first
question is to determine whether or not the regulation conforms
to the standard of legality, i.e., constitutes a valid interpreta
tion.
A second type of amplifying regulation rests on a specific
legislative delegation to the tax administration to exercise leg
islative authority.
Unless the delegated power deals solely
with procedural matters, such delegation conflicts with the con
stitutional provision which restricts establishment of a tax to
However, as explained
that body holding legislative power.
previously, the courts cannot overrule the legislature 41 and,
therefore, do not have the power to rule on the validity of its
delegation of legislative power. In consequence, courts have
only the power to determine whether the government did or did
not exceed the limits of the specific delegation granted by the
law. For some t; me the legislature has turned over to admin
istrative authorities much of its legislative power, including
promulgation of substantive tax rules. The pretext is that the
legislature is unable to deal in sufficient detail with those par
ticular matters. While this may not be a completely satisfac
tory explanation, the fact is that the tax reform law of Novem
ber 20, 1962, contains more such specific delegations than any
previous statute. Two delegations drawn from this law will
serve to illustrate the scope of such delegations .
As to the first, the general statutory rule is that all busi
ness associations, whether corporations or partnerships, are
40 Art. 44 , § 1 , of the Code of Income Tax, Art. 1 1 , § 1 , of the law
of November 2 0 , 1962; Art. 26 , § 1 , of the Coordinated Laws of Income
Tax. Except insofar as the deduction of taxes is concerned , these pro
visions are largely identical.
41 See 2 . 3 supra .
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subject as entities to the corporate tax. 42 However, under the
new law, 43 partnerships , sociitis en nom collectij, limited
partnerships, societes en commandite simple, limited liability
companies, societes de personnes a responsibilite limitee , and
cooperatives, may elect-subject to formalities and conditions
"to be determined by the King" -to be taxed under the individ
ual income tax, on the basis of the individual members' respec
tive shares in the profits . Under this delegation of power, a
royal decree was promulgated 44 prescribing as formalities and
conditions the maximum permissible capital, maximum permis
s ible number of members, and a requirement that all members
agree to be so taxed.
The second illustration pertains to the statutory principle
that all taxable income, irrespective of its source, is subject
to a single global tax. 45 In general this tax is prepaid through
a series of withholding taxes known as precomptes, the spe
cific amount of prepayment being dependent on the source from
which the income is derived, i . e . , whether derived from im
movables, movables, or professional activity. However, the re
form tax law provides that, as to income from certain sources
"the King can renounce" entirely or partially the right to col
lect the prepayment (the precompte mobilie r) . 46 In keeping
with this delegation of power, royal decrees prescribed the
conditions and limits under which income from movable �rop
erty is exempt from the prepayment otherwise required. 4
2 . 5 Precise purpose of "interpre tative " regulations

The tax administration drafts its regulations with great
care. While judicial decisions are incorporated, usually as
specific illustrations of how the statute is applied in practice,
the administration on its own initiative drafts regulations in a
deliberate effort to supplement the statute and provide an in
terpretation in addition to the interpretation set out in the ex
planatory report. For example, recent legislation extended the
42 Art. 94 of the Code (Art. 24, § 1, law of November 20, 1962) .
43 Art. 95 of the Code (Art. 24, § 2 , law of November 2 0 , 1962) .
44 The royal decree was promulgated November 4, 1963.
45 This was one of the basic principles in the tax reform of 1962
as noted in 1.1 supra .
46 Art. 170 of the Code (Art. 43, § 2 , al. 1 , law of November 2 0 ,
1962) .
47 Royal decree of December 2 , 1962 , as amended by royal decrees
of January 30 , 1963 , March 1 3 , 196 3 , January 31, 1964, and December
7 ' 1966 .
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scope of the existing tax on new building construction. The
tax administration prepared a regulation to the effect that the
tax would not apply to the home-owner who attached a garage
to his house, even though the garage was entirely new.
As noted previously, interpretative and legislative regula
tions are often commingled in the same document. Moreover,
sometimes it is difficult to determine what part of an admin
istrative commentary on a given substantive tax provision in
terprets it and what part rests on a coordination of that provi
sion with other statutory provisions dealing with the same
subject.
In general, there is a great reluctance to rephrase sub
stantive statutory language into lay terms . 48
Even so, the
statutory language is often supplemented by administrative ex
planation-with examples where feasible 49 -to provide ma::�i
mum clarity for laymen as well as for experienced practitioners .
Many interpretative difficulties will remain uncovered, however,
because they are not likely to be foreseen except where pre
enactment materials focused attention on and provided solutions
for the interpretative problems . 50 Then, after the statute has
been in force for a time, the unanticipated interpretative issues
reach the judiciary. Not until a significant number of decisions
have been handed down on a particular issue which tend to fix
its dimensions, is it likely that the administrative regulations
will incorporate the judicial decisions on that issue. Despite
this reluctance to incorporate within the regulations the results
of judicial decisions, experience shows that administrative com
mentaries on any particular piece of tax legislation tend to in
crease and become more detailed throughout the first fifteen
or twenty years after enactment. Then follows a period of
stability, assuming interim statutory amendments have been
relatively few and insignificant.
Since the tax reform law of 1962 became effective for cor 
porations during fiscal 1963 and for individuals during fiscal
48 This reluctance stems from the inevitable increase in disputes
should a discrepancy appear between the official language of the stat
ute and its rephrasing in an official commentary or instruction man
The lack of precision in the statutory language itself causes
ual.
some controversy but, in general, tax practitioners -whether represent
ing the government or a taxpayer-possess adequate acquaintance with
the technical terminology of the revenue administration.
49 Examples will be issued on occasion even in so-called "black and
white" situations .
50 See 2 .2 supra .
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1964, it is unlikely that there will be a court of appeals deci
sion on an interpretative issue until early 1966 and yet another
year probably will elapse before there is a Court of Cassation
decision. In the interim, the official administrative commen
taries on the tax reform law consist of a compilation of the
text of the statute together with the following:
1 . Extracts from the legislative history of the statute-i. e . ,
introductory comment o n the bill, reports of the Finance
Committees of both houses, floor debate;
2 . A paraphrase of the language of the statute, including
examples ; and
3 . Answers given by the Minister of Finance in response
to questions posed by members of Parliament with re
spect to the application of the statute .51
The comparative extent to which a regulation will elaborate
on a new, as contrasted with an old, provision of the statute
can be shown best by illustration. As previously noted, Arti
cle 44 of the Code-an old provision-defines "deductible pro
fessional expenses" in broad terms . The relevant commentary
in official instructions covers about 300 pages of 400 words
each. 52 A new provision, Article 9 8 of the Code, 53 subjects
to the corporate tax the taxable net profits of a corporation,
whether undistributed, distributed to shareholders, or paid to
directors and auditors. 54 Relevant official administrative regu
lations dealing with this include only seven pages of about 300
words each, with an annex of seven pages containing examples .
The contrast reflected by that illustration is also apparent
from a comparison of the overall magnitude of the regulations
dealing with the old and new tax systems . Regulations cover
ing the old, which is still partially in effect, 55 fill seven loose 
leaf volumes . 56 About 3,000 pages deal with the professional
tax, 300 with the tax on income from movable property, and
2 00 with the personal complementary tax. Regulations for the
new tax system-i. e . , the Law of November 20, 1962-as of
51 See 2 . 7 infra .
52 See 2 . 4 supra .
53 Art. 25, law of November 2 0 , 1962.
54 Except for the special allowance to directors having special execu
tive functions in the company.
55 See 2 . 1 note supra .
56 Loose-leaf volumes are used to facilitate replacement of pages
superseded by amendments to the regul ations .
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June 1, 19 64, used only 351 pages to deal with the individual
income tax, 1 50 with the corporate tax, and about 100 with
other taxes and miscellaneous provisions . In 1965 the tax ad
ministration commenced to publish new, more detailed regula
tions for the new tax system. Issued in loose -leaf volumes,
as of March 1967-and admittedly incomplete-it already covers
approximately 4, 500 pages of 400 words on each page .
2 . 6 Manner of processing regulations
Income tax regulations are drafted by the first branch
legislation -of the first division of the central administration
of direct taxes . Typically, the officials of that branch will be
familiar with the new statute 's provisions . Usually they worked
on the draft bill at the time of its submission to the legisla
ture and attended the deliberations in both houses of Parlia
ment. And if a commentary is to be prepared on a royal
decree, these same officials also will have written that decree.
All persons who work on an income tax regulation belong
to the first of the two categories of government officials . 57
However, regulations do pass through several levels . The ini
tial draft customarily is prepared by a junior assistant, after
which it is reviewed by a senior officer. Then it must be
signed, on behalf of the Minister, by the Director General. In
fact, the Minister entrusts to experienced top level officials of
the revenue administration full responsibility for classification
and coordination of regulations issued by the administration at
different times, for cancellation of regulations relating to re
pealed enactments and decrees, and for preparing the text to
be printed. Since there is a continuing amendment of adminis 
trative regulations, to take account of important decisions of
the courts of appeal and of the Court of Cassation, drafting of
ficials necessarily maintain close contact with officials in
charge of the Treasury' s litigation. Formal public hearings
are not held prior to promulgation of the final version of a
regulation. Nevertheless, representatives of industrial federa
tions, chambers of commerce, trade unions , professional groups ,
etc. , normally do communicate their views and observations to
the revenue administration prior to the point a regulation is
issued. Thus, the legitimate interests of affected groups can
be taken into consideration to the extent the interpretation they
foster is not incompatible with the legislature's intention.
57 See Chap. V, 1 .5 supra .
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Typically about two months elapse from the date of enact
ment to the time an initial commentary is available to taxpayers
and to revenue personnel. Under this time schedule, the com
mentary usually will appear a few weeks before a new law
takes effect. The initial commentary, however, is brief, and
must later be enlarged upon and amended as new interpretative
problems arise. 5 8
Where a royal decree -because of specific legislative dele
gation-contains one or more substantive tax provisions, an ex
planatory comment very often is published in the official gazette
on the day of promulgation or within a very few days there
after . 59
Section C.

The Rulings Program

2 . 7 Formal advance written rulings to taxpayers

With respect to proposed transactions, the Belgian admin
istration of direct taxes has no special program for issuing to
taxpayers written advance rulings upon which taxpayers can
rely. Since the basic criterion in interpreting the statute is
legality, the administration could not legally commit itself in
advance to apply the statute in a given way should that inter
pretation later appear to be erroneous . If a tax official, how
ever highly placed, interprets the statute in a manner later
shown to be contrary to the legislative intention-whether that
interpretation takes place in oral conference, in a letter to a
taxpayer, or in a printed instruction-the administration remains
free to change its position. 60 Since the courts have held that
they are not bound by administrative interpretations, 61 the
5 8 See 2 . 5 supra .
59 For example, both royal decrees on the prepayment of tax on in
come from movable property (Pnfcompte mobilier, December 2 , 1962)
and the complementary prepayment of tax on income from movable
property ( Complement de precompte mobilier, December 3 , 1962) were
promulgated in the official Belgian gazette, Moniteur Belge, for Decem
ber 2 9 , 1 96 2 , and were accompanied on that date by an official com
mentary of about 14 pages , each approximately 500 words. The com
plementary prepayment has been abolished , effective J anuary 1 , 196 7 ,
law o f July 1 5 , 1966.
60 This is true even of the Director General or the Minister of
F inance.
6 1 Cas s . November 22 (Convents) , P. 1950 , I, 182. Recent decisions ,
unpublished , of the Courts of Appeal include the following: Lil.�ge ,
March 4, 1959 (Assurance Liegeoise) ; Brussels , March 1 5 , 1962 (Frere) ;
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revenue administration is unwilling to run the risk of issuing
written advance rulings with which the courts might disagree
should litigation later arise.
Distinct from a formal rulings program are responses by
the Minister of Finance to questions raised by members of
both houses of Parliament, who are entitled to interrogate the
government on all points of general interest, including the in
terpretation of a law administered by a particular Minister,
such as the Minister of Finance . Question and answer alike
are printed in an official periodical, and thus constitute a val
uable source of documentation in interpreting the law. 62 Later
these answers are inserted in the administrative regulations .
However, no Minister will answer a question concerning a par
ticular case in which the tax'payer is mentioned by name . The
major purpose of such questioning, especially in tax matters,
is to elicit official interpretation of obscure provisions of the
law. Further, it should be understood that the answer of a
Minister to a parliamentary question is not binding. Like all
administrative interpretations, theoretically it can be altered
before or after publication if shown to be contrary to the leg
islature 's will.
2 . 8 Informal technical advice to taxpaye rs on proposed transac
tions

Although Belgium has no formal rulings program, officials
at all levels are free to give informal advice concerning the
tax effects of proposed transactions .
However, a tax officer is not obliged to give such advice.
He may conclude the circumstances are such that he should re
fuse. In such case, the taxpayer is told that no opinion will be
issued until the transaction has been consummated, and that its
tax effects will be determined when the yearly return is audit
ed. Clearly any request should be refused if the officer be
lieves that the facts have not been completely disclosed or that
the prospective transaction involves fraud or tax avoidance . 6 3
( footnote continued)
Liege , November 2 , 196 3 (Hamels & Louis) ; Liege , January 2 0 , 1964
(Baguette-Gorman) ; Liege , February 17, 1964 (Transports routiers Veuve
Julien Richard et fils) .
62 Questions et reponses appear fortnightly in two parallel columns
of French and Dutch text. There are two series : Senat and Chambre
des Representants . Official printing office Moniteur Belge, 40-42 , Rue
de Louvain, Brussels I.
6 3 No data is available to show the extent to which the revenue ad
ministration is consulted informally as to the tax consequences of pro
posed transactions .
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While it must be emphasized that a taxpayer has no legal
right to rely on any informal advice given him, even where it
comes from the highest echelon, theory and practice are not
precisely identical. Since the officer who answers a taxpayer ' s
question concerning the tax consequences of a proposed transac
tion is also usually the officer who later will supervise exami
nation of that taxpayer' s return, in practice there is a substan
tial prospect that the advice will turn out to be reliable.
The level at which such informal advice may be given de
pends primarily on the importance of the prospective transac 
tion and the difficulties it presents . Obviously, if the issue is
presented clearly and succinctly, and if no dispute as to inter
pretation exists, the head of a local assessment office can de
cide whether such a transaction is subject to taxation. In more
complex situations where the interpretation of the statute is
less certain, or in situations where it is anticipated that a sub
stantial tax will be involved, the taxpayer or his adviser is
likely to deal with higher ranking officials, generally with an
inspector general in the central administration or possibly with
the Director General himself. Customarily, one or more oral
conferences are held with the tax official, but the informal ad
vice so given probably will not be reduced to writing inasmuch
as the administration is not in a position to make a binding de
cision before the transaction has taken place. However, in
practice the taxpayer knows that if he shapes the proposed
transaction precisely as it was described to the official, he can
rely on the advice given to him. The ability of taxpayers to
secure these advance statements as to the tax consequences of
proposed major transactions tends to decrease the number of
interpretative issues which might otherwise arise with respect
to completed transactions .
2 . 9 Technical advice to field offices

Lower officers are free to request the advice of higher
echelons when faced with specific situations . The charts in
Chapter V, 64 showing the administrative framework at the na
tional, regional, and local levels, indicate that the head of a
particular local assessing office decides whether and to what
extent an individual or corporation is subj ect to taxation. Since
the activities of the local assessment offices are supervised at
the regional level by the so-called inspectors A, officers in
charge of the local offices are not only permitted but encouraged
64 See Chap. V , 1 . 2 , 1 . 3 , and 1 . 4 supra .
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to seek the inspector 's advice regarding difficult situations,
whether interpretative or factual. 6 5 Generally, but not neces 
sarily, the taxpayer is informed if such advice is to be sought.
Since an oral conference with the higher echelon official is
never refused, the taxpayer will have an opportunity to argue
his point of view.
In addition to request for advice from the assessing offices
to the higher echelons, frequently taxpayers or their advisers
request intervention by a higher echelon (by the inspector gen
eral, Director General, or by a member of the Finance Minis
ter' s cabinet) . 66 Such intervention is requested to insure a
supplementary and thorough examination of some problem prior
to actual assessment.
There are no formal procedural requirements to be met in
seeking intervention of a higher echelon, whether the request
comes from a taxpayer or the head of a local assessing office.
Typically the higher echelon is forwarded the file of the tax
payer, containing his return and all relevant documents . Rare
ly is the matter handled by telephone; at a minimum, the in
spector whose intervention is requested expects to receive a
memorandum analyzing the matter in dispute.
While the prime purpose of the foregoing practice is to
insure certainty and uniformity in the application of the law,
it serves also to decrease litigation. No publication sets forth
all advice given by the higher administration echelons at the
request of the lower ranking tax officers ; however, where such
advice is considered to be of general interest, it is inserted
in the official printed instructions of the revenue administration
which are more fully described below.
2 . 10 Publication of technical advice given taxpayers and local
offices

The revenue administration issues a number of publica
tions for the benefit of taxpayers as well as for the guidance
of tax offices . Each appears in both a Dutch and French lan
guage edition. While they are distributed to all tax personnel,
anyone outside the administration is free to subscribe to them.
The technical advice which is published is not limited to
a bare statement of the rule to be applied. It includes not
only the justification for the conclusions reached-that is, the
65 No statistical data are available concerning the number of ques
tions laid before inspectors A by the local assessing offices.
66 No statistics are available to show the actual number of such in
terventions which take place.
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references to the statutes and to the regulations -but also the
legal reasoning itself.
The publications fall into four groups . The first includes
a text of the basic tax statute accompanied by all royal decrees
promulgated either to fill out (in the case of specific legisla
tive delegation) or to enforce the law . As of June 1, 1964,
each language edition was set forth in two loose-leaf volumes
totaling 600 pages with about 3 50 words a page .
The second is a loose-leaf coordinator containing impor
tant nonstatutory material, including administrative instructions
concerning direct taxes . These instructions do include digests
of the technical positions taken in response to informal requests
for information by taxpayers or by local assessment officers,
although the instructions in full are not officially published. 67
The coordinator also contains the legislative history of the
statute, public answers made by the Finance Minister to par
liamentary questions, and a summary of the decisions handed
down by the courts of appeal and the Court of Cassation.
The third, a monthly bulletin, is the most popular publica
tion of the Finance Ministry. It is designed to keep in-service
personnel and practitioners up to date, and to that end contains
recent laws and decrees, administrative regulations, court de
cisions, parliamentary questions, statistical surveys, and other
data. Each language edition now runs to about 2, 500 pages of
400 words a page .
The fourth is published at irregular intervals (usually bi
monthly) . It contains the full text of important decisions hand
ed down by the courts of appeal and of the Court of Cassation
on direct taxes . 6 8 Each such publication runs to about 40 pages
of 400 words each.

67 For the length of the instructions dealing with certain portions
of the "old" and the " new" statutes , see 2 . 5 supra .
68 However ; most other judicial decisions do not appear in Finance
Ministry publications.
All decisions of the Court of Cassation are
printed, however, in the "Pasicrisie" Part I.
See footnote 11 supra .

CHAPTER

Vll

ASSESSMENT, REFUND, AND ADMINISTRATIVE
APPEAL PROCEDURES
Section A. Asse ssment and Audit Procedures
3 . 1 Introductory no te
The levying of taxes can be divided into three distinct and
successive phases: ( 1) the assessment, i.e., the definition of
the exact amount of income or profit subject to taxation under
the statute, ( 2) the computation, i.e., the application of a pro
gressive or proportional rate on the taxable amount, and (3) the
collection, i.e. , the procedure used to secure payment absent
voluntary payment.
Essentially, Belgian assessment and audit procedures are
the same for both individual and corporate taxpayers and with
two prime exceptions for all types of income. The two spe
cial procedures relate to imputed income from immovable
property situated in Belgium, the so-called "cadastral income,"
and to income arising from certain categories of professional
activity.
3 .2a De tails of the typical assessment and audit procedure
All individuals (residents as well as no!ll' esidents subj ect
to the nonresident tax), 1 corporations, juridical persons, and
unincorporated communities must file an annual return showing
taxable income .2 In essence, however, this is an information
return, for the taxpayer himself does not compute the tax it
self. The return, with the attached reports, is supposed to
provide such complete information that the assessing official
can rely on it to compute the correct tax.
The returns, in the form of questionnaires, are mailed by
the Minister of Finance, during the year' s first quarter, to all
1 Art. 212 of the Code of Income Tax (Art. 55 , § 1 , Coordinated
Laws and Art. 53, 1°, of the law of November 2 0 , 1962) r equires the
filing of a return by nonresidents , whether on their entire B elgian
income or on remuneration earned in Belgium.
2 Art. 218 of the Code of Income T ax (Art. 54, § 1 , of the Co
ordinated Laws as amended by Art. 9 of the law of July 13 , 1959) .
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persons subject to taxation.3 Different types of questionnaires
are used: ( 1) for corporations, ( 2) for wage earners and those
individuals whose income is derived from only two or three
sources, and (3) for individuals whose income is derived from
many sources .
These returns are designed to supply the
assessing officer with all possible data concerning the taxpayer,
his family, his occupational activity, his real and personal
property, and related expenditures. In the course of complet
ing a return, a taxpayer or his representative may have to
resolve one or more questions of law or mixed questions of
law and fact. An officially prepared explanation of the law,
covering 8 pages of about 1 400 words each, is attached to each
questionnaire for the benefit of the declarant who is otherwise
legally presumed to know all of the provisions of the tax law.
The statute requires certain supplementary statements to
be attached to specified types of returns . Corporation returns
must be accompanied by copies of the balance sheet, profit and
loss statement, and minutes of the corporation's general meet
ing where these financial reports were approved. 4 Returns
filed by partnerships must be accompanied by a statement of
all amounts paid to the associates on the basis of the com
pany' s accounts .5 In certain cases individuals also must sup
ply certain documents . Illustratively, when foreign income is
declared, the taxpayer must identify its nature and the country
of origin.
In addition to the statutorily required supplementary state 
ments the administration is entitled to call for other informa
tion it anticipates using during the course of assessment and
audit. For example, corporations filing the 1964 return were
requested to add copies of about fifteen records or statements .
These included (in addition to the documents noted previously)
a list of directors, an account of sums paid to directors and to
stockholders, a detailed depreciation schedule, and a valuation
3 This list is subj ect to annual revision on the basis of informa
tion communicated by the municipal authorities . However , the King
is empowered to decide that individuals (not juridical persons) who ,
on the basis of the return previously filed , appear to earn an income
below the taxable limit need not file a new return annually . This de
cision is subj ect to revision at any time. Art. 216, al. 1 , Coordinated
Laws , Art. 53, 2°, of the law of November 2 0 , 1 9 6 2 , Art. 144 of the
Royal Decree of March 4, 1 9 6 5 .
4 Art. 218, al. 2 , of the Code of Income Tax.
5 Art. 219 of the Code of Income Tax, Art. 54, § 2 , al. 1 , of the
Coordinated Laws , Art. 54 of the law of November 2 0 , 1 9 62.
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schedule of the stocks and bonds owned by the corporation.
Included also in the assessing official's file for each taxpayer
is other information drawn from returns filed by yet other
taxpayers 6 or received from other governmental authorities and
agencies. 7
Typically, returns are examined by local assessing offices,
though special offices at the local level handle all corporations
except very large enterprises which are dealt with by the cen
tral administration's own special office for direct taxes .
The assessing office assumes a return to be correct until
it determines otherwise . 8 Its examination involves a verifica
tion both of the factual data on the return and attached docu
ments and of the taxpayer' s application of the statute in arriving
at taxable net income. Any legal evidence, other than a sworn
statement, can be utilized in the verification process. 9
In practice, however, individuals who have returns showing
a low income or income from an easily verified source will
not have their returns audited except for such returns of this
character as are selected for audit on a sampling basis. Indi
viduals whose income is in the neighborhood of 500,000 Belgian
francs ($10,000 . 00 U.S. dollars) have their returns checked,
however easily verifiable the sources . However, if such an in
dividual has a stable income from approximately the same
sources year after year, the local assessor tends not to check
6 The return of one taxpayer can be an extremely valuable source
of information in verifying the r eturn of another. For example, when
ever a taxpayer includes within his deductible expenses the interest
paid on borrowed money or the fee paid to a professional expert, he
must show the name and address of the payee. When this information
is placed before the appropriate assessing official, he can readily de
termine whether the payee has included such payment within his de
clared income.
7 When requested by the revenue administration, governmental ,
provincial , and municipal authorities (with the exception of the National
Institute for Statistics , the Institute for the Study of E conomic and So
cial Problems of the Middle Clas s , the credit institutions maintained
by the government, and the Postal Checks and Clearing Service (Art.
2 35 , § 2 , of the Code of Income Tax)) must forward all records which
an assessing or collecting official considers necessary for the assess
ment or collection of taxes. Art. 235, § 1, of the Code of Income Tax
(Art. 5 7 , bis § 1 , of the Coordinated Laws , Art. 58 of the law of No
vember 2 0 , 1962) .
8 Art. 245 of the Code of Income Tax (Art. 5 5 , § 1 , of the Coordi
nated Laws , Art. 5 6 , § 1 , of the law of November 20 , 1962) .
9 Art. 245 of the Code of Income Tax (Art. 55 , § 2 , of the C oordi
nated Laws , Art. 56 , § 1 , of the law of November 20 , 1962) .
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his return after the first two or three years in the belief that
this taxpayer' s honesty can be relied upon.
During the examination, the assessor frequently finds him
self in disagreement with the taxpayer, either as to the amount
of the latter's income or the manner in which the taxpayer re
solved a question of law or mixed question of law and fact.
Typically, such a taxpayer is called into the office to be ques 
tioned in detail. During the course of such a discussion, the
taxpayer may submit a statement, attesting to the accuracy of
his figures and signed by an accountant belonging to an official
ly reco f511i zed group known as Institut de s re viseurs d 'entre 
prises. l
While great weight is attached to such a statement
insofar as it relates to the mere accuracy of figures, the state
ment is not at all conclusive with respect to whether the tax
law was properly applied in determining the tax treatment of
each item.
The assessor is very likely to request informal advice
from the appropriate inspector A or even from the central ad
ministration whenever he confronts a new problem regarding
proper application of the law to the situation before him, or
other issues which emerge from the return of an important
company or a return involving a substantial sum of money. It
is entirely within his discretion whether he informs the tax
payer that he has requested this advice, but in practice the
taxpayer is told. 11 The taxpayer is free to request an oral
conference. Comparably, and with equal informality, the tax
payer himself may try to resolve the problem in a conference
with a higher ranking official and not infrequently he is suc 
cessful. N o statistics are available t o show the number of
taxpayers who seek such a conference at this level.
In practice, however, both assessor and taxpayer discuss
exhaustively every aspect of the tax return. A complicating
10 There are no so-called chartered or certified public accountants
in Belgium. Certain experienced accounting experts of good reputation
have been selected by an official group, Institut des reviseurs d' entre
prises, to act as auditors for corporations whose stocks and bonds are
quoted on the stock exchange. In some circumstances, the members
of this group have been appointed by the government or by a govern
mental agency to supervise the application of special regulations deal
ing with banking, insurance , etc. These appointments , however , do not
authorize them to substantiate in any official sense the accuracy of the
figures set out in a tax return.
11 There will, however, be relatively few situations where an inter
pretative question arises under the Belgian statute; its minimal num
ber of deviations and broad statements of policy tend to curtail auto
m atically the number of potential interpretative issues.
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factor is the requirement that the ass essor complete his work
within a given period in a particular year. This may effec 
tively preclude a conference with an official at a higher eche
lon, for all assessments must be made by the end of the year .
Nevertheless, the taxpayer is aware that if he is not fully
satisfied with the results of whatever discussions have taken
place, appeal to the regional director need cost no more than
a postage stamp and is fully available . However, it not in
frequently happens that the assessor and the taxpayer are able
to reach an agreement as to matters of fact. At this local
level, as to which there are no available statistics, there is a
good deal of adjustment as to purely factual issues, such as
those involving the value of an inventory at the end of the year
or the amount of expenses incurred for some clearly business
purpose. Illustratively, a taxpayer may claim 2 5, 000 Belgian
francs and have records showing expenditures of 1 5,000 Bel
gian francs . The assessor may say that from his station in
life, it would be reasonable to assume expenditures of 20,000
Belgian francs and both agree as to this figure . The assessor,
however, has no power to resolve interpretative issues and he
cannot engage in settlement activities . He may only adjust
fact questions where substantiation is the major problem .
The taxpayer i s not allowed to bypass the detailed discus 
sions with the assessor and go directly to the regional direc 
tor. However, merely because the taxpayer cannot bypass the
assessor prior to assessment, does not affect his right to file
a petition with the regional director after assessment.
Certain taxpayers, in the course of the assessing official' s
interrogation, may assert that they are bound b y professional
s ecrecy and unable to communicate what they claim to be privi
leged information. l2 Under such circumstances, the assessing
officer consults a special advisory board, Comite d 'avis, com
posed of the president and two members of the local profes 
sional or occupational group-lawyers, doctors, notaries-to
which the taxpayer belongs . Within ten days after referral,
the board must give its opinion as to the taxpayer ' s probable
income .
12 Art. 458 of the Belgian Penal Code punishes physicians , surgeons ,
chemists , midwives " and all other persons who have a professional
responsibility to keep secrets" -i.e. , lawyers , solicitors , notarie s , etc.
should they r eveal facts of which they have been informed in secrecy
unless they must appear as witnesses in court or legally are obliged
to reveal them.

206

B E LGIUM: AS SESSMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE A PPEA LS

While such a board does not consider any question of law
and has no power to make a final decision, in effect there is
a presumption that its opinion accurately reflects the taxpayer ' s
income . 13"
Should an assessing officer finally decide that a taxpayer
has filed an incorrect return, informal interchange of views
ends . But before the assessing officer can make a final ad
justment to the income as reported, he must send the taxpayer
a carefully prepared rectification, stating what he believes is
the taxpayer' s net taxable income. The rectification also re
quests that the form be returned within twenty days , together
with the taxpayer's written objections, if any, to the proposed
adjustment.
Until the twenty days have elapsed, no definitive asses s 
ment can b e made. But if this period goes by without receipt
of written obj ections from the taxpayer, the assessing official
is free to act although, 14 for reasonable cause, he may grant
the taxpayer a twenty-day extension. Further, the mere fact
that the taxpayer does file written objections will not neces
sarily postpone the assessment. The assessing officer is not
required to reconsider arguments previously raised by the
taxpayer if he believes the taxpayer' s rationale to be in error .
He may disregard them and proceed without delay to an assess
ment. However, on filing his written objections, the taxpayer
has a right to request that the case be submitted to an advisory
committee, Commission fiscale . 15 This request is not auto
matically granted. It is approved only when the ass essing of
ficial believes the referral will contribute to a proper determi
nation of the taxpayer' s income.
Such committees exist in each locality where there is an
assessing office. The chairman is a tax inspector; the other
members are private citizens, i.e., are representatives of
trade, industrial, agricultural, professional, and wage-earners
organizations . Designated by their officially recognized oc 
cupational organizations, they are appointed for three -year
terms .
13 Arts. 254-255 of the Code of Income Tax (Art. 44, § 1 3 , of the
Coordinated Law s , Art. 5 6 , § 3 , of the law of November 20 , 1962) .
14 Art. 251 of the Code of Income Tax (Art. 55 , § 12 , of the C oordi
nated Law s , as completed by Art. 5 6 , § 2 , of the law of November 2 0 ,
1962) .
15 Art. 252 of the Code of Income Tax (Art. 55, § 14, al. 1 to 3 , of
the Coordinated Law s , as amended by Art. 5 6 , § 4, of the law of No
vember 2 0 , 1962) .
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Such committees never deal with interpretative issues . As
before noted, an ass essor can obtain informed advice regard
ing that type of question from the so-called inspectors A or
from the central administration. The advisory committees are
competent to deal only with questions of fact. They are ex
pected to answer only one question: Did the taxpayer make
realistic estimates of his gross income, professional expenses,
etc . ?
Once a question is submitted to the fiscal committee, the
assessing officer and the taxpayer, or his tax advisor, are re
quested to forward all notes and documents . In addition, each
side is given an opportunity to offer an oral explanation and
argument.
In theory, the committee ' s decision does not bind the as 
sessing official; its sole function is to advise. However, should
the assessing officer assess a tax in excess of the amount con
sidered proper by the committee and should the taxpayer sub
s equently appeal, a legal presumption arises, to the effect that
the assessing officer erred and that the committee ' s finding
represents the maximum possible amount of taxable income. !€>
Should a taxpayer fail to file a return or to turn over rec 
ords or data upon request, the ass essing officer estimates the
tax due. Under such circumstances, the assessing officer need
not prove the exact amount of net income he estimates the tax
payer to have received. l7 The taxpayer, however, must prove
that he did not earn that income. 1 8
3 . 2b De tails of assessment and audit procedure re cadastral in 
come
As noted above, there is a separate assessment procedure

for income from real property located in Belgium. The tax
payer himself neither calculates nor estimates the amount of
his so-called cadastral income. This is not an amount actually
received by the owner . Instead, taxable income of this type is
a presumed income, i.e., cadastral income. The Land Register,
16 Art. 25 3 of the Code of Income Tax (Art. 5 5 , § 14 , al. 4 and 5 ,
of the Coordinated Laws , Art. 5 6 , § 4 , of the law of November 2 0 ,
1962) .
17 Art. 248 , § 2 , of the Code of Income Tax.
18 Except where the taxpayer can give acceptable reasons why the
filing of the return or the answer to questions of the assess ing offi
cer have been delayed. Art. 257 of the Code of Income Tax (Art. 56 ,
al. 2 , of the Coordinated Laws , as amended by Art. 5 7 , § 2 , of the
law of November 20 , 1962) .
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Administration du cadastre, determines the presumed income

from each piece of such real property for a twenty-year peri
od, by estimating the average normal income for one year, de
ducting a lump sum (one-fourth for buildings and one-tenth for
land) for costs, maintenance, and repairs . Except where im
portant changes are made to such property, the amount so de
termined remains, in principle, fixed for twenty years .
When this determination takes place, each owner is in
formed officially. Should he disagree with the conclusion of
the Land Register, he has thirty days in which to s end a let
ter to the official in that office, complementing his request for
review of that estimate with his own proposal as to the net
taxable income from the property . 19
If the Land Register officials and the taxpayer cannot agree,
the taxpayer-owner may have the property appraised by an in
dependent expert appointed by the Justice of the Peace for the
locality where the property is situated. The appraisal proce
dure provided by statute is followed,20 and once made the ex
pert's appraisal of the cadastral income binds both the taxpayer
and the assessing official.
The cadastral income was revised last in 1956-1960. 21 The
next revision occurs in 1975. While the cadastral or presumed
income from real property cannot be increased before that
year, a supplemental income tax must be paid on the owner ' s
actual net income therefrom to the extent it exceeds 200% of
the cadastral income . 22 Further, if there is no actual income
or if the actual income has declined, an exemption or reduc 
tion of tax can be obtained.23
3 .2c Details of assessment and audit procedure re income aris 
ing from certain categories of professional activity

The legislature recognizes that it is not easy for some
taxpayers to determine the precise amount of their occupational
net income. In consequence, the tax administration, either at
19 Arts . 412-415 of the Code of Income Tax (Art. 6 1 , § 1 , of the
Coordinated Laws) .
20 See Arts . 417-428 of the Code of Income Tax (Art. 61 , § 1 , of the
Coordinated Laws, as amended by Art. 10 of the law of July 14, 1955) .
21 Law of July 14, 1955.
22 Only , however , when the rent paid to the owner can be deducted
by the tenant as a professional expense. Art. 7 , § 1 , 1° b , of the Code
of Income Tax (Art. 4, § 1 , of the law of November 20, 1962) .
23 Art. 9 , § 1 , of the Code of Income Tax (Art. 4 , § 2 , 20 and 3° , of
the law of November 1962) .
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the national or regional level, may reach agreement with occu
pational associations fixing an estimated base by which the tax
able net income of their members will be determined for a
period not to exceed three years . 24
Some such agreements, as in the case of agriculture, are
on a nationwide basis , Others, as in the case of bakers and
butchers, are regional in scope, and in these cases the esti
mated base for occupational income differs from place to place .
Members o f an occupational group subj ect t o such an
agreement are required, nevertheless, to file an annual return.
But instead of listing both the gross income received and de 
ductible expenses, they provide other factual information. Il
lustratively, in the case of farmers, they state for the given
year the area of land cultivated, in the case of butchers or
bakers the amount of wares sold. Using this factual data, the
net income of such individuals is estimated, in accordance with
the agreement reached between their occupational associations
and the tax administration.
Foreigners running a business in Belgium also are subject
to a system of estimated minimum taxable incomes . Since
they remain subject to the regular assessment procedure, the
estimation arrangement is intended only to assure that they
will pay at least some personal or corporate income tax on a
minimum base with reference to the number of employees,
etc. 25
Section B.

Adminis trative Appeals

3 . 3 Introductory note
To recapitulate briefly, the process of taxpayer assess
ment in Belgium places the responsibility for the actual assess
ment of the income tax on the assessing official, although only
after opportunity for an informal exchange of views between
the assessing official and the taxpayer and for referrals seek
ing nonbinding advisory opinions on factual matters from cer 
tain consultative boards .
Once the assessment has been made, the taxpayer may ap
peal the ass essing official's decision to a higher level within
the tax administration. Should the decision there be unfavor
able, he may lay his case before the judiciary.
24 Art. 248, § 1, of the Code of Income Tax (Art .
ordinated Laws) .
25 Art. 248, § 2 , of the Code of Income Tax.

2 8,

§ 1, of the Co

210

BE LGIUM: ASSESSMENT AND ADMINISTRA TIVE A PPEA LS

3 . 4 De tails of the administrative appeal procedure re assess 
ments

Two situations permit a taxpayer to secure a full adminis 
trative review of the facts and of the law relating to any dis 
agreement with the assessor. The first is where tax payments
exceed the amount the taxpayer believes to be correct, either
because of an excessive withholding of taxes or because of ex
cessive payments of estimated tax. The second is where the
assessor, having completed his examination of a taxpayer ' s re
turn as a prelude to making a regular assessment, does not
agree with the taxpayer regarding the amount of tax due, all
procedures available to resolve their differences having been
utilized without success . The assessing officer then s ends a
formal notice of his conclusion (the so-called "tax paper") re 
garding the tax due and directs that payment be made within
the legally prescribed period of two months . 26
Should the taxpayer disagree with the tax paper-a likely
situation since the parties failed to reach agreement earlier 
or should he believe that his previous payments exceeded the
amount properly owing, he can file a petition with the regional
director of direct taxes for his area. This enables him to
secure a full administrative review of the case, not only as to
questions of fact but interpretative questions of law.
As pointed out earlier, the twelve regional directors of
direct taxes perform two functions in the overall tax adminis 
tration. They constitute the authority to which an appeal is
taken after formal assessment, and they supervise all local
revenue offices within their respective regions, including the
work done by assessing officials . 27 In dealing with petitions
for review, the directors are assisted by inspectors for litiga
tion matters, whose assistance is necessary because of the
large number of petitions filed annually. In many such cases,
the taxpayer does not request an oral hearing because of the
nature of the alleged error, for example, a claimed miscalcu
lation. However, according to the following table of petitions
filed during a recent six-year period, in approximately half
the cases there is an oral hearing. But the bulk of the cases,
even where there is a hearing and a detailed examination of
the taxpayer' s contentions, did not involve interpretative
26 Art. 304 of the Code of Income Tax (Art. 53 , § 1 , al. 3 and 4 , of
the Coordinated Law s , Art. 63 of the law of November 2 0 , 1962) .
27 See Chap. I, 1 . 1 supra for discussion of the territorial compe
tence of the twelve regional directors .
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issues . 2 8 Rather, they concerned questions of fact such as
computation of gross income, the exact amount of business ex
penditures, losses, etc . Moreover, the petty cadastral property
cases-which raise only issues of fact and which involve very
small amounts of money-are included in this total. 29
PETITIONS FILLED WITH THE REGIONA L DIRECTORS
OF DIRECT TAXES

Year

With
Preliminary
Examination

1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963

6 1 ,142
6 1 ,625
5 8 ,448
5 3 ,754
5 8 ,494
69 ,199

Without
Preliminary
Examination
56 ,971
6 1 ,996
67 ,011
58,744
60 ,143
66 ,113

Total
1 1 8 , 1 13
123,621
125 ,459
1 1 2 ,498
1 1 8 ,637
135 ,312

The procedure governing this administrative appeal is both
simple and common to all taxpayers -resident or nonresident,
individual or corporate-and for all forms of income tax. To
file a petition, the taxpayer need only mail a letter to the ap
propriate regional director, briefly explaining his objections to
the tax as determined by the assessing official or as previous 
ly withheld or paid. The director or that inspector for litiga
tion matters who actually subjects the taxpayer' s return, to
gether with the attached documents , to a new and thorough
examination, possesses all the investigative powers of the origi
nal ass essing official, 30 and in addition he may request any
other potentially useful information from banks, other credit
institutions, and the postal check and clearing service .
Since the regional director derives his review powers di
rectly from the statute, not from the central tax administration,
he is under no legal obligation to consult the central adminis
tration prior to making any decision on the taxpayer ' s petition.
In the interest of uniformity, however, in practice the regional
2 8 The fact that a taxpayer can secure an unofficial informal opin
ion on the tax consequences of his prospective transaction means that
if he completes the transaction precisely as he has described it, he
will have no problems and hence no interpretative issues will arise.
29 The very minimal cost of a petition tends to make many tax
payers think it worth their while to appeal an assessment s ince they
possibly may benefit themselves .
30 Art. 275 of the Code of Income Tax (Art. 64 of the law of No
vember 2 0 , 1962) .
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director does seek the advice of the central administration on
encountering an interpretative problem not previously treated
in the official regulations or publications of the Finance Minis 
try.
When the regional director does consult the central admin
istration, he is not required to, but in fact usually does, inform
the taxpayer. Whenever the taxpayer knows that such consul
tation has occurred, he may and usually does request an oral
conference with the central administration; such requests are
always granted.
There is no opportunity at the regional director' s level for
settlement in the sense of compromise where interpretation or
application of the statute is concerned. There is opportunity
only to make corrections . Further, the only possible adjust
ments relative to issues of fact where proof is unavailable took
place at the assessor 's level.
The regional director informs the taxpayer of his decision
by registered letter . 31 If he rejected the taxpayer 's arguments
and dismissed the petition, or concluded that the original as 
s essing official underestimated the taxpayer 's income with the
consequence that the taxpayer owes more than even the amount
shown by the formal assessment, the taxpayer can turn only to
the courts for further consideration. Should the regional di
rector sustain the taxpayer, however, the tax administration is
bound.
While no definite statistics are available, informed sources
believe that about 40 percent of all petitioners at the regional
director 's level feel that they have secured whatever relief they
sought. Of the remaining 60 percent, only a small percentage
will carry their cases to the courts . A postage stamp is all
that is needed for a petition to the regional director ; an action
in the Court of Appeal requires a lawyer and entails procedural
costs . Thus a taxpayer does not commence a court action for
a trivial reason. It must be worth his while . Further, it may
happen that a number of petitions filed with regional directors
in a given year raises a single issue, e.g., such as one relat
ing to a particular type of professional or commercial activity.
Under such circumstances, the trade or professional organiza
tion frequently selects the dispute of a single taxpayer to try
as a test case and sometimes shoulders the entire financial
expense, with everyone involved fully aware of what is happening.
3 1 Art. 276 of the Code of Income Tax (Art. 6 5 , al.
nated Laws) .
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In the meantime, instructions from the national office will di
rect the regional directors to refrain-as they may do, not
being under any limit as to time-from handing down a deci
sion on all the other appeals raising the same legal question.
Comparably, there is a close enough cross -communication be
tween the regional directors to insure their awareness if a
number of taxpayers throughout the country independently file
petitions raising a similar legal issue. Under such circum
stances, the national office usually s elects one petition for liti
gation and holds back decisions on the others .
Section c . Extent Administrative Pro ce ssing of
Refund Claims Departs from Administrative
Pro ce ssing of Asse ssments
3 . 5 Introductory note

Except in the limited instance described in the next sub
topic, the Belgian tax system has no separate procedure for
refunds distinct from those which may be paid automatically
in connection with the ass essment procedure itself. In other
words, generally speaking, a taxpayer must raise his obj ec
tions , if any, in a timely manner during the course of the as 
sessment procedure, and the dispute will be handled in the
same manner whether he had paid less or more than the as 
sessment as finally determined. This stems from the fact that
the tax return is essentially an information return, the tax on
income (as originally stated or as corrected) is calculated and
assessed by the administration. Once calculated, the taxpayer
receives the so-called tax paper showing the total tax, which
must be paid within two months . It is quite possible, however,
that some or all of this tax was paid prior to that assessment,
because of ( 1) withholding at the source or (2) voluntary pay
ments of estimated tax which arc made in certain cases to
avoid supplementary exactions equal to 7. 5 percent or 1 5 per
cent of the total tax. 32 If the amounts paid through either
32 See 3.3 supra . No supplement is due if the advance payment is
made before July 15 of the year during which the taxable professional
income will be earned. A supplementary payment of 7.5% is paid on
the corporate or personal income tax, as calculated at the normal rate
on the professional part of the total income, if the advance payment is
made fifteen days after the closing of the taxpayer ' s financial year .
The supplementary payment i s 15% if payment o f the t ax takes place
at the usual time, i.e. , at least two months after the tax-paper has
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method exceed the assessment fixed by the local office, a re
fund is in order, but this will be paid automatically. No spe
cial refund claim is required.
In other cases, should a taxpayer conclude that the asses s 
ment shown in the tax-paper i s excessive and file a timely
petition for review with the regional director, the full amount
of the asserted tax need not be paid while the administrative
appeal is pending. While the filing of the petition does not ac 
tually suspend the legal obligation to pay the entire assessment
within the legally prescribed two-month period, in practice
the tax administration will not commence a collection action if,
within that two-month period, the taxpayer pays the undisputed
portion of the tax.
Should the regional director, after examining the taxpayer ' s
petition, decide in favor of the taxpayer, h e will automatically
refund overpayments, if any. However, should the taxpayer owe
other taxes , the refund will serve instead as a credit against
them.
Should the regional director decide against the taxpayer,
the previously disputed portion of the assessment as to which
payment may have been postponed must now be paid, with in
terest at six-tenths of one percent per month. However, to
induce regional directors to avoid delay in processing adminis
trative appeals, the legislature provided that such interest shall
cease to run from a point six months after a petition has been
filed to the point when the director' s decision is forwarded to
the taxpayer. 33
3 . 6 Details regarding refund procedure in cases of "material
error"

A taxpayer who fails to contest an assessment by filing a
timely petition for review with the regional director may not
thereafter secure a re-examination of his return for the pur
pose of recapturing a claimed overpayment, except on a show
ing of material error. Such an error, whether discovered by
the taxpayer or a revenue official leads automatically, without
any formal requirement, to a refund if an overpayment is in
volved. This is subject, however, to two limitations . Refunds
(footnote continued)
been dispatched. Art. 89 of the Code of Income Tax (Art. 2 2 , § 2 , al.
1 to 3, law of November 2 0 , 196 2 , as amended by Art. 1 0 , law of
July 15 , 1966) .
33 Art. 306 of the Code of Income Tax (Art. 6 5 , al. 2 of the Co
ordinated Laws , Art. 11, law of March 2 8 , 1955) .
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cannot be made following the lapse of three years from the be 
ginning of the year to which the tax relates . Further, if the
taxpayer had filed a timely petition for review of his original
assessment to which the claimed overpayment relates, and a
final decision on that petition has been handed down, that final
ly determined assessment cannot be reopened even upon later
discovery of a material error .
Subject to those two limitations, the types of error accom
modated under this procedure included mathematical mistakes
which favored the government (whether made by the taxpayer
himself or by a revenue official) or double computations of a
taxable term. Also treated as tantamount to material error is
the situation where the taxpayer, after the assessment is made,
produces new records or facts which for completely valid rea
sons he was unable to submit prior to assessment. A new
legal argument or a change in the administrative or judicial
interpretation of the statute will never be considered a "new
fact," however. 34

34 Art. 277 of the Code of Income Tax (Art. 6 1 , § 6 of the C oordi
nated Laws as amended by Art. 2 , law of May 3 0 , 1949 , Art. 2 3 3 , law
of July 27 , 1953 , Art. 2 0 , § 2 , law of March 2 8 , 1955 , Art. 2 , law of
March 2 4 , 1959 , and Art. 6 3 , § 5 , law of November 2 0 , 1962) .

CHAPTER VIII
RESOLUTION OF INTERPRETATIVE INCOME TAX
QUESTIONS BY INDEPENDENT TRIBUNALS
4 . 1 Introduction

As pointed out earlier, a taxpayer must exhaust the ad
ministrative processes before he may carry into court a dispute
with the tax authorities . The government, however, faced with
an adverse administrative appeal decision by the statutorily
endowed regional director, does not have the right to carry its
case to the courts. The taxpayer alone has this privilege .
The judiciary possess final authority to interpret the tax
statute . The Belgian Constitution insures the absolute inde
pendence of the tribunal to which the taxpayer has an absolute
right to appeal in the event of an adverse decision at the ad
ministrative level.
The courts with jurisdiction over tax matters are not spe 
cialized courts, limited either to tax litigation or to disputes
between administrative agencies and individual citizens . They
are courts of general jurisdiction-civil, commercial, criminal,
etc . -fully competent also to resolve substantive income tax
questions . However, these general courts do have specialized
chambres for tax matters. To the extent necessary, they will
re-examine the regional director 's conclusions of fact and of
law.
The Belgian judicial organization has no precise counter 
part to trial and appellate tribunals . Nevertheless, two levels
of competence exist. The Courts of Appeal make findings of
fact de novo, to which they apply their view of the law . The
C ourt of Cassation, the supreme court to which lies an appeal
from the Courts of Appeal, is limited to questions of law.
Section A.

Organization and Pro cedure s :
Lower Courts

4.2 Organization of the lower courts

Belgium has three Courts of Appeal each with a specified
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seat and territorial jurisdiction. 1 A petition for revision of a
director 's decision must be brought before the Court of Appeal
with territorial jurisdiction over the office of the regional di
rector who handed down the decision.
Each Court of Appeal is divided into the number of sec
tions , Cham bres, reflected in following schedule, the number
having been determined on the basis of average workloads :
Court of
Appeal
Ghent
Brussels
Liege

Total
Chambres

Taxation
Chambres

8
24
12

1
3
2

Total Members
(Conseillers)

26
60

33

Taxation
(Conseillers)

3-4
9-12
6-8

Every case coming before a section is heard at least by three
members .
Irrespective of the section of the court of which they are
members, all conseille rs are doctors of law. Generally they
have spent ten to twenty years as justices of a district tribunal
or as members of a district office of the public prosecutor.
As a rule, members of the tax section were not tax specialists
prior to appointment, but they normally serve such long terms
that they develop a high level of expertise. Whenever a matter
of general interest is argued before a Court of Appeal, a mem
ber of the Attorney General 's staff-usually a deputy attorney
general-is present. He submits an advisory opinion in each
case. 2
Like the conseillers, the members of the Attorney Gener
al 's staff are generalists upon appointment but after advising
on hundreds of tax cases they acquire a thorough knowledge of
tax law and experience in interpreting the statute .
4.3 Processing cases through the Court of Appeal

Should the taxpayer 's administrative appeal be decided
adversely in whole or in part, he will be so informed by a
1 The courts at Ghent, Brussels, and Liege exercise jurisdiction,
respectively , over (1) West Flanders and E ast Flander s , (2) Brabent ,
Antwerp, and Hainaut , and ( 3) Liege , Limbourg, Namur , and Luxem
bourg.
2 This device of an advisory opinion is a requisite part of Belgian
j udicial procedure whenever the public interest, l ' ordre public, is con
cerned. The office of the attorney general is not involved in the con
troversy between the parties . Hence , the representative of the attorney
general' s office , in tax cases the deputy attorney general, has the duty
of delivering an impartial opinion which semetimes will favor the Min
ister of F inance and sometimes the taxpayer , depending upon his esti
mation of the merits of the case.
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registered letter from the regional director.
The taxpayer
then has forty days within which to file with the appropriate
Court of Appeal a new petition, a copy of which is sent to the
regional director. 3
Neither administrative nor judicial appeal affects the tax
payer's obligation to pay his tax as assessed, nor is the run
ning of interest suspended should the taxpayer delay paying that
portion of the tax in dispute . 4
It is possible to settle cases after invoking the jurisdic 
tion of the C ourt of Appeal. Where this occurs, the taxpayer
officially waives the right to dispute further the regional direc 
tor's decision. The Court, however, must decide whether it
will approve the settlement. Should the Court conclude that
the settlement is based on an incorrect interpretation of the
statute, it can refuse to permit the petition to be withdrawn
and hand down a decision as if no administrative settlement
had been made.5 Should the Court be satisfied with the settle 
ment, it will recognize withdrawal of the petition by a formal
decision. No statistics are available to indicate the frequency
with which such administrative settlements are reached.
Once a taxpayer files a petition with a Court of Appeal,
the tax administration must defend the case. Communication
of the taxpayer ' s petition to the regional director in effect
summons the tax administration to appear before the court. At
the hearing the government is represented by a lawyer, a regu
lar practising member of the bar who also holds a .permanent
appointment from the Minister of Finance to defend the revenue
administration in court. These lawyers maintain contact with
the fourth division of the central Administration of Direct
Taxes, three branches of which handle the work on tax cases,
in litigation before the courts . 6
Contrary to the customary procedure in the civil cases,
taxpayers are not required to be represented before a Court
of Appeal by a solicitor, avo ue. Theoretically, any taxpayer
may represent himself at such hearings, with or without the
3 Arts. 2 7 8-280 , Code of Income Tax (Arts . 66 and 67 of the Co
ordinated Laws) .
4 See Chap. VII, 3.5 supra .
5 See , for example , Court of Appeal of Brussels , June 2 7 , 1956 .
(Chevalier pour Despatures) , Recueil Special de Jurisprudence , XII,
no. 649.
6 The personnel of the office for litigated matters belong to the
first category of government officials, whose educational background
was discussed in Chap. V supra .
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assistance of a tax expert who may or may not be a member
of the bar . In practice, however, the taxpayer is represented
by a member of the bar, i.e., by lega� counsel authorized to
plead before any Belgian tribunal.
The proceedings are formal. 7 Both facts and legal argu
ments must be stipulated in writing by taxpayer and tax ad
ministration alike . According to the general principle actori
incumbit probatio, sed reus in exceptione fit actor, proof of
facts and legal arguments must be borne by the party invoking
them . 8
Upon receipt of a copy of the petition, the regional direc
tor must deposit all documents concerning the dispute, together
with a certified copy of his decision, with the Court of Appeal,
where the taxpayer is free to examine them.9 Should the tax
payer wish to rely on new documents or memoranda not intro
duced previously when the matter was before the regional di
rector, he must file them at the same office of record where
the director, in turn, may examine them. The director then
has thirty days in which to respond, by submitting additional
documents or memoranda in support of his position. 10 With
the court' s permission, the taxpayer can reply by filling yet
further records, documents , or memoranda.
In the end, both the tax administration and the taxpayer
must have submitted formal documents, so-called conclusions,
s etting out their arguments . The view of the Attorney General
is also submitted in writing.
There is , however, a typically exercised right to oral ar
gument with respect both to the facts and applicable legal prin
ciples. But this is in addition to and not a substitute for the
conclusions . Further, it is most unusual for the taxpayer him
self to be interrogated, for other oral evidence to be intro
duced, or for witness es to be used.
The court rarely hands down its decision on the day in
which the hearing is completed. The time lag between the
close of the hearing and the decision itself ranges from two
weeks to two months, depending on the difficulty of the case.
7 Art. 2 8 7 , Code o f Income Tax (Art. 6 7 ,
L aws) .
8 Except where the advice of the " F iscal
of the taxpayer . See Chap. VII, 3.4
9 Art. 281 , Code of Income Tax (Art. 67 ,
Laws) .
10 Art. 2 8 3 , Code of Income Tax (Art. 6 7 ,
Laws) .
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The Belgian Constitution requires that the decisions of all
tribunals be announced in public, but the litigants themselves
need not be present. Since the Constitution also requires that
decisions include more than the bare judgment, each decision
s ets out a detailed statement of facts as well as the legal rea
soning which led the court to its conclusion.
The schedule which follows indicates the number of cases,
involvmg direct taxes, decided by the Courts of Appeal in re 
cent years :
Judiciary
Year

All Courts
of Appeal

1959 -60
1960 - 61
1961 - 62
1962-63

1 ,727
1 ,537
1 , 283
1 ,107

Individual Courts of Appeal
Brussels

1 ,075
1 ,003
825
778

Ghent

Liege

341
329
260
166

311
205
198
163

Tax periodicals, whether officially or privately printed,
publish only those decisions of the Courts of Appeal which seem
of particular importance, either to taxpayers or to revenue of
ficials . 11 Illustrative are decisions involving a new application
of the statute or interpretations resolving a known disputed
point of law.
In theory, except for decisions of the Court of Cassation
under special circumstances, decisions of courts do not consti
tute precedents . In practice, however, it obviously is helpful
in tax litigation to refer to comparable decisions by courts with
like jurisdiction or, a fortiori, by the particular court itself.
Section B.

Organization and Procedures :
The Court / of Cassation

4 . 4 Organization of the Court of Cassation

The Belgian constitution provides for one Court of Cassa
tion for all Belgium and limits its jurisdiction to questions of
11 See Chap. VI, 2.10 supra for a discussion of the official publica
tions issued by the central administration of direct taxes . The most
important privately published tax periodicals are Journal Pratique de
Droit Fiscal et Financier, Algemeen Fiscaal Tijdschrijt, Revue Fis
cale, Revue Pratique des Socitftes Civiles et Commerciales, Revue
Pratique du Notariat, Tijdschrift voor Notarissen, Annales du Notariat
eet de l ' Engistrement .
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law. 12 This tribunal has its seat at Brussels, the national
capital.
The Court is divided into two sections, Chambres. The
first deals with civil and commercial cases, the second inter
alia with tax cases . The total number of members is twenty
three with eleven or twelve in each section. Five must sit on
each case . In every case brought before the Cour de Cassa 
tion, either the Attorney General himself or his deputy must
submit his views .
In general, the members of the Court of Cassation and the
members of the office of the attorney general are s elected
from the members of the Courts of Appeal. The majority of
members in that court's second section were not tax special
ists prior to their appointment. Knowledge of and experience
in the handling of tax problems typically are acquired while
serving on the bench. l 3
4. 5 Processing a case through the Court of Cassation

There are two important differences between the Court of
Cassation and the Courts of AppeaL 14
First, the Court of Cassation's jurisdiction is limited to
issues of law. Thus an appeal must be based solely on an al
leged misapplication of law, and should it appear that questions
of fact or mixed questions of law and fact are involved, the
claim is dismissed.
Second, while the taxpayer alone can invoke jurisdiction of
a Court of Appeal, both the revenue administration and the tax
payer can invoke the jurisdiction of the C ourt of Cassation.
Should a decision of a Court of Appeal be unfavorable to the
government, the Director General of direct taxes, advised by
members of the fourth division of the general direction of di
rect taxes ( responsible for litigated matters), decides whether
it will be appealed to the Court of Cassation.
An appeal to the Court of Cassation, as was true of an
action brought before a Court of Appeal, does not suspend the
taxpayer's obligation to pay the tax or the running of interest
if the disputed part of the tax has not been paid.
12 Belgium Constitution, Art. 95.
13 Some members of the second

section may have been appointed
after lengthy service on the tax section of a Court of Appeal.
14 This is apart from the fact that all tribunals in Belgium are sub
ordinate to the Court of Cassation in the sense that the Court super
vises the manner in which the law (used in the broad sense of the
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A party who wishes to appeal a Court of Appeal's decision
has ninety days after receiving official communication of the
decision in which to file a Retition and all relevant documents
with the C ourt of Cassation. 15 Within forty days after notifi
cation by the Court of Cassation's recorder that a petition has
been filed, the defendant must file all documents and memoran
da in support of his position. The petitioner is free to inspect
these matters. 16
The taxpayer, whether petitioner or defendant, must be
represented before the Court by a member of the bar of either
the Court of Cassation or a Court of Appeal. Memoranda set
ting forth the taxpayer 's arguments frequently are prepared by
the lawyer, a tax specialist, who handled the case before the
Court of Appeal.
The government, whether as petitioner or defendant, is not
represented on appeal by a tax official or by the permanently
appointed counsel who handled the case before the Court of Ap
peal. Instead the government's case is handled by a member
of the bar of the Court of Cassation.
Procedure before the Court of Cassation is even more
formal than before the Court of Appeal. There is no right to
oral argument and all material must be submitted in writing.
Like all decisions of the Court of Cassation, tax decisions
set out the legal reasoning which led the court to the result
reached. The Bulletin des arrets de la Cour de Cassation 17
publishes all of the court' s decisions but decisions of major
importance appear also in both official and private legal peri
odicals . 1 8
Should the Court of Cassation conclude that the law has
been misapplied, it will quash the decision and, because it
never finds facts, then send the case to another Court of Ap
peal. Within thirty days after notice of the decision, the peti
tioner must bring the case before the particular Court of Appeal
specified in the decision. l9
(footnote continued)
word to include implementation of royal and ministerial decrees) is
interpreted and the rules of procedure observed.
15 Art. 289 , Code of Income Tax (Art. 6 7 , al. 1 , of the Coordinated
Laws) .
16 Art. 290, Code of Income Tax (Art. 67 , al. 1 , of the Coordinated
Laws) .
17 The decisions appear in French and in Dutch versions.
18 Of particular importance are the Bulletin des contributions and
the Recueil Special de la Jurisprudence .
1 9 Art. 292, Code of Income Tax (Art. 6 7 , al. 1 , of the Coordinated
Laws) .
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This Court of Appeal decides both questions of law and
fact. It is not bound by the action of the C ourt of Cassation,
and may apply the statute as it sees fit, completely disregard
ing the Court of Cassation's decision. Should the second Court
of Appeal reach the same conclusion as the first, the petitioner
is free to file a second petition with the Court of Cassation
using the same legal arguments as in the first.
The Court of Cassation then re-examines the case at a
common session of both sections . If the Court of Cassation's
second decision is based on the same legal reasoning as the
first, the Court of Appeal to which the case is now sent must
conform its decision to that handed down by the Court of Cassa
tion.
Subsequently, the Attorney General will call the attention
of the Minister of Justice to this situation so that the govern
ment can introduce an interpretative bill in Parliament, to pre
vent further interpretative difficulty with respect to the particu
lar point of law which gave rise to the dispute. 20
In general, the Minister of Finance does follow the princi
ple of any case in which the Court of Cassation hands ctown a
decision, but there have been a few exceptions . Also, since
there is no opportunity for further appeal, the potential impact
of an adverse decision has sometimes led the government to
introduce in the Parliament a so-called interpretative bill to
nullify or modify the holding of the Court of Cassation.2 1

20 In t ax matters , recent interpretative laws which do not nullify or
modify j udicial decisions include the following: A cts of May 24, 1948;
May 30 , 1949; March 1 9 , 1953; March 18 , 1955; March 24 , 1959; De
cember 2 1 , 1962; February 1 3 , 1963; March 16, 1964.
21 Interpretative laws which nullify or modify j udicial decisions in
clude the following: A cts of July 1 3, 1930 ; April 7 , 1936; May 3 0 ,
1939; October 2 8, 1950; June 26, 1957; July 8 , 1957; July 13 , 1959.

PART THREE
FRANCE
by

Pierre Kerlan

CHAPTER

IX

ADMlN1STRATIVE ORGANIZATIONAL AND PERSONNEL
FRAMEWORKS
Section A.

Administrative Organizational
Framework

1 . 1 Introduction

French standards of assessment for each tax, whether im
posed for national or local purposes, are uniform throughout
the country. While rates imposed by local units are not uni
form, the subj ect-matter of all assessments, i . e . , the property
or transactions against which taxes are imposed, are governed
by standards fixed at the national level. Thus the General Di
rector of Taxes, 1 as head of the division charged with admin
istration and collection of all direct taxes, must provide for
uniformity in the subject-matter · of assessment while simul
taneously utilizing decentralized administrative organization to
determine and collect local taxes in accordance with locally
set rates, as well as national taxes .
There are three levels in the French tax administration:
the central or national office, departmental or regional offices,
and local tax offices which, while covering geographical areas
of varying sizes, are supposed to have approximately identical
work loads .
1 . 2 Organizational framework, national office le vel
At the head of the central administration, L 'Administration
centrale de la Direction G e ne rale de s Impots, is the Director

General. Serving under the authority of the Ministry of Finance
and of Economic Affairs , he is concerned both with tax policy
and administration of the French tax system at the national and
local levels . His office has three important subordinate divi
sions, excluding those responsible for personnel matters or for
supervision of departmental and local offices : the International
Relations Service, Le Service de s Re lations Inte rnationale s , the
1 The Director General of the Customs occupies an equivalent po
s ition with respect to this class of tax. The administrative divisions
headed by these two officials bear the prime responsibility for French
taxes .
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Legislative Service, Le Service de la Legis lation, and the Legal
Service, Le Se rvice du Contentieux.
The International Relations Service handles the preparation,
negotiation, and interpretation of tax conventions .
The Legislative Service has two subdivisions : one deals
with income taxes on enterprises with particular attention to
industrial and commercial activity, Sous -Direction des impOts
sur les ente rprises, and the other with taxes on individual in
comes, Sous-Direction des impots sur les pe rsonnes physiques .
B y allocating to each subdivision of the Legislative Service
responsibility for a particular type of tax, a coordinated ap
proach to that tax becomes possible . The same office proposes
reforms to the Ministry and, if the proposal is approved, goes
on to draft the bill together with the accompanying explanation
of its objectives and significance . When the draft bill reaches
the Council of State, the office participates in the discussion.
And when the bill reaches the legislature, the office assists the
Ministry in preparing for the debates, by developing the Minis 
try's statements of explanation, interventions, and in advising
the Ministry on the significance of any proposed amendment.
Since the debates are published in the official journal, the Min
istry ' s interventions are considered of major importance should
it later be necessary, because of interpretative difficulties, to
determine the legislative intent. Finally, upon enactment, the
same office prepares a variety of implementing materials .
These range from statements designed to explain to agents of
the administrative division the interpretative position of the
Director of Taxes 2 to formulation of decrees which, in effect,
are supplements to the legislation itself.
A French statute tends to do no more than state the basic
principles of a tax, i. e . , general rules . Subsequently, an ap
propriate administrative office drafts a decree which sets out
the method of application. Illustratively, when use of the de
clining balance method of depreciation was authorized by statute,
the determination of the consequent depreciation rates was left
to the tax administration. Its draft of a decree setting out this
rate pattern was then submitted for examination to the Council
of State, with the appropriate office participating in the discus 
sion. Should unforeseen interpretative difficulties arise there
after, the same office prepares an explanation which, upon
2 These statements are published in an official bulletin distributed
to all agents.
Private publishers make this information available to
the public,
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approval by appropriate superiors in the administrative hierar 
chy, then becomes the administration's official position.
1 . 3 Organizational framework, regional office le vel

A regional office has been placed in each of the ninety de
partments in France , except for the Seine, which, because of
the heavy population concentrated in and around Paris, has two
such offices . Since the departments vary in population density
and economic activity, there are marked differences in work
load among the ninety-one offices .
At most, a departmental office will have ten qualified tech
nical personnel on its staff, though the average is five to an
office (including the director) . The offices will also have an
average of four other less qualified agents who are, however,
well acquainted with fiscal legislation. These offices perform
two functions, overseeing local office activity and dealing with
specific problems arising at the local office level.
A wide variety of controls are exercised by the depart
mental office over the local offices under its supervision. Prin
cipal inspectors, attached to the departmental office, each
supervise two or more local offices and advise the departmental
director of the state of affairs in each.
After a local office has assembled the figures relating to
the income and deductions for taxpayers within its geographi
cal jurisdiction, it sends this data to the departmental office,
which then computes the tax for each taxpayer on the basis of
the figures supplied. Only then are taxpayers informed of the
tax due . 3 Auditing programs for the local offices are also
fixed at the departmental level. Further, it develops the for
mulae used in estimating the actual taxes to be paid by certain
groups of French taxpayers-small tradesmen, skilled artisans,
professional men including doctors, dentists, architects, and
lawyers -who are subject to the regime du forfait, a form of
estimated or presumptive taxation. 4 Similarly, farm income
assessment bases are determined at the departmental level
after consultation with farm organization representatives . 5
Specific problems arising at the local level also are brought
to the departmental office, some by the local office but most
by taxpayers . A local office may encounter either a factual
situation not dealt with at all by statute or regulation or an
3 Local offices also forward the relevant information upon which
the departmental office fixes penalties.
4 See Chap. XI, 3 .2b infra .
5 Id.
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ordinary interpretative question it cannot resolve . Either may
be laid before the departmental office . If the question cannot
be resolved there, the matter is forwarded to the Director
General. Some taxpayers encounter problems which fall within
the peculiar competence of departmental offices. These prob
lems spring from unexpected financial hardship, arising from
circumstances beyond the taxpayer 's control, such as the death
of a husband or a catastrophe such as fire or flood which
terminates productive activity. Under such conditions , the de 
partmental office may remit the tax in whole or in part up to
specified monetary limits .
Should the amount exceed such
limits, the taxpayer's petition goes to the Director General,
accompanied by the taxpayer's file and a report prepared by
an agent of the local office reflecting the petitioner's tax base
and the agent' s opinion regarding available resources and the
accuracy of the facts alleged.
Other taxpayers may challenge the imposition of a tax on
the basis of an interpretative issue. Here scrupulous adher 
ence t o the strict conditions of a form s et out by statute is
required: failure to comply results in automatic rejection of
the claim. Such c laims are submitted initially to the same
departmental office which earlier made the final determination
of his taxes. If the form is correct, the claim is then for
warded to the appropriate local office where the inspector who
determined the income analyzes the facts and points of law and
prepares a report reflecting his opinion on the merits . The
report goes to the departmental office, which is empowered to
waive the tax if the taxpayer' s claim is considered valid. If
it is not, the claim is rejected by letter. After such a rejec
tion, a taxpayer must use the courts for any further challenge.
1 . 4 Organizational framework, local office le ve l

Below the departmental directions and directly responsible
for preparing the assessment rolls are the 1 700 local office s
distributed throughout France. Each office has approximately
the same work-load, though the territory under each-termed
a section-varies, depending as it does upon population density.
Thus a section in a rural area may include s everal communes,
while a so-called mixed section may include a town and one or
more adjacent rural communes . Sections in urban areas may
include all of a small city, or only a portion of a major one . 6
6 Illustratively , an urban section might include a portion of Mar

seilles , a rural section might include St. Valery en C aux, located in
Normandy , a mixed section might include a city of 9 ,0 00 such as Vitre
with the neighboring communes .
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The following table illustrates the number of communes and of
taxpayers likely to be found in each of the three major types
of s ections :
Type of Section

Urban
Extent of section, or
number of communes

Part of the city

Rural

Mixed

82

30

Number of inhabitants

22 ,236

31 ,659

31,900

Number of files (tax on
income, local taxes)

15 ,068

9 ,440

7 ,500

3 ,538

2 , 382

2 ,442

Number of taxpayers subject to income tax

Each s ection is headed by an inspector, assisted by one
or more tax examiners and several clerks . There are 2 400
inspectors for the whole of France, for certain sections have
two. Technically qualified agents assisting these inspectors
total 1 200. 7
,
Each s ection' s prime responsibility is to determine the
tax base. About one-third of its effort goes into preparation
of assessment rolls for local taxes (the land tax upon real
property, the tax on occupancy, and license and franchise taxes ) .
Even more effort is involved in preparing assessment rolls
for income taxes, based either upon taxpayer declarations of
income (as in the case of income from salaries, sales of per
sonalty, and from commercial and industrial activity) , or upon
estimates of income (as in the case of profits from agricul
tural activity, from small shops, or from the exercise of the
liberal professions) .
To assist the inspector to make the assessments for all
these taxes each s ection maintains individual files for each
taxpayer . A file includes not only the declarations or esti
mates of the taxpayer 's income but also reports s ent in from
other sources. These reports may be from the local bank
(covering the opening or closing of bank accounts, and income
from securities collected by the bank for the taxpayer), or from
the registry of automobiles reporting on a taxpayer' s purchase
or sale of an automobile, or from other sources indicating his
purchases or sales of realty or other property.
7 The insufficient number of personnel is recognized but all French
administrative agencies experience difficulty in securing sufficient per
sonnel.
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An effort presently is being made to regroup the local of
fices in metropolitan centers, though without any fundamental
change in functions or organizations . Even now, the offices of
more than one section are sometimes housed in the same build
ing and are called tax centers, some consolidation of minor
administrative functions having also been accomplished, such
as receipt and dispatch of mail. A principal inspector of taxes
supervises the work of the inspectors of one or more of these
tax centers, and reports directly to the departmental director .
Section B.

Personne l Frame wo rk (Go ve rnmental
and Non -Go ve rnmental)

1 . 5 Gove rnmental professional personne l

Quite different methods of recruitment and standards of
qualification are applied to the two principal groups of officials
associated with the tax administration: the top echelon of the
national office, and all other officials .
Prior to 1945, officials in the top echelon of the national
tax administration, and in all other comparable divisions of the
government, had worked up through the lower levels of the par
ticular agency, qualifying on the basis of seniority and rank
for a rigorous competitive examination.
While this system
produced men with great technical competence, it did not con
tribute to their awareness of non-agency factors and problems
relevant to the governing process .
T o remedy this situation, the provisional government in
1944 established a school, under the Prime Minister, to recruit
and train top level officials for all ministries, L 'E cole Nationale
d 'Administration. Upon admission the students are considered
as officials, and are paid by the state 8 during the course of
study which lasts for twenty- eight months . The competitive
examination for admission may be taken by two groups . To
qualify for the first, an individual must be less than 26 years
of age, and either hold a degree of bachelor of laws or possess
a <:liploma from the Institute of Political Studies, L 'Ins titut
d 'E tudes Politiques, or from some other comparable institute.
To qualify for the second, an individual must be a public offi
cial, less than 30 years of age, with a minimum of five years
8 B etween 1946 and 1964 , the School of National Administration
graduated 1282 administrators. Of these 45 have been appointed to the
tax administration, representing about half the effective force of that
agency.
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of public service. Only about ten percent of the candidates
survive the initial examination and the majority of these hold
both the degree of bachelor of laws and a diploma from the
Institute of Political Studies, courses which can be pursued
simultaneously.
The written portion of the initial competitive examination
has a broad economic, social, and political orientation, cover
ing (1) the evolution of some ideas and political, soc.ial, or
economic developments since the eighteenth century, (2) policy
considerations bearing on a contemporary economic issue,
( 3) the current political institutions of some important nation,
international organization, or constituent of French administra
tion, and ( 4) a translation into French of a text in a foreign
language chosen by the candidate . Candidates who survive that
test then take a penetrating oral examination designed to test
the candidates ' ability to deal competently and exhaustively with
some matter of political or economic philosophy, within the
framework of a brief speech, prepared on short notice, followed
by questioning from the board of examiners.9 Then follows a
series consisting of four additional oral examinations dealing
with the following areas : ( 1) the candidates ' general knowledge,
( 2) some social question, (3) either administrative law or
fiscal legislation, as chosen by the candidates themselves, and
(4), again at the choice of the candidates, either international
organizations or economic and human geography. This series
of examinations is concluded by a test dealing with the candi
dates ' physical qualifications .
The candidates receive points on the basis of their per 
formance in each examination, and the totals are multiplied by
individual coefficients . From these come the rankings which
determine the comparative standing of each individual. lO
9 " F or the second examination, the corresponding interrogation
consists of a conversation with the board of examiners , lasting about
twenty minutes after a preparation of ten minutes , having as a point
of departure a text which both interests the tax administration and en
ables the board to determine the experience acquired by the candidate.
" This interrogation is entirely conversational , born of the idea
that practical experience of some years is as valuable as academic
training and that equality between the candidates is better assured if
each is considered in terms of the personal training which he is sup
posed to have acquired in service. But the examiners obviously can
not confine themselves . to subjects too technical and do not limit them
selves to administrative techniques." E cole Nationale d'Administration,
Concours et scolarite 35 (1964) .
10 " . . . at each examination, the members of the board of examin
ers are careful to test, as to these matters , the extent of the education
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Upon admission to the National School of Administration,
the students are sent to some unfamiliar part of France or to
a foreign country, where for eleven months they work with top
level French or international officials to provide practical ex
perience as well as an awareness of administrative realities . 1 1
The second period of study, lasting some seventeen months,
is spent attending lectures, administrative conferences, and in
working in either private or public offices and on practical
exercises.
At the conclusion of this second period, the students are
ranked, and select their careers in the order of rank. l2 Be 
fore commencing work, however, a student must sign a pledge
to serve the state for at least ten years. If he refuses to
sign, he must refund the salary he received during his period
of study.
Only at this point do the young administrators or judges
begin to familiarize themselves with the specific requirements
of their assigned functions . Illustratively, at the Ministry of
Finance, administrators attached to the office of the Director
General of Taxes now begin to learn the details of the French
tax law . Previously, they knew only the principles and major
outlines of that law, but with the typical background in law and
economics, adjustment is rapid.
(footnote continued)
of the candidates ; this is equally true with respect to basic and ele
mentary ideas which, as to pr,actical subj ects , one has the right to
expect of a future student of l 'Ecole nationale d'administration .
11As another president wrote , ' The examination should permit the
selection of students capable of benefiting from the full complement of
the training given at l 'Ecole and of adaptation to the functions of top
level administration; it is less important to probe the extent of the
candidates' knowledge than their presence of mind , their skill in shift
ing from one subject to another , and , this done , to consider the new
subject in its totality , their frankness in acknowledging ignorance or
their skill in palliating this , and finally their pos s ibility of growth
E cole Nationale d'Administration, Concours et
within the service. ' "
s colarite 34 (1964) .
1 1 At the conclusion of this period , each student prepares a detailed
memorandum on some aspect of political , economic financial , social ,
or administrative problems.
12 The posts to which the , students may be appointed include the
Council of state , le Conseil d'Etat, the Court of Accounts , le Cour des
Comptes, the administrative tribunals, les tribunaux administratifs, the
Office of the Inspector of F inances , l 'Inspection des Finances, Admin
istrator for the Ministries of Finance , Foreign Affairs , Work, National
�ducation, and of the Interior.� Ministe'res des Finances, des Affairs
Etrang{wes, au Travail, de l 'Education Nationale, de l 'Interieur .
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Other lesser officials enter the tax administration by tak
ing either the examination for examiner or that for an inspec 
tor.
To qualify for the former, a candidate must be less than
26 years of age, and hold a diploma evidencing his completion
of the s econdary level of education. 13 Success on the exami
nation is followed by a one -year training period during which
trainees are paid. The training period includes a three and a
half month period of study at the National School for Taxes ,
L 'E cole Nationale des Jmpots. and an eight and a half month
period of on-the -job training in the field. 14 Then after five
years service as an examiner, during which he assists an in
spector, an individual may take the examination for inspector.
One-fifth of the inspector vacancies are reserved for examin
ers. 15
Otherwise, admission to the examination for inspector re
quires that the candidate be less than 2 8 years of age and have
completed at least one year 's study toward a bachelor' s degree
in law. Indeed, the written examination itself covers some of
the matters studied in that first year, for it requires prepara
tion of ( 1) memoranda on some phase of economic policy or
fiscal legislation, and on some aspect of civil or commercial
law, and (2) at the choice of the candidate, either the solution
of certain mathematical problems or a memorandum on consti
tutional law and political institutions . 16 The candidate is sub
j ect also to oral interrogatories .
Students who successfully complete the examinations are
then paid while taking the two-year course of study for inspec
tors at the National School for Taxes, L 'E cole Nationale des
Imp8ts . This program includes two periods of practical ex
perience in the field and two periods of study in Paris . l7 The
13 The written portion of the examination requires the candidate to
solve certain mathematical problems, to prepare an essay on a sub
j ect of general information and a memorandum on some aspect of
France' s goverumental organization. Also the candidate must explain
orally a text of general s ignificance and submit to interrogation on
financial legislation.
14 Located s ince October 1966 in Clermont-Ferrand.
15 The examiners have the further advantage of being excused from
the requirement of further academic study, i.e. , they need not secure
the degree of bachelor of laws .
16 While optional with each candidate, competence in foreign language
and/or accounting may be demonstrated in addition to the required
proofs of admissibility.
17 Since October 196 6 , located in Clermont-Ferrand.
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schedule deliberately is planned to permit the students to attend
simultaneously the law school and thus secure their degrees in
law . The first period of study emphasizes comparative tax
systems, social and economic aspects of the French tax struc
ture, principles of taxation embodied in French fiscal legisla
tion, and principles of commercial accounting. Before the first
year ends, the students choose between specialization in turn
over taxes, taxes sur le chijjre d 'ajjairs , or in registry and
direct taxes, contributions directes e t enregistrement.
This
choice largely controls the materials to be studied during the
s econd year, though all students also continue to study account
ing principles and procedures .
If the candidates for the rank of inspector did not possess
a bachelor of laws degree upon entering the training program,
they are required to obtain the degree before completing that
program. Those candidates who are unable to obtain such a
degree are classified as examiners . 18 Upon graduating from
the National School for Taxes, students must agree to serve
the state for at least eight years; sums previously advanced
must be refunded if the agreement is broken.
New inspectors are assigned to either the national or de 
partmental offices, or placed at the head of a local office .
After ten years, they may take the competitive examination for
the rank of principal inspector . 19
Principal inspectors may work under departmental direc
tors, supervisory inspectors who either audit accounts or es
tablish the ass essment rolls . Alternatively, a principal inspector
may be given specific duties of his own relative to either audit
or assessment. Occasionally, principal inspectors also serve
as technical associates in the national office or as departmental
directors.
1 . 6 Private tax practitioners

There are three main groups of tax advisors : former in
spectors of taxes, expert accountants , and specialized advocates .
1 8 Since the training program includes two periods of residence, ini
tially in Paris , since October 1966 in Clermont-Ferrand , it is entirely
feasible to acquire the required law degree.
19 While account is taken of the professional qualities and general
abilities of the candidates , each candidate also must prepare an essay
on an economic or financial problem and a very detailed memorandum
on a specific tax question, his only reference being to the general tax
code. F inally , oral examinations also are given to test his technical
knowledge , his reasoning abilities , qualities of j udgment, and his gen
eral aptitude in administrative and control techniques .

PERSONNE L FRAMEWORK

2 37

Former inspectors of taxes comprise the largest single
group of lawyers specializing in tax practice. These men have
a bachelor 's degree in law, 20 have been trained at the National
School for Taxes, and couple their practical experience with
intimate knowledge of the inner workings of the tax system .
In consequence, this group typically represents taxpayers
in contested cases, both at the administrative level and in the
c ourts.
Because other lawyers who lack this in-s ervice experience
do counsel on business matters, some inevitably also give ad
vice on tax problems . Their earlier formal education did not
deal with the fine points of tax legislation. The subject was
touched upon in only two of their courses : Public Finance , and
Commercial and Tax Law of Business Transactions , which is
required of students concentrating in private law but not of
public law concentrates . In consequence, except for the very
few who have devoted much time mastering the details of tax
law, these advocates tend to be far less competent in tax mat
ters than the previously described group of former inspectors.
Members of a final group of tax advisers were trained as
accountants in accounting offices, though some have completed
studies at the university level in either schools of commerce
or law. The examinations for an accountant' s diploma e mpha
size primarily accounting techniques and only secondarily touch
upon legal matters . These accountants, after preparing the
financial statements for a business enterprise, apply the tax
law in extracting the data necessary to fill out declarations of
income from taxable profits.

20 Except for former examiners who qualified for the rank of in
spector and were excused from this requirement.

CHAPTER X
ADMINISTRATIVE RULE -MAKING PROGRAMS
Section A. Characte r of the Unde rlying Statute
2 . 1 The precision of the statute itse lf
There are more than 2,000 articles in the General Code

of Taxes which covers all taxes levied in France by the central
government, departments , communes, and certain public insti
tutions . Of these, only 2 48 articles deal with determination of
the tax on income . These cover 80 pages, each of which in
cludes about 600 words . An added 28 pages deal with collec
tion, penalties, procedure , and litigation.
To the statutes enacted by Parliament l must be added the
regulations 2 which are issued by administrative agencies and
which may be tested, as to legality, before the judiciary. Tax
regulations appear in an annex to the General Code for Taxes .
Those relating to the income tax cover 77 pages, and thus , in
bulk, almost equal that part of the code to which they relate.
A factor contributing to the importance of these regulations
is the form of French tax statutes . Principles and fundamen
tal concepts are not defined, although the terms -for example,
income, profits, etc. -- are used constantly. Ultimately, inde
pendent tribunals hammer out the general meaning of such
terms .
Special rules and exceptions, though relatively few in num
ber, are set out in both the statute and in the regulations . And
when these come before the independent tribunals, they are
construed strictly. 3 Illustrating the degree of specificity found
in the exceptions is Article 1 57 of the Code, which enumerates
the types of income which need not be taken into account in
determining the total net income of an individual. Excludable
income under this article includes ( 1) income from properties
1 Article 34 of the French Constitution gives Parliament exclusive
power , in the case of all taxes , to enact statutes relating to the tax
base, the rates , and the methods of collection.
2 Parliament, in enacting a statute , can delegate expressly to the
administrative agency the power to fix the method of applying the law
which itself states only a general principle.
3 See 2.4 infra .
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classed as historical monuments subject, however, to such
conditions as may be imposed by the classifying decree, ( 2) in
terest on Treasury bonds with a maturity date of five years or
less, (3) gratuities given to long-time workers to whom the
Minister of Work has conferred a medal of honor, (4) arrear
ages on certain bonds issued in 19 52 and 19 58.
As distinguished from the exceptions, however, the general
rules leave room for much interpretation. To illustrate, Arti
cle 209 states that corporations are subject to the corporate
income tax only to the extent that profit is derived from enter
prises conducted in France . 4 The Code does not define the
meaning of "conducted in France." An indication of the degree
to which this created interpretative questions is implicit both
from the following description of criteria which evolved out of
case law and administrative regulations , and from the fact that,
despite these criteria, difficulty in practical application per 
sists . The criteria which evolved include : ( 1) operation of an
establishment in France, (2) activity in France of an agent
whose legal identity, in concluding contracts in the name of the
enterprise, is not distinct from that of the enterprise itself,
and ( 3) realization in France of profits from operations entire 
ly carried on in France, e .g., purchases and sales of merchan
dise there.
Also illustrating the generality of France's statutory pat
tern is the area of depreciation deductions . The Code itself
does nothing more than authorize deduction of "amortizations
really effectuated by the enterprise, within the limit of those
generally admitted according to the usages of each particular
type of industry, of commerce or of operation. " 5 Under this
general provision, enterprises are free within the limits of the
particular industry 's customary usage, to determine their own
depreciation deductions in the first instance . The tax adminis 
tration is also free, however, to prove those deductions exces
sive. 6 In this same connection, a recent statute which permits
4 The text of Article 209 follows in part: " . . . en tenant compte
uniquement des benefices r ealises dans les enterprises exploitees en
France ."
5 Article 39-2 reads in part as follows: " . . . amortissements
reellement effectues par l'entrepris e , dans la limite de ceux generale
ment admis d' apres les usages de chaque nature d' industrie, de com
merce ou d' exploitation."
6 In actuality , the rate of depreciation is less of a problem in
France than in other countries , such as the United states , where very
precise and detailed rules have been set. There is little interest in
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the use of the declining balance method in calculating deprecia
tion states only the principle; the method of application is left
entirely to administrative regulation.
2 . 2 Legis lative pre -enactment aids to inte rpre tation

The initial characterization applied to proposed legislation
depends upon its source. If presented by the government, it is
termed a draft, if by a member of Parliament, a proposal. In
either case, however, the initial presentation of the bill is ac
companied by a written statement of the motives , expose des
mo tifs . This statement explains the purpose and scope of the
proposed legislation. It also puts into lay language the techni
cal terminology of the proposed bill which frequently will con
tain cross-references to existing statutes .
The proposed bill is examined by the Committee on Finan
ces of the National Assembly. The Minister of Finance, ac
companied by senior civil servants from the office of the
Director General of Taxes, attempts a full explanation of the
bill and answers inquiries . These hearings are not open to the
public, nor are they published. The final report prepared by
a reporter appointed by the Committee is published and dis 
tributed to the members of the Parliament. However, profes 
sional groups get in touch with individual members of Parliament
and make known their opinions or objections . Further, the
press usually carries a critical analysis of the bill as pro
posed.
In contrast to the non-publication of the Committee's hear
ings, the debates which follow in the National Asse mbly are
fully published in the official journal. These parliamentary
discussions are preceded by an explanation of the entire draft
or proposal. Spokesmen for different groups state their gen
eral views on the proposed bill. Discussion of the bill then
follows, article by article, with proposed amendments to any
article being discussed before the article itself. 7
Deputies
state their positions , and the Minister of Finance, assisted by
technical counselors (officials from the office of the Director
General of Taxes), states his view of any proposed amendment,
(footnote continued)
France in instituting such a system . Under French law , all gains de
rived from the sale of active elements , assets , are taxed as ordinary
income , and hence excessive depreciation cannot yield a preferentially
treated capital gain on subsequent sales.
7 Any deputy is free to propose such amendments during the hear
ings before the Committee br before the debate opens .
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whether in criticism or assent. He also explains the govern
ment's interpretation of the proposed text. Finally a vote is
taken on the article in question.
Because debates are published in full, the public has ready
access to the Minister ' s stated opinions, explanations, and the
answers he gave to the questions posed. These are extremely
valuable in future attempts to interpret the statute, for in them
may be found the intention of the legislature . Indeed, deputies
frequently address interpretative questions to the Minister, in
writing or orally, to force disclosure of the administrative in
terpretation of particular clauses . 8 These questions usually
are prepared by tax practitioners and provoke wide interest. 9
In addition to publication in the official journals, the official
tax administration bulletins and the tax law reviews reprint
them with added commentaries .
2 . 3 Standards of construction fo llowed by the judiciary in in 
terpre ting the statute

Administrative tribunals, with the Council of State at the
apex, and not the ordinary judiciary, have jurisdiction both to
determine the legal status of tax laws and regulatory acts (de
crees and orders) and to interpret them. It is most unusual,
however, for the tribunals to encounter a case wherein the tax
payer seeks to have even a regulatory act declared invalid for
reasons of illegality, recours pour exce s de pouvoir, on the
ground the regulation exceeds the limits set by the law. But
where such an action is successfully maintained, the act being
declared ultra vire s , it will suffer that impediment as to all
taxpayers, present and future, e rga omne s .
The prime function of administrative tribunals in tax cases
is to apply the law and regulatory acts, and if their texts be
silent, obscure, or inadequate, the tribunals must interpret
them. This interpretative function has become an increasingly
significant source of law because of the increasing complexity
of legislation and the wide ranging diversity of transactions .
Marginal and paradoxical situations heretofore unforeseen con
tinually arise . Consequent imperfections in the regulatory texts
8 The oral questions are known as orales, A ctually , they are writ
ten but are termed orales, because their text and the answer , also in
writing , are read aloud.
9 These questions frequently relate to an anticipated interpretative
difficulty which the recently enacted statute will create for some sec
tion of the tax codes , or to an apparent conflict between a taxpayer
and some local tax official as to a particular situation.
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are inevitable, have become every day matters, and their firm
resolution is the important task of the administrative tribu
nals . 10 The manner in which these tribunals have approached
their task has been marked by at least two tendencies.
The first has been facilitated by the generality of the
French statute's basic principles. As distinguished from other
areas of case law, the results actually reached by these tribu
nals reflect a greater concern for similarities in the net effect
of transactions than for differences involving mere legal nice
ties. That facts and factual effects are stressed, n rather than
legal arguments based on the subtleties of the private law,
warrants the conclusion that these tribunals tend to construe
the basic provisions of the statutes broadly, not narrowly or
pedantically. This rests on the supposition that France 's pub
licly oriented income tax statute was intended, to a greater
extent than the private law, to focus on the economic essence
of transactions, and this necessarily renders formal legal dis 
tinctions less significant. Thus account may be taken of illegal
situations or those lacking an equivalent in private law-e.g. ,
illegal commercial practices, the existence of irregular cor
porations, or prohibited activities (drug traffic, white slave
traffic, etc .). This is not to suggest, however, that the tax law
is completely independent of the private law. Indeed, it appears
primarily in instances where the broadly based general princi 
ple of a statute o r regulatory act i s coupled with a precise
identification of those matters to be excepted.
A second tendency reflected in the results reached by the
administrative tribunals shows their interest in guaranteeing
certain basic rights to taxpayers , by imposing what might be
called due process requirements . For example, it was the
Council of State that first established the principle that a regu
latory act could not have a retroactive effect if it established
a tax covering the past. 12 Again, the C ouncil of State held
that, to the end of preserving to a taxpayer the chance of mak
ing an adequate defense, a judge in a tax case could not take
judicial notice of facts, submitted by the tax administration, if
access to the source was denied to the taxpayer . While these
guarantees may represent nothing more than an extension to
the tax area of general legal principles, it is noteworthy that
10 C. Lasry , The Council of State, Studies and Documents (1955) .
1 1 See Conclusions Corneille , Order of January 21 , 1921. Sirey

1921. 3. 38.
12 0rder , December 23, 1949 ,
Lebon 1 2 1 .

Lebon 567 ;

Order March 16 , 195 6 ,
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that the extension was accomplished in the first instance by
courts . Only afterwards were they confirmed by the legisla
ture. 13
Where a court is faced with an interpretative question as
such, it seeks to determine the intention of the legislature in
order to clarify its own understanding of the text of the statute.
It will give prime attention to the expose de motif, the expla
nation presented by the government at the time the bill e mbody
ing the presently considered statute was under consideration by
the Parliament. In addition, the court will read carefully the
debates to note the comments made prior to enactment, such
comments frequently providing considerable assistance in the
resolution of issues . In general, it may be said that the courts
do not seek to limit the tax statute by strict construction but
instead seek to effectuate what they conceive to be the basic
purpose of the provision in question.
Section B.

The ''Regulations " Program

2 . 4 and 2 . 5 Type s, force , and purpose of "regulations "

In France , the expression, regulations, has a quite differ 
ent meaning than that accorded the term in United States tax
administration. In France , the term covers both regulatory
texts -that is, the decrees -which as a part of the law must be
followed and thus possess true legal significance , and adminis
trative instructions which do nothing more, on the substantive
side, than reflect the administrative view.
The legal effect of the regulatory texts stems from the
constitution, which vests regulatory power in the Prime Minis 
ter . 14 These texts may be promulgated under the general regu
latory power or pursuant to a particular statute which delegates
to regulatory texts the establishment of details regarding a
general principle and its application. The regulatory texts are
published in the official journals and must be taken into account
both by the tax administration and the tribunals .
In no case, however, · may these regulatory texts be con
trary to the statutes themselves . 15 While the judiciary must
recognize their force, it may inquire into their legality. Should
the occasion arise, careful consideration will be given to the
1 3 Acts of 1959 and 1963.
14 Art. 21, Constitution of 1958.
1 5 See 2. 3 supra .
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question of whether a regulatory text creates a taxpayer obli
gation exceeding that prescribed in the law.
As noted earlier, taken together, these re gulatory texts
have considerable bulk as well as importance, 1 in part be
cause they both implement and supplement the statutes them
selves. Thus not only do the regulatory texts complete the
gaps left in the statute by the legislature but further they speci
fy the manner in which the statute is to be applied in practice .
All such texts, however, are not issued by the same govern
mental level and all are not of equal weight. The formal clas 
sification is significant, for the provisions of the text cannot
be revoked or modified by a text of lesser weight. The revok
ing text must be at least of equal or greater weight. Thus a
simple decree cannot cancel a decree issued by the Council of
State, whereas a decree from the Council of State can revoke
a simple decree or a ministerial order. A description of the
different types of regulatory texts, ranked in descending order,
follows .
Decrees which take the form of a regulation of the public
administration spring from language of a specific statute which
delegates the rule-making function regarding details and methods
of application. They are issued by the Prime Minister after
consultation with the general assembly of the Council of State .
Drafts are prepared in the office of the Director General of
Taxes and forwarded to the Ministry of Finance which submits
them to the Council of State . There they are examined fully.
Senior civil servants from the Director General's office are
present for the purpose of explaining the regulation' s general
purpose and specific objectives, as well as to answer queries .
The Council of State renders an opinion, favorable or unfavor
able . It is free to propose changes both as to form and sub
stance . Proposed changes of form are generally, but not al
ways, accepted by the office of the Director General. Proposed
substantive changes raise questions of public policy which the
government itself ultimately must resolve, as such matters are
not left to civil servants.
A second type, decrees of the Council of State, arise from
the government' s request that the Council of State render an
opinion, which takes the form of a decree . It is not necessary
to convoke the general assembly of the Council of State for this
purpose ; one of the administrative divisions acting alone is
competent to act. As suggested earlier, such a decree carries
16 see 2 . 1

supra .
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less weight than a decree in the form of a regulation of the
public administration. And should the Council of State render
an unfavorable opinion, the government may disregard it. More
over, opinions by the Council of State, falling in this second
category, are never published.
Simple decrees issued by the Prime Minister constitute a
third type . While he customarily consults the C ouncil of State,
this is not required .
Ministerial orders, a fourth type, are issued by the com
petent minister as he considers necessary or desirable .
Apart from these regulatory texts, circulars, instructions ,
and memoranda are prepared by the office of the Director Gen
eral of Taxes for use by the tax administration. Unlike most
regulatory texts, these publications are not submitted to the
Council of State. Nor are there any public hearings, though in
some cases officials will contact representatives of affected
trade and professional groups 17 or officials of other interested
Ministries . These publications rephrase in lay language the
They specify the
statutes and the implementing decrees . 1 8
procedures to be followed by the local tax officials who must
abide by these instructions . Taxpayers are not bound by the
interpretations set out in the instructions but they find them
an excellent source of information regarding the governmental
interpretation of the statute. They are free, however, to con
test the application of such instructions to their personal cases
before competent tribunals, citing in support of their position
the statutes and regulatory texts . These administrative inter
pretations differ from the regulatory texts not only by refer 
ence t o their respective official sources and in the weight ac
corded them, but also in the form they follow . Regulatory texts
follow a legal form, similar to a statute . Administrative in
structions are expository in that they seek to explain the law
and the implementing decrees, using as an aid numerous exam
ples . The examples cover not only the most frequently arising
situations, but also some unusual ones . Often the administra
tive position they reflect is more liberal than strict construc 
tion of the statute would permit. These instructions are not
considered unalterable; additional ones are published where
17 Typically, as soon as a statute is passed by Parliament , affected
groups clamor to be heard that they may express their opinions on
the implementation of the statute. Thus it is very easy for the office
of the Director General of Taxes to learn their views and reactions .
1 8 rn a typical instruction, the official text of the statute and the
regulatory texts appear in an Annex .
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modification appears desirable, e.g., where new unforeseen in
terpretative difficulties arise.
Unfortunately, however, the
instructions do not cover all of the legislation enacted. Ir
regularly, the tax administration collects instructions which
have been issued intermittently over a period, rearranges them
in logical order and republishes them in a maj or circular .
The prime shortcoming of the instructions is that they do not
cover all of the legislation enacted.
2 . 6 Manne r of processing "regulations " 1 9

While regulatory texts and the administrative instructions
have the important differences noted above, there is a strong
unifying force. The same office prepares both. In fact the
same officials will have drafted the ori:f:inal bi11 20 to which the
regulatory text and instructions relate. 1 This preserves con
tinuity of thought beginning with the draft of a bill through its
implementing regulatory text and complementary instructions . 22
The time which elapses between the enactment of a statute
and the appearance of the regulatory texts is not uniform. If
the statute itself fixes a specific period of time, usually an at
tempt is made to comply. However, some regulatory texts have
never been prepared for publication, despite statutory direc
tives . This is most likely to occur where the statute was en
acted as a result of parliamentary initiative, over government
opposition stemming from a belief the statute itself is unwork
able in practice. Illustratively, in 19 59 a member of Parlia
ment proposed-and Parliament enacted-a provision imposing
a complementary tax of 1 5 percent on income derived by work
ers who took on additional jobs during their free time, that is,
over the weekends and vacations . 23 Complaints had arisen over
1 9 The diverse types of French regulations required that their pur
poses be dealt with in 2 .4 and 2 . 5 supra .
20 ' Changes , of course, may have been made in the course of the
parliamentary debate.
21 Where a circular treats the administrative matters outside the
tax law area itself , it will be prepared by another group of officials
who are charged with a different level of activity-i.e. , administrative
duties.
22 As pointed out in Chap. IX, the office of the D irector of Taxes
is divided into groups of officials by reference to particular types of
taxes or activity. Thus the office responsible for taxes on industrial
and commercial profits prepares , as to that subject, the drafts of any
law , implementing or supplementing decress , and the administrative
instructions.
2 3 Law of December 22, 1 959 , Art. 22, paragraph 45 .
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this practice, travail noir, and the legislation was in response
thereto. However, the tax administration considered that it
was impossible to apply the measure, recognizing the clandes 
tine nature of the activity and the difficulties in s ecuring in
formation. In consequence, it made no effort to take any actual
steps to implement the legislation and hence addressed no in
struction to the men in the field.
Administrative instructions tend to appear within one to
four months after publication of the law and the implementing
decree. The law of December 2 8 , 1959, instituting the use of
the declining balance method of depreciation, can be used to
illustrate the typical time pattern.
The regulatory text or
decree was issued on May 9, 1960. The first administrative
instruction was dated August 22, 19 60, and since then a few
decisions on particular points have been published by the ad
ministration.
Section c . The Rulings Program
2 . 7 Formal advance rulings to taxpayers

France makes no provision for advance rulings requested
by individual taxpayers on prospective transactions . On occa
sion, however, collective rulings are issued in these circum
stances, and even private rulings may be obtained in the case
of completed transactions .
The so-called collective rulings are issued in response to
requests received from the tax departments of trade or pro
fessional organizations, to resolve interpretative difficulties or
unanticipated situations encountered by that trade or profession.
Such tax departments constantly study new laws, implementing
decrees, and instructions, to ascertain possible effects on the
association' s members . A commentary on the law, taking due
account of administrative interpretations, is prepared and dis 
tributed to the members. Not infrequently, an organization' s
tax division contacts the appropriate officials in the office of
the Director General to resolve a question or raise an objec
tion bearing, e . g. , on the rate of depreciation regarding new
types of equipment or on the variations in the provisions re
garding risks insured by insurance companies . If the matter
lends itself to easy resolution, the competent official' s oral
opinion may suffice . If the matter does not lend itself to such
informal treatment, detailed and thoughtful consideration being
required, no oral answer is given. Instead, after the informal
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discussion, the organization's representatives submit the prob
lem in writing to the office of the Director General of Taxes .
This memorandum is turned over to the same group of officials
who drafted the bill, decrees, and administrative instructions
which provoked the inquiry. This group prepared the official
response . The importance of the question posed by the trade
or professional organization determines at what official level
the response will be signed. 24 Should a quite liberal interpre
tation be considered desirable, the Minister, who is responsible
to Parliament, will make the actual decision, not the civil serv
ants . In any event, any written response is always in the form
of a memorandum which the administration is willing to have
published. Once transmitted to the tax division of the particu
lar association, the administration feels bound by the decision.
The association itself will distribute this decision to its mem
bers, and the tax administration will send it to all officials .
Individual taxpayers may, though rarely do, request that
the administration advise them of the effect of a statute, regu
latory text, or administrative instruction on a given completed
transaction. Such a request must be written, and should be as
clear, complete, and precise as possible, explaining each de
tail of the completed transaction, so the administration's agents
can obtain readily all of the requisite information and factual
proof. Requests of this kind, addressed to the departmental
Director of Taxes , are investigated by an inspector who makes
a field audit. Should the departmental Director feel uncertain
regarding the proper response, the taxpayer ' s request is for
warded on to the Director General of Taxes . The written re 
sponse of this office is then forwarded to the taxpayer. A
declaration of income prepared by a taxpayer in accordance
with the official response will not be challenged if his own situ
ation, and the relevant law and regulations, remain unchanged.
However, the official response binds the administration only as
to that taxpayer alone; it does not have general application.
While the above procedure is seldom used, another is em
ployed fairly often. Trade associations or tax advisors will
contact a deputy in the National Assembly and request that he
pose an interpretative question to the Minister of Finance . The
deputy will submit the question to the Minister in writing. The
24 rn the order of increasing importance , the response will be signed
by the head of the office , the under director charged with the tax on
enterprise s , the chief of the legislative service, or by the Director
General himself.
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resulting answer from the Minister, contrary to a private rul
ing on a completed transaction, will apply to all taxpayers and
as to both prospective and completed transactions, absent a
statutory or regulatory change .
2 . 8 Informal technical advice to taxpayers on proposed trans 
actions

It is most unusual for a French taxpayer to request in
formal advice from a tax agent on the tax consequences of a
proposed transaction.
Occasionally, legal advisors of large
corporations do contact officials in the office of the Director
General of Taxes to discuss orally some anticipated tax ques
tions . Such officials do indicate their own opinions, and on
occasion, at the request of the taxpayer, these are reduced to
writing. 25
2.9 Technical advice to fie ld offices

Should a local inspector be unable to resolve interpretative
questions which arise during the course of an assessment, he
will refer the question to the departmental Director. Should
the Director, in turn, feel the need for advice from a yet higher
echelon, the question is forwarded by him to the appropriate
officials in the office of the Director General. The officials ,
to whom the matter is referred there, previously will have
drafted the bill, implementing regulatory texts or decrees, and
administrative instructions, and served also as the earlier de 
scribed point of contact with trade associations . Thus con
sistency of interpretation is assured. These in-service requests
for advice can be handled informally-i.e . , by telephone or in
a written communication not sent through the usual channels.
More often than not, they are forwarded as official requests,
and the formal answer of the superior relieves his subordinate
of all responsibility. The taxpayer is not informed that such a
request has been made, is not given a hearing by the higher
echelon, and the response is confidential.
Most frequently, these requests for advice are settled at
the departmental level. Those which reach the Director Gen
eral's office usually raise questions having both broad theoreti
cal and practical significance. Occasionally, conclusions reached
25 While this procedure is rarely requested by French taxpayers ,
American law offices located in France request advice with great fre
quency , without doubt to relieve them of responsibility or because of
the well established American practice to invoke such a procedure.
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at the national level are published in the official weekly bulle
tin of the tax administration.
2 . 10 Publication of technical advice given taxpayers and local
offices

The tax administration publishes a weekly bulletin which
reprints statutes and decrees which appeared earlier in the
official journal. Also included are the instructions, circulars,
and interpretative memoranda sent out by the office of the
Director General. Where deemed appropriate, the bulletin also
sets forth the previously published answer to the written ques 
tions posed by deputies in the National Assembly, significant
case law, accompanied by official comments, as well as other
memoranda reflecting administrative positions . There is no
systematic pattern as to the publication of such memoranda.
Those bulletins appear in looseleaf form with an index.
They are distributed to the local inspectors, and taxpayers may
subscribe to the edition which omits directives relating to in
ternal procedures and policies. Unfortunately, the publication
of the clarifying memoranda is seriously in arrears ; the ap
propriate offices have not had time to complete the necessary
synthesis and coordination. Further, in actual practice, out
side publishers in contact with the tax administration and with
government officials have taken over the prime responsibility
of integrating such material as is made available, and prepare
commentaries thereon.

CHAPTER XI
ASSESSMENT, REFUND, AND ADMINISTRATIVE
APPEAL PROCEDURES
Section A. Assessment and Audit Procedures
3 . 1 Introductory note
French income tax law relies on two procedures to make
final assessments . The first begins with an annual declaration
of actual income by all taxpayers not in receipt of certain
types of income . The tax administration retains the right to
verify and where necessary correct these declarations . The
second, applicable only to s mall enterprises, the professions,
and agricultural pursuits, is designed to minimize the burden
both of record keeping by the taxpayer and of verification by
the tax administration. It relies ultimately on estimates of
income. Estimates may also be used where the external evi
dence of the taxpayer 's wealth varies substantially from his
declaration.
3 . 2a Details of assessment and audit procedures re actual in
come

Every taxpayer, whether individual or corporate, submits
annually on appropriate forms furnished by the administration,
a declaration of income. 1 The head of the household includes
any income received by his wife and dependent children. The
declaration includes taxpayer identification data 2 as well as in
formation identifying each source of income. 3 Where an indi
vidual, carrying on an industrial, commercial, or professional
activity, must or chooses to be assessed on the basis of actual
1 Most taxpayers must submit their returns by February 2 8 . How
ever , taxpayers with income derived from industrial, commercial, or
professional activities need not submit their returns until March 31 if
such are based on actual profit s .
2 Address , date and place o f birth, nationality , social security
identification number , as well as the names and dates of births of de
pendent children.
3 Where wages are listed as a source of income, the name and ad
dress of the employer must be shown. Where there is income from
real property , the address of each piece of real estate must be given
and the gross as well as the net rents.
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rather than estimated profits, 4 the return must be accompanied
by sufficient documentation to establish the net profit. This
documentation includes profit and loss statement, a balance
sheet, and a detailed abstract of the depreciation schedule and
Individual taxpayers, who must or
of inventories on hand.
choose to be taxed on the basis of actual profits, calculate the
total amount of taxable income but not the tax itself.5
The
assessor will do the latter . Corporate taxpayers, however, not
only calculate the total amount of taxable income but also the
tax, forwarding with the return whatever tax may be due. 6
Declarations, upon receipt by the appropriate local office, 7
are classified on the basis of taxpayer files , arranged accord
ing to street addresses in the cities and by alphabetical order
in little communes . These files, one for each taxpayer, 8 con
tain all the information which has been built up over the years
concerning his affairs, this being derived in part from his an
nual declarations and in part from outside sources . 9
4 see 3 .2b infra .
5 Thus there is a significant spread between the time the taxpayer
files his return and the time he is notified of the amount owed. The
administration must verify statements on his return, as well as check
it for mathematical accuracy. Upon discovery of an error , the tax
payer will be notified , and further delay ensues , until he responds .
Thus , commencement of the collection process , preceded by comple
tion of the tax roll , does not begin until early autumn and the tax it
self will not be paid before the end of the year. Because of this de
lay , individual taxpayers , whose tax is on an income for the preceding
year exceeding 200 francs , must pay two installments during that year ,
each amounting to one-third of the preceding year ' s tax. When the
final assessment is made for that year , only the balance will remain
due.
6 In actuality , any corporation will have been making quarterly
payments throughout a given year , covering the taxes for that year ,
the several installments each amounting to one-fifth of the total taxes
paid in the preceding year. Adjustments in the event of decreased in
come may be made. However , should the tax owed prove to exceed
the payments , a penalty for late payment is imposed.
7 E ach is dated by the mail room (and an acknowledgment sent out)
to avoid disputes over the application of the penalty for late filing.
8 E ach local office , as pointed out in Chap. IX , is charged with a
particular geographic section. If the taxpayer moves to another geo
graphical area, the file is forwarded to the local office bearing re
sponsibility for that area.
9 The local office uses other official sources to make sure its files
include every taxpayer. For example , all inhabitants of each commune
pay an annual local tax, and this requires an annual listing of all resi
dents. In cities with populations in excess of 9 ,000 there is an annual
census , each landowner being required to declare the names of his
tenants. Identification of the landowners presents no problem because
there is a cadastral survey .
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Once received and classified, the declarations are divided,
those showing income in excess of 25,000 francs being placed
in a separate category. This group is processed first. File
sheets ( constituting the original of the assessment role) are
set up, with the taxpayers ' names appearing horizontally at
right angles to vertical columns showing dependents, type of
income, etc . 10 Once the declarations are checked for math
e matical accuracy and the entries on the assessment roll are
completed, the declarations themselves are placed in the tax
payers ' files, to be fully examined for verification at a later
date . The sheets are forwarded 11 to the office of the depart
mental Director which calculates the tax 12 and prepares the
notices to be s ent out to the collectors for each geographic
district. l3 The collector, the official personally responsible
10 The file of the taxpayer actually is made up of a permanent file
and annual sub-files.
The permanent file contains , inter alia, data
bearing on his income from land (i.e. , reports on the purchase and
sale of real property , location of his real property , cadastral identi
fication of real property and buildings thereon, if any) , from industrial
and commercial activity (including , if incorporated , articles of associ
ation and other relevant data) , from choses in action , from stocks and
bonds , and other reports showing the opening and closing of bank ac
counts (forwarded by the depository banks) , purchase of auto�obiles
(forwarded by the office handling registration of vehicles) , contract of
marriage , declaration of succession, and the declaration of capital in
1945 for the assessment of the national solidarity tax. The annual
files are prepared on a yearly basis and include only documents relat
ing to that year : the declaration of income with supplementary state
ments relating to income from land or to industrial and commercial
profits , and also statements supplied by others , i.e . , by payors re
garding wages , fees for professional services , pension payments , and
dividends .
1 1 Income i s broken down according to its source , i.e. , income from
real property , wages , stocks and bonds .
12 The local offices are not able to prepare and forward all the as
sessment roll sheets simultaneously .
Hence , the sheets concerning
those taxpayers declaring income in excess of 25 ,000 francs are for
warded in order of their preparation to the office of the departmental
Director by April 30. Later sets of sheets are dispatched to the de
partmental D irector' s office by May 20, June 20, and July 20.
13 Some effort is being made , on an experimental basis , to utilize
a central computing system to handle tax calculation and notification.
Under this proposed system , the local office would prepare a report
for each taxpayer which would serve as the basis for preparation of
perforated cards . However , the bulk of tax calculation is still car
ried on in the traditional manner .
Under the generally prevailing
method , when the assessment roll sheets arrive at the departmental
D irector' s office , the portion of the sheet showing the names and ad
dresses of the taxpayers is detached. The sheets , now devoid of any
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for the collection of taxes on the rolls sent to him, then ad
dresses the notices to the taxpayers, and thereby fixes the
future date when tax payments will be deemed overdue. 14
At some point subsequent to the transmittal of the assess
ment roll sheets to the office of the departmental Director, the
local office verifies or audits the taxpayers ' declarations, either
at the local tax office or at the taxpayer' s place of busines s .
In the course of this verification o r audit, the inspector
has full authority to make such adjustments as he feels desir
able, including the correction of errors of fact or law in the
government 's position. In addition, he may conclude, as to all
yes -or-all-no questions of law, that it would be preferable to
reach an accord with the taxpayer rather than pursue the mat
ter through the higher administrative levels or even the courts .
Accordingly, and to the end of attempting to reach an agree
ment, he may propose a settlement based on the relative merits
of the positions of the two parties . Should the taxpayer agree,
the settlement will be made and will bind both parties . Such
a settlement can include either the trading or the splitting of
issues . The inspector at this early stage-and at all subse 
quent stages-has the full power to reach a binding settlement.
In complex or important situations, he may discuss the matter
on an informal basis with his supervisor, but the authority and
the responsibility are his alone.
Where the examination is confined to the local office , docu
ments in the taxpayer's file furnish the prime, though not the only,
informative source against which the declaration is tested. These
will assist the inspector in verifying the dependents claimed, 15
(footnote continued)
identifying data, are sent out to individuals (not full-time employees
of the tax administration but retired individuals or housewives who
seek to supplement their incomes) who perform in their homes the
work of tax calculation, on a piece-work basis . These taxers , work
ing under the supervision of the tax administration , use tables which
permit a ready calculation of the amount of tax with reference to the
number of dependents , thus reducing the possibility of error . After
the taxers have completed their calculations , the sheets are returned
to the departmental Director' s office where the names of the taxpayers
are paired up with the sheets showing their income and their total
ta.x .
14 Once the assessment roll sheets are s igned by the departmental
Director, they become enforceable. These rolls also are sent out to
the collectors for each geographic district.
15 Since the local office has sent the first of these assessment roll
sheets to the office of the departmental Director by April 30, theo
retically a tax roll should be established by May 31, with the tax pay
able by June 3 0 . T o take account , however , of the fact that delays in
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the income listed, 16 and the deductions taken. 17 A quick check
also is made to determine if the total income tends to corre
spond to the general manner of life led by the taxpayer, 1 8 and
to his capital investments, transfers, and debts incurred or
repaid. 19 Data on documents relating to his local taxes is
scanned to see, for example, if the taxpayer is maintaining a
s econdary residence. 20
Should the inspector ascertain a discrepancy between the
income declared and the results of his general audit, he either
can request an explanation from the taxpayer or arrange for a
field audit which would be undertaken by personnel at varying
levels depending upon the nature and size of the business . The
local inspector himself would handle it if the individual has
(footnote continued)
tax calculation do occur , a tax penalty of 10% becomes operative for
communes with more than 3 ,000 inhabitants only after the fifteenth day
of the third month following issuance of the notices , that is , at the
earliest , after September 16-and for other communes the penalty is
imposed at the earliest after October 31.
16 The list of dependents claimed is compared with prior declara
tions. In the event of a discrepancy , the examining official may re
quest an explanation from the taxpayer or check the local census .
17 Where income from real estate appear s , the listing in the decla
ration for each piece of property will be compared with the filed docu
ments described in note 10 supra . With respect to wages and salaries ,
the amounts shown by the taxpayer will be compared with the amount
reported by his employer or employers , which report is due by Janu
ary 31 of the year following receipt. Should the taxpayer ' s declara
tion include income from industrial and/or commercial profits or prof
its from professional activity , the detailed explanations which accompany
the return itself will be examined but the profit reported also will be
compared with official tables setting out typical profit levels for the
several types of enterprise. Where income from stocks or bonds is
listed , the sums will be compared with lists turned over by the banks
which have acted as transfer agents in paying corporate dividends or
interest.
1 8 For example , where the taxpayer lists deductions for items such
as alimony , arrear ages of rent , interest on indebtednes s , the name and
address of each beneficiary is set out on the return. Should the bene
ficiary live in another district , a report on the deduction will be sent
to that district' s local office , and if there is a discrepancy this will
be r eported back.
19 Particularly in a small community , the inspector will have per
sonal knowledge of most taxpayers , and can determine readily if their
general level of living corresponds to the income declared.
20 Taking due account of declarations made in previous year s , and
of reports filed by third parties relating to purchases of real estate ,
stock subscriptions , payment of high premiums for life insurance , etc .
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only a small industrial or commercial enterprise . Medium
sized enterprises are audited, however, by inspectors who are
trained for this purpose, work under the authority of a princi
pal inspector, and have responsibility for a territory covering
several departments . Because of limited personnel resources,
s mall and medium-sized enterprises are only audited when the
declaration itself or reports derived from third parties sug
gest that income has been either inadequately documented or
incorrectly reported. In contrast, large enterprises are audited
on a more systematic basis . For this purpose, a director of
verification supervises units, competent for all France, which
specialize in the different major types of economic activity.
Should either the office or field audit indicate that the
declaration was incorrect, the inspector will notify the taxpayer
in writing of the proposed change and the underlying rationale .
The taxpayer has thirty days in which to accept the proposal
or express dissatisfaction, making a counter-proposal. Such
differences are resolved by an informal, simplified procedure
in the case of taxpayers whose turnover is below a certain
minimum 21 and whose good faith is not in question. 22 A more
rigid procedure is used, however, where the apparent discrep
ancy involves a larger enterprise which has been audited by a
specialized verification unit.
In either case -that is, whether the simplified or more
rigid procedure is employed-the inspector has full authority
to attempt to reach a settlement with the taxpayer. As was
the situation which existed during the original field or office
audit, this power in the inspector includes that of splitting or
trading issues of law on a basis responsive to the competing
strengths and weaknesses of the two parties .
The verification unit inspectors prepare reports reflecting
details revealed by the audit and the methods utilized to ascer
tain these details . To the proposed correction, which is ex
plained in full, the unit' s examiner adds his opinion regarding
21 Taxpayers who possess a residence are subject to a local tax,
contribution mobiliere . There is a strong incentive to avoid , if possi
ble , reporting a second residence as this is subj ect to the same tax.
However , should a taxpayer establish a second residence within a dis
trict other than the district where his domicile is located , the district
of his domicile will be notified of the secondary residence.
22 The use of the s implified procedure is limited to taxpayers whose
annual turnover is less than 600,000 francs where derived from a sales
enterprise and 150 ,000 francs where derived from performance of serv
ices.
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the good faith of the taxpayer and the penalties that might be
applicable . This report is reviewed by the head of the unit
who may return it to the examiner with a recommendation for
further investigation of insufficiently explored areas or that
certain claims be abandoned.
Once the report is accepted by the unit's head, 2 3 the tax
payer is sent a statement of the proposed changes . The tax
payer, who is entitled to be represented by two counselors of
his own choice (lawyer, chartered accountant, tax advisor) , has
a right to request a conference to discuss the proposed changes
with the head of the unit, 24 and that conference may result in
an accord. Again that accord may and usually does represent
a settlement between the two parties or it may lead to the
withdrawal of an issue by either party.
If agreement is reached, whether based on the tax admin
istration's proposals , the taxpayer' s proposals, or a compro
mise figure, the verification unit sends to the office of the
departmental Director the information necessary for the tax
roll to be completed.
Should no accord be reached, either the tax administration
or the taxpayer can request that the dispute be submitted to
the departmental Commission for its opinion-a procedure to
be discussed later. 25
3 . 2b Details of assessment and audit procedure re estimated
income

Assessments on three types of income, and also in the
case of one type of taxpayer, are based on estimates . These
estimates, as to income from small industrial or commercial
enterprises or from the liberal professions, are made individ
ually for each recipient. Income from agriculture, on the other
hand, is geared to averages based on collective data. How
ever, in any of these cases, the taxpayer may request that as
sessment be based upon the income actually received, and the
23 To use this simplified procedure , certain conditions must be ful
filled: (1) The taxpayer ' s books must have been verified , (2) this veri
fication must not have revealed any absence of good faith, (3) the tax
payer himself must have requested express ly the use of the s implified
procedure, and (4) the taxpayer must agree to pay within 15 days the
amount of whatever tax may be held due with the addition of interest ,
computed at the rate of 0.75% per month for the period of the delay.
2 4 This conference has no legal basis. However , it is used fre
quently to facilitate communication between the tax administration and
taxpayers.
25 See 3 .4a infra .
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tax administration will honor the request. In practice such a
request is made by those taxpayers who may have suffered a
substantial loss or who have had markedly lower incomes than
typical for taxpayers comparably situated. Otherwise, it tends
to be to the advantage of eligible taxpayers to utilize the esti
mated income procedure . Finally, taxpayers whose standard
of living suggests an income in excess of the amount declared
are subject, individually, to an assessment based upon the ex
terior signs of wealth. The table on page
shows that the
overwhelming percentage of those taxpayers who are free to
have their income assessed on the basis of an estimate chose
to have such an estimated assessment.
The estimated assessment procedure does not extend to
income derived frqm companies with capital stock or to partner
ships. It is limited to individually- owned commercial and in
dustrial enterprises whose annual turnover is 400,000 francs or
less if derived from selling goods or furnishing lodging, or is
1 00,000 francs or less if from rendition of services . 2 6
A qualifying taxpayer whose assessment will b e based on
an estimate, must submit before the close of the year a decla
ration setting forth certain information as to that year . The
required information relates not only to business matters-i.e. ,
amount of purchases, of sales, stock on hand, number of em
ployees and wages paid, rent paid-but also to his standard of
living including, for example, any purchases of automobiles .
The local inspector has access not only to the individual
taxpayer 's file ( of substantial importance in facilitating an ac 
curate appraisal of the taxpayer' s standard of living) , 27 but
also to certain data supplied by the Director General of Taxes :
monographs dealing with a variety of occupations 28 and indica
tions of general economic activity. In addition, a given decla
ration is compared with those of other taxpayers engaged in
similar activity. Using all available information, and taking
particular account of the taxpayer 's level of living, the inspector
26 Since J anuary 1, 19 66 , the figures have been increased to 500 ,000
and 125 ,000 respectively .
2 7 Where the inspector is dealing with a rural of semi-rural area,
his actual knowledge of the manner of life of its inhabitants will be ex
tremely helpful.
2 8 In addition, the offices of the departmental Directors , with the
cooperation of agents charged with inquiry into certain occupations ,
have prepared surveys which indicate for certain retail establishments
the norms of purchases from wholesale suppliers and the habitual prof
it margins of the retail establishments .
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will propose an estimated figure, representing the profits that
"enterprise can normally produce . "
The taxpayer has twenty days to consider this proposed
figure . If he accepts it, either directly or by not answering
the inspector 's letter, the estimate cannot be challenged by the
tax administration for the next two years, 29 unless it develops
that the taxpayer furnished incorrect information.
The taxpayer, however, is free to protest the assessment.
Should he protest, the dispute will be forwarded to the depart
mental Commission, which will fix the estimate. The figure
so fixed becomes binding upon the tax administration, but the
taxpayer is again free to protest, this time to the departmental
Director of Taxes.3 °
While it is recognized that taxpayers who elect to use the
estimate-based assessment are not bound to maintain full sets
of regular books, any taxpayer who protests either the inspec
tor 's or the C ommission's estimate should be prepared to
furnish sufficient data to permit an estimate of the normal in
come his enterprise produces . 31
The taxpayer using the estimated assessment procedure
thus can meet his tax obligation with a minimum of record
keeping. The tax administration also derives an advantage : It
need not devote the man-hours otherwise necessary to make
complete audits .
Indeed, estimate-based assessments have
proved to be higher than assessments based on statements of
actual income . In the latter case, the administration has ex
perienced real difficulty in proving profit concealment by petty
tradesmen or s mall individually-operated service enterprises .
Whereas estimated assessments are used with respect to
income derived from individually owned commercial and indus 
trial enterprises only if annual turnover is below a certain
level, 32 they are used in the case of individuals deriving income
from a liberal profession-i.e., doctors, lawyers, chartered
�9 In practice, once the estimate is fixed , it will be renewed by
tacit agreement for subsequent biennial periods as long as the turn
over remains below the upper limit for this type of assessment and
as long as neither the inspector nor the taxpayer gives notice of
termination.
30 See 3 .4a infra .
31 Thus , at the least , such taxpayers should maintain a register of
purchases supported by the invoices. Where the enterprise performs
service s , a book of original entries should be maintained , setting out
the day-by-day receipts.
32 It should be repeated that use of the estimate-based assessment
is optional.
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accountants, architects, etc . , without reference to a monetary
ceiling, though here there is an annual estimate .
While the procedures in the two cases are otherwise sim
ilar, 33 there is a significant difference in the degree to which
the estimates will approach true income . An inspector typical
ly has a substantial number of small tradesmen and petty serv
ice enterprises within his area of responsibility; just as typi
cally he has only a limited number of professional men. Thus
it is more difficult to prepare estimates by comparing, say, a
limited number of doctors. Moreover, decentralization of the
tax administration places many young and inexperienced inspec
tors in local offices, and they often find it difficult to discuss
an estimated assessment with an established professional man
who is a long-time resident of the community. Further, the
nature of professional activities vary and this leads to marked
inequities in assessment. Illustratively, a relatively accurate
estimate can be made in the case of an attorney who derives
the bulk of his income from fees paid by industrial or commer 
cial concerns, for the latter concerns will have reported the
payments . By contrast, where an attorney's practice is pri
marily with individuals who pay him in cash, it is very diffi
cult for the inspector to even approach an accurate figure. 34
This contrast exists also in the case of doctors, though in a
somewhat different form. Estimates will be fairly accurate in
the case of physicians paid primarily from social security funds,
whereas physicians in private practice, who receive their fees
in cash, can be quite confident their income will be under
estimated. This fact has caused many doctors to avoid the
social-security type of practice , with the result that social
security beneficiaries could not obtain adequate care. And in
consequence, pressure was put on the tax administration to in
sure a less accurate estimate of the income derived by these
physicians .
33 One difference is that in the case of the income from a liberal
profession, the estimate must be filed by F ebruary 1 , of each year .
A lso , it should be noted that if a dispute is forwarded to a departmen
tal Commission, the Commission' s membership will be geared to the
particular professional activity of the individual taxpayer.
34 It is probable that in the s ituation where a lawyer has a medium
sized practice, the inspector can make a reasonably accurate estimate,
aided by some appreciation of his general level of living. Where, how
ever , an outstanding lawyer is able to command high fees from private
persons , even an estimate based upon exterior signs of wealth is like
ly to lead to an underestimate of his actual income.
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The foregoing factors have led to marked differences in
the accuracy of estimates and, in turn, this has created dis 
satisfaction among professionals who compare their respective
estimates. Such inequities are tolerated both because of the
legislature 's unwillingness to require such professional people
to keep an accurate and full set of books 35 and because of the
tax administration 's utter inability to audit the accounts of
every professional man in France .
Unlike the other types of income subj ect to an estimated
assessment, agricultural income is estimated, 36 not on an in
dividual basis, but rather by reference to averages geared to
collective data, these averages then being applied to the units
a given taxpayer has under cultivation. 37
These averages are calculated by the departmental Com 
mission, on the basis of its knowledge of actual conditions
and in light of certain information made available by the Di
rector General of Taxes 38 and the office of the departmental
Director. 39 The averages , however, are based on a medium
sized farm, theoretically typical of the region. Consequently,
35 Notaries are required to keep a full set of books. Chartered
accountants , lawyer s , architects , doctors , etc . , are not.
36 While the use of the estimate-based assessment is optional for
those deriving income from agricultural operations , in exceptional
cases , the administration has the right to deny the use of the esti
mate and require the use of the actual income as the basis for as
sessment.
37 The units under cultivation may be calculated in terms of the
land itself or in the terms of the use made of the land. Thus , where
land is used for a specialized purpose-viticulture , orchards , apicul
ture, poultry-raising-assessment will be based on the amount of wine
or the number of fruit trees , beehives , or laying hens . Where the
land is used for more general agriculture , assessment will be based
on �he hectare, i.e. , 2 . 47 acres .
38 The Office of the D irector General of Taxes prepares a general
study of the agricultural situation at the national level based on the
different agricultural products . Taken into account are a number of
factors including yield , prices in comparison with preceding year s .
This study is transmitted to the offices o f the departmental direc
tors .
3 9 The office of each departmental Director uses a s a base the data
forwarded by the office of the Director General of Taxe s .
See note
3 8 supra . Information peculiar to the region or to the agricultural
portions of the department is assembled. This is forwarded to the
departmental Commission, together with some proposals of a medium
income which will serve to fix the assessable income of all the agri
cultural enterprises of the department.

ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES

263

the more productive agricultural operations are under
assessed. 40
Once the formulae for assessment-one for each type of
agricultural activity-have been computed by the departmental
Commission, 41 the list of agricultural enterprises, showing the
acreage of each and the specific type or types of agricultural
activity engaged in, is posted publicly for fifteen days . During
that time, a taxpayer who disagrees with the classification of
his property in terms of the activity carried on, can lodge a
protest with the departmental Commission, 42 not with the tax ad
ministration. 43
Finally, any taxpayer may be assessed on the basis of an
estimate where the exterior signs of his wealth indicate a
gross under-declaration. Before making such an assessment,
the inspector requests the taxpayer to supply on a form certain
facts relevant to his standard of living. The data relates , inte r
alia, to the rental value of his home or homes, the number of
40 Understandably , the owners of the more productive-because larg
er and efficiently managed- agricultural enterprises are staunch de
fenders of this system of collective assessment.
Moreover , these
same men tend to be the directors of the agricultural organizations
which enables them to wield considerable influence. In 1959 , the gov
ernment proposed a bill which would have changed the method of as
sessment for agricultural operations , abolishing the existing system
of the unitary profit per hectare and establishing an individual esti
mate for the largest farms , about 30 ,000 in number. The agricultural
organizations were successful in persuading the Parliament to reject
the government bill.
41 Where the agricultural land is utilized in some manner not pro
vided for by the typical categories , thus rendering unusable the uni
tary profit per hectare computation, the income from the land will be
assessed by reference to the cadastral income.
This determination
is made by the local inspector with the concurrence of the communal
commis sion for direct taxes .
This local group , in addition to its
responsibility relative to this type of assessment , also assists the
inspector in the assessment of local taxes (i.e. , occupany tax , assess
ment of improved or unimproved real estate) and expresses its opin
ion on the lists of those in the commune liable to pay income tax.
42 See 3 .4a infra .
43 Should a particular farmer have sustained loss of anticipated
harvest by reason of hail, ice , flood , etc. , he can petition the tax ad
ministration-accompanied by an attestation from the mayor-to be al
lowed to deduct the amount of his loss from the estimated profits
from his agricultural operations. This is the only s ituation in which
the owner of an agricultural operation enters into direct communica
tion with the tax administration.
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domestics employed, his cars, boats, etc . , to each of which

standard amounts of income are applied by the inspector. 44

These standard scales are then used, together with other
available information, to calculate the assessment. The tax
payer has twenty days in which to protest. A taxpayer might
counter, for example, with proof, that a portion of his apparent
income actually represented capital gains -not includible within
assessable income, or other tax-exempt income, such as inter
est on treasury bonds, pensions for war victims, etc .
In making estimated assessments on the basis of exterior
signs of wealth, the inspector himself is subject to certain
limitations . First, this method is not used when upon appli
cation of the standard scales the estimated income is 1 5,000
francs or less . Second, in practice, this method is used only
when there is substantial discrepancy between the taxpayer ' s
declared income and his general level of living. While not a
rule of law, this method is used only where an estimate based
on the level of living equals or exceeds 130 percent of declared
income . Third, the administration deems the method inappro
priate in cases where the taxpayer ' s income is composed in
major part of sums paid by others-i.e., wages and salaries ,
fees for professional services, etc. In these cases, the admin
istration focuses directly on the income itself. Also, the fact
that such a taxpayer 's income tax assessment is otherwise
based on an estimate will not warrant a reduction by reference
to a lower estimate geared to his external signs of wealth.
Section B.

Administrative Appeals

3 . 3 Introductory note

As indicated in the preceding section, there are two types
of income tax assessment in France : one utilizing a declara
tion of actual income by the taxpayer, the other an estimated
assessment. In either case, i.e., should the taxpayer disagree
with the result of a post-declaration audit by a tax agent or
with an inspector ' s estimate of his income, he may carry the
dispute first, to the departmental Commission, though this is
not indispensable to a further appeal.
The form of the Commission's response will vary, depend
ing on the type of income tax assessment. If the taxpayer had
44 The taxpayer cannot contest the figures set out in the scale
though it is proper for him to show that one of the elements is not
applicable to him, for example, that he has no domestic servants.
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filed a declaration of actual income, the Commission will render
an opinion on the particular issue in dispute, provided it in
volves only a question of fact. The Commission has no power
to rule on questions of law. If the taxpayer 's original assess
ment had been based on an estimate of income derived from a
sole proprietorship or from a liberal profession, the Commis 
sion will render a decision, fixing the total amount of estimated
income. Whether a decision or an opinion has been rendered,
however, a taxpayer is free to appeal further to the depart
mental Director.
For reasons later described, a taxpayer whose estimated
income was derived from agricultural activity may not contest
his ass essment before the Commission. In effect, the previous 
ly described averages employed in making those estimates may
be tested only by the tax administration or by an organization
of farmers, but before a forum distinct from the Commission.
Finally, where the administration believes that a contract
or other legal act conceals a legal deceit for which a heavy
fine might be imposed, it may first refer the case to a yet
different body, the Consultative Committee and if successful
there, later avoid bearing the burden of proof should actual liti
gation ensue.
3 . 4a De tails of administrative appeals to a departmental Com 
mission

The departmental Commission for each department is pre
sided over by the Counselor of the Administrative Tribunal, 45
that is, by a judge, not by an official of the tax administration.
In addition, there are three tax administration 46 and four tax
payer representatives, 47 all appointed for renewable terms of
45 This judge is nominated by the Minister of the Interior , not by
the tax authorities .
46 The secretaryship of the C ommiss ion i s held by an inspector of
taxes assigned to the office of the departmental Director.
47 The general pattern of these departmental commissions (four tax
payer representatives and four members of the tax administration) has
remained constant for some time, though recent modifications have re
duced the weight accorded the views of tax administration members .
Prior to 1954, the tax administration members were headed by
the departmental Director of Taxes who held the chairmanship. While
the views of a majority of the eight members theoretically determined
the C ommiss ion' s decisions , the Director or his delegate, in effect,
cast an extra vote · in case of a tie, a not infrequently occurring cir
cumstance. Thus , much to the diss atisfaction of taxpayer organiza
tions , the tax administration, in practice, always had the last word.
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one year. While the proceedings must be treated in confidence,
there are few qualification requirements for membership on
the commission. A member must be a French national, at
least twenty-five years of age, possess civil rights, and must
not have suffered a conviction for tax fraud. In general, a
taxpayer whose case is to be heard is entitled to have four
taxpayer representatives : in the case of professional men,
these are drawn from their own professions ; in the case of
those engaged in trade (including manufacturing and the service
occupations) representatives are appointed by the local business
groups; in the case of handicraft-artisans by their special or
ganizations .
Agricultural groups likewise appoint their own
representatives . To this end, each major occupational or pro
fessional group designates a number of such representatives
to serve, as need be, on the departmental Commission. 48
Some indication of the annual number of cases laid before
the departmental Commission can be gained from the following
figures pertaining to 1964.

Source of income
Industrial or commercial activity
Agricultural establishments
Liberal (non-commercial) professions
Total

Assessment based on
Estimated
Real
income
income
257
7
19

1 ,347
-0997

Total
number
of
cases
1 ,604
7
1 ,016
2 ,627

(footnote continued)
In 1954, these voting practices were altered. In the event of a
tie vot e , a deadlock ensued , requiring the matter to be referred to a
departmental committee of arbitration. This committee was made up
of five member s . The chairman was a C ounselor of the Administra
tive Tribunal (outside the tax administration) , and of the other four
members , two were members of the civil service and two represent
ed taxpayers.
Another modification in 1959 abolished the committee of arbitra
tion and instituted the present system.
4 8 The following four major occupational groups designate repre
sentatives to s it on departmental Commissions:
(1) Departmental chambers of commerce, for cases involving
industrial or commercial profit s ;
(2) Guild chambers of trade, for cases involving artisans;
(3) F ederations of the agricultural syndicates (half drawn from
rural proprietors and half from farm operators) , for cases
involving agricultural enterprises; and
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Where the taxpayer has filed a declaration of actual in
come, but disagrees with the inspector' s proposed increase ,
either side may request the Commission's opinion regarding
questions of fact. In such event, the inspector forwards to the
Commission the taxpayer ' s complete assessment file, together
with a report summarizing all relevant information, including
some indication of the amount the taxpayer previously was dis 
posed to accept and, as to each point in dispute, the respective
positions of the two parties . At least ten days before the hear
ing, the taxpayer is reminded that he may present his case
orally or by written statement. Also, he is advised of the con
tents of any documents in his in-service file on which the in
spector relies in sustaining his position and, as to documents
and data the inspector submits relating to the income of com
parable third parties, the taxpayer is informed of the names
of the persons or corporations involved, but not their actual
incomes . The intention is to enable the taxpayer to "assure
himself that the points of comparison submitted by the admin
istration completely take into account enterprises the activity
of which is comparable to his own."
Though the taxpayer does not bear the burden of proof in
the strict sense, he must provide the Commission with all
items -accounts, etc . -essential to its proper resolution of the
dispute. In presenting his case, he may be assisted by two
persons, a lawyer and an accountant, or qualified agents .
Even though the Commission is presided over by a judge,
the proceedings are very informal. If the taxpayer elects to
make an oral presentation, it is for him to decide whether he
will or will not present a written brief. After hearing both
sides, the Commission issues an opinion which is communicated
to the taxpayer. Neither he nor the inspector is bound, how
ever, to accept the Commission's findings. The taxpayer may
But
file a further appeal with the departmental Director .
should either the taxpayer or inspector pursue the matter into
the actual litigation stage, by appealing to the administrative
tribunal, the party which did not accept the Commission's find
ings will bear the burden of proof.
(footnote continued)
( 4) Three professional organizations representing , respectively ,
physicians , dentist-surgeons, and lawyers.
In the case of
other liberal professions , if there is no taxpayer representa
tive engaged in the profession of the taxpayer in question,
he can demand that one Commission member be replaced by
a representative of the professional organization to which he
belongs.
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If a taxpayer who filed a declaration of actual income is
accused by the administration of having entered into a contract
or other transaction to conceal a legal deceit for which a heavy
fine may be imposed, 49 the administration has the alternative
of referring the case in the first instance to a yet different
body, the Consultative Committee, headed by a judge of the
highest administrative court, the Conseil d 'E tat, assisted by
three additional members: the Director General of Taxes and
two members designated by the Minister of Finance, one a
judge of the highest civil court, Cour de Cassation, the other
a professor of law, usually the Dean of the Faculty of Law of
Paris . If the administration exercises this option and prevails
before the Consultative Committee, its recourse to the C ommit
tee will have served the purpose of shifting the burden of proof
to the taxpayer if he later appeals to the judiciary. 50 But the
administration is not bound by the Committee's findings ; it too
can appeal to the judiciary. But in such case, it bears the
burden of proof to the extent its assessment exceeds that fixed
by the Committee.
Consider now those taxpayers whose assessment was based
originally on an estimate to which they have taken an exception.
As to them, the regular departmental Commission's procedures
will vary, depending on the source of the estimated income.
One set of procedures, applicable to income from s mall
s ole proprietorships and from the liberal professions, is simi
lar to that described above . Here, however, the Commission
will render a decision fixing the total estimated income. Also,
typically the sole proprietor will attempt to show the amount
his business normally can produce, whereas a taxpayer associ
ated with a liberal profession will focus on the income actually
received for the year in question. Finally, the taxpayer can
appeal further to the departmental Director, but an inspector
who takes exception to the Commission's findings must then
enter the litigation stage, by taking the case to the adminis
trative tribunal.
Where the original estimated assessment related to agri
cultural income, the Commission's role is quite different from
that described above . This is the same Commission which
earlier established the collective estimates which fixed the

4 9 Should a legal deceit be disclosed at any time, it will give rise

to a fine equal to double the tax actually due.
50 Absent resort to this body , the administration would continue to
carry the burden of proof.

ADMINISTRATIVE A PPEA LS

269

average profit for each particular type of agricultural activity.
And that average was applied automatically by the inspector to
each taxpayer engaged in agricultural activity, with deviations
responsive only to the number of units a taxpayer had under
cultivation. If the Commission's determination of the average
was unsatisfactory to a particular taxpayer or to an inspector,
neither can appeal directly. If appeal is taken, it must be by
the departmental Director of Taxes or by the President of the
Departmental Federation-an organization of farmers. The ap
peal goes to the Central Commission, a body with nationwide
jurisdiction.
The C entral Commission has three justices 51 and four con
sultants (two senior civil servants from the office of the Direc
tor-General of Taxes, one senior civil servant from the Ministry
of Agriculture, and two representatives designated by the Na
tional Federation-the previously mentioned organization of
farmers) . However, the justices alone hand down a binding de
cision determining the averages to be e mployed . Their deci
sion can be appealed only to the Council of State and on only
one very limited ground, that the action taken was ultra vires.
3 . 4b Administrative appeals to the departmental Director: Re 
cours contentieux

Whether or not a taxpayer has appealed his case to a de
partmental C ommission, he may not carry the dispute (tax
penalty) to the judiciary (administrative tribunal) until he has
laid it before the departmental Director unless the tax was as 
sessed by a specialized office , in which case it is laid before
the director of that office . Not until the taxpayer 's claim has
been rejected in whole or in part-or not acted upon within the
six -months ' time limit-may he turn to the judiciary.
Like the inspector, the departmental Director has full
authority to reach a settlement on issues of law as well as ,
of course, the authority to correct errors of either fact or law
in the government's position. This settlement may take place
as a consequence of an oral conference with the departmental
Director granted at the taxpayer 's request, which permits a
further exploration of all outstanding issues .
Such claims must be presented within a fixed time limit,
which begins when the tax roll is placed in collection and ends
51 Of the three justices , one is drawn from each of the following

categories: a C ounselor of state who is the chairman, a Counselor of
the Court of C assation, a Master Counselor of the state Audit Court, Cour
des Comptes .
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on December 3 1 of the calendar year following such date . Cer
tain other formal requirements are also imposed. 52 The con
tested tax must be identified; the assessment notice or copy
thereof must be attached; the grounds upon which the taxpayer
relies must be fully explained; and the claim must be signed
by the taxpayer or by his duly authorized attorney or agent. 53
Where the taxpayer 's claim raises a question of law, the
petition should cite the relevant legal provisions and set forth
the interpretation on which the taxpayer rests his claim. In
support of that interpretation, the petition may cite not only
judicial decisions but also ministerial statements or even ad
ministrative instructions .
Where the claim relates to a question of fact, the petition
should set forth all supporting circumstances and offer to pro 
vide proof of the facts alleged. All types of evidence , other
than witnesses , can be used.
The petition may include also a request that actual pay
ment of the contested tax be postponed, but unless future pay
ment is sufficiently guaranteed, the request can be refused.
This refusal can be contested, however, by means of the refire
fiscal-an emergency procedure lodging summary jurisdiction
over urgent tax matters in a single judge of the administrative
tribunal, as designated by its president.
Claims received by the departmental Director, if free of
defects in form, are sent back to the inspector who fixed the
initial assessment. The inspector, after assuring himself that
the formal requirements have been met, then examines the
petition to determine if it correctly states the law and the facts .
This includes a check of the statutes and regulations , and where
time permits, the case law . At his discretion, he may contact
the taxpayer for additional information, and the taxpayer him
self may request the opportunity to explain his position.
The inspector then makes whatever adjustments he deems
warranted, and send his conclusions, together with the taxpayer ' s
file, back to the departmental Director .
The Director now examines the petition, file, and the in
spector 's report and may accord a hearing to the taxpayer. If
52 Where a defect is considered correctable (e.g. , failure to attach
the r equired notice of assessment or set out the taxpayer' s conclu
s ions and supporting arguments) , the taxpayer will be notified and given
20 days in which to make necessary corrections . If not corrected
within the time limit , the petition will be rejected.
53 For a corporation, any salaried employee who has received a
commission from the hoard can s ign such a claim .
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he finds the inspector 's conclusions inadequately supported or
believes an inadequate examination was made, he will return
the file and require additional verification. He may not, how
ever, require the inspector to alter his conclusions.
The departmental Director is expected to act within six
months, but if additional time is necessary, the taxpayer will
be so informed prior to the expiration of that period, and will
be advised also regarding the probable additional time re
quired. This cannot exceed three months .
Where a claim is rejected in whole or in part, the Direc 
tor explains the reason for his conclusion, though his decision
on the matter is not final. The dispute may be carried to the
judiciary (administrative tribunal), the Director ' s action having
been an indispensable prerequisite . About 36 5,000 such claims
reach this office annually, though many involve very simple
questions, such as dependency deductions for children.
3 . 4c Administrative appeals to the departmental Director: Re 
cours gracieux

In addition to claims for tax reduction on legal grounds,
taxpayers may petition the tax administration either to reduce
tax penalties or to forgive or lower properly determined assess
ments which the petitioner cannot pay because of poverty or
financial embarrass ment.
The administration itself has complete jurisdiction over
these recours gracieux petitions; the administrative proceed
ings are not a preliminary in any sense to a judicial stage .
No time limit is imposed and the signature of the petitioning
taxpayer is the prime formal requirement.
The taxpayer submits his petition to the office of the de
partmental Director who forwards it to the inspector who origi
nally made the assessment. The inspector contacts the collec
tion office to determine the likelihood of collecting the tax due,
and then attempts to make a general estimate of the total situ
ation, including an appraisal of the taxpayer ' s sincerity and
honesty.
In the case of individuals, he will focus primarily on the
taxpayer 's actual resources and present financial condition. 54
In the case of business enterprises, he also will be concerned
54 I. e , on the actual acuteness of the taxpayer ' s alleged financial
stringency or poverty , taking due account of his age , profession, fam
ily s ituation, burdens , amount of income , exterior s igns of wealth,
etc.
.
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with its competitive status, the liquidity of its resources, and
the attitude of its other creditors .55 After all relevant infor
mation has been collected, the inspector will draft his report
and submit his conclusions .
Decisional jurisdiction for re cours gracieux petitions de
pends upon the amount of tax involved . Where 50,000 francs
or less, it rests with the departmental Director of Taxes . Where
more than 50,000 francs but less than 1 50,000 francs, jurisdic 
tion lies with the Director General of Taxes subject to concur
rence by the Council of Administration-a body made up of the
heads of the several offices. In all other cases, decision rests
with the Minister of Finance who normally follows the opinion
of his Committee of Remission and Settlements .
Where jurisdiction rests in the first instance with the de 
partment Director, appeal can be made to the Director General.
Should new facts develop, even after the Director General or
the Minister of Finance has handed down a decision, a petition
can be laid before the same authorities to obtain a better in
formed decision. However, no reason need be cited for any
decision nor can a decision be challenged in the courts .
Approximately 120,000 recours gracieux petitions are filed
annually with the departmental Directors . Only a relatively
small percentage-in 1961, only 199 cases -is appealed from
the departmental Director to the Director General.
Section c. Administrative Proces sing of
Refund Claims

The French tax system does not have a special procedure
for reimbursement of excessive tax payments . Where such
payments have been made, the claim and reimbursement are
handled in connection with the assessment procedures previous 
ly described. If the claim is justified, reimbursement is made
without any additional formalities . Further, any administrative
appeal regarding such a claim actually involves an appeal to
contest the assessment itself. Such must be undertaken in a
timely manner in accordance with previously described proce 
dures .
55 Should the petition be for a reduction in a tax penalty , the inspec
tor also takes account of the reason for the penalty: whether for late
filing or late payment , failure to make a declaration, etc.

CHAPTER XII
RESOLUTION OF TAX QUESTIONS BY
INDEPENDENT TRIBUNALS
4 . 1 Introduction

Litigation in France is conducted in two distinct types of
forums, the judicial and the administrative. The judicial forums
have jurisdiction over disputes between private persons; the
administrative over disputes between the government and pri
vate persons .
The original jurisdiction of the administrative tribunals 
from which appeal lies to the Council of State -covers three
types of actions, of which one is the contentieux fiscale , where 
in a claimant asks that his tax obligation be determined. ! In
addition to jurisdiction over actions of this type, the depart
mental Director may appeal to the administrative tribunal any
taxpayer claim as to which he believes the tribunal should hand
down a decision.
Procedures followed by the administrative tribunals are
somewhat less formal than those followed by the regular judi
ciary. For example, the use of an attorney is optional.
A request, that the taxpayer be permitted to postpone pay
ment of the tax until the administrative tribunal hands down
its decision, cannot be made for the first time in a petition
submitted to it. Such suspension, however, is automatic if the
taxpayer, on invocation of an earlier administrative appeal to
the departmental Director, secured his permission to postpone
payment pending that appeal, the conditions imposed being the
same in both cases. But this suspension will not carry over
automatically during a yet further appeal to the Council of
State . However, if such a taxpayer can show that payment
prior to the Council's determination would result in serious
1 A claimant also may bring a recours pour exces de pouvoir, and
thereby challenge the legality of the administrative act-i.e . , ministeri
al decree , decree of a prefecture or of a mayor , etc . -by alleging this
act has violated a general and widespread rule of law . In effect, the
tribunal is requested to nullify the administrative act .
To protect
citizens against arbitrary administrative actions , few formalities are
involved in bringing a recours pour exces de pouvoir .
A lawyer is
not necessary .
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detriment, the Council has discretion, on special petition, to
grant a yet further delay.
Section A. Organization and Procedure s :
Trial Leve l
4 . 2 Organization of the tribunals
There are 24 administrative tribunals for the 90 depart

ments in metropolitan France . Thus their jurisdiction neces 
sarily extends beyond departmental boundaries, with the ex
ception of the Paris tribunal, which exercises jurisdiction only
over the department of the Seine .
An appeal to the Council of State is not limited to questions
of law. Questions of fact may be raised as well. Since the
Council of State functions as an appellate tribunal, it can con
sider only those questions which previously were presented to an
administrative tribunal. While the taxpayer is free to present
new grounds of fact and of law, he cannot enlarge on the conclu
sions set out in his original claim addressed to the Director.
Illustratively, a taxpayer who based his petition for the discharge
of a tax on the ground that the sums taxed constituted capital
assets may not allege upon appeal a procedural irregularity in
the assessment itself; such a conclusion would constitute a new
demand.
The typical administrative tribunal has a president and
four members, of which one is vice-president and another is
the Commissaire du Gouve rnement. 2 The Paris and Strasbourg
tribunals, however, because of their work load, are larger, and
are divided into sections -Paris has four-with a president for
each section.
To hold court, a tribunal must have at least three mem 
bers present, but it can request that a deputy serve when a
quorum is absent. 3
The presidents of the tribunals are drawn from the tri2 The third type of action, a recours de pleine jurisdiction rests
on assertion of an individual claim arising out of some action or non
action on the part of the government . Illustratively , the claimant may
allege a right derived from a government contract , with the govern
ment contesting the amount claimed , the method of payment , or even
the very existence of the contract .
2 The commissaire is appointed from among the conseillers for a
one-year term, with the prospect of reappointment.
3 The deputies can be drawn from the members of a neighboring
administrative tribunal or from advocates or solicitors . If the latter
category is drawn upon , the oldest advocate available must be utilized.
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bunal members, the conseillers or justices, 4 whose qualifica
tions are governed by statute to insure their c ompetence and
independence . Theoretically, all are supposed to have graduated
from the National School of Administration. These graduates
are not necessarily lawyers since they are not required to
have their degrees in law. Their careers will have begun with
a training period in that section of the Council of State which
deals with judicial business . 5 Other officials will be appointed
also, but these men must have graduated in law before appoint
ment. They will have been appointed to the tribunals directly
from either the Ministry of Interior or the Ministry of Justice,
never from the tax administration. 6
4.3 Processing cases through the trial tribunals

As explained earlier, 7 a taxpayer cannot invoke the juris 
diction of an administrative tribunal until his claim has been
laid before the departmental Director of Taxes and the Direc
tor either has rejected it or allowed six months to elapse from
the time the claim was filed without communicating with the
taxpayer. Upon receiving such a rejection, the taxpayer has
two months, 8 in which to file a petition with the clerk of the
appropriate administrative tribunal.
Typically, the taxpayer lays his case before the adminis 
trative tribunal because he has been unable to work out a
settlement or compromise earlier. He is aware that settle
ment, as such, henceforward is most unusual.
4 Ranked in a descending order , the hierarchy of the judges of
these administrative tribunals is as follow s : president of the adminis
trative tribunal of Paris , president of a provincial administrative tri
bunal or conseiller of the administrative tribunal of Paris , conseiller
of a provincial administrative tribunal .
5 Thus they receive the same training as the auditeurs of the Coun
cil of State. See 4.4 infra. Both informal and formal contacts exist
The
between the administrative tribunals and the Council of State .
tribunal members commenced their training with the C ouncil of State.
Also , tribunal members sometimes are appointed to the Council of
State ,. and some members of the Council of State have been appointed
to the Paris administrative tribunal. Finally , the Council of State in
spects the tribunals through a three-member commission , not to check
on case-by-case decisions of the tribunals but rather to appraise and
bring some uniformity to their general operations .
6 This practice assures their independence as well as the inde
pendence of the tax administration.
7 See Chap. XI , 3 .4b supra .
8 Upon receipt a petition is registered and marked with the date
of arrival , to help police this limitation.
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Formal requirements pertaining to the petition itself are
similar to those which applied earlier when the claim was sub
mitted to the Director. A petition, however, must be on stamped
paper 9 and be accompanied by a copy of the Director 's deci
sion and a transcript on unstamped paper. As was true of the
earlier claim, the petition should contain a summary of the
facts, a statement of the arguments, the legal bases thereof,
and the conclusions which s et out the relief requested. The
taxpayer cannot claim a reduction greater than that previously
claimed but he is not precluded from asserting a different line
of reasoning. Should he desire to use expert witnesses or
present oral arguments, he may request such either in the pe
tition or at a later date . But a request to the tribunal, seeking
permission to postpone payment of the heretofore assessed tax,
would be misdirected. This request must have been made
earlier to the Director and, if granted, no additional request
is necessary and the taxpayer may continue to postpone pay:
ment.
The administrative tribunal's clerk sends by registered
mail to the Director a copy of the petition and any amplifying
memoranda. After a cursory examination for form, the Direc 
tor sends the petition to the inspector who made the original
assessment and who examined the same taxpayer 's earlier
claim addressed to the Director . 10
The inspector examines the petition for form, and tries
to determine if any matter relevant to substance (factual or
legal) was overlooked earlier. To this end, he re-examines
the law (statutes, cases, and instructions) and may request fur
ther information from the taxpayer or even re-examine his
books .
His investigation completed, the inspector prepares a re
port, analyzing the petition and the problem. After noting any
defect of form in the claimant 's petition, the report s ets out
the relief requested, the facts as found by the inspector, his
analysis of each legal argument advanced by the taxpayer, and
closes with a brief statement of his conclusion, indicating, if
necessary, the amount of tax due or the reduction or reimburse
ment believed justified.
This report is due in the departmental Director's office
9 For each sheet of paper 21 x 27 e m , there i s a charge of two
and a half francs .
lO where the disagreement arises from an assessment established
by an agent who specializes in the examination of accounts , it is this
agent who will examine the petition.

TRIA L TRIBUNALS

277

within three months from the date the inspector receives the
In light of the report, the Director carefully re
petition.
examines the case and this may result in a request for sup
plementary information from the inspector. While this same
claim was rejected earlier by the Director, the re-examination
sometimes causes him to revise his decision and to declare
justified the claim for reduction. Should this occur, the tax
payer is notified and a summary memorandum prepared, in
forming the administrative tribunal that the case no longer
requires consideration.
More typically, however, the Director prepares a memo
randum of law, submitting four copies to the administrative
tribunal-in theory, within six months from his receipt of the
petition, though an extension may be granted by the president
of the tribunal. 11 While this memorandum carefully considers
the statute and case law, it does not cite instructions though
their rationale may be used to justify his interpretation of the
statutes and decisions .
Prior to the time the director prepares the memorandum,
the taxpayer on occasion will request (a request which will be
granted) an opportunity to confer with the departmental Direc
tor. Occasionally, the departmental Director at his discretion
will ask the taxpayer to come into his office for an oral dis 
cussion of the matter. Typically, there is no settlement of
issues at this point as any such adjustment will have taken
place before invoking the court' s jurisdiction. The one excep
tion to the general rule that these pretrial negotiations only
provide opportunities for the c orrection of errors -in addition,
of course, to the clarification of issues -lies in the situation
where a case was docketed to prevent the running of the statute
of limitations . In such circumstances, discussions can lead to
the settlement of issues .
In four circumstances, however, before submitting such a
memorandum, indeed, before arriving at his own conclusion,
the departmental Director will consult the office of the Direc
This occurs, in the interest of uniformity,
tor General. 12
11 The president of the tribunal first extends the time limit by an

other three months . Should this added three months be insufficient ,
the Director can request another extension , setting out the reasons
therefor .
1 2 The taxpayer is not informed formally of such consultation by
the departmental Director with the Director General .
The depart
mental Director has no specific obligation to acquaint him with this
fact.
Unofficially , however , the taxpayer may be told but this is a
matter entirely within the discretion of the departmental D irector .
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where he believes the petition rested on a sound legal principle
although such principle was not stated specifically in either
case law or administrative instructions; where he is uncertain
as to thB interpretation of an international convention or of the
constitution and bylaws of an international organization; and
where the petition cites decisions which are contrary to ad
ministrative regulations but as yet are unpublished in either
the compilations or the administration's official bulletin. Con
sultation also occurs for an obvious reason whenever he ex
pects the decision would be against a pending petition presented
in the name of the state by another administrative branch or by
a division subject to the Minister of Finance 's authority.
The administrative tribunal, upon receiving the Director ' s
memorandum, forwards a copy t o the taxpayer o r his author 
ized agents, setting a time limit for reply. The taxpayer may
file one or more memoranda in response to the Director's and
the Director, in turn, may respond with yet another memoran
dum. Or, in the interim, the Director may have consulted
with the inspector who made the original assessment and then
modified his original conclusions . Otherwise, however, these
memoranda are exchanged until one of the parties either does
not reply at all to the memorandum of the other or does not
reply within the time limit specified by the president of the
tribunal. At that point the case is considered ripe for judg
ment although, in practice, memoranda can be deposited with
the clerk of the administrative tribunal until the date set for
hearing. The aim of this repeated exchange of memoranda is
to enable the parties to refine the issues and their respective
arguments . However, if these preliminary exchanges are con
tinued unnecessarily, the president of the tribunal can terminate
this stage of the proceeding by deliberately refusing to forward
memoranda which merely reiterate the grounds or arguments
presented earlier.
While memoranda deposited with the administrative tribunal
otherwise are always forwarded to the opposing party, support
ing documents submitted by the administration remain on file
in the clerk's office, but are available to the taxpayer or his
authorized agent. That file, for example, may include com
parative data on third-party income or profits, and the tax
payer can check this material to determine whether the other
situations or enterprises are truly comparable . 13
1 3 To preserve secrecy regarding the affairs of others , third-party

information accumulated by the administration should deal only with
the averages , whether of business turnover or of income.
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In spite of this free exchange of memoranda and the op
portunity for oral argument, the tribunal may find that additional
facts are needed, and request supplementary information. But
if the taxpayer, in response to this or on his own initiative,
asserts at the hearing what in effect is a new ground, the tri
bunal must require him to develop this in a written memoranda,
which then is forwarded to the tax administration to enable it
to respond in writing. Also, if the tribunal believes, for veri
fication purposes, that an inspection of the taxpayer 's site is
necessary, all, several, or only one of its members, may be
directed to make the inspection. But in any case, an official
written report of the inspection will be prepared and made
available to the parties for their comments .
The tribunal may also call upon expert witnesses on its
own initiative or by request of either party, 14 to determine
doubtful or contested facts relevant to a final resolution of the
case. 15 Illustratively, such experts may be requested to de
termine the value of a corporation's inventory at a given date . 16
Although the normal number of experts utilized is three,
if the parties agree, one will fulfill all requirements . Where
three are used, one is appointed by the tribunal and one by
each party, though their cost will be borne by the losing party.
While each must be placed under oath, there are no specific
qualification requirements, except that appointments cannot be
made from either of two groups : officials subordinate to the
defending departmental Director of Taxes and authorized agents
of the taxpayer . However, the departmental Director may ap
point an inspector to accompany or observe the work of the
experts where necessary. The taxpayer can do likewise, using
either an authorized agent or an attorney. In either event, the
experts will submit a full written report, individually or joint
ly. The official report, however, is drafted by the expert ap
pointed by the tribunal; it describes the way in which they ap
proached the problem, contents of documents examined by them,
and their findings of fact.
14 The request may be made at any time during the proceedings .
While the tribunal can refuse the request , the refusal should be ac
companied by a full explanation.
15 Questions of law or theory do not fall within the competence of
such experts .
16 The tribunal has no power to order an inquiry or an interroga
tion or consultation of persons . It cannot hear witnesses. But it can,
for example , have experts determine the authenticity of documents if
such is put in question.
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When the case is considered ripe for a hearing, that con
seille r of the tribunal who has been appointed rapporteur for

this case studies the complete file and prepares a report, set
ting out a resume of the facts' and the legal arguments and
conclusions reached by each party. The conseiller-rapporteur
reads his report at the hearing, to point up the issues of fact
or law to be resolved by the tribunal which consists of at least
two other conseillers including the president. 17
The public is barred from hearings relating to taxes on
income . 1 8 The administration is represented not by an attor 
ney, but b y an inspector who is appointed by the departmental
Director from among those residing in the city where the tri
bunal is sitting. 19 While the taxpayer 's agent may also attend
and may present written memoranda during the hearing, he can
participate in oral argument only if he is an attorney.
At the final hearing of the case, the commissaire of the
government presents the factual and legal conclusions he has
reached independently and, presumably, impartially. To these,
the parties cannot reply; the tribunal takes them under advise 
ment and usually will hand down its decision within the fort
night following. Its written decision should state the reasons,
legal arguments , and supporting authorities for the conclusion
reached as to each issue, to facilitate review in the event of
an appeal.
The decision may, of course, reduce the amount of the
assessment as originally established. But the tribunal may
also increase the tax, as compensation for delay in payment,
should it find that an earlier petition for postponement was en
tirely unwarranted.
Approximately 1 3 , 400 judgments a year are handed down
by these tribunals . In 1960, 4, 578 dealt with direct taxes - i . e . ,
taxes o n income and taxes levied for the state o r the units of
17 The tribunal should be made up of an unequal number of con
seillers at every hearing.
18 Indeed, if deemed desirable , the tribunal may request that it re
ceive for private inspection in the court chambers , a full presentation
of all evidence or documents concerning the income of other persons
or enterprises to which the taxpayer' s alleged income is being com
pared .
19 While the administration' s representative can be heard and should
answer questions posed by the tribunal, if the taxpayer ' s representa
tive alleges new facts or new legal arguments , or deposits a written
memorandum , the administration' s agent is expected not to answer .
Instead , he should request a continuance until he has had an opportun
ity to respond in writing.
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local government. Decisions in 3 , 580 or 7 8 . 2 percent upheld
the decision of the tax administration and 998 or 2 1 . 8 percent
were in favor of the taxpayer.
Unless such a judgment contains a new interpretation of
the statute or administrative regulations, it will not be pub
lished. In part, this is because it would lack precedent value
and in part because each such judgment is appealable and many
feel that case law, as such, should be evolved only by the Coun
cil of State, not by an administrative tribunal.
Section B. Organization and Procedure s :
Appe llate Tribunals
4 . 4 Organization of the appellate system

Decisions of administrative tribunals may be appealed by
either the taxpayer or the Minister of Finance , to the Council
of State, 20 a body which fulfills a dual role . It furnishes the
government its opinion on a variety of matters: drafts of pro
posed statutes , administrative regulations,2 1 points of law. 22
It also is the supreme appellate tribunal for the administrative
tribunals, and is the only body with jurisdiction over actions
which challenge the legality of administrative acts and seek to
set them aside-les recours pour exce s de pouvoir. 23
The Council of State is made up of the vice -president and
the presidents of the five sections, 53 conse illers en service
o rdinaire, 69 maitres de s requetes , and 44 auditeurs. 24
The auditeurs are graduates of the National School of Ad
ministration who have chosen this branch of government serv
ice. 25 From their ranks are drawn the mattres des re quetes ;
and from the latter are drawn the conseille rs. The one excep
tion to this is that the government may appoint up to a third
20 Created by Napoleon I, the role of the Council of State has
evolved in response to the current political climate.
21 The Council of State must be asked for its opinion with respect
to regulations of the public administration; for all other types of regu
lations it may be asked for its opinion.
22 When the government requests the opinion of the Council of State
upon a point of law , it is comparable to consulting a lawyer for a
legal opinion.
23 Les recours pour exces de pouvoir may be utilized with respect
to decrees or revenues stemming from administrative · acts which have
an area of application extending beyond the jurisdiction of a single ad
ministrative tribunal. See note 1 supra .
24 This diversity in seniority causes a wide age range among the
members of the Council of State , typically 26 to 7 0 .
25 The graduates of the National School of Administration who se
lect the Council of State usually ranked at the top of their clas s .
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of the conseillers and up to a quarter of the mattres des re 
que tes from outside the civil service hierarchy.
The auditeurs and the mattres des requetes prepare ma

terial for discussion. From these two groups are chosen the
government commissaires who present to the Council of State
their own independent and impartial view as to the legal con
clusions which should be reached in contested cases .
The
questions will be heard and decided by the conseillers .
The administrative or consultative function of the C ouncil
of State has been more or less completely separated from its
judiciaJ function. Four of its five sections are charged with
administrative matters; 26 the fifth handles the judicial function.
The latter, the section du contentieux, is divided into eleven
subsections, three of which specialize in tax litigation. Beyond
this, the eleven presidents of these subsections (each of whom
is a Conse ille r d 'Etat) 27 together with four conseillers from
the consultative sections , 2 8 make up the plenary assembly of
the section du contentieux, which is presided over by the vice
president of the Council of State . The plenary assembly con
siders only matters posing new important questions which may
lead the Council of State to alter its position or take a new
position as to some legal principle.
A Conseiller d 'E tat presides over each subsection of the
section du contentieux. He is assisted by two associate Con
se illers d 'E tat, and about ten ma ttres des reque tes and audi
teurs who function as rapporteurs. Chosen from the maitres
de s reque tes is the previously mentioned commissaire who
presents his own conclusions -presumably impartial-as to the
facts, legal principles, and the decision he deems appropriate
in each case. 29 His report is of substantial importance to the
judicial process and the most significant are published in the
specialized legal periodicals .
2 6 The administrative sections-Finances , Public Works, Interior,
Social-provide opinions in their respective areas of competence . In
fulfilling its administrative functions , the Council of State will delib
erate , sometimes in a s ingle section, sometimes in two or more sec
tions united for this purpos e , and sometimes in a general assembly.
In the latter s ituation, some conseillers from the judicial section will
be present.
27 A Conseiller d'Etat is so designated by a decree of the first
Minister upon recommendation of the Ministry of Justice after his name
has been presented by the vice-president of the C ouncil of State.
28 These are elected by their colleagues .
29 The commissaire i s designated in the same manner a s a Con
seiller d 'E tat . See note 26 supra .
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The fact that the section du contentieux has three subsec
tions which deal with tax matters facilitates reasonably prompt
decisions. But it does not facilitate uniformity of decisions .
Nor is this difficulty completely mitigated by the close relation
existing between the president of the section du contentieux and
the members of the three subsections . However, three other
devices , none entirely successful, tend at least to cushion the
magnitude of the problem. The commissaire rotates among the
subsections, and questions of prime importance or questions
upon which the subsections disagree can be-but not too fre 
quently are-examined by more than one subsection. 30 Also,
on very rare occasions, where an issue of legality is involved,
the matter may be put to the entire section du contentieux.
Finally, any interpretative conflict over the meaning of a stat
ute or regulatory text, arising between a tax subsection and
the earlier expressed opinion of the Council of State, must be
laid before the plenary assembly. 3 1
4. 5 Processing a case through the appe llate tribunal

Taxpayer and tax administration alike have two months, 32
from the date notice is received of the administrative tribunal' s
decision, within which t o lodge an appeal t o the Council of
State .
Any decision by the tax administration to appeal must pass
through a fairly complicated process . First, the departmental
Director prepares a report on the administrative tribunal's de
cision, explaining-in the case of adverse decisions-why he
believes the decision for the taxpayer was incorrect (i.e . ,
whether it arose from an erroneous interpretation of applica
ble statutes or from an incorrect appraisal of the facts) . Or,
if he believes the adverse decision would be sustained on ap
peal, perhaps because of an intervening judicial decision, this
is set forth.
This report, together with the complete file, is forwarded
to the office of the Director General where it is carefully ex
amined by senior civil servants, assisted by inspectors who
30 This will occur on a very few occasions in the course of a s ingle
year .
3 1 The Council of State will have given its opinion as to the inter
pretation of the statute or regulatory text at an earlier point in time
when its opinion was requested .
32 For the Minister of F inance the two-month time limit runs from
the day the file is received at the office of the Director General of
Taxes or from the day on which he is notified by the bailiff ' s writ of
the administrative tribunal' s j udgment.
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come in from the field, to determine if an appeal should be
lodged. 33 These officials may decide not to appeal. If they
favor an appeal, the report from the departmental Director
may serve as the petition,34 or another will be prepared if a
different line of argument or method of presentation seems
appropriate. The petition is signed by the Director General of
Taxes or a senior civil servant to whom this power has been
delegated.
Petitions filed by taxpayers must comply with certain for 
mal requirements which essentially are the same as those
imposed by the administrative tribunals . Most are prepared
by experienced lawyers,35 though the taxpayer may prepare
his own. In fact, an attorney need not be used at all unless
the taxpayer wishes to make an oral argument or comments
during the hearing. 36 In practice, twenty-six percent of all
income tax petitions are prepared by a particular group-the
avo cats aux conseils . This group of lawyers, limited in num
ber, are appointed by the state. They are permitted to handle
private cases and have a monopoly on the right to make oral
argument before the Council of State and the Court of Cassa
tion.
The petition itself, and any supporting documents later sup
plied, can be filed, either with the secretariat of the section
du contentieux or with the prefecture of the department where
the taxpayer is domiciled, but in either case is forwarded to
the office of the Director General of Taxes which, in turn,
sends it to the appropriate departmental Director. There the
petition is examined, both as to formal requirements and the
merits, and a full report prepared for submission-together
with a c omplete record of the administrative tribunal' s proceed
ings -to the Director General of Taxes . 37 The report will
33 The examination takes place in the office responsible for litiga
tion before the Council of State, the service du contentieux.
34 If the office of the Director General does utilize the departmen
tal Director' s report , it is likely to make modifications or observa
tions in the margin.
35 I e . , attorneys , tax counselors , members of the legal staffs of
trust companies .
Petitions which are prepared by taxpayers relate
principally to local taxes and are limited almost entirely to uncompli
cated matters , pos ing few technical difficulties .
36 The presentation of oral arguments or statements is an excep
tion to the typical hearing.
37 By preparing the petition at two distinct levels , having both levels
work on the petition, the best possible defense is assured . The depart
mental service is better s ituated to deal with issues of fact , and the
.
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carefully analyze the facts , legal arguments, and the conclu
sions which should be drawn. The inspector responsible for
the original assessment normally will have been contacted only
if the departmental Director determined either that the case
has been inadequately examined prior to the administrative
tribunal's decision or that the taxpayer is now relying on facts
or legal arguments not heretofore raised.
Whether the taxpayer or the Director General entered the
appeal, the parties exchange memoranda, just as they did in the
tribunal below, until the case is considered ripe for judgment.
Occasionally the taxpayer 's adviser will request the oppor 
tunity to elaborate orally on the pleadings, but this is the ex
ception rather than the rule . When such oral elaboration does
occur, it is limited to developing the contents of the written
pleadings and, thus, can add little to properly prepared memo
randa. The government never requests such an opportunity. 38
Even more rarely, indeed in less than one percent of the cases,
will expert witnesses be used at this appellate level. Presum
ably all facts have been established at the lower court level
and, if necessary, additional documentation from witnesses will
be submitted during the exchange of pleadings . Hence there is
no particular need for their use at this level. Moreover, the
lack of impartiality too often exhibited by the taxpayer ' s ex
pert witnesses has diminished their value in the eyes of the
Council of State .
When the case is considered ready for judgment, it is
turned over to a rapporteur3 9 who analyzes it for the purpose
of preparing two documents . The first is a memorandum which
states the facts, analyzes the applicable statutes and case law,
and concludes with a proposed decision. The second (visas of
final judgment) summarizes the contention advanced by the re
spective parties , the principal documents , and the applicable
law and sets forth a proposed final decree .
These documents , together with the entire file, are sent
through the office of the president of the subsection to the
commissaire of the government, who prepares his independent
(footnote continued)
office of the Director General is better prepared to handle the legal
arguments . In addition, this arrangement reduces the work of the of
fice of the Director General , for usually the report of the departmen
tal Director contains all pivotal elements for the administration' s d.e 
fense.
3 8 The government takes the position that the submission and inter 
change of pleadings serves to clarify the issues and provide the judi
ciary with all necessary insights .
3 9 Drawn from the ranks of auditeurs or the maitres des requetes.
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and impartial conclusions . The commissaire views the case
from a point which goes beyond that of the rapporteur.
The
latter considered only the particular case and file before him.
The commissaire goes on to consider how this particular case
fits into the totality of case law, the proposed decision's possi
ble repercussions, in practice and on the law's future direction,
and whether it would be wise to abandon the rationale of pre 
vious cases -however abrupt.
Submission of his written conclusions is followed by the
hearing before the subsection, from which the public is barred.
Typically, five members are present: the president, two Con
se ille rs d 'E tat, the rapporteur for this particular case, and a
mazt'te des reque tes . After the visas, as prepared by the rap
porteur, are read, the attorneys, if they wish, are permitted to
make an oral argument. The hearing concludes with the com 
missaire ' s presentation.
The deliberation which follows, from which the public and
parties are barred, is participated in by the commissaire
though he cannot vote . If either he or the president disagrees
with the majority' s view, however, either can demand that the
case be submitted to the combined subsections .
The decree, which is prepared by the rapporteur and read
at a public session, typically recites the names of the parties,
their respective contentions, a summary of principal documents
presented, and in concise form the legal reasoning which led
to the decision. While such decrees of the Council of State
are conclusive, in very limited circumstances involving formal
defects, a decree can be vacated or modified.40 All of that
body' s decrees are published in a review; also tax j ournals
reprint the more important tax decisions, sometimes together
with the commissaire ' s conclusions and other comments . In
addition, the administration' s weekly bulletin prints those de
crees which reflect important legal principles, typically with a
commentary relating the decree to existing case law .
In general, a decision constitutes a precedent for similar
situations arising in the future. Occasionally, however, the
administration indicates that it will distinguish a particular
decree from a given line of decisions for reasons not immedi
ately apparent upon reading the decree.
In 1960-6 1 , of the 4,883 judgments handed down by the
lower administrative tribunals, 3,848 favored the administra
tion. Nevertheless, the actual number of appeals from the ad40 Such formal defects include a judgment rendered by default in

absentia, a defect in the procedur e , correction of a material error .
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ministrative tribunals to the Council of State is spread almost
equally between taxpayers and the government. This results
from the fact that only about 10 percent of those taxpayers who
initially suffered an adverse decision do appeal, whereas the
government appeals between 30 percent and 40 percent of deci
sions unfavorable to it.
In 1960-6 1 the Council of State judged 8 1 5 tax cases, 724
of which were appeals from decisions of administrative tri
bunals. The tax administration submitted 94 cases .
Out of the 7 2 4 appeals, 608 dealt with direct taxes levied
for the benefit of the state and of the communes, and of these,
316 dealt with taxes on income-with the majority ( 2 1 1) involv
ing taxes on industrial and commercial profits . 41
An analysis of decisions by the Council of State shows that
in 1960 - 6 1 the government was completely sustained in 62 per 
cent o f all taxpayer appeals although almost a fourth of these
resulted from defects in form. Of the administration' s own
appeals , 41 percent were decided completely adverse to it, an
other 41 percent confirmed the contested taxes, and 1 1 . 5 per 
cent were abandoned by the administration.
While the administration was completely successful in only
41 percent of its own appeals, this is in sharp contrast to tax
payers who were completely successful in only 9 percent of
their appeals . 42 Several considerations contribute to this dif
ference . On the one hand, taxpayers are not always knowledge 
able, tend to view their own cases subjectively, can litigate at
little c ost (no attorney being required) , and thus are willing to
take a chance . On the other hand, the administration usually
is more knowledgeable, attempts to be objective, employs suc 
cessive levels to weed out errors made by lower echelons,
tends to abandon the weaker issues in a case-submitting only
the stronger ones to the tribunal - and, in general, exercises
considerable restraint regarding the number of cases it will
appeal.
41 This is understandable in light of the difficulty in determining

such profits and the monetary interests involved.
42 An overall breakdown of Council of state decisions on tax appeals for 1960-1961 shows the following:
Taxpayer in error to appeal . . . . . .
A ppeal by taxpayer badly taken . . . .
T axpayer became discouraged . . . . .
T axpayer right in whole o r in part .
Administration in error to appeal . .
Intermediate position . . . . . . . . . . .
Return t o administrative tribunal . . .
U s e o f expert witnesses . . . . . . . . .
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CHAPTER XITI
ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONAL AND
PERSONNEL FRAMEWORKS
Section A.

Administrative Organizational
Framework

1 . 1 Introduction

Under the Constitution, the Federal Republic of Germany
is composed of states, Laende r, each of which, independently
of the federal government, exercises legislative, administrative,
and judicial powers. While fiscal powers are exercised simul
taneously by the two levels of government, the states and the
federal government, the Constitution does allocate certain func 
tions between them by reference to the distinctions between
(a) the authority to enact laws, (b) the authority to exercise
administrative jurisdiction, and (c) the authority to dispose of
the revenue from a given tax.
Taxes as to which all three powers are vested in the Fed
eration are called federal taxes . These include especially the
turnover tax, the transport tax, and the excise taxes, with the
exception of the beer tax, the revenue from which accrues to
the States .
The Federation is also authorized, and exercises authority,
to legislate on taxes which are administered by, and accrue
to, the States . This is true of the capital tax, Ve rmoegensteue r,
the inheritance and gift tax, E rbs chajts teue r and Schenkungsteuer,
the motor vehicles tax, Krajtjahrzeugsteuer. And above all,
this category includes the income and the corporation tax where, 1
however, part of the revenue accrues to the Federation which,
to the latter extent, also has the administrative authority. Also
within this group is the trade tax, Gewerbe steuer, the revenue
from which accrues to the municipalities.
Only as to very few taxes do the States have legislative
power, the most important being the real property transfer tax,
G runde rwe rbsteuer.
1 While the Federation exercises the legislative function, the states
indirectly play a part through the Bundesrat, which represents the
states in the federal legislative procedure.
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The federal tax structure is headed by the Federal Minis 
ter of Finance, with comparable state officials at the head of
the tax structure of each state . These are distinct adminis 
trative offices; the Minister of Finance for a state is not the
subordinate of the Federal Minister of Finance .
At the regional level, however, the chief administrative of
ficial ( Chief Finance President, Obe rfinanz -prae sident) is simul
taneously a federal and a state official. The sixteen Regional
Finance Offices, Obe rfinanzdirektionen, comprise both federal
and state offices , some divisions therein being concerned with
federal and others with state taxes, and their respective em
ployees belong either to the state or to the federal government. 2
This contrasts with the local level where separate federal
and state offices do exist. However, the federal offices, Zoll
aemte r, are responsible only for customs duties and excise
taxes, whereas the state offices, Finanzaemte r, are responsible
for the individual and corporate income taxes and also for the
turnover tax. The fact that all of the turnover tax revenue and
a portion of that produced by the income tax is turned over to
the federal government 3 does not in practice, diminish the
authority of the local state offices . They have full, actual re
sponsibility for local administration of these taxes because, to
the extent of the Federation's share of such revenue, these
state offices in effect act as agents of the Federation. In con- sequence, duplication of local administration is avoided. 4
1 . 2 Organizational framework, national office le ve l
A . Fede ral tax administration

As noted previously, the Federal Minister of Finance is
the highest ranking officer in the federal tax administration.
As such, he engages actively in policy determination. In addition,
2 The Federal Republic of Germany is made up of states , Laender.
The smaller states and the city states , such as Bremen , Hamburg , and
West Berlin, have only one regional office. The larger states may
have two or three .
3 The revenue from the income tax is divided between the federal
government and the states. The federal quota is variable and may be
modified at two-year intervals . For the fiscal years 1964 and 1 9 65 ,
the federal government received 39% of the total income tax revenue.
4 In theory , the responsib ility of administering the Federation' s
turnover tax rests with the Regional Offices . But , as the law stands ,
the Regional Offices may request the assistance of the state finance
offices. In practice , as a result of this set-up, the state finance of
fices actually administer the turnover tax.
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he is responsible for organizational and personnel matters and
for matters pertaining to the application of federal tax laws .
In practice, however, the State Secretary of the ministry handles
the day-by-day business .
Reporting directly to the Minister of Finance is a bureau
concerned with fiscal policy and economic matters. Apart from
that, the Ministry houses the six divisions set out in Chart I,
each headed by a Ministerial-Director. Only the Third and
Fourth Divisions are concerned directly with taxes. The divi
sions are divided into subdivisions, headed by Ministerial Deputy
Directors, each of which in turn is broken down into sections,
headed by senior officials, usually with the rank of Ministerial
Counselor . These officials act on their own responsibility in
that they make the first decision on all matters within their
competence .
The most important tax division ( Division IV) has respon
sibilities with respect to both turnover and income taxes, but
these responsibilities are not identical. For taxes collected
solely for the benefit of the federal government, such as the
turnover tax, this division drafts laws, issues regulations , and
hands down decisions in appellate proceedings . For taxes col
lected only in part for the federal government, such as income
taxes, the division exercises less sweeping authority. Its for
mal direct responsibility is limited to the drafting of legislation.
It also contributes to uniformity in interpretation, however, by
having the prime responsibility for the drafting of regulations .
Further, it plays a major role in the coordination of, and co
operation in, administrative measures taken by state tax ad
ministration. Rulings are not issued by the federal government,
but by state governments ; however, prior to issuance , the fed
eral government in fact prepares and approves them. This,
again, insures uniformity. Also, meetings of senior state and
federal tax officials are called by and presided over by the
Federal Finance Ministry with the end of insuring maximum
uniformity in the actual application of the tax laws . To that
same end, and to safeguard its interest in the revenues thus
produced, the Central Federal Auditing Office within the Fed
eral Ministry of Finance exercises its right to participate in
the auditing activity which theoretically is the concern of the
various states . For like reasons, acquiescence of the federal
tax administration is also required with respect to the forgive
ness of individual and corporate income taxes which exceed a
certain sum.
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B. State tax administration

As previously noted, none of the eleven State Ministries of
Finance are subordinate to the Federal Ministry. The former
are organized, however, along lines similar but not identical
to those of the federal ministry, the difference being attributed
to the fact that some functions are performed solely at the
federal level.
Nevertheless, each does have a tax division
which is subdivided. The State ministry consists of s everal
divisions subdivided into groups (which are the equivalent of
the subdivisions of the Federal Ministry of Finance ) ; each group
comprises a number of se ctions depending on the range and
importance of the tasks assigned to it. As in the case of the
Federal Ministry of Finance , these sections constitute the basic
operational units of the ministry.
In the area of individual and corporate income taxes the
Ministry of Finance for a particular state supervises imple 
mentation of the tax laws by lower -level authorities ( regional
finance offices and the local finance offices ) . In this process,
instruction is given concerning assessment, auditing, tax for 
giveness, etc . In some circumstances the state ministry hands
down a decision in an individual situation.
However, all questions of common interest to tax adminis 
trations in the other states as well as questions relating to
future legislation are referred to the federal tax administration
by the state tax administrations . Moreover, no state ministry
has any direct concern in the drafting of statutes dealing with
individ•.1al or corporate income taxes .
-

1 . 3 Organizational framework, regional office le ve l

As previously noted, the Regional Finance Offices serve as
regional authority for both the state and federal tax administra
tions . The head, known as C hief Finance President, Oberfinanz 
praesident, serves under joint nomination by the Federal and
the appropriate state Ministers of Finance .
The heads o f the s everal divisions, the Finance Presidents,
Finanzpraesident, are subordinate to the Chief Finance Presi
dent. However, the Customs and Excises Division is staffed
with federal employees and its head is responSible to the Chief
Finance President in the latter ' s capacity as a federal official,
while the Division for Income , Profits, Net Worth, and Transfer
Taxes is staffed with state employees and its head is responsi
ble to the same regional Chief Finance President but in his
capacity as a state official. Further, while the Group Unit for
federal Turnover and Transport Taxes is attached to the Division
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for Taxes on Income, Profits, Net Worth, and for Transfer
Taxes, the former unit actually is independent of the latter
division' s authority and reports directly to the Chief Finance
President in his capacity as a federal official.
The tax division is concerned primarily with supervision
of the local state tax offices, Finanzaemter, where the actual
work of ta:x administration is carried on. Within limits set by
the State Ministry of Finance, the Regional Finance Office in
structs the local offices on all aspects of income ta:x and trade
tax administration, with particular attention to assessment,
auditing, and tax forgiveness procedures. It also usually works
with the local offices in auditing the more important enterprises
in the region. 5 Further, under certain circumstances it hands
down decisions covering particular fact situations which have
been referred to it. In addition, the officials of this division
of the Regional Finance Office conduct personal inspections to
determine if the ta:x law is being enforced properly and if there
is compliance with Regional Finance Office instructions . Final
ly, information forwarded by the local offices to the regional
tax division is analyzed and matters of general interest called
to the attention of the State Ministry of Finance .
1 . 4 Organizational framework, local office leve l

The actual administration of the tax laws falls upon the
approximately 500 local offices which are severally responsible
for geographical areas varying sharply in size and number of
taxpayers. The number of local offices in a particular state
depends upon geographic and economic considerations . In the
City State of Bremen, only 5 local offices are needed, whereas
45 are established in the State of Hesse, 63 in Lower Saxony,
1 0 1 in North-Rhine Westphalia with its huge industrial centers,
and 128 in Bavaria with its large rural districts . Also, the
number of local offices serving under a particular Regional
Finance Office varies according to the circumstances, and
ranges from 5 ( Bremen) to 69 (Munich) .
The geographical areas assigned to the various local of
fices also vary in size . In a city with a great number of peo 
ple and businesses concentrated i n a relatively small area, the
district of a local tax office is necessarily much more restricted
5 Among the other functions of the auditing section is the respon
sibility of fixing , on the basis of criteria and data collected by the
local authorities , the standard rates for estimating the turnover and
profits of enterprise.
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than in rural areas with widely dispersed settlements . The
number of individual taxpayers -as distinct from residents 
within the jurisdiction of a local office also varies . In the
federal territory approximately 3 . 2 million individuals are as 
sessed for income tax. The number accommodated by a particu
lar local office ranges from four thousand taxpayers to a high
of twelve thousand or more, with an average in the neighbor 
hood of seven thousand. 6 Throughout the Federal Republic of
Germany there are approximately 60,000 corporate taxpayers .
In some of the larger cities, responsibility for the assessment
of the corporate income tax has been given to special offices
for corporations 7 but no data is available to indicate the aver 
age number of corporate taxpayers for which a typical office
is responsible .
Each local finance office is divided into a number of branch
es which, in turn, are subdivided into working units , each of
which is responsible for either a certain residential area or a
certain category of taxpayers, such as corporations . The num
ber of branches and of employees in a particular finance office
depends upon the size of the area and the number of taxpayers . 8
To some extent these same factors control the s ervices per 
formed by a given local office, as in the case of auditing. Cer
tain small local offices do not have an auditing staff. Where
this situation exists, assessment personnel perform office
audits, but the more complex audits are turned over to the
auditing staff of a nearby larger local office which customarily
does have such a staff. Further, all auditing activity within a
particular region is coordinated by the auditing section of the
Regional Finance Office to insure uniformity.
The head of each local office is subordinate to the head
of the Regional Finance Office, though his rank depends upon
the size of the local office . He supervises the local adminis 
trative personnel, including the heads of the branches who, in
6 Excluded from these figures are those taxpayers who are re

quired to file tax returns but for some reason (i. e . , income below
minimum taxable) are not liable for any tax. Also excluded are those
taxpayers who have had their taxes (i. e . , wage tax, capital yields tax)
withheld at the source.
7 In these same large cities , other local offices are charged with
the centralized administration of certain other kinds of taxes , such as
those on transactions , the inheritance tax , etc .
8 Offices i n larger towns and industrial centers usually have staffs
of considerable siz e , up to 450 , and more branches than smaller of
fices in rural areas . These latter average about 50 employees to an
office.
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turn, supervise the work of the working units . In the larger
local offices, one or two heads of branches are denominated
coordinators for taxes of particular importance, such as indi
vidual and corporate income taxes, turnover taxes, or for a
group of related taxes, such as capital transfer taxes. These
coordinators perform consultative and coordinating activities
with respect to the particular taxes falling within their respec
tive competence.
Each taxpayer falls within the jurisdiction of some particu
lar local office . If an individual, jurisdiction is determined by
his domicile; if a corporation, by the seat of management; if a
foreign enterprise , by the site of the permanent e stablishment.
In fulfilling its role as part of the state tax administration,
each local office assesses, enforces, and collects individual and
corporate income taxes from those falling within its jurisdic 
tion. Although the revenues from the turnover tax accrue to
the federal government, local administration is handled by the
state ' s local office, acting as agent for the federal government.
In fact, before preparing a taxpayer ' s income tax assessment,
the state official in the local office first computes the turnover
for establishing the turnover tax. After all, the turnover,
measured by gross receipts, serves as a point of departure in
computing the taxpayer 's income . 9 Moreover, in s maller and
medium-sized tax offices, when the income tax assessment for 
a business is being prepared, the assessing official concurrent
ly handles the work involved in computing the amount of the
municipal trade tax, income being one of the multiple compo
nents which constitute the base of that tax.
Should the taxpayer wish to raise any questions relating to
his tax, two administrative remedies are available . One, the
protest, E inspruch, goes to the substance of tax liability; the
other, the complaint, Beschwerde , involves discretionary mat
ters which in practice raise procedural issues, e.g., forgive
ness of taxes, or delay in filing returns because, illustratively,
of force majeure or temporary absence from the country . Under
both procedures, the protest and the complaint, the local office
hands down a decision. Should the local office deny the taxpay
er's protest, the taxpayer has no further level of administrative
9 If a taxpayer ' s business has establishments in two or more mu
nicipalities , the office apportions the trade tax receipts between the
To facilitate the collection process , the
concerned municipalities.
larger municipalities have their own tax offices which administer not
only the trade tax but other municipal taxes as well, including the real
estate tax, levied in much the same manner.
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appeal but must bring his case before the appropriate fiscal
court. In the case of a complaint, however, the taxpayer may
have the denial submitted to the regional office . Should the
regional office deny relief, the taxpayer then may proceed be 
fore the fiscal court.
To summarize the work of the local office with respect to
the income tax, this office determines the basis of taxation and
then assesses and collects the amounts due. The same office
also handles all administrative appeals with respect to sub
stance and the first of the two levels of administrative appeals
with respect to procedure .
Section B.

Pe rsonne l Framework (Go ve rnmental
and Non-Gove rnmental)

1 . 5 Governmental professional personne l

With very few exceptions the tax administrations 10 of the
Federal Republic and of the several states are staffed by civil
servants . 1 1 These fall into four classes-senior, administra
tive, clerical, and subclerical. Classification depends to a very
substantial degree upon the individual's educational level at the
time of entry. This educational level also determines the par 
ticular in-service training program into which an individual is
channeled.
The lowest level of employment for the senior class is as
head of a branch in one of the local tax offices . However,
such a position may be one of the top levels for a member of
the s econd or administrative class, although officials of this
class are employed as assistants to the senior class officials
10 F iscal administration is subdivided into three branches: taxes ,
custom s , property and construction.
This subdivision is particularly
evident in the structure of the Regional F inance Offices.
See 1.3
supra .
1 1 The term civil servant includes those persons whose status as
such is governed by public law rather than by a private contract of
employment. While theoretically practically all functions assigned to
civil servants may be performed by salaried employees , the latter
play only a minor part in tax administration. Where employed , s ala
ried employees typically perform clerical work but sometimes , where
there is a need and their qualifications are satisfactory , they will be
utilized in administrative posts. Relatively often such employees with
particular competence in tax matters and accounting practices will be
employed in auditing sections . However , the majority of such posts
are filled by civil servants.
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at all higher levels , and occasionally will be promoted into the
senior clas s . Clerical and subclerical classes have no admin
istrative responsibilities, being employed in subordinate capaci
ties .
Since tax administration involves the application of rele
vant laws and-at the higher levels of the federal hierarchy
the drafting of appropriate legislation, extensive legal knowledge
is required of all officials who deal with other than purely ad
ministrative matters. In consequence, the senior posts within
the tax administration are filled typically by lawyers , although
in some instances these positions are filled by university grad
uates other than lawyers -i. e . , from economics, etc . -or by
officials promoted from the administrative class 12 to the so
called senior class.
A lawyer applying for a senior class civil s ervant classi
fication in the tax administration, like all other lawyers, has
completed approximately seven years of training in a university
and in post-university apprenticeships and has passed his First
and Second Legal State Examinations , and thus qualifies for the
title of Assessor . 1 3 If the appropriate State Ministry of Fi
nance 14 accepts his application, the young Assessor is enrolled
by a Regional Office as a Finance Assessor and undergoes a
training period lasting from eighteen months to two years . The
bulk of this period is utilized in practical training . He spends
ten to sixteen months at a local office, where stress is placed
on auditing, four months at the Regional Finance Office, and
one month at a Finance Court. On the theoretical side, the
Finance Assessor attends three training courses, each lasting
about one month, at the Federal Finance C ollege, supervised by
the Federal Ministry of Finance . 15
12 Officials i n the top brackets o f the administrative class frequent
ly have duties comparable to those of senior officials. Therefore , they
may move into the senior class without first qualifying through the ex
amination process normally required.
1 3 This training is made up of two parts. First , there are at least
seven half-year terms of legal training at a university , concluded by
the First Legal State Examination, Referendar Examination . This is
followed by at least three and a half years of apprenticeship training
in courts , administrative authorities , and law offices , successful com
pletion of which entitles the student to take the Second Legal State Ex
amination, A ssessor Examination.
14 The Federal Ministry of Finance handles the employment of at
torneys to be used in the turnover and transactions tax areas .
15 In adrlition to the F ederal F inance College , there are several
finance training schools conducted by the several states .
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The courses at the Federal Finance College are designed
to supplement the university legal training and give the Finance
Assessor a broader and more detailed knowledge of the tax law
as well as information in other areas (i. e . , business adminis 
tration with particular stress on industrial management) essen
tial for tax administration. Special attention is given to ac 
counting and the analysis of balance sheets . In addition, there
is some discussion of certain aspects of economics, sociology,
personnel management, industrial relations, and related subjects .
Supplementing the formal course work are lectures of a gen
eral character, covering political, cultural, and scientific topics.
Upon successful completion of the training program, the
Finance Assessor is appointed a Government Assessor, Regie 
rungsassessor. Normally, his first assignment is as head of
a branch at a s mall local office, but after two or three years
he is promoted to Government Counselor, Regie rungs rat , which
is the lowest ordinary rank, according to Table A, of the seven
ranks in the senior class.
TABLE A
Officials of the Senior Class:
Promotion Sequence
Government Counselor
Regierungsrat
Chief Government Counselor . . . . . . . . . Oberregierungsrat
Government Director .
. . . . . . . Regierungsdirektor
Leitender Regierungsdirektor
Chief Government Director 16
Ministerial Counselor
or Minsterialrat
Ministerial D eputy Director . . . . . . Ministerialdirigent
. . . . . Ministerialdirektor
Ministerial Director . . . . .
•

.

.

.

.

.

.
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.

.
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.

·

·
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This bottom rank heads branches in the larger local offices.
In the largest local offices, however, the heads of the more
important branches are Chief Government Counselors, Obe r
regierungsrat. The rank held by heads of local finance offices
depends upon the size of the particular offices . Most offices
are headed by experienced personnel who have progressed
through two or three, sometimes in the case of larger offices
even four, ranks . A few very small offices are headed by men
of the lowest rank.
16 These two officials occupy an equal rank and enjoy an equal sal
ary. The difference in title depends upon where the official in ques
tion works ; the Leitender Regierungsdirektor works in the field , the
Ministerialrat in either the state or federal Finance Ministry.
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In the Regional Offices, section chiefs are either Govern
ment Counselors, Regie rungsrat, or Chief Government Coun
selors, Obe rregierungsrat, while officials in charge of groups
( made up of sections ) are Government Directors , Regierungs 
direktor.

Within the State Ministries, the rank of the head of the tax
division depends upon the size of that division. Usually this
division is headed by an official who holds the second highest
rank in the senior class, i.e . , a Ministerial Deputy Director,
Ministe rialdirigent. Groups working on the level below that of
the division are headed by Ministerial Counselors, Ministerial
rat, or Government Directors, Regierungsdirektor, with the
section chiefs holding the rank of Chief Government Counselor,
Obe rregierungsrat.

While the educational qualifications for tax officials of the
second or so-called administrative class are not nearly as de
manding as the standards applied to those who seek to enter
the s enior class, the wide variety and complexity of the tasks
performed by the former does require them to have a sound
basic educational background. Federal and state laws 17 set out
minimum requirements -i. e . , completion of training at an inter 
mediate -level school ( e . g. , commercial school) or qualification
for the upper years at a high school 18 -but in practice the tax
administration prefers candidates with somewhat greater quali�
fications -i. e . , completion of training at a high school.
The candidate , upon acceptance of his application by the
Regional Finance Office, commences his apprenticeship train
ing at a local office , the training period lasting at least three
years . The state-administered training programs are general
ly similar although they differ in detail. The bulk of the ap
prenticeship training, geared to familiarize the candidates with
the work of the local offices, involves actual work in the dif
ferent branches of these offices. In the course of the training,
knowledge of administrative class functions is acquired through
contact with experienced officials . Simultaneously, the candi
date is introduced gradually to progressively more difficult
cases .
1 7 The Federal Law on C ivil Servants , which fixes the general re
quirements , is binding on the several states . In addition, each state
has its own particular laws .
1 8 In the s chool system in effect throughout Germany , the subjects
taught in the upper year�.> at high school correspond at least in part
to the subjects taught in the first two years in a college in the United
States .
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In addition to this practical training, a minimum of nine
months is spent in theoretical studies . To this end, six states
maintain special training schools ; 1 9 in the other states, Re
gional Finance Offices are responsible for administration of
the training programs .
Typically, the first introductory course , usually lasting
three but sometimes as long as ten months, begins after the
candidate has had a short period of practical experience in a
local office. This brief course, concluding by a preliminary
examination, provides the theoretical knowledge necessary for
successful continuation in the training program.
A second
course follows a substantial period of practical training and is
concluded by written and oral examinations covering the im
portant subjects a candidate will e mploy in his future work.
These include: government and administration, accounting,
balance - sheet analysis , auditing, individual income tax, corpo
rate income tax, turnover tax, general tax law, capital tax,
criminal law pertaining to fiscal offenses, enforcement meas 
ures, budgetary administration, etc .
Candidates successfully passing this s econd examination
are classed as civil servants on probation and are hired as
supernumerary Tax Inspectors . After satisfactory service dur
ing the probation period (normally two years), they are ap
pointed to the lowest bracket of the administrative class, Tax
Inspectors, and assigned a specific post within a local tax of
fice.
Typically the working unit of a local office is headed by
a Tax Inspector or Chief Tax Inspector. Such an official, with
the aid of one or two assistants, handles the assessment work.
Inspectors also bear the prime responsibility for field audits .
The two highest ranks of the administrative class, Tax Superi
ors and Tax Counselors , are to be found for the most part as
heads of branches in Regional Finance Offices. However, all
four ranks of the administrative class also occupy posts at re
gional, state, and federal levels as assistants to senior class
officials .
Normally, throughout the tax administration, the careers of
all persons in the senior and administrative classes commence
in a local tax office . From the staffs of these offices, appoint
ments are made to the regional offices . The state ministries
of finance draw their personnel both from the regional and the
local offices . The Federal Ministry of Finance draws its staff
19 A s

of

1964

there were nine such training schools.
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from the tax administrations of all states, the several state
governments consenting to the transfer.
When an official is transferred from a lower to a higher
office, i.e . , from the regional office to the state or the federal
ministry, he will not be expected to secure further education
or on-the -job training. Such an official is already a member
of a particular class and he will continue, albeit on a higher
level, to perform the duties of that clas s . Hence, such a pro
motion merely presumes superior qualifications, such as a
high degree of specialized knowledge, administrative or execu
tive capacities, creative imagination, and initiative . These are
the essentials for appointment to the state and federal minis 
tries ; no consideration is given to proportional representation
of lower level authorities or any particular class of personnel.
1 . 6 Private tax practitioners

With the heavy post-war tax burden, the services of tax
advisors have become increasingly important. These advisors
fall into two main groups -Tax Consultants, Steue rbe rater, and
Agents in Tax Matters, Steue rbe vollmachtigte r-and presently
number respectively 4,000 and 20,000. To insure suitable edu
cational background and necessary professional qualifications,
the 1961 Law on Tax Advisors , applicable to all the states, set
up certain requirements for admission to the respective pro
fessional examinations .
To sit for the Tax Consultant examination, an individual
must have completed a full course of university study in law
or economics and subsequently must have been e mployed for
at least three years by an individual or company admitted to
tax practice . There are somewhat less stringent requirements
for the Agent in Tax Matters examination. Admission to this
examination is granted on the basis of a high school or ac 
credited school-of-commerce education followed by an appren
ticeship with a tax or business advisor or a trader and four
years practical experience in the giving of tax advice while
e mployed by a Tax Consultant or Agent in Tax Matters .
In cooperation with the respective professional associations,
the State Ministries of Finance conduct the examinations for
Tax Consultants, the Regional Finance Offices for Agents in
Tax Matters. Because of the high level of competence demand
ed, between 20 and 2 5 percent of the applicants fail to pas s .
Both types of examinations cover tax law, relevant criminal
law and procedure, accounting with particular e mphasis on bal
ance sheet analysis, civil law, and professional law. The Tax
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Consultant examination, in addition to requiring a more exten
sive and sophisticated knowledge of these subjects, includes
commercial and company law, public finance, and economics .
Candidates for the examinations may not attend the federal
or state in-service training programs .
Instead they attend
private courses conducted by experienced teachers including
Tax Consultants , C ertified Public Accountants, and senior or
administrative class tax officials . In addition textbooks and
correspondence courses are available .
The typical candidate for the rank of Tax Consultant has
completed his university training before taking the qualifying
examination. However, the examination may be taken by two
groups who lack university training: Agents in Tax Matters
who have had ten years of full time service considered satis 
factory by the head of the local finance office most familiar
with their capabilities, and former tax administration officials
(in practice members of the non-senior class) who in the ten
years prior to their retirement had worked for five years as
head of a branch. If such a former non-senior class tax ad
ministration official had headed a section or working unit under
the same conditions, he may sit for the Agent for Tax Matters
examination.
No qualifying examination for Tax Consultant is required
of two groups : former judges of fiscal courts and senior class
tax officials who for five of the ten years directly preceding
retirement have headed a branch in a local office or occupied
an equivalent position. Their technical knowledge is considered
sufficient to warrant this special arrangement.
These two groups of tax advisors-Tax Consultants and
Agents in Tax Matters -perform essentially the same functions,
including closing taxpayers ' books, establishing balance sheets,
preparing tax returns, representing taxpayers in dealings with
the tax administration or before the fiscal courts. However,
Agents in Tax Matters handle primarily tax affairs of small
and medium-sized firms with less complex financial dealings ,
while Tax Consultants are retained by larger firms with more
complicated tax problems . Only Tax Consultants may be the
members of the boards of managers of the hundred-odd cor 
porations o r limited liability companies organized t o engage in
tax practice.
Both Tax Consultants and Agents in Tax Matters may rep
resent taxpayers in administrative proceedings and in the tax
courts . Two other groups of professional tax advisors have
the same privilege: a very small and steadily decreasing group
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of Certified Auditors , vereidigter Buchpriijer; and the much
more important group of Certified Public Accountants, number 
ing about 1 50, who have completed university training in eco
nomics and related fields, have had six years of professional
accounting experience, and have passed a difficult qualifying
examination.
Because a taxpayer can use members of any of these four
groups as tax advisers and as representatives in tax litigation,
it is not necessary to have a lawyer represent him. Yet rep
resentation in tax litigation is the only tax area where lawyers
are at all active , for the giving of tax advice is almost entire
ly handled by members of other professional groups .

CHAPTER XIV
ADMINISTRATIVE RULE -MAKING PROGRAMS
Section A. Characte r of the Unde rlying Statute
2 . 1 The precision of the statute itself

The basic principles of German income tax law are the
same for individuals and for corporations . While there are
two separate statutes -individuals are subject to the Income
Tax Law and corporate bodies to the Corporation Income Tax
Law-the corporation tax statute refers to and is based on the
individual tax statute .
Both the Income Tax Law and the Corporation Income Tax
Law are relatively short. The Income Tax Law fills 80 print
ed pages with approximately 300 words to the page . It has 73
sections . 1 About two-thirds of these contain substantive provi
sions concerning the determination of income, tax rates , etc .
The remaining one-third contains procedural rules, such as the
authority to issue regulatory ordinances having the force of
law . 2 Most, but not all, of the individual sections of the law
are relatively short. The most extensive sections are those
which, in addition to a general principle, set forth rules grant
ing special relief as to which the law seeks to be as precise
as possible .
The Corporation Income Tax Law is shorter than the In
come Tax Law, with 24 sections on 1 5 pages of approximately
300 words each. This brevity is possible because the Corpora
tion Income Tax is essentially based on the Income Tax Law .
Illustratively, it refers back to the Income Tax Law when deal
ing with income determination and tax assessment, restricting
itself to special provisions governing the taxation of corporate
bodies, i.e., intercompany holdings, tax rates, etc .
1 The numbered sections run only to 54, but several sections marked
with letters have been added, bringing the actual number of sections to
73.
2 During the post-World War II period o f reconstruction, special
economic considerations led to incorporation of a number of rules ex
pected to have a short life.
Their number is decreasing as the ob
j ectives of their enactment are being achieved.
307

308

GERMANY: RULE-MAKING PROGRAMS

A factor contributing to the relative shortness of both stat
utes is the fact that there is a separate code of procedure
covering all taxes, the Fiscal Code, Re ichsabgabenordnung. This
code deals with assessment, conditions permitting modification
of assessment notices, collection of deficiencies , tax refunds ,
statutes of limitations, and penalties. Although extensive, com
prising 488 sections, relatively few provisions directly affect
the taxation of income . However, in addition to the two basic
statutes, certain other comparatively brief laws do deal with
isolated specialized sectors of individual and corporate income
taxation, such as contributions to industrial pension funds, in
vestment funds, and corporate reorganizations .
Another prime factor contributing to the brevity of the
basic income tax statutes are the complementary regulatory
ordinances, Re chtsve rordnungen, discussed in 2 . 4 infra.
Most important, however, is the fact that the two laws are
based on abstract concepts and state abstract rules . The statu
tory provisions do not enumerate concrete cases which may be
encountered in practice. In solving any such problem, the ab
straction is applied to the factual situation, with specific rules
then being derived from the guiding principle.
This approach of the statute is based on the premise that,
since the law must cover a wide range of factual situations, it
must leave room for flexible interpretation. An enumeration
of concrete cases might be helpful to the layman, but would
tend to make the law rigid and inflexible, unable to adjust to
changing conditions . 3 Moreover, it is unlikely that inclusion
of a large number of subordinate rules to govern diverse types
of individual cases would reduce the volume of interpretative
controversies, for no list could cover all possibilities . And in
practice, it then would be difficult to classify factual situations
under the competing rules however great their number. While
Germany avoids this by using general provisions , and thus
achieves far greater brevity than does the United States in its
code, delimitations are not lacking; but they are confined to
basic essentials and thus not nearly so numerous as those
found in the United States code .
This greater reliance on abstract legal principles also in
sures greater uniformity in application of the law to economic
3 A rigid statute, out of tune with current conditions , might grant
unanticipated benefits or result in unforeseen hardships. Such inequity
might lead to new demands by taxpayers , further detailed specifications
in the statute with increased ramifications , and even an aggravation of
existing rigidity.
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gain. Under the German law, income from trade or business
comprises all income derived by a businessman from his busi
ness . It is immaterial whether the income arises from inter
est payments , capital gains, or profit from the sale of goods;
income is treated as a single unit. The structure of the law
itself tends to resist the insertion of complicated special rules
according special or preferential treatment to isolated items.
Illustratively, the Income Tax Law, Section 2, paragraph 1 ,
states that income tax is calculated on the basis o f net income
received in any one calendar year. Paragraph 2 provides, by
way of deduction from the principle expressed in paragraph 1 ,
that net · income is the total amount of income derived from
each of the listed sources of income, less losses and expenses
incurred in respect of those sources.
The sources of income listed in the statute are as follows :
(1)
(2)
( 3)
( 4)
( 5)
( 6)
(7)

Income from agriculture and forestry;
Income from trade or business;
Income from independent personal services ;
E mployment income ;
Income from the investment of capital;
Rentals and royalties ; and
Other income defined and circumscribed likewise in abstract
terms including
( a) Recurring payments such as pensions ;
(b) Income from speculative transactions, i.e., sales of pri
vate property, if, in the case of real property, not more
than two years , and in the case of other property not
more than two months , have elapsed between the acqui
sition and the sale; and
( c ) Income from any other payments or benefits received
and not included in one of the sources of income listed
as, for instance, income from the occasional leasing of
movable property.

Under each of the sources of income are listed the types
of income . Thus income from trade or business is said to
comprise the profits derived by a partner from a partnership,
including payment for his services to the partnership, payment
for assets made available to the partnership, or interest on a
loan granted by him. Employment income includes non-cash
benefits and pensions, while income from the investment of
capital includes dividends , interest, etc .
In the case of corporations, however, their entire income
is deemed to be income from trade or business.
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The statute defines the terms surplus and profits. These
concepts are of prime importance because for the first three
sources of income listed above, income is understood to be the
profit from the activity while for the other four it is the sur
plus of receipts over income-connected expenses .
Under the statute, profit is computed by comparing net
worth at the end of one business year with that at the end of
the preceding business year . This is an abstract approach,
preceding from general terms to particular elements, starting
with the balance sheet not the profit and loss account. Fur
ther, the balance sheet must be prepared to accord with com
mercial law principles, while at the same time taking into ac
count special provisions in the tax law governing withdrawals
and investments, valuation, physical depreciation, busines s ex
penses, etc. This reference to commercial law simplifies the
tax law 's structure , but in practice it requires the preparation
of two balance sheets, one for commercial, the other for tax
purposes.
Since income is determined by comparing two balance
sheets, no capital loss deduction provision is needed: this be
comes a matter of asset valuation in the balance sheet. De
ductible expenses, however, are specified, with those not deducti
ble regarded as withdrawals to be added to the profits .
By specifying certain types of receipts as subject to in•
come tax, those not so identified are excluded, such as lottery
gains ; this stems from the structure of the law, that is , an
item is excludable because it is not specifically included. Thus,
while the statute does not list every kind of payment excluda
ble from income tax, it does list approximately sixty items
which, absent such identification, could be included under a
source of income .
When determining an individual 's net income, certain per
sonal expenses are deductible.
These include interest, life
insurance premiums, church tax, etc . Further the taxpayer
may deduct various allowances for dependent children or ad 
vanced age, and also certain extraordinary burdens such as
unusual medical costs . Thus the net income figure is reached,
a sum to which the income tax rate table is applied.
A statute stating abstract concepts inevitably creates inter
pretative problems in the course of applying the abstractions
to individual cas es . The following example relating to income
from trade or business illustrates this proces s .
In determining whether items constitute receipts o r ex
penditures, the statute establishes certain criteria. With respect
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to receipts, the only issue is whether the income was derived
from the trade or business; the nature of the individual item
is immaterial. With respect to expenditures, the statute pro
vides : "Business expenses shall be understood to mean expendi
tures occasioned by the operation of a business . " 4 Under this
provision, expenditures for private purposes are not deductible .
If the latter are shown as business expenses, an adjustment
will be made, adding them back to profit. While the treatment
of business expenditures is clear, disputes do arise as to the
meaning of the standards , "occasioned by the operation of a
business" or "incurred for private purposes . " The statute at
tempts to clarify the abstract standards by providing that non
deductible expenses include expenditures to maintain a standard
of living commensurate with the taxpayer ' s economic or social
position, irrespective of whether such expenditure promotes the
taxpayer 's professional or business activities . 5 However, be 
cause the terms used in these standards ("economic or social
position" and "promoting the taxpayer ' s professional or business
activities") do not readily provide a clear answer to each of
the wide range of factual circumstances to which they must be
applied, courts do encounter a large number of controversies
in this area.
Where deductibility depends upon the expenditure' s having
been occasioned by the operation of the business , the principle
of causality becomes the criterion. Should a businessman incur
excessively large expenditures for customer entertainment, the
abstract language of the statute, standing alone, might seem to
warrant their deduction. To prevent this possible construction,
the statute sets out concrete criteria and classifies as non
deductible the following expenditures :
1. Expenditures for presents made to persons who are not em
ployees of the taxpayer and do not have continuous business
relations with him under either a commercial agency con
tract or a contract for work and services , except presents
with an aggregate value during the taxpayer ' s business year
not exceeding DM 100 for each individual recipient;
2 . Expenditures for guest houses maintained by the taxpayer
outside the city or town where the business is located, to
the extent these facilities are used for accommodating and
entertaining persons other than employees; and
3 . Expenditures connected with the acquisition or exercise of
hunting or fishing privileges or the maintenance of yachts
or similar facilities , and the entertainment of guests through
use of such facilities.
4 Income Tax Law, § 4 , para. 4.
5 Income Tax Law , § 1 2 .

312

GERMANY: RULE -MAKING PROGRAMS

Finally, the following catchall provision provides a general
safeguard against excessive expenses :
Expenditure affecting the standard of living of the taxpayer
or another person shall not be taken into account when deter
mining the profit s , to the extent that such expenditure is deemed
to be excessive by generally accepted standards. 6

Since this less precise standard must be applied to each indi
vidual set of facts, here too courts encounter many controver
sies requiring construction of the phrase "deemed to be exces 
sive by generally accepted standards . " "Constructive dividends"
is another phrase creating interpretative problems . The Cor
poration Income Tax Law does not define the phrase, simply
stating:
The question as to which receipts are income and the
method of computing such income shall be governed by the
provisions of the Income Tax Law. In this connection, con
structive dividends shall also be taken into account.

The relevant regulatory ordinance, Ordinance Regulating the
C orporation Income Tax Law,7 gives ten examples but no defi
nition. 8 Consequently the courts must define and interpret the
statutory expression.
The fact that the courts are available to resolve these in
terpretative disputes means, on the one hand, that the statute ' s
reliance on abstract principles does not j eopardize the stability
of the legal system. In borderline cases, on the other hand,
the taxpayer cannot be certain in advance as to the tax conse 
quence of his actions, for each decision covers only the case
at issue .
Finally, it should also be observed that the German statute
does include some provisions which contain precise definitions
with scant room for interpretation, such as those dealing with
the extraordinary depreciation allowances on private housing
6 Income Tax
7 For details

Law , § 4, para. 5.
concerning the status of regulatory ordinances , see

2 . 4 infra .
8 Typically an ordinance does not contain illustrative examples.
They are to be found in administrative regulations . The first two ex
amples of constructive dividends set out in Ordinance Regulating the
Corporation Income Tax Law , § 19 , read as follows:
"1. A shareholder is paid an excessive salary for his services
as an officer of the company .
" 2 . A shareholder is paid, in addition to an adequate s alary ,
extra compensation based on the turnover of the business."
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(including owner-occupied dwellings) and with charitable contri
butions . Thus German tax law employs deliberately a variety
of drafting techniques, the overriding motive being to keep the
law as flexible as possible . 9
The annual number of income tax controversies which in
volve interpretative issues is not known. While some are re 
solved at the judicial level, administrative procedures handle
far more . It is not even known how many reach, or how many
are resolved by, either the lower echelon fiscal courts or the
Federal Fiscal Court.10 Only the latter tribunal publishes de 
ClSlOns . And while, in 1963 for example, it published 164 in
come tax and 17 corporation tax decisions, the total number
handed down was substantially higher, for even that court does
not publish all its decisions.
2 . 2 Legislative pre -enactment aids to inte rpre tation

Legislative pre -enactment aids to income tax law interpre
tation include :
( 1) Minutes of the Budestag or Bundesrat Fiscal Commit
tee or of any other technical committees dealing with
income tax matters; 11
( 2) Reports submitted to the Bundestag or Bundesrat by the
Fiscal Committee concerning the results of its discus 
sion; and
( 3) Minutes of the plenary session debates of the Bundestag
or Bundesrat.
Of these three, the Bundestag Fiscal Committee 's minutes
contain the greatest amount of information regarding the sense
and purpose of a provision. The Fiscal Committee may and
typically does invite the Federal Minister of Finance, senior
officials of the Finance Ministry, experts from industry, etc . ,
to participate in these clarifying discussions . However, the
hearings are closed and the minutes , summary rather than ver
batim reports of the discussion, generally are not available to
the public .
9 One advantage: Taxpayers , r ather than attempt to exploit the
marginal areas hoping to find loopholes in the law, may seek sound
footings , not otherwise being sure of a court' s reaction.
10 The Federal F iscal Court , the supreme court for German tax
matters , deals only with questions of law. See Chap. XVI, 4.4 infra .
11 The grass-roots work on a given provision-apart from the pre
paratory work done by the Federal Ministry of F inance-generally is
left to the several committees.
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The public, however, does have access to the reports which
the Committee submits to the legislature and to legislative
minutes . The utility of the former is limited because they re
flect only a summary of the committee 's views . And typically,
the legislative minutes furnish no details regarding the inter 
pretation of a given provision. The processing of one new pro
vision in 1964 ( section 6 ( b) of the Income Tax Law) illustrates
the relative informative quality of these three sources. The
portion of that provision of interest here reads as follows :
Profit from the disposal of certain fixed assets
( 1) Taxpayers who dispose of real property , fixtures attached
to real property including the appurtenant lands . . . or live
stock of agricultural and forestry enterprises in connection
with a plant reorganization, may , in the business year in
which the assets are disposed of, deduct from the cost of ac
quiring or producing the [especially defined . . . similar] assets
purchased or produced in the said business year an amount
not exceeding the profit derived from such disposal. . .
.

Two questions aris e . What are "fixtures attached to real prop
erty" within the meaning of the provision ? What is a "plant
reorganization" ?
,
The Fiscal Committee minutes, though not available to the
public, provide some clarification. They state that the expres 
sion, "fixtures attached to real property, " is more or less re 
stricted to irrigation and drainage facilities used for agricul
tural or forestry purposes .
"Plant reorganization" -a term
hitherto unused by German tax law -is said to cover not only
the fundamental reorganization of a business but also situations
where, for instance , a cattle farm is converted into a duck farm.
The minutes go on to state that the ultimate definition of "plant
reorganization" must rest with the courts .
The Fiscal Committee ' s published report to the Bundestag
does not refer at all to "fixtures attached to real property. "
"Plant reorganization" is explained only by an illustration,
"e.g., when changing from bovine cattle farming to small cattle
farming. "
The Bunde s tag minutes o f the debate o n the 1 9 6 4 Tax
Amendment Law mentions neither of the previously quoted
statutory phrases. The plenary session did not concern itself
with these details; it explored only the economic, political, and
fiscal effects of provisions granting tax reliefs .
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2 . 3 Standards of construction followed by the judiciary in inter
pre ting the statute

A German court, construing a statute, takes as a point of
departure the premise that the language of a law determines
its construction, for the language reflects the legislature's in
tention.
Therefore, any construction must accord with the
language used in the law, unless a literal application were to
lead to an obviously unreasonable result.
The extent of judicial interpretation depends, of course, on
the way a provision was drafted. When a statute is phrased
in abstract form, there is much scope for judicial interpreta
tion. When a statute is expressed in precise terms, there is
little judicial interpretation. Since each provision reflects its
own character, the courts try to ascertain from the statute
itself the proper degree of interpretative freedom. For exam
ple, a sweeping term such as constructive dividends obviously
gives wide latitude.
That interpretations will be realistic and responsive to new
situations is insured by the fact that certain principles of con
struction, not set out in any statute, ride piggy-back on the
text of the law itself. Among those to which the judiciary ad
heres, the most important is the so-called economic approach,
wirschaftliche Be trachtungsweise .
This approach stresses the
economic aspects of a transaction, its substance rather than
the niceties of its legalistic form. The interpretation accorded
"concealed capital stock" illustrates the use of this overriding
economic approach. Should an interest-bearing loan be granted
to a limited liability company by a shareholder, the loan will
be scrutinized in the light of all facts pertaining to the com
pany to determine whether it constitutes additional capital rather
than a liability. If it is determined to be additional capital,
interest payments are deemed distributions rather than recog
nized deductible business expenses .
This realistic approach also enables the courts to keep the
law in tune with current economic developments . For example,
changes in agricultural practices with greater use of farm
machinery, fertilizer, etc . , led courts to recognize that part
nership agreements between farm parents and children should
no longer be regarded as tax avoidance devices reflecting mere
family ties, but as genuine contractual relationships .
This approach to interpretation also has enabled the ju
diciary to assure that cases of like economic substance re
ceive identical tax treatment even in the instance where a
literal interpretation of the law would produce different results .
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Illustratively, the statute literally accords different treatment
to businessmen and to individual investors in depreciating capi
tal improvements to realty. Should a businessman shift from
coke to oil heat, the rules concerning the determination of
profits from trade or business would apply with the conse
quence that his depreciation would be geared to the useful life
of the new system. The private investor, however, is governed
by the provisions relating to rental income, and literally would
be forced to gear his depreciation to the longer useful life of
the building. This obviously discriminatory treatment caused
the courts to rule that the private investor, at the point when
the new oil furnace became unserviceable, could write off as
income-connected expenses the then remaining undepreciated
basis of the furnace.
Finally, where the courts are uncertain as to the legisla
tive intent, consideration is given to the historical background
of a provision, though this may not be used to justify an in
terpretation incompatible with the thrust of the provision itself.
The background includes the pre-enactment documents men
tioned previously 12 though, in general, these do not rank high
among the guides to interpretation.
Section B.

The Regulations Program

2 . 4 Type s and fo rce of regulations
As noted in 2 . 1 supra, German tax statutes are supple 
mented by regulatory ordinances, Rechtsve rordnunger. These

are issued by the Federal Government with the consent of the
Federal C ouncil, Bundesrat, pursuant to authority contained in
the individual laws which lay down the scope, limits, and pur 
pose o f the authority. These ordinances then s erve only to
implement the law, providing specifics in accordance with the
general legislative intent reflected by the statute itself.
Regulatory ordinances cannot change or modify the law ' s
provisions nor can they create new obligations and privileges .
Unless they fail to conform to the language and purpose of the
law, they are regarded as binding legislation susceptible to in
terpretation. Thus they are far more than mere administrative
instructions . They bind both the administrative authorities and
the courts except where the courts hold either that a regula
tory provision exceeds the delegated authority, or that the
12

See

2.2

infra .
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delegation itself was invalid because insufficiently defined in
the statute .
Despite these limitations, regulatory ordinances can be
used effectively to supply details not incorporated in the law
itself or to permit adaption to changing conditions without fur
ther resort to the more time-consuming legislative process.
Illustratively, the statute authorizes the issuance of regulatory
ordinances granting special depreciation allowances for such
items as sewage plants, mining, air purification, and research
equipment, and to provide special deductions for certain cate
gories of goods, including imported goods the prices of which
have declined sharply on the world's market and other goods
of particular importance to the German economy. Other regu
latory ordinances are authorized to permit increased accumu
lation of reserves when prices rise or to allow special de
preciation allowances during a recession. Again, authority is
delegated to issue ordinances according tax relief to inventions
by employees, independent inventors, etc .
The Income Tax Law confers both specific and general
authority to issue regulatory ordinances. Specific authority is
conferred in certain selected areas, l 3 such as those previously
mentioned . In order to insure equality of all taxpayers before
the law, to provide relief in hardship cases, or to simplify tax
procedures , general authority is granted to facilitate implemen
tation of the Income Tax Law with respect to the delimitation
of tax liability, determination of income, assessments, applica
tion of tax rate provisions , and payment of taxes .
The most important ordinance issued under the Income Tax
Law is the General Ordinance regulating the Income Tax Law.
It contains 9 1 sections and comprises about 60 pages of ap
proximately 300 words each, and thus is somewhat smaller in
size than the Income Tax Law itself. Also relevant to this
comparison of size is the fact that this ordinance -like all regu
latory ordinances-for more complete understanding frequently
repeats the text of the various parts of the law with which it
deals . However, not every s ection of the statute is supple
mented by a corresponding portion of the regulatory ordinance .
Only portions are so complemented, selected usually because
13 The identification of these specified areas is primarily a matter
of drafting technique. At the end of the Income Tax Law , the text re
flects both the general authority to issue regulatory ordinances , as
well as specific authority in selected areas to make certain that the
Federal Government is authorized to issue the latter ordinances with
the approval of the Bundesrat.

318

GERMANY: RULE-MAKING PROGRAMS

the statute is not exhaustive enough on a given point. Subject
to the overriding requirement that a regulatory ordinance con
form to the law itself, the government in exercising its author
ity to issue regulatory ordinances has full administrative dis 
cretion in determining what it will include within a particular
regulation. In addition to the General Ordinance , there are
approximately ten major regulatory ordinances covering im
portant special income tax areas . The most voluminous of
these is the Wage Tax Ordinance , which comprises 58 s elec
tions dealing in large part with the technical aspects of the
wage tax. Other ordinances bear on the withholding tax on
income from capital, taxation of independent inventors, tax
treatment of inventions by employees, and on the calculation
of the rental value of owner-occupied homes . Together, these
ordinances add slightly less than a hundred sections .
These regulatory ordinances fulfill the purpose of making
precise whatever may have been left open or unclear in the
statute. They do not interpret the statute. Rather they set
out supplementary rules omitted by the legislature. Further,
they do not include summaries of Supreme Court decisions.
The Ordinance regulating the Corporation Income Tax Law,
issued under the authority contained in the statute itself, has
only 38 sections, for it deals only with the special problems
peculiar to corporate taxation.
Whereas the regulatory ordinances establish legally bind
ing rules, the quite s eparate administrative regulations dis 
cussed below serve only to reflect the government' s interpre
tative position.
2 . 5 Precise purpose of inte rpre tative regulations

The introductions to the Income Tax Regulations, Corpora
tion Income Tax Regulations, and Wage Tax Regulations state
their purpose as follows :
The regulations deal with questions of doubt and interpre
tative questions of general importance with a view to insuring
uniformity in the application of the income tax law [corporation
income tax law , wage tax law] by the tax authorities . In addi
tion, they give instructions to the local finance offices on how
to proceed in certain cases in order to prevent undue hardship
and to simplify administrative procedures. 14
1 4 under German tax law ( Fiscal Code, § 1 31) , taxes may be for
given or r efunded in whole or in part wher e , in the circumstances of
the individual case, taxation would result in undue hardship. It also
is permissible to reduce the base of income on which the tax rates
are applied. A lthough this provision r efers to hardship in relation to
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These administrative regulations describe and interpret
both the law and the regulatory ordinances . They do not sup
plement the law, i.e., fill gaps left open by the legislature .
This is left to the regulatory ordinances.
The authority to issue these administrative regulations is
derived by the Federal government from the Basic Law, 15 not
from specific delegations in the tax statutes . However, because
of the power held by the several states in income tax matters,
the administrative regulations covering this area can be issued
only after receiving the approval of the Bundesrat (comprised
of representatives of the states) .
Administrative regulations, unlike statutes or regulatory
ordinances, do not bind the courts. A regulation may be taken
into account, however, either because it is deemed to repre
sent a well thought out administrative view or because it is a
source of information regarding methods which have been ap
plied in practice. Even so, in the end a court renders its de
cision on the basis of its own interpretation of the law.
Nevertheless, the abstract language of the German statutes
makes centralized administrative interpretation a prerequisite
to uniform application of the law by all administrative officials,
and is peculiarly important as to matters having wide applica
tion. Since the focus on interpretative problems is only to
assure uniform application by fiscal authorities, rather than to
guide the lay public, lay language is not used. Nor are exam
ples provided where the law itself provides a clear answer. In
general, the aim is to strive to interpret the law to conform
with objective c riteria, i.e . , as the courts would be expected
to interpret it.
Two illustrations will indicate the type of interpretative
assistance these administrative regulations provide. The first
relates to Sections 2 and 2 1 of the Income Tax Law which re
quire inclusion of rental income from real property. Income
means receipts less income-connected expenses . The latter
are defined in Section 9 precisely, to mean those incurred in
obtaining, conserving, and maintaining receipts . In practice ,
however, it is difficult to distinguish between expenditures con
stituting income-connected expenses and expenditures requiring
capitalization. The administrative regulations seek to clarify
the distinction, as follows :
(footnote continued)
the circumstances of individual case s , it expressly allows similar ar
rangements to be provided for certain groups of analogous cases.
1 5 Basic Law , art. 1 0 8 , para. 6 .
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There is no fixed borderline between maintenance-connect
ed expenditure and capital expenditure. Maintenance-connected
expenditure invariably includes expenditure
1. Which does not change the nature of the real property
and
2 . Which is incurred with a view to maintaining the prop
erty in proper operating condition and
3. Which recurs regularly in about the same amounts.
Even if not all of these conditions are fulfilled , expenses in
curred may , under certain conditions , constitute maintenance
connected expenditure (cf. F ederal Fiscal Court Decisions ,
July 9 , 1953 and March 1 , 1960 -BStBl (Bundessteuerblatt) III ,
245 and BStBl III, 198) . In particular , maintenance-connected
expenditure includes expenditure on current maintenance and on
repair (backlog of maintenance work) . . . , 1 6

This effort to be as precise as circumstances permit is
illustrated by the regulation dealing with Section 9a of the In
come Tax Law. The latter allows, in lieu of a deduction for
actual income -connected expenses, a standard deduction in the
following amounts :
( 1) DM 564 deductible from employment income;
(2) DM 1 50 deductible from the income from capital assets .

From this emerge s everal questions . Is a taxpayer with more
than one employer allowed to claim more than one standard
deduction? If a taxpayer receives both employment income
and income from capital, can he claim both standard deduc
tions ? If he ceases to be liable for tax during part of a given
year, must the standard amounts be reduced proportionately ?
The Income Tax Regulations respond as follows:
The standard deduction for income-connected expenses
shall be allowed only once in respect from the s ame source [17 ]
o f income ( cf. F ederal Fiscal Court Decision, April 3 , 1959BStBl III, 220) .
In the case of income from two or more
sources , the standard deduction shall be allowed in respect of
each source of income up to the amount of the income involved.
The standard amounts shall not be reduced if the taxpayer's
liability to tax during a given year failed to extend over the
full year.

Observe that both of the above examples from the regula
tions cite decisions of the Federal Fiscal Court, the highest
1 6 Income Tax Regulations , p:j.ra. 157,
17 E .g., employment income irrespective of the number of employ
ers .
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German court in tax matters. Thus the regulations not only
clarify but serve also to indicate the issues which the tax ad
ministration regards as now settled but which at some point
were doubtful enough to have reached the highest judicial tri
bunal.
Finally, it should be noted that administrative regulations
do not try to cover exhaustively all interpretative questions .
C overage depends on foreseeable or actual needs . Consequent
ly, initial regulations must be supplemented with amendments
and, in practice, almost every year amended versions of the
Income Tax and Wage Tax Regulations are issued. 18 The bulk
of the provisions remain unchanged, but for identification pur
poses the particular year is added to the title, i.e., Income
Tax Regulations for the Calendar Year

1963.

Administrative regulations are subdivided into paragraphs,
unlike the laws and the regulatory ordinances which are sub
divided into sections . The Income Tax Regulations contain 224
paragraphs covering 2 1 5 pages with approximately 300 words
to each page. While procedural rules are of secondary impor
tance in the case of the Income Tax Regulations , they are more
important for the Wage Tax Regulations . Wage Tax Regulations
spread 94 paragraphs across 120 pages, and the Corporation
Income Tax Regulations include 69 paragraphs which run about
100 pages .
2 . 6 Manne r of processing regulations

A division of the Federal Ministry of Finance, responsible
for taxes on income, capital, and transactions, prepares all
statutes , regulatory ordinances , and administrative regulations
relating to the taxation of income.
Section heads within this division, 19 assisted by senior of
ficials and officials of the administrative class, 20 handle the
actual preparatory work. The s ection heads and s enior offi
cials are lawyers . Their prime guidance comes from the de
bates on the statute . Consequently the basic thrust is fixed by
the time of enactment. But actual drafting takes place later,
after all interested parties -i. e . , the State Finance Ministries,
18 The regulations constitute definite instructions for local finance
offices for the calendar year of issuance. Consequently , amendments
are introduced only once a year.
19 See Chap. XIII, 1.2 supra .
20 See Chap. XIU, 1. 5 supra, for a discussion of officials of the
administrative class.
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other Federal Ministries, 21 and private organizations (particu
larly the leading professional and industrial groups) -have ex
pressed their opinions and made recommendations .
Public
hearings are not held though regulations are normally prepared
after discussing matters with all interested groups -who may
in fact have made the initial suggestion for the proposed regu
lation.
Typically a few months elapse between the enactment of
the statute and the issuance of the regulatory ordinances . The
administrative regulations, on the other hand, are published
annually. 22
Section C .

The Rulings Program

2 . 7 Formal advance private written rulings to taxpayers

The German tax administratiqn is not required to supply
taxpayers with rulings concerning the tax consequences of pro
posed transactions . There is only one exception: it is possible
to obtain a ruling on whether and to what extent wage tax pro
visions must be applied. This exception is justified because
the employer is liable for the proper deduction of this tax,
even in the absence of fault. Information as to this liability
may be obtained without formality, even over the telephone .
While the administration is not legally bound by its answer,
should it prove to be erroneous, in practice the administration
legally stands by the position taken if the applicant relied
thereon in good faith.
Though not legally bound to do so, the administration often
does issue advance written rulings to accommodate taxpayers
who plan to conclude important contracts or to commence large
scale transactions . But this is a discretionary matter·. No
rules define the questions which will or will not be answered.
And in exercising discretion as to whether or not a ruling
should be issued, the administration is guided by the principle
that a taxpayer deserves the protection of a ruling only in cases
involving doubtful questions of law which impose an undue bur 
den on a taxpayer unable by himself to clarify the problem .
Further, rulings are never issued i n two types o f situations .
2 1 Most important of these ministries is the Ministry of E conomics .
Others likely to be invited , depending upon the nature of the questions
involved , are the ministries of Labor , Transport , Food and Agricul
ture.
22 See 2 . 5 supra .
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Requests involving an issue of fact are rejected; this type of
problem can be resolved only during a tax audit. Also reject
ed are requests for rulings with respect to transactions possi
bly inspired by tax avoidance possibilities .
Since no office is formally designated as a rulings office ,
requests may b e addressed to, and rulings issued by, the local
finance offices, Regional Finance Offices , State Finance Minis
tries, or the Federal Ministry of Finance . Each level may
answer a request submitted to it. But Regional Finance Offices
and State Finance Ministries will usually decide to refer the
matter to the local finance office which is responsible for the
applicant' s assessment and hence familiar with his circum
stances . In consequence, the local finance offices issue the
bulk of all income tax rulings . This means that most rulings
are prepared by officials who did not participate in any of the
preparatory work on the statute, the regulatory ordinances, or
the administrative regulations . However, if the question is of
fundamental importance or involves large sums, the final rul
ing will usually come from the Regional Finance Office or the
State Finance Ministry. The Federal Ministry of Finance avoids
becoming involved in ruling on specific cases, and tends to
rule only on abstract questions usually involving matters of
fairly wide significance . Should a State Finance Ministry re 
ceive a question of this caliber, it forwards it to the federal
level, 23 because the officials there have participated in the
preliminary work on the statutes, regulatory ordinances, and
administrative regulations .
In theory, an advance ruling is only an expert opinion of
the tax authorities . In preparing them, the officials strive to
formulate and adhere to the line of reasoning which would be
valid for the final decision on an ass essment.
In the abstract, an expert opinion does not legally bind the
tax administration. However, when a taxpayer obtains a ruling
on a particular set of facts, the ruling is treated as a decision
taken in anticipation of a subsequent assessment upon which the
taxpayer may rely. In other words , even if the administration
later concludes, on balance, that a different legal conclusion
should have been drawn, it will adhere to the position taken in
its ruling, regarding it as the equivalent of a promise . This
is based on the well-established principle of fair dealing, origi
nally developed under that part of the civil law which governs
2 3 This is in consequence of the constitutional status of the federal
states . See Chap. XIII, 1 . 1 , 1 .2 supra .
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However, if the ruling was
taxpayer-government relations .
clearly erroneous, the principle of fair dealing is not deemed
to override the competing principle, that no tax claim can be
subjected to arbitrary manipulation. Thus the administration
does not consider itself bound by clearly erroneous rulings it
had no power to issue .
The absence of legal provisions covering the status of rul
ings is causing increased dissatisfaction. Disputes between tax
authorities and taxpayers arise continuously over the degree
of reliance a taxpayer is entitled to place upon a ruling in a
given case. There is a widespread belief that a matter of
such great importance should be governed by statute, and the
Federal Government is planning to amend the Fiscal Code by
adding provisions to permit local finance offices to issue bind
ing advance rulings . The ruling will provide the basis of sub
sequent assessment provided there has been no change in the
facts as presented. To secure such a ruling, the taxpayer will
have to file a written application, describe the contemplated
transaction, and analyze the tax question. Oral conferences
with the issuing officials would be permitted, but in these the
taxpayer may not alter the facts as originally presented. Nor
need the local finance office audit the facts, though in suitaple
cases it may invite the applicant to supplement his presenta;..
tion of the facts . In any event, the ruling would be binding
only if all relevant facts were exposed and the transaction is
carried out as presented.
The ruling itself will include an analytical explanation. The
taxpayer will be informed also that the ruling may be appealed
to the appropriate fiscal court, from whence appeal lies to the
Federal Fiscal Court.
It is not contemplated that the procedure under the pro
posed statute would supersede the present practice. Moreover,
there is no plan to limit the areas in which binding rulings
would be issued. Because of the continuance of the present
practice and because it is proposed to charge for a ruling with
the added requirement that the request analyze the tax ques 
tions presented, a flood of requests is not anticipated.
At present, since most rulings are issued at the local level,
statistics are not available showing the number requested.
2 . 8 Informal technical advice to taxpayers on proposed trans 
actions

Authorities at all echelons typically are willing to discuss
informally any problem with a taxpayer. The importance of
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the question determines the level at which the discussions will
take place, however . If the case i s relatively unimportant,
higher-echelon authorities will refer the taxpayer to his local
finance office . Taxpayers, however, try to get their advice
from the higher echelons because of their fear that the local
office's view may not accord with that of the Regional Finance
Office and State Finance Ministry whose hierarchical status
entitles them to send instructions to the local offices. More 
over, local offices tend to be far more reluctant to render
definitive, albeit oral informal opinions, than the higher-eche
lon authorities with more extensive powers .
2 . 9 Technical advice to fie ld offices

The local finance offices have full autonomy to render de 
cisions on their own responsibility. They receive, however,
binding administrative instructions from the competent Regional
Finance Office , 24 which usually acts under directions given by
the State Finance Ministry, not on its own initiative .
State Finance Ministries are the highest level entitled to
give instructions to the local finance office . To insure uni
formity through the Federal Republic, heads of divisions (i.e . ,
income tax, wage tax, corporation income tax) of the several
State Finance Ministries frequently meet in the Federal Minis 
try of Finance to discuss interpretative questions under the
chairmanship of one of that Ministry's competent top officials .
C onclusions reached at such discussions are set out in minutes
which are not published, but are used by the State Finance
Ministries as the basis for instructions issued to the lower
level authorities on interpretative problems .
The more important instructions, however, are published
as general rulings, E rlasse, in the Federal Tax Gazette, Bundes 
s teuerb latt, the official publication of the Federal Ministry of
Finance which is available to the public . While published in
this manner, the instructions are not actually issued by the
Federal Ministry. Rather each State Finance Ministry has ex
clusive power to issue its own instructions in its jurisdictional
area. However, publication is usually discussed and decided
upon in the meetings held under federal auspices and the texts
of each state' s instructions ordinarily are drafted by the fed
eral officials and are more or less identical. Consequently
24 For practical reasons , the more important instructions are ar
ranged in card files which are supplemented regularly and kept up to
date. Thus officials of local finance offices can draw on a convenient
collection of important instructions to guide them in their work.
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these general rules are termed Coordinated Laender Rulings,
and appear as such in the Fede ral Tax Gaze tte .
It not infrequently happens that when the annual volume of
administrative regulations is issued, an important interpreta
tive question has not been clarified sufficiently. Rather than
wait until the next annual set of regulations is published, a
Coordinated Laende r Ruling can be issued in the interim.
While senior officials at the local finance office normally
have ultimate responsibility for any decision, upon encounter
ing a complicated question of tax law, it is under instructions
to refer the question to the Regional Finance Office which then
assumes responsibility for the decision. The referral is ac 
complished by submission of a detailed statement of the facts
and a legal analysis of the issues involved. The Regional Of
fice either will decide the question itself or, if it is a matter
of prime importance, refer it to the State Finance Ministry.
Should the State Finance Ministry consider the issue to be of
interest to the tax administrations of all the states or one
which should be the subject of future legislation, it will for
ward the question to the Federal Ministry of Finance .
Since the typical case referred to the Regional Finance
Office presents a difficult question of law which the local of
fice has explored extensively with the taxpayer, the taxpayer
customarily is informed that the matter has been sent to a
hi8'her-level authority. The taxpayer then is free to contact
and discuss his problem with the appropriate higher office,
whether it be the Regional Office, the State Finance Ministry,
or the Federal Ministry of Finance .
No information is available as to the number of cases sent
to the Regional Office by the local offices . In general, local
offices usually try to solve their own problems and secure high
er level decisions only in exceptional cases .
2 . 10 Publication of te chnical advice given taxpayers and local
offices
The Federal Tax Gaze tte publishes as rulings the instruc

tions State Finance Ministries send to all local finance offices,
instructions which normally stem out of concrete cases decid
ed by the same Ministries . When an instruction is derived
from a concrete case, the taxpayer' s name is omitted and the
solution shaped in terms of general application. Such an in
struction s ets out only one or two specific points decided, to
gether with a rough indication of the legal issues involved.
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The State Finance Ministries and the Federal Ministry of
Finance also issue information circulars, the more significant
of which are published in the Fede ral Tax Gazette .
Other information is made available to the public in vari
ous ways . For example, the tax administration annually pub
lishes standard profit margins for the most important types of
trade and commerce, as well as tables of normally recognized
depreciation rates . Less sophisticated information on topical
tax matters is provided through press conferences and news 
paper articles . Television and radio also are used. Whatever
the method of publication employed, effort is made to provide
not only the decision or conclusion but also the underlying ra
tionale.

CHAPTER XV
ASSESSMENT, REFUND, AND ADMINISTRATIVE
APPEAL PROCEDURES
Section A. Assessment and Audit P rocedure s
3 . 1 Introductory note

The assessment procedure begins with the filing of the tax
return by the taxpayer, and concludes when the local office is 
sues the formal notice of assessment which establishes the tax
due. In computing the amount, credit is given for the quarter
ly installment payments made by taxpayers during the asses s 
ment year . In addition t o stating the tax due, the assessment
notice s ets out the factors making up the tax base, such as
profits from business, income from other sources, personal
deductions , etc. The notice states where, when, and how the
tax is to be paid. Further, it specifies the points where the
assessment differs from the information return filed by th,e
taxpayer .
Since the tax depends upon the tax base, a taxpayer can
not challenge one and not the other.1 Should a taxpayer dis 
pute the assessed tax, he must protest the assessment notice
as a whole .
1 There is one exception to the general rule, i.e. , that the assess
ment notice constitutes the final determination of the tax on income
and that any challenge to either the tax base or the amount of tax
must be made to the entire assessment notice. This exception arises
when two or more persons jointly , most usually in the setting of a
partner ship or jointly owned property , carry on a business or are en
gaged in any other income-producing activity. It is unlikely that such
individuals will have identical income from other sources or identical
personal deductions. Moreover , their shares of the jointly derived in
come may differ .
Under such circumstances , a preliminary notice
dealing with such jointly derived income is sent to each of the partici
pants, settmg out the amount of tax each one owes on this particular
income. As the law requires , such tax base and such amount are es
tablished " separately and uniformly ."
This notice may be contested
separately by each taxpayer.
It must be contested if the taxpayer
does not want the amounts set out in the notice to be incorporated
into the subsequent assessment notice determining his total income
tax base and total tax liability. Moreover , if not contested on the
basis of the preliminary notice, it may not be contested when the final
assessment notice is received.
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If a taxpayer does disagree with the assessment, he must
make known his disagreement within a month. Failure to act
within that month renders the assessment incontestable unless
the taxpayer qualifies for a so-called c orrectin� assessment
because new facts or new evidence is discovered.
Generally,
even this type of correction is not possible after the period of
limitations (normally five years) has elapsed. Prior to the
expiration of the five -year period, if the Regional Office should
discover on examination -which in practice may be stimulated
by a request from the taxpayer himself-that the taxpayer re
ceived a higher assessment than was justified, the error will
be corrected. However, if upon such an examination an error
is discovered showing the taxpayer should have received a high
er assessment, no correction can be made.
The same assessment procedure is used for individuals
and juridical persons, such as corporations . 3 However, where
wages are withheld at the source, a simplified procedure is
used. 4
Tax assessments are signed by the head of the appropriate
branch at the local office, but the tax assessors within that of
fice do all the ass essment work. Since the head is kept fully
informed, the final signature represents not mere acquiescence
but participating responsibility.
To insure maximum uniformity in assessment and audit
procedures , within a local district and through the several units
2 Certain safeguards have been thrown up around the use of the
correcting assessment device. Absent the discovery of new facts or
new evidence , a correcting assessment exceeding the original one is
unenforceable unless accepted by the taxpayer-most unlikely circum
stance.
Moreover , the local office cannot claim facts or evidence
were newly discovered if they were in its own files but their rele
vance went unrecognized.
Should new facts or evidence in favor of
the government develop, the local office may reconsider the entire
assessment but the tax may not be decreased below the original
amount, C omparably , a decreased assessment is possible if new facts
or evidence in favor of the taxpayer are discovered in the course of
an audit or if mistakes are discovered in the course of a review by
the local office' s supervising authority. Thus , where an audit reveals
facts or evidence , partly in favor of the taxpayer and partly in favor
of the government-the situation which in point of fact is the most
usual one-the legal aspects of the entire assessment are reconsidered,
with the result that there is a redetermination of the tax base and the
amount of the tax, irrespective of the previous assessment. However ,
should the matter have been appealed , decisions rendered in the course
of such appeal procedures must be reckoned with.
3 See 3.2a infra .
4 see 3 . 2b infra .
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of government, there is continuing supervision at several lev
els . Over and above the assessing officials is the head of the
local office . In cases of particular c omplexity, he handles the
assessment personally, thus insuring maximum uniformity with
in his jurisdiction. The entire assessment procedure is super
vised by the head of the office , who himself participates in the
discussion of complex questions with the taxpayer, and both in
structs and coordinates the work of his subordinates . The Re 
gional Finance Office, in the course of its supervision of local
office activity, examines individual cases . State and Federal
audit authorities , technically separate but actually working to
gether with a high degree of cooperation, review the work of
local offices.
3 . 2a Details of assessment and audit procedures : In general
The formal assessment procedure, sketched in the preced
ing paragraphs, makes no provision for taxpayer self-assess 
ment. 5 The taxpayer merely files an information return. The
local office determines whether the taxpayer is liable for tax
and, if liable, the amount of tax due . In making such a deter 
mination, assessing authorities investigate all relevant factual
and legal aspects, taking account of all factors whether favor'
able to the government or to the taxpayer .
Return forms are sent by local offices to known taxpayers,
and others are reminded through public notices of their obliga
tion to file .6 Failure to file a return renders a taxpayer liable
to a fine up to a maximum of DM 5,000. 7 Also, in the event
5 C onsideration has been given to the introduction of self-assess
ment procedures in the Federal Republic of Germany . On an experi
mental basis , certain localities temporarily introduced the system.
Reactions varied. Tax consultants , on the whole, were unenthusiastic.
Local tax administration offices reported favorable comments, if only
for the reason that self-assessment released qualified staff members
from assessment work to auditing.
However , there were more un
favorable than favorable comments.
The complexity of the tax law
argued against computation by taxpayers of their own tax liabilities.
Moreover , it was pointed out that with the introduction of automatic
data processing , self-assessment would be obsolete.
If electronic
computers could compute the majority of the liabilities for an tax
payers , there was no need for taxpayers to compute their own taxes.
6 The Ordinance Regulating the Income Tax Law lists all cases
where income tax liability appears likely , and adds a requirement that
r eturns be filed by all such individuals . This list, however , is not of
major practical significance , as every individual requested to file a
tax return by the tax administration must do so.
7 Theoretically , failure to file is subj ect also to a prison term.
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of a definite refusal to file, the appropriate local office is
authorized to make an assessment based on an estimate.
The official form which a taxpayer must use , if properly
completed, should contain sufficient information to enable the
local office to determine the correct tax liability. 8 That of
fice is free, however, to seek additional data and, if it pro
poses to rely thereon, the taxpayer must be informed and given
opportunity to present his arguments .
Where a taxpayer derives profit from a business or in
come from rental properties, a supplementary return is re
quired, listing receipts, expenditures, deductions for deprecia
tion, etc. 9 Also a balance sheet, 10 prepared from business
records, must accompany the return where-as in the case of
business, agricultural or forestry pursuits, or service enter 
prises-net worth comparisons are used t o determine income.
Where a commercial balance- sheet is submitted by the taxpayer,
the figures shown on it, though acceptable from an accounting
point of view and correct from the standpoint of commercial
law, do not always conform to tax law requirements . Addition
al data and annotations must be supplied to adapt these figures
for tax purposes. Alternatively-and in practice, customarily
the taxpayer may submit a separate balance sheet prepared in
accordance with tax law requirements .
In any event, if the
records are based on double entry bookkeeping, a profit and
loss account must accompany the balance sheet. Finally, if
deemed necessary, the local office may require the taxpayer
to submit a principal account statement, Hauptabs chlu Bilber
sicht-i . e . , a horizontal breakdown of all accounts . 1 1 In theory,
any available business reports, including reports prepared by
certified public accountants , must accompany the return though,
in practice , only larger firms , particularly corporations, com
ply with the requirement-not waiting for a special request from
the office.
S where the taxpayer submits only estimates , necessary supporting
information must be supplied.
9 Taxpayers themselves often add clarifying data relative to cer
tain balance sheet items : for example, depreciation tables for indi
vidual assets , detailed breakdown of transitory b alance sheet items,
lists of new receivables and net payables , calculations concerning the
revaluation of assets and reserves , and explanatory notes.
10 This balance sheet may not be abbreviated , that is , the individ
ual items must be shown separately and may not be grouped together
or set off against each other.
11 It shows for each account the initial balances , accruals , and with
drawals , as well as the effect of each account on the profit and loss
account.
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Where a taxpayer used a licensed professional tax consult
ant to prepare the return or the attached information, the re
turn must state the consultant 's name and address . While the
local office generally can rely on the accuracy of the figures
reflected in such a return, and can assume the return con
forms to clearly established legal principles, it also recognizes
that sophisticated advisors will have resolved in favor of the
client any interpretative tax questions the answer to which may
not be wholly clear. Hence, returns prepared with professional
assistance are examined as thoroughly and carefully as any
other returns and inquiries are made whenever considered nee 
essary.
In examining a filed return, 12 a local office makes use
not only of the required supplementary data but also of the
permanent file it keeps on each taxpayer. These files are ex
tremely important, for they contain his prior years' returns, 13
the results of earlier audits, and the so-called cros s -check
memoranda, Kontrollmitte ilunger. Some cross -check memo
randa are obtained, on request, directly from firms which make
extensive fee payments to other taxpayers, e . g . , from broad
casting companies . The bulk of such memoranda, however,
come from the government' s own tax audit of enterprises which
transacted business with such other taxpayer. Illustratively,
the books of a business may show intermittent payments to a
payee who could indulge in tax avoidance through failure to re
port. An auditor, on noting such intermittent payments, pre
pares cross-check memoranda to place in the files of the
taxpayer-payees, thereby enabling the latters ' local offices, as
a matter of routine, to check to be sure such payments were
included in income .
Should questions arise concerning the accuracy of state
ments made in the return, the local office , in seeking additional
information from the taxpayer, 14 usually requests an oral
12 V ery rarely , the local office decides before the return is filed
to take emergency measures designed to insure proper collection of
the tax, i . e . , it may order that the inventories be checked during the
first few weeks of each year.
13 Thus the assessing official has before him the full tax history
of this particular taxpayer .
14 Circumstances creating such requests for additional data can in
clude situations where the basis for valuation of balance sheet items
is not clear or where the profit rate varies from the typical rate for
the particular trade or business. Such differences are apparent to the
assessor upon referring to the tables of standard profit rates published
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conference rather than a written explanatory statement. The
former is preferred, experience having shown that written re
plies are often so vague and incomplete as to be almost use 
less, and the oral conference enables tax officials t o gain an
understanding of the actual facts as well as some impression
of the taxpayer ' s reliability.
However, the local office may not request information or
records other than those the taxpayer can reasonably be ex
pected to furnish. Further, where it is necessary to look into
extensive business records and documents, this normally will
be accomplished on the taxpayer' s premises unless he himself
desires otherwise .
Since the taxpayer must declare in his return that the in
formation therein is correct and complete to the best of his
knowledge and belief, assessing officials commence their own
work on the assumption that the return itself and accompanying
documents are correct. Though the assessment process itself
involves at least some examination of the taxpayer ' s return,
accompanying documents, and permanent file, and oral discus 
sions with the taxpayer if necessary, the assessing official is
confronted with the necessity of completing his share of the
total assessments of a district within a given time . Hence,
other than in exceptional cases, the assessing official himself
does not have time to examine the books and accounts of those
taxpayers who submitted what appeared to be proper returns
and adequate supplementary statements . Nor in such cases
would he request third persons to supply information. In con
sequence of these practices, however, much of the assessment
work in the local office is supplemented by later audits , i . e . ,
extensive examinations of books and records, conducted o n the
taxpayer 's business premises, by other tax officials . Where
such a later tax audit is customary because of the size of the
business or where the assessing official dee ms such an audit
to be necessary, 15 the ass essor-if certain questions remain
open-will make a provisional assessment, postponing final de 
cision until completion of the audit. Modification of such pro
visional assessments is not subject to the restrictions applicable
to final assessments .
(footnote continued)
annually for a number of trades and occupations.
These tables indi
cate the typical mark-up and the rates of gross and net profits com
puted on the basis of turnover.
15 In rare instances , he alternatively may ask the so-called tax
committee , discussed in 3.3 infra, to handle the matter, rather than
the regular audit officials.
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The larger local offices maintain special audit sections
which audit both the large industrial enterprises in their dis 
tricts and comparable enterprises situated in nearby districts
if the local office there does not have similar specialized per
sonnel. Other specialists in these same larger local offices
audit agriculture and forestry operations .
Medium and small enterprises16 are audited by the regular
audit section, Betriebsprujung, in the typical local office, and
this staff audits similar enterprises in districts where the local
office does not maintain an audit section. Such an audit sec 
tion, subordinate to the head of the local office, is staffed with
men of a rank equivalent to those performing assessment func 
tions, the personnel of both sections being interchangeable . 17
As a general matter, audits cover only taxpayers who by
law are required to keep books and records (though such audits
may extend to such taxpayer 's e mployees-wage and salary
earners -past or present, particularly if there is some question
concerning proper withholding of the wage tax) . 1 8 In practice ,
this means that the audits are restricted to industrial o r com
mercial enterprises, independent professional offices, and the
larger agricultural and forestry establishments . In all other
cases, examination of returns is considered completed after
the investigation by the ass essing official and his superior, the
head of the branch who signs all assessments which exceed
DM 500.
Every large enterprise according to the law should be
audited at three-year intervals . In practice, however, because
of the shortage of personnel, these audits actually are c onduct
ed at about four -year intervals, but the fact that each such
audit commences where the prior one ended, means that all
transactions of each large enterprise are subjected to audit on
a continuing basis. By way of contrast, audits of medium and
s mall firms usually cover only the preceding three years, and
are made only after considerably longer intervals, the law not
16 Classification of enterprises as " small," " medium-sized ," and
"large" is governed by specific criteria.
Any business which falls
short of the standards required of a "small" business is classed as
a "very small" business.
17 Under an experimental program , designed to increase the scope
of audit coverage , assessors in some districts not only made the as
sessment , but also audited small enterprises . The results were gen
erally uns atisfactory , primarily because of the heavy burden of the
assessment work itself.
18 In addition, the wage tax staff of the local offke conducts wage
tax field audits.
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specifying any particular period. Medium-sized firms, again
taking the actual practice, are audited about every six and a
half years and small firms about every s eventeen years . Con
s equently, at least 50 percent of the returns filed by medium
sized businesses and at least 80 percent of those filed by s mall
business es are not audited. Note the following data for 1962:
Type of enterprise
Large Enterprises
Medium-Sized
Enterprises
Small Enterprises

Total
number

Number
audited

Number audited as a
percent of total

48,441

1 1 ,911

24.59%

314,360
737 ,576

51 ,166
42 ,814

16.28%
5 . 81%

Though tax audits normally follow a regular schedule, audits
also are made out of turn, especially when the period of limi
tations is about to expire, though even here account will be
taken of the probable amount of tax involved. Sometimes they
take place where the ass essor, on examining a particular re 
turn, questions a taxpayer ' s statements, with verification re
quiring thorough examinations of the books and records and,
perhaps, inspection of the business premises .
The auditor 's functions are strictly limited. He only in
vestigates the taxpayer 's books and records. It is the assessor
who draws the final conclusions from such an investigation, by
deciding all questions of law and fact in order to determine the
proper tax liability. The very nature of the task-i. e . , deciding
whether or not certain facts are to be regarded as having been
proved sufficiently or deciding between competing legal argu
ments as applied to a given set of facts -clearly makes it im
perative that the ass essor exercise his own judgment in fulfill
ing his responsibilities . Since the assessor has the ultimate
responsibility for the assessment, he usually is present at the
final discussion which concludes the audit, where the taxpayer
(and, perhaps, his consultant) confers with the auditing official
and his superior. If the case is an important one, the ass essor
is accompanied by his superior or even by the head of the local
office . If a particularly difficult question is involved, the audit
officials from the Regional Finance Office may participate .
This meeting is designed to explain to the taxpayer the
result of the audit, not to work out a compromise . The as 
sessor has absolutely no power to s ettle in the sense of split
ting or trading of issues; the judgment of the assessor includes
only the power to determine what is or is not taxable . It does
not include the power to compromise. The assessor, however,

336

GERMANY: ASSESSMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE A PPEALS

may see fit to state his views during the meeting so that the
taxpayer will know what changes the local office will make in
his assessment ( a correcting assessment) and the rationale in
support of the change .
3 . 2b Details of assessment and audit procedure s where taxe s
withheld at source

While taxes on several types of income are withheld at the
source, wage and salary earners constitute the largest single
group of individuals subject to such withholding. 1 9 Their tax
payments are deducted by their employers on the basis of wage
tax cards issued by the municipal authorities . The cards carry
all relevant personal data needed to compute the withholding
tax, being amended where circumstances change . 20 Each em
ployer must forward the proper amount to the local office at
proper intervals . 2 1 While the wage or salary earner is the
actual taxpayer, he can be held liable only if proper deductions
were not made or if he is aware of his employer's failure to
forward the correct amounts to the appropriate office .
Should the tax withheld exceed the amount due, 22 the ex
cess is refunded to the wage or salary earner under a special
1 9 Other types of income subject to withholding include dividerdt s
and directors.• fees. Also withholding is applied to royalties and inter
est paid nonresident s , the amount withheld being the final tax thereby
rendering a formal assessment unnecessary.
The same is true of
wages earned and, by a recent amendment , interest received by a non
resident. E arnings of foreign entities or of noncitizens , are subject
to unlimited tax liability if they are residents of Germany , and tax is
w ithheld on their earnings. If the earnings are attributable to a per
manent establishment situated in the F ederal Republic, a tormal as
sessment will take account of the amounts withheld.
20 where an individual expects his deductible expenses to exceed
the standard deduction, he may apply for an amendment of his wage
tax card reflecting the additional expenses. Should the circumstances
causing these additional expenses change , the taxpayer must have the
entries amended.
Should he neglect to do this , any resulting under
payment subsequently discovered is claimed by way of a special notice.
This notice , however , has no relationship to the assessment notice is
sued after a regular assessment.
2 1 To insure proper computation and retention, wage tax audits in
the field are carried out at regular intervals. Under the w ithholding
procedure the tax is computed and retained in respect to the actual
pay period-month, week, day-with special wage tax tables having been
drawn up on the basis of the income tax table.
22 This can occur for a number of reasons . For example, the wage
or salary earner may become entitled to higher allowances in the
course of the year because of changes in his family status . His wage
or salary may not be constant for all pay periods throughout the year.
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wage tax adjustment procedure, Lohnsteue r-Jahre sausgleich. If
the wage tax cards supply all necessary information, the local
office then credits the employers.
Millions of refunds are
handled in this way.
Where wage tax cards do not supply all the necessary data,
wage and salary earners entitled to refunds must make appli
cations for such to the appropriate local office . In 1963, of
the 2 3 . 8 million wage earners subjected to this withholding tax,
10 million or 42 percent obtained some refund from their local
offices on the basis of such applications .
The fact that tax is withheld from an individual's wage
does not always neutralize the need to make a formal assess
ment. Sometimes this is required simply because the salary
exceeds a certain amount, or because the taxpayer had more
than a de minimus amount of income from other sources . Under
other circumstances, taxpayers themselves may request assess
ment, e .g., where they have suffered net losses from other
sources of income . Should assessment be made under either
type of circumstance, the amount withheld is credited against
the amount declared due in the formal assessment notice . In
1961, out of the 3 . 277 million persons assessed for income tax,
43 percent were wage or salary earners, having been subject
to withholding at the source by their employers .
Section B . Adminis tra tive Appeals
3 . 3 Introductory note

German tax law provides two distinct types of administra
tive appeal for all income taxpayers, whether individual or
corporate.
The protest, Einspruch, is used for substantive
issues, the c omplaint, Beschwe rde , for discretionary matters
which in practice raise procedural issues . The taxpayer does
not choose between the remedie s ; the type of issue determines
the appeal to be employed.
Once a taxpayer has exhausted the protest unsuccessfully
at the local office level, he must turn to the courts for relief.
Where he must utilize the complaint, however, should the local
office deny relief, the taxpayer may have the whole matter re
ferred to the Regional Finance Office for a decision. Should
he be dissatisfied with that office's decision, he then must pro
ceed through the courts .
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3 . 4a Protest
The prime use of the protest is to challenge an assessment,
that is, to question whether tax liability exists at all or to
raise specific questions involving the tax base or the amount
of the tax. Its timely use prevents an assessment notice from
becoming final or, where there is jointly earned income as in
the case of a partnership, prevents the preliminary determina
tion notice from being incorporated in an unchallengeable as 
sessment notice .
Wage tax questions also may b e raised through the protest.
For example, a taxpayer may conclude he is entitled to a re 
fund exceeding that fixed by the local office, believing that of
fice erred in refusing to enter certain deductible amounts on
his wage tax card. Or he may feel that office was wrong in
contending that a deduction was entered incorrectly on the wage
tax card and consequently was wrong in asserting a tax defi
ciency.
Every effort has been made to simplify administrative pro
cedures, keeping them as flexible and uncomplicated as possi
ble, with formalities at a minimum. The one undeviating re
quirement is that the protest be filed within one month, but the
filing may be effected in a variety of ways . Though it may not
be telephoned, it may be written, in the form of a telegram,
or lodged orally with a local office official .
The law requires only that the protest state that the tax
payer disagrees with the local office ' s assessment. As a prac 
tical matter, however, the taxpayer should state the facts and
supporting evidence he proposes to use ; otherwise the local
office will not know the basis for his objection. In preparing
this protest, the taxpayer may use a consultant, who may have
assisted him earlier in the preparation of his return. How 
ever, very frequently a tax consultant i s called in only after
the taxpayer has decided to file a protest.
Once filed, the protests are handled at the local office .
Prior to January 1 , 1966, taxpayers could choose to have the
protest laid before the tax committee, attached to the local
finance office . 23
However, only one percent utilized this
(footnote continued)
The taxpayer' s deductible expenses in excess of his standard deduc
tion may not have been fully entered on his wage tax card.
23 One or more of these tax committees is attached to each local
office , with the head of the local office or his authorized agent acting
as chairman. otherwise, the membership consists of private citizens.
E ach of the communities located in the district of the finance office
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procedure, and this limited use caused the procedure itself to
be abolished. 24
While in some local offices it has been felt convenient to
establish special staffs to handle administrative appeals, the
great majority of protests are handled by the same officials
who prepared the original assessments, with a detailed review
by the same superior who bears the ultimate responsibility. It
is true that this superior approved the original assessment, but
his scrutiny of the assessor' s report on the protest goes far
beyond his somewhat routine check of the normal assessment
work.
The obvious question is how the taxpayer can hope to bene
fit from a protest if the decision on that protest and the re
view are made by the same officials who reached the original
(footnote continued)
is represented by one member nominated for a six-year term by the
elected governing body of his community. These member s participate
in deliberations and decisions of the committee with reference to tax
payers who have their residence or their business in the particular
community . In addition, the committee comprises two to four mem
bers who must be familiar with the specific conditions of the region
and experienced in business matters. They , too, are nominated for a
term of six years by the elected body of the self-governing political
subdivision representative of the communities located in the district
of the local office concerned. The head of the local office also is en
titled to name suitable persons after considering candidates proposed
by industrial, commercial , professional, or vocational associations ,
trade unions , farmers' unions , and the like.
The composition of the tax committee was one of the prime de
terrents to its use for the protest.
Most taxpayers were reluctant to
let the tax committee know the details of their personal and financial
transactions because of the nonofficial character of its members.
To constitute, for the purpose of the protest, a quorum of the
tax committee, at least two members in addition to the chairman must
have been present. Decisions were taken by majority vote, with the
chairman entitled to vote. In the event of a tie, he cast the deciding
vote. Decisions were not subj ect to instructions by the local office ,
but higher authorities-i.e. , the Regional Finance Office and the state
F inance Ministry-were entitled to be informed of cases before the tax
committee and to be heard in an advisory capacity. A taxpayer dis
satisfied with the committee's decision could then appeal to the courts .
In arriving at its conclusions , the tax committee had the same
authority and was subject to the same limitations as the local finance
office dealing with a protest.
24 A lthough the tax committee has lost the power to decide on a
protest , it remains in existence because of the remaining function-to
give advice in some rare instances of minor importance where the
local office should take advantage of the members' practical experi
ence.
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decision now being protested. The explanation lies in part in
the fact that the taxpayer knows that pressures of time and
shortages of personnel may have caused assessments to be
prepared on the basis of a relatively routine examination.
Moreover, the original assessment notice gave only the brief
est explanation of the local office ' s refusal to accept the tax
payer's statements . By protesting the conclusions of this notice,
the taxpayer, when the matter comes up for discussion, can
give the local office a detailed explanation of the facts, set out
the supporting evidence, and explore legal considerations . Both
parties are fully aware of how the original assessment is han
dled and the device of the protest provides an opportunity for
a full discussion of every possible relevant matter. Further,
when the local office renders its decision on the protest, it
evaluates all the taxpayer 's objections, whether relating to law
or to fact. Thus the taxpayer obtains a very detailed explana
tion of the considerations which led the local office to reach
its conclusions . Should he decide to contest the decision fur
ther-which only occurs in about four percent of the cases pro
tested, he can anticipate the arguments which the government
will advance in court.
Once the protest has been filed, the local office has full
jurisdiction, irrespective of whether the taxpayer has raised 'a
question of law, a question of fact, or a mixed question of law
and fact. It is not required to clear its decision with the Re 
gional Finance Office. Merely because the taxpayer protests
one part of the assessment notice does not restrict the local
office to a consideration of that point alone . The local office
may raise other issues not previously considered, or revise
its own former conclusions -giving the taxpayer more relief
than he requested or, contrariwise, asserting a higher tax than
that reflected in the original assess ment.
The finance office is required to decide the case in con
formity with the law . It is not authorized to render a decision
which would depart from what it thinks is appropriate both
from the factual and the legal points of view, merely because
it is in doubt as to the outcome of litigation. Thus, as to the
type of issue which a court necessarily would decide entirely
for one side or the other, the local office may not split the
issue on the basis of mutual concessions responsive to the
litigation hazards . Furthermore, it must render its decision
in conformity with its own convictions even if it fears that the
courts may hold different views on the subject matter, thus un
favorably prejudicing later cases where the facts are perhaps
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more in the government' s favor. But in practice there are
many questions of fact which by their nature cannot be pre 
cisely answered, or where complete substantiation is unavail
able, leaving room for the assessor to reach a decision which
he believes most closely approximates the actual facts of the
case and which at the same time will s ecure the consent of
the taxpayer who himself recognizes that he is unable to give
a more precise or more complete substantiation.
The annual number of all protests filed in the local offices
of the Federal Republic total between 450,000 and 500,000 and
about 40 percent of this total relate to individual and corporate
tax matters, 25 though the way in which the 40 percent breaks
down as between those two types of taxpayers is not known.
3 . 4b Complaint
Taxpayers must utilize another remedy, the complaint as
distinct from the protest, when the matter challenged involves
procedural rather than substantive questions .
Typical of the situations giving rise to the filing of a com
plaint is the case where a local office imposed a penalty (which
may be as high as ten percent of the tax) on the ground the
tax return was not filed within the prescribed period, and the
taxpayer argues the delay was excusable. Again, the complaint
would be used to contest a penalty imposed for late payment
of the tax (one percent for every month or fraction thereof} ;
or where a taxpayer and the local office disagree as to the
sufficiency of the installment payments an individual or cor
poration makes -the taxpayer' s income estimate for the current
year being somewhat less than the amount of income he re
ceived from such sources during the preceding year.
Like the protest, a complaint must be filed with the ap
propriate office within a one -month period. The absence of
formality with regard to the method of filing, the uncomplicated
and loose standards bearing on statements supporting the com
plaint, the freedom to use tax consultants, which characterize
the use of the protest, also characterize the use of the com
plaint. Also, upon the filing of complaint, it again is the local
office which sits as the reviewing agency. However, contrary
to the situation regarding protests, the issues covered by the
complaint procedure allow a certain discretion, for example, as
to the matter of penalties -the area where the most important
25 The remaining 60% relate to such other taxes as the capital tax ,
trade tax, turnover tax, inheritance tax, real estate tax, etc.

342

GERMANY: ASSESSMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE A PPEA LS

complaints originate . Should the local office deny the complaint,
another distinctive feature is that the whole case -with the local
office's comments thereon-is sent up to the Regional Finance
Office for a decision. Should the Regional Finance Office deny
the complaint in whole or in part, its formal decision may be
appealed by the taxpayer to the Fiscal Court. The number of
complaints filed annually, relating to income taxes , is not known .
Section c . Extent Administrative P roce ss ing of
Refund Claims Departs from Administrative
Processing of Assessments
3 . 5 Introductory note

In the United States, a taxpayer himself may initiate a re
evaluation of a finally assessed tax of an earlier year, provided
only he files a claim for refund within a three-year period. No
such procedure exists in Germany. German income tax law is
based exclusively on the ass essment procedure . The amount
of tax payable is formally stated in an assessment notice, after
having been computed on the basis of the local finance offic e ' s
investigations which took account o f evidence and arguments
both favorable and unfavorable to the taxpayer . Normally, once
the assessment notice has become final (within one month, ab
sent an administrative appeal), the tax is definitively fixed even
if an actual error was committed. Only in three instances
does Germany have a procedure which bears any resemblance
to the much more sweeping refund procedures available in the
United States . These are described below.
3 . 6 De tails regarding refund procedures

The first exception to the rule that, once an assessment
notice becomes final, corrections cannot be made, relates to
mere mechanical errors . For example, errors attributable to
typographical or arithmetical mistakes must be corrected by
the authorities automatically upon detection. However, the gov
ernment is subject to the five -year statute of limitations even
if the arithmetical error is to the government's detriment.
Second, an assessment notice which has become final can
be modified by a so-called correcting assessment. But this
means only that a change favoring the taxpayer is made if a
tax audit (initiated by the government) reveals new facts or
evidence in that taxpayer 's favor . 26 Most audits are conducted
26 See note 2 supra .
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in accordance with the overall audit program of the tax admin
istration or the local offi ce. Occasionally, a taxpayer himself
will request that an audit be made-a request which the tax ad
ministration or local office may or may not honor -but this
does not mean that the taxpayer himself can initiate a re 
evaluation of the case by filing a refund claim.
The third situation involves the procedure , discussed in
3 . 2b supra, relating to refunds owed wage and salary earners
who have been subjected to withholding at the source. For ex
ample, a given taxpayer may not have requested that the de
ductions shown on his wage card be adjusted in accordance
with the facts or he may have made such a request and the
request been erroneously denied. Under either set of circum
stances , at the end of the year, under this procedure, the tax
payer may file a claim requesting a refund. The local tax
office is in no way bound by its earlier decision, which in fact
only established the probable pattern of deductions and which
both parties recognized was subject to subsequent change .
Should the wage or salary earner be entitled to a refund, he
receives one. Thus, in one sense, the annual wage tax refund
permits a second independent review of decisions reached ear
lier-albeit by the same local office-with the possibility of a
change in its conclusion.
Since the annual wage tax refund procedure involves only
tax refunds and not collection of unpaid taxes, it might appear
to resemble the sweeping refund procedure followed in the
United States . However there is only a superficial similarity.
The wage tax refund procedure is actually deemed to be just a
part of a simplified method of colle cting taxes from a restrict
Whereas the standard
ed group-wage and salary earners .
assessment process results in the taxpayer' s being informed
of the amount he owes, this wage tax refund procedure simply
informs him that he paid, through withholding, more than what
is finally due . And, as pointed out earlier, once a taxpayer
receives the assessment, he has only one month to request
administrative reconsideration. Should he fail to file either a
timely protest or a complaint either as an end in itself or as
a prelude to court action, the amount of the tax-absent later
correcting assessment-is considered fixed. No administrative
appeal is possible simply by filing a claim for refund .
Finally, should a taxpayer secure a readjustment of his tax
liability through timely invocation of the administrative or judi
cial process, no formal application for a refund is necessary;
repayment of any sum owing is automatic.

CHAPTER XVI
RESOLUTION OF INTERPRETATIVE INCOME TAX
QUESTIONS BY INDEPENDENT TRIBUNALS
4 . 1 Introduction

Jurisdiction over tax cases is conferred only on special
courts designed for that sole purpose: 1 Fiscal Courts Finanz 
ge richte of the several states, Laenders, which deal with both
questions of fact and law, and the Federal Fiscal Court, Bunde s 
jinanznoj, which deals only with questions of law .
An act of October 6, 1965, effective January 1 , 1966, made
substantial changes in the procedures e mployed in the Fiscal
Courts, changes so dramatic that they have been said to insti
tute a new era in tax litigation. The statute provided that every
taxpayer may have any decision of the tax administration-in
cluding the ministries -reviewed by an independent tribunal. 2
Judicial procedures in tax cases also were conformed to those
utilized in other types of litigation. 3 Further to e mphasize the
judicial character of its proceedings , the governing statutory
provisions were removed from the Fiscal C ode and placed in
a separate statute . In consequence , no longer -as a mere in
cident to resolution of a dispute - may a Fiscal Court usurp the
administrator 's function on a de novo basis . More specifically,
taxpayers who institute proceedings against either the local or
regional Finance Office, through a remedy termed a revision,
do not now run the risk that a judgment favoring the govern
ment might be entered for an amount exceeding that in dispute.4
The taxpayer is free to sue the tax authorities for any
benefit to which he believes himself legally entitled, the only
requirement being that he set out facts which at least suggest
1 Including refund
2 The Basic Law

cases.
(Constitution) provides that any person who be
lieves that a public authority has infringed his rights can seek redress
from an independent tribunal.
3 See note 4 infra .
4 Previously , the Fiscal Courts were not limited to the adjudica
tive function of an independent tribunal. In cases coming before them ,
they could operate as if they were finance offices. No earlier finding
of a finance office was binding; a Fiscal Court could substitute its own
judgment as to the proper total assessment, in the manner of an ad
ministrative agency.
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detrimental impairment of his rights by application of law .
The suit is based upon the act or, very rarely, the refusal to
act of the tax authorities . Typically the taxpayer directs his
claim against the assessment as it stands after the decision
on his protest, either seeking cancellation of the assessment
as a whole or requesting a mere reduction in his assessment.
Occasionally, a taxpayer institutes proceedings to obtain from
the local finance office a decision which that office either
refused or failed to render.
A taxpayer also may seek a
declaratory judgment that a certain act of the tax authorities
is a nullity and void.
Except in small cases, with respect to which certain addi
tional restrictions are imposed, either the taxpayer or the
local finance office has one month in which to appeal the deci
sion of the Fiscal Court. Appeal lies to the Federal Fiscal
Court, normally by revision. However, complaint is the proper
remedy to secure review of a Fiscal Court decision on pro
cedural questions -such as the admission of parties to a pro
ceeding, wherever such decisions can be contested s eparately .
Ordinary tax litigation cannot be carried beyond the Fed
eral Fiscal Court. However, a constitutional complaint can be
taken within one month to the Federal Constitutional Court.
This remedy is available when a taxpayer believes that his
basic rights, as laid down in the Constitution, have been im
paired by statute, administrative act, or a decision of the Fis 
cal Courts ( e . g. , on the ground that there has been a violation
of the principle of equality before the law) . A procedural re
quirement is to the effect that a taxpayer must exhaust his
remedies in both the Fiscal Court and the Federal Fiscal
Courts before lodging a constitutional complaint with the Fed
eral Constitutional Court; it is waived only where an established
practice in the Fiscal Courts precludes any likelihood of a de 
cision favorable to the taxpayer.
A decision by the Federal Constitutional C ourt, holding a
statute, or decisions of the tax administration or of the Fiscal
Courts, incompatible with the Basic Law, renders the offending
statute or decision void. Within recent years, this Court has
declared unconstitutional a number of tax provisions, some of
a fundamental nature-such as one which treated husband and
wife as a unit for income tax purposes. In consequence, its
decisions have become of increasing significance to the daily
work of the tax authorities.
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Section A. Organization and Procedure s :
Trial Le ve l
4 . 2 Organization of the trial tribunals

The fifteen Fiscal Courts are completely independent state
tribunals, empowered to decide questions both of fact and law,
with appeal on questions of law alone lying to a federal tri
bunal, the Federal Fiscal Court.
Prior to the act of October 6, 1965, there was consider 
able variation from state to state in the organization of the
Fiscal Courts . The new law, however, s ets out uniform provi
sions , in force throughout the Federal Republic . It also up
graded the Fiscal Courts : they have been raised to the higher
of the two echelons of state courts and are the equal of the
Regional Appeal Courts which handle ordinary non-tax litiga
tion.
Each Fiscal Court is divided into so-called Senates , from
two to eight for each court, depending upon local requirements . 5
The jurisdiction of each Senate may be fixed by reference to any
one of several criteria: ( 1) geographical boundaries, (2) cate 
gories of taxable objects, such as real property or business
enterprises, or (3) types of taxes, that is, the individual in
come tax, the corporate income tax, etc . In each Senate, five
members form a quorum, three members of which must be
professional judges. The other two are honorary associate lay
judges . 6
Each Fiscal Court is headed by a professional judge-the
President of that particular court, who is appointed for life by
the state finance ministry. As President, he bears the admin
istrative responsibility for the overall functioning of the court.
In his capacity as a judge, he acts as presiding judge of one
or more Senates . His deputy is that President of a Senate who
has the highest seniority among the court members .
5 Prior to the upgrading of the F iscal Courts , these several intra
court divisions were termed chambers.
6 By increasing the professional judges from two to three, and re
ducing the lay judges from three to two , the preponderance of laymen
sitting on the Fiscal Courts has been eliminated. The earlier require
ment , that there be three lay judges, was designed to counterbalance
the tendency of F iscal Courts to side with the finance offices. The
change was made to more closely conform these courts to comparable
courts in other areas of law and in the belief that other structural
changes would preclude finance offices from exercising undue influ
ence,
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Senates not headed by the President of the Court are head
ed by professional judges with the rank of "President of Senate ."
They, like the associate judges of the several s enates , are ap
pointed for life 7 by the state finance minister . The Senate as
sociate judges possessing legal training 8 and carrying the title
of Fiscal Court Counselor, 9 are drawn from the tax adminis 
tration. However, once a senior tax official is appointed pro
fessional judge on a Fiscal C ourt, his connection with the tax
administration is completely severed. His new role requires
that he be completely independent of the tax administration.
But neither this, nor the fact that judges of the Fiscal Court
are drawn from the senior tax officials, means that service as
a judge is considered superior to that of the s enior officials.
The two are deemed equal in importance and are under the
same salary pattern.
As stated previously, the new statute requires that a Senate
quorum be composed of three professional and two lay judges .
Each Fiscal Court has a committee which elects the lay judges
for four-year terms . This nine-member selection committee ,
whose chairman i s the President o f the Senate, includes one
official from the state tax administration and seven citizens
"of confidence" selected by the legislative body of that state.
The lay judges are chosen by the committee from a list
of candidates proposed by the President of the Court after con
sultation with professional and trade organizations . The number
7 A ccording to the federal statutes , a judge may be appointed " on
probation."
8 Senior tax officials who are appointed to the lowest rank of the
tax judiciary typically will have passed the government' s senior level
legal examination which made them eligible at least to serve in legal
capacities or as senior civil servants.
While individuals who have
passed qualifying examinations in areas other than law-specifically ,
economics-are appointed to senior administrative posts , and theoreti
cally become eligible for appointment to the judiciary , such appoint
ments are very rare.
9 It is not y et clear what the Laender will do in supplementing
the new federal statute. Until the revision of the federal law , the fol
lowing state of affairs existed. Fiscal Court Counselor was the lowest
rank in the judicial hierarchy . An associate judge might be promoted
from that rank to that of Senior Fiscal Court C ounselor without any
change in duties. The next higher rank was that of a Fiscal Court
Director with the highest r ank that of Fiscal C ourt President. Typi
cally , the senior posts were filled through promotion of judge s , al
though in the early years of the Fiscal Court , senior tax officials were
appointed directly to the higher r anks if they occupied comparable
posts in the tax administration.
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of names on the proposed list is expected to be three times
the number of persons to be appointed, and the number appoint
ed is sufficiently large that no one will have to sit .on the Fis 
cal Court more than twelve days in any one year.
4.3 Processing case s through the trial tribunal

Every attempt is made to dispose of disputes at the admin
istrative level and it now resolves 96 percent of the total. In
keeping with this principle, a taxpayer -to invoke the jurisdic 
tion of a Fiscal Court-must show that he has exhausted the
administrative remedy. The one exception permitting the ad
ministrative procedures 10 to be bypassed, requires agreement
of the local finance office and this usually occurs only when
both parties recognize that administrative re-examination of
the case would be futile . Such a conclusion might be reached,
for example, where pre -assessment examination of the facts
was so thorough that it is unrealistic to expect new factual de 
velopments , leaving for resolution only questions of law as to
which neither party is prepared to yield. Direct appeal to the
Fiscal Court in such cases saves administrative time 11 and
also accelerates the point of time when a yet further appeal
can be made, if desired, to the Federal Fiscal Court.
,
Once the administrative process has ended, the taxpayer
has a month in which he may bring an action challenging the
assessment as it stands after the decision rendered on his pro 
test. But even where this is done, in theory the disputed tax
must be paid on the due date stated in the assessment notice ,
for the latter retains its vitality until altered o r set aside .
However, under the new law the local finance office may post
pone payment by suspending implementation of the assessment
notice. Moreover, that office is required to grant the taxpay
er's application for postponement whenever s erious doubt exists
as to the assessment's correctness or where payment would
have an unnecessarily harsh effect on the taxpayer. The Fiscal
Court, even before an action is brought, also may order a
postponement under these circumstances.
While a case, once brought, will be defended by the local
finance office unless convinced its own position is untenable,
10 The new law refers to the administrative procedure as a "pre
cursory procedure ," i.e . , precursory to the court proceedings proper.
11 Since the head of the finance office has the power to refuse or
to consent to such a direct appeal, he determines whether or not ad:..
ditional effort will be made to settle at the administrative level.
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invocation of the Fiscal Court 's jurisdiction does not prevent
either party or both from changing its position. 12 However,
this in no way alters the obligation of the tax administration
to resolve the issue in that manner which under the law seems
to be the right solution. Consequently, should the taxpayer
offer to concede more than appears justified to the administra
tion, such a concession could not be accepted . Obviously, then,
the taxpayer cannot hope to secure as a concession from the
tax administration any treatment to which, from the adminis 
tration' s point of view, he is not entitled under the law . Fur
ther, on the basis of its own re-examination, the finance office
may modify or replace the old assessment notice . In such
event, the taxpayer may proceed with his action in the Fiscal
Court under the new notice without having to re -process the
case through the administrative procedures. The taxpayer also
may withdraw his action at any time before the Fiscal Court's
decision becomes final but, once the oral hearing has been
held, only if the finance office agrees.
The higher levels within the tax administration are not
routinely informed of all cases moving from local finance of
fices to the Fiscal Courts . Only if a case has substantial sig
nificance are the higher echelons alerted.
They also keep
abreast of important Fiscal Court decisions ; these are published
by legal j ournals . Thus such officials are in a position to
make general suggestions to finance offices regarding the way
in which similar cases should be handled in the future .
In hearings before the Fiscal Courts, the tax administra
tion is represented by the local finance office, customarily by
its head or by his nominee who usually is a so-called senior
class official with legal training.
The taxpayer usually is represented at the hearing though
rarely by a lawyer. Typically, his representative is the tax
consultant or agent in tax matters who either assisted the tax
payer in preparing his return or first represented him at the
point discussions were held with the finance office . While tax
payers are entirely free to represent themselves before the
Fiscal Court, should the court conclude a given taxpayer is in
capable of protecting his own interests, the new law permits it
to require him to s ecure counsel.
Proceedings are as informal and flexible as possible, to
insure maximum expedition consistent with full protection of
the party' s rights . However, strict adherence is required with
12 Under the old law , once a case had been carried to the Fiscal
Court , the Fiscal Court assumed control and direction of the case.
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respect to the one requirement that actions be brought within
one month from receipt of the protest (or if the protest pro
cedure is waived, the assessment notice) which must advise the
taxpayer of ( 1) his right to bring an action,
the competent
court, and ( 3) the time limit to be observed . 1
As long as the one- month time limit is met, considerable
latitude is allowed with respect to the written statement which
the taxpayer must file with the Fiscal C ourt, regarding both
its form and the agency with which it is filed. Illustratively,
the requirement has been deemed fulfilled by (1 ) a telegram
s ent to the Fiscal Court, (2) a statement of claim filed with
the local finance office, or (3) an oral statement made by a
taxpayer to a competent official, either of the Fiscal C ourt or
the local finance office, who will make a formal record of the
taxpayer 's statement and see that it is properly filed.
Whatever the initial form of the statement, it must include
the names of the plaintiff and defendant, the administrative
notice which he disputes, and the subject at issue. The tax
payer, though not required to do so at this earlier stage, will
also expedite matters if he identifies the specific relief sought
and sets forth the facts and evidence supporting his claim, to
the end of making it obvious that his rights were in fact im
paired. In turn, the local finance office has no option but to
submit all available records, even those received after com
mencement of the suit. Failure to do so is ground for re
versal of revision. In practice, the documents submitted by
both the finance office and the taxpayer are equivalent to briefs .
Apart from the foregoing, the new law itself permits, but
does not require, other pleadings or statements prior to the
oral hearing which that law made an integral part of Fiscal
Court proceedings , l4 though such can be waived by agreement
of the parties . It also is possible for the court to issue a pre 
liminary determination before an oral hearing if it also informs
the taxpayer that (a) he may request such a hearing, and (b) that
if he fails to do so the decision set out in the preliminary

<f)

13 Should the taxpayer decide to sue the finance office for failure
to issue such a notice, he must wait six months after he has filed a
protest.
1 4 under the o ld law, the Fiscal Court had full discretion whether
to grant a taxpayer ' s request for an oral hearing, although in prac
tice the .request was granted. Under the new law, to prevent oral
hearings from becoming an undue burden on the parties and the tri
bunal , the latter seeks to dispose in advance of all preliminaries so
that one hearing is sufficient.
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notice will become final. Should an oral hearing then be ap
plied for within the prescribed time limit, the decision set out
in the preliminary notice becomes inoperative . At the hearing,
and prior to the final decision, the parties themselves are free
to introduce-and the court must take into account-new facts or
evidence now considered relevant though previously not brought
out during the administrative process -whether from ignorance,
accident, or a mistaken belief in their irrelevance .15 Witness 
e s may be used at the option of the parties or under the direc 
tion of the court. Neither party bears the burden of proof as
the prime concern of the court is to ascertain the true situation.
Whether or not the parties introduce new facts or evidence,
or waive an oral hearing, the court itself, in fulfilling its re
sponsibility to examine all relevant factual and legal aspects of
the case , must make its own inquiry, and in so doing is not
limited to matters of record. Indeed, it is expected to conduct
such an inquiry even if the parties agree as to the facts . In
consequence, the parties are not allowed to file formal stipula
tions of fact. To illustrate the practice: if the taxpayer, on
instituting the proceeding, filed only an abbreviated statement
regarding his claim, the court, through the presiding judge, may
request, for example, that he furnish additional explanation to
clarify apparent vagueness or to supplement the insufficient
factual data, to facilitate either determination of the facts or
appreciation of their significance. The court also may ask
either side to prepare a statement in response to matters stat
ed by the other side.
The court may base its judgment only on facts or evidence
presented in the course of the hearing. Thus, in those rare
instances where, to avoid delay, evidence is taken by a member
of the court prior to the hearing, such evidence must be laid
before the court during the hearing itself.
The particular relief which the taxpayer requests limits the
relief the Fiscal Court may grant. 16 Thus, without further ado,
15 F acts o r evidence not introduced b y the time the court hands
down its decision cannot later be relied upon to justify a correction
in the assessment.
16 Under the old statute , the Fiscal Court and the finance office
approached the case in the same manner : each reached its decision
on its appraisal of the taxpayer ' s entire situation , ignoring his par
ticular claim for relief.
Thus before J anuary 1 , 1966, the Fiscal
Court was authorized to hand down a decision granting more than he
had requested or it could change the decision of the finance office and
place the taxpayer in a worse position than he was before bringing his
case to the Fiscal Court.

352

GERMANY: INDE PENDENT TRIBUNA LS

it may not accord more favorable treatment than he requested.
But if the court believes the taxpayer actually is entitled to
additional relief, he must be so advised and at that point may
modify his petition. On the other hand, the court may not in
crease the contested tax beyond the total amount originally set
by the finance office . In other words, at worst his action will
be dismissed and the ass essment of the finance office upheld.
Then if the finance office concludes it treated the taxpayer too
liberally, it may issue a new assessment notice which the tax
payer then may contest. Finally, it is possible for the court
to conclude that, as to the question at issue, there are sound
reasons for reducing the tax as originally determined but that
other circumstances involving this taxpayer do justify a larger
amount. In such circumstances, the court confirms the origi
nal amount.
Every effort is made to minimize the time lag between the
date of the oral hearing and the date of judgment. The bare
decision itself may be read in court at the end of the hearing
or delivered in writing to the parties at a later date, usually
within a two-week period. In any event, within two weeks after
that bare decision is rendered, a complete written judgment
must be forwarded to the parties . This judgment, in addition
to the decision, sets forth the facts as determined by the court,
an analysis of the legal rationale on which the decision is based,
and information regarding further remedies available to the
parties . The statement regarding the facts includes also an
explanation of the weight attached to the several matters put in
evidence . The legal analysis also explains why the court re
j ected any given arguments advanced by the parties. In short,
the parties receive an exhaustive analysis of the facts and rele 
vant law. To minimize the burden on the court, however, a
statement of facts need not be included in the judgment where
the amount in controversy is less than DM 100. It need only
identify the points as to which the court differs from the re
sult reached in the administrative procedures .
Approximately 20,000 appeals are decided annually by the
fifteen Fiscal Courts in the Federal Republic . Between six and
eight thousand such appeals involve individual or corporate in
come tax cases.
Not all Fiscal Court decisions are published. The several
courts themselves select for publication in the Collection of
Fiscal Court De cisions the particular decisions they consider
of prime importance .
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In theory, a Fiscal Court decision has no precedent value
whatsoever, either as to the court which decided it or any
other court. However, as a practical matter, attention is given
to previous decisions, by both the court of decision and other
courts . Indeed, the judgments of the Fiscal Courts increasing
ly tend to discover prior decisions in developing the rationale
in support of the judgment.
Since the courts themselves independently select the deci
sions to be included in the Collection of Fiscal Court De cisions,
the mere fact of inclusion indicates that the c ourt of decision
believes this particular case is likely to influence future inter
pretations of the law.
Understandably, these decisions are
widely studied, further facilitating their use as precedents .
The tax administration itself provides no published clue as
to its reaction to an adverse decision. Though it may decide
not to appeal a particular judgment, it does not publish any in
dication of whether, in the future, it will follow the thrust of
that decision or continue to press for its original position.
Since a decision of a Fiscal Court, in theory at least, has
no precedent value in subsequent judicial proceedings, the de 
fending local finance office , on encountering a substantially
similar case, is wholly free to ignore the Fiscal Court deci
sion and proceed as if it were dealing with a case of first
impression. In practice, however, the local finance office tends,
when faced with a doubtful issue covered by an earlier deci
sion, to follow the court' s reasoning and adopt a similar posi
tion.
Section B. Organization and Procedure s :
Appe llate Tribunals
4 . 4 Organization of the appe llate court system

The highest court for tax matters is the Federal Fiscal
Court, located in Munich. Normally, its decisions are final;
they can be reversed only by the Federal Constitutional Court
if a taxpayer establishes that his constitutionally guaranteed
basic rights have been violated. The most usual case involves
a claim by the taxpayers of an impingement on his right to
equal treatment before the law.
The Federal Fiscal Court consists of a President, Vice
President, five presiding judges of the Senates , and about thirty
five judges . Members of the court must be at least thirty-five
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years of age . In practice, almost every member is qualified
to hold a judicial post. 17
Persons appointed are thoroughly familiar with tax law and
business economics, having had substantial practical experience
in tax matters. They will have served in the federal or state
tax administrations, 1 8 on lower Fiscal Courts, or as tax con
sultants or tax lawyers. Occasionally, however, judges from
other branches of the judiciary are appointed to the Federal
Fiscal Court, thus enriching it with their knowledge of other
legal areas .
All Federal Fiscal Court judges are appointed for life by
the Federal President after election by a special committee .
The Federal Minister of Finance appoints the other officials of
the court: clerks, registrars, and about ten junior legal offi
cers. Appointments as President, Vice-President, or presiding
judge of a Senate are made from judges previously appointed.
The committee which elects the judges of the Federal Fis 
cal Court consists of twenty-three members : the Federal Min
ister of Finance, the eleven State Finance Ministers, and eleven
others appointed by the Bundestag, Parliament. These latter
eleven are recommended by the political parties represented in
the Bundestag. The Committee's election of judges takes place
in secret and is presided over by the Federal Ministe:r: of
Finance . Although he does not vote, he does exercise a veto
power.
The Federal Fiscal Court, for operating purposes, is di
vided into Senates , the number at any one time depending upon
current requirements as determined by the Federal Minister
of Finance . At present there are seven Senates , in addition to
Six members of the latter are
the so-called Great Senate.
chosen by the court' s governing board which is made up of the
President of the Court, the presiding judges of the several
Senates , and the two judges with the highest seniority. Deci
sions are reached by majority vote, with the President casting
the deciding vote in case of a tie .
17 The relatively rare judicial appointee who does not possess the
r equisite formal qualification will have the qualification necessary for
a senior administrative post or will have been for at least three years
a professional judge of a Fiscal Court.
1 8 once appointed to the bench, a j udge may not serve the tax ad
ministration in any capacity. In an earlier period , it was feared that
judges with a tax administration background might be prejudiced against
taxpayers. This fear has proved groundless.
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The court's governing board also des ignates the members
and their deputies of the other several Senates , though on occa

sion one j udge may be a member of several Senates.

Further,

a year in advance each Senate is assigned responsib ility for a
particular group of taxes -though this ass ignment tends to con
tinue y ear after year -and the scope of the responsibility is not
changed

during

the

year except where necessary to

equalize

the work load among the several Senates or to accommodate a
particular Senate, the work of which has been adversely affect
ed by illnes s , etc . , of one or more judge s .
Before

each year begins, the

President o f the

lects the Senate over which he intends to presid e .

Court s e 
The Presi

dent and the presiding judges determine by maj ority vote which
will preside

judges

over which Senates .

Within each Senate,

the pres iding judge allocates all business before
gins .

the year be

As in the case of the inter-Senate allocations, no change

is permitted except where required by work pressures or per 
sonnel change s .
The statute requires

that five judges sit i n every case . 19

Three j udges decide on those questions which raise preliminary
or peripheral questions , normally of a procedural nature .
The seven-member Great Senate,
dent of the

Senate

and the

20

six judges

made up of the Presi
elected by the

court ' s

governing board, must render the decision whenever one Senate
21
More 
does not wish to follow any decision of another Senate .
over, any Senate may refer to the Great Senate a case involv
ing an important question of law, considered s ignificant to the
development of either a legal principle or consistency in judi
cial decis ions .

Where a Senate does refer a case to the Great

Senate , which happens about five times a year, one of its own
members s its

with

the

latter,

participates

in the discuss ion,

and votes on the disposition of that particular c as e .

Should a

tie develop, the Pres ident of the Court casts the deciding vote .

4. 5 Processing a case through the appellate tribunal
An appeal-termed a revis ion-to the Federal Fiscal Court
may be

entered by

e ither the taxpayer or

the

local finance

19 The law formerly in force required that a minimum of five judges
sit in each case.
20 Under the old law , the number of members of the Great Senate
depended upon the number of Senates.
Now the number is fixed per
manently .
21 The old law required only that the Great Senate decide all cases
where a Senate did not wish to follow a published decision of another
Senate.
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office , but only with respect to questions of law. The Federal
C ourt must accept the facts as determined by the lower tri
bunal; new facts or new evidence cannot be introduced. The
court is bound by the facts as found by the lower court unless
the error of fact is so dreadful and enormous that in the find
ing of the facts, the law itself was violated. Thus, it is possi
ble to support a revision on the ground that the trial tribunal
did not comply with the law when it determined the facts of
the cas e . Illustratively, a taxpayer may request a revision,
alleging that the lower Fiscal Court violated the law in not in
vestigating the facts for itself as required.
The Federal Fiscal Court is not restricted to those issues
of law specifically pleaded by the taxpayer. It is free to con
sider, at its discretion, any issues of law it believes emerge
from the facts . Procedural defects, however, must be specifi
cally pleaded.
A taxpayer may bring an action of revision if the amount
in controversy exceeds DM 1 ,000 or if the trial tribunal grant
ed permission to apply for a revision. And that tribunal is to
grant such permission if:
( 1) The legal issue raised is of fundamental importance ;
(2) The judgment does not follow a previous decision hand

ed down by the Federal Fiscal Court, or

(3) It is alleged that the judgment was bottomed on a pro
22

cedural defect.

If the trial tribunal concludes that a taxpayer 's application
for a revision, which in practice contains a careful analysis of
the rationale underlying his claim, does not fall in any one of
these three categories and denies his request, the taxpayer is
entitled to have the Federal Fiscal Court review that procedural
determination.
The Federal Fiscal Court, in then deciding
whether or not to grant the request for a revision, need not
explain its decision, even if adverse to the taxpayer, so long
as ( 1) all participatil'g judges agree and (2) the taxpayer had
an opportunity to state his views as to why he should be per
mitted to file a revision.
22 The new statute reduced the discretion of the Fiscal Court. Pre
viously , the Fiscal Court was supposed to grant permission to file an
application if the matter was considered to be of fundamental impor
tance. This single but relatively demanding standard was impo sed in
an effort to reduce the volume of work handled by the F ederal Fiscal
C ourt in the belief that minor cases lacking any legal significance
were dealt with satisfactorily by the lower-level Fiscal Courts.
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The Federal Fiscal Court can decide a case brought be
fore it on revis ion only if it concludes that all of the essential
facts were determined by the court below. Should it conclude
further fact finding is necessary, the case must be sent back
to the lower Fiscal C ourt for a new trial and decis ion, 23 for
the Federal Fiscal Court may decide only questions of law .
Also, should it disagree with the rationale on which a lower
court rested but conclude that the decision itself was sound for
other reasons, it must refer the matter back to the lower
court. This requirement is designed to safeguard the taxpay
er 's interests , by assuring him of an opportunity to discuss
before a trial court all aspects relevant24 to the different rea
sons which influenced the Federal Fiscal Court.
Except for the foregoing, the procedural rules which gov
erned the lower Fiscal C ourts apply also to the Federal Fiscal
Court. For example , though taxpayers typically use lawyers
expert in tax matters to represent them in revision proceed
ings , in theory every taxpayer is free to appear and represent
himself. Here too, however, the court may order the taxpayer
to employ a representative if it believes he is unable to de 
fend properly his own interests . 25
On the government's side, the question of whether to ap
peal an adverse lower court decision rests with the head of
the local finance office which originally issued the contested
assessment notice . Typically, the individual who makes such
a decision is a senior class tax official with legal training.
Occasionally, those who supervise a local finance office may
instruct it to seek a revision, but this is unusual. Even less
frequently will the state finance ministry or the Federal Finance
Ministry join the proceedings on their own initiative . If they
do join, they are in the same position as the local finance of
fice and the taxpayer : they are separate parties to the pro
ceedings . In some instances, the Federal Fiscal Court itself
23 Under the old law , the Federal Fiscal Court had the power in
theory to conduct its own fact-finding investigation. In practice, how
ever , this power was rarely utilized.
24 It is no longer pos sible , as it was in the past , to refer the case
back to the finance office.
25 Prior to J anuary 1 , 1966 , a taxpayer ' s freedom to appear pro se
The modification incorporated into the new statute
was unlimited.
was a compromise following extensive debates in the Bundestag. Some
argued that taxpayers should be required to have representatives be
fore this tribunal, and that such representation be restricted to cer
tain groups of experts . These arguments were rej ected.
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may seek the views of either ministry by inviting either or
both to join the proceedings . Such an invitation usually is ex
tended when the court is faced with a question of far- reaching
or fundamental importance to the development of the tax law .
Rather frequently, the state finance ministers decline to j oin
such proceedings . The Federal Finance Ministry is much more
likely to accept the invitation, particularly if it appears that
the final decision may affect future legislation or administra
tive regulations .
Should either ministry join the revision proceedings, the
head of the appropriate section represents it. However, he
will not interfere with the presentation of the case by the local
finance office ; but he will focus primarily on the ministry's
estimate regarding the overall importance of the issues .
The local finance office usually is represented either by
its head or by an official designated by him. Typically, this
is the same person who handled the matter before the trial
court and who continues to handle the case for the finance of
fice until a final decision has been reached.
The parties have one month, from the date they received
notice of the trial court' s final judgment, within which to file
a request for revision with the Federal Fiscal Court. They
then have another month in which to file supporting state 
ments . 26
The request for revision must identify the specific relief
s ought, the statutory provision or legal rule which the party
believes to have been infringed, and procedural defects , if any,
on which he relies. Noncompliance with these rules will cause
the court to rej ect the revision.
Provisions regarding oral hearings before the lower Fiscal
Courts apply also to the Federal Fiscal C ourt. Thus there
must be such a hearing, unless the parties agree to waive it.
But, like the lower court, the Federal Fiscal C ourt retains the
power to issue a preliminary notice without an oral hearing,
provided the taxpayer is given one month before the notice be
comes final within which to request an oral hearing.
In 1964 the Federal Fiscal Court dealt with almost 2 ,000
legal complaints, of which 39 percent (780) dealt with individ
ual and corporate income tax questions . Of the 2 ,000, approxi
mately 8 percent ( 1 60) were quashed because the amount in
controversy was too small, 50 percent ( 1 ,000) were dismissed
26 Upon application, the presiding judge of the Senate may extend
these time limits.
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for being unfounded, that is dismissed on the merits,27 2 5 per 
cent ( 500} were referred back to the lower courts, and final
decisions were rendered in 17 percent (340} .
Theoretically, decisions handed down by one Senate do not
constitute precedents even for future cases which may come
before it. However, the court itself classifies certain deci
sions as having fundamental importance .
This includes any
Senate 's decision believed to be important and so well founded
that it may be considered as a guide in pending or future
cases . In practice, other Senates must respect these prece
dents . One Senate cannot deviate from such a decision coming
from another Senate unless consent is given by the deciding
Senate . Should consent be refused, the Senate seeking to over
rule the earlier decision must refer the question of law, together
with its own legal opinions , to the Great Senate . The Great
Senate decides the matter, and its decision binds all the Senates .
The Federal Fiscal C ourt publishes two groups of deci
sions : ( 1} the previously mentioned decisions of fundamental
importance, and (2} other decisions believed to be of general
interest. However, it will postpone publication of a decision
of fundamental importance if it expects in the near future
( 1 } that other Senates will deal with comparable cases or ( 2} that
authoritative discussions of the problem by legal writers will
appear. Delay of publication in these circumstances makes it
easier for the particular decision-making Senate later to change
its position if such a change seems to be warranted.
Published decisions appear in a special s ection of the Fed
e ral Tax Gazette , Bundessteue rblatt.
This is issued as the
need arises -three or four times a month-and is available to
the public . Decisions of fundamental importance are marked,
and to facilitate reference, all published decisions appear under
subject matter headings .
In practice, all lower courts, whatever their formal obliga
tion to rely upon and follow their own legal opinions almost
invariably are guided by the published decisions of the Federal
Fiscal Court, absent circumstances which suggest that the
2 7 The question may be raised as to why taxpayers-when approxi
mately 5 0% of all complaints brought to the Federal Fiscal Court were
dismissed on the merits-take the trouble to process a complaint.
B asically , taxpayers feel it is worth the chance . The court costs are
low. The F ederal Fiscal Court is accessible. Attorneys' costs on
the whole are low and depend entirely on the complexity of the case.
Moreover , taxpayers tend to feel that taxes should be contested wher
ever there is any reason for so doing.
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Federal Fiscal Court will overrule its earlier decision. Obvi
ously, this will not be anticipated where an earlier position has
been reaffirmed rec ently by the Federal Fiscal Court, particu
larly if such reaffirmation occurs when either the earlier de 
cision or the trend of thought it reflects has been attacked by
legal writers .
In theory, the tax authorities, like the courts, are free to
ignore the decisions of the Federal Fiscal Court but in prac 
tice tend to follow them. Understandably, again like the courts ,
greater weight is accorded published decisions, especially those
considered to be of fundamental importance.
Interpretations the tax administration sets out in adminis 
trative instructions and regulations pertaining to individual or
corporate income taxes (or to the wage tax) are frequently fol
lowed by the phrase, "subject to contrary appellate opinion."
This is intended only to remind tax officials that they are ex
pected to take into account any subsequent contrary decision
handed down by the Federal Fiscal C ourt. Indeed, the regula
tions themselves are based in large part on Federal Fiscal
Court decisions. By incorporating the principles of selected
decisions, the tax administration indirectly indicates which judi
cial pronouncements the tax administration believes should
henceforth control points heretofore in dispute .
Otherwise ,
however, the tax administration does not publish its view r e 
garding any court decision. On occasion, however , the admin
istration does decide to relitigate an adverse Federal Fiscal
Court decision in a similar fact situation. In such event, local
finance offices are told to act on the basis of administrative
pronouncements, not on the basis of the contrary decision.

PART FIVE
GREAT BRITAIN
by

James Arthur Johnstone

CHAPTER XVII
ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONAL AND
PERSONNEL FRAMEWORKS
Section A.

Adminis trative Organizational
Framework

1 . 1 Introduction
In the United Kingdom the income tax is placed, by statute,
under the care and management of the Board of Inland Revenue,
that is, all the processes leading to the ascertainment and en
forcement of taxpayers ' liabilities are initiated and controlled
by officials of the Inland Revenue Department over which the
Board preside . The staff of the Department consists wholly of
civil servants, recruited by the same general procedures as
the officials of other departments of the central government.
The members of the Board themselves are civil servants and
not political appointees; and the political responsibility to Par
liament for the work of the Department rests with the Chan
cellor of the Exchequer (the title given in the United Kingdom
to the member of the Cabinet in charge of Treasury problems) .
As will be seen in Chapter XX infra, certain independent
authorities play a part in determining the legal liability in par
ticular cases where the taxpayer disputes the calculation of
the amount of tax for which the Inland Revenue Department
proposes to hold him responsible. But the intervention of those
authorities must be regarded as the exercise of a judicial func 
tion, and to that extent those authorities stand apart from the
Inland Revenue Department, considered as an executive agency .
The organizational framework of those authorities, therefore ,
i s outside the scope o f the present Chapter . Further, i n keep
ing with the dominant purpose of this volume only those organs
of the Department are described which contribute in some way
to the resolution of substantive interpretative tax questions .
This principle of selection requires that reference first be
made to agencies in the field which undertake the bulk of the
work of assessing income tax liabilities, namely, the local Tax
Office s . The broad principle of organization followed is to as 
sign responsibility to a Tax Office operating in the geographi
cal area where the source of income in question is found .
363
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The business profits of a shopkeeper, for instance , are as 
sessed by the Tax Office for the area where his shop is located,
and so on.
However, when the total income of an individual taxpayer
from all sources exceeds a specified limit, the locally assessed
income tax is not the end of his liability. He is liable, in ad
dition, to a further charge, arrived at by applying a graduated
scale of complementary tax rates to his total income less
authorized deductions . In the cases affected, this complemen
tary charge-known as surtax-is in reality a deferred install
ment of income tax. The work of assessing this surtax has
been assigned, not to the local Tax Offices , but to a distinct
branch at headquarters, covering the whole country and called
the Surtax Office . 1
Because of the function just described, the Surtax Office
must handle, in relation to surtax, substantive interpretative
tax questions closely analogous to those arising for decision in
local Tax Offices . Consequently its organizational framework
does fall within the scope of the present Chapter. 2
Surtax, being a graduated complementary tax only on indi
viduals with a sufficiently large income, does not affect the
liability of corporate bodies . 3 But corporate bodies (and nota
bly limited liability companies) which carry on a trade or busi
ness are liable to a profits tax on their income, in addition to
the income tax they suffer in common with natural persons . 4

1 It was called formerly the Office of the Special Commissioners
because, before the recent legislation clarifying the division of assess
ing and appellate functions , the formal responsibility for final approval
of the estimates of liability prepared by Inland Revenue officials em
ployed there rested with the Special Commissioners , the appellate body
described in Chap. XX , 4.2b infra .
2 A ccount will be taken also in Chaps. XVIII-XX of procedures in
volving the Surtax Office to the extent that they diverge in principle
from the procedures affecting local Tax Offices.
3 See, however , Chap. XX, 4.2c infra, for a r eference to legisla
tion under which surtax assessed on shareholders in certain companies
may be collected from the companies.
4 The system of taxing companies was altered considerably by the
Finance A ct of 1965. The income of companies was made subj ect to
a new corporation tax (instead of income tax and profits tax) , but in
come tax-with surtax-remained the tax on the income of individuals.
From April 1966 onward , companies were made accountable for in
come tax withheld on the payment of dividends. The A ct of 1965 also
introduced a capital gains tax. Despite these changes , the procedure
described in the text as existing before the 1965 legislation remains
generally applicable,
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This complementary tax on corporate bodies is not, however,
handled by any separate office of the Inland Revenue Depart
ment for computation of such a body 's liability to profits tax
is in the hands of the same local Tax Office which bears re 
sponsibility for assessment of the income tax.
In summary, the organizational framework of the Inland
Revenue Department, relevant as essential background to any
study of the processes by which interpretative tax questions
are resolved, would include the following: first, the network of
local Tax Offices , together with the higher ec helons by which
the activities of those Offices are directed, supervised, and co
ordinated: secondly, the Surtax Office; and thirdly, the organi
zation through which the Board discharge their responsibility
of undertaking the care and management of the taxes involved.

1 . 2 Organizational framework, national office leve l

The whole organization of the Department centers round
the Board. The head of the entire Department is the Chair
man of the Board; he is assisted by two Deputy C hairmen and
by four other Board members .
The Board exercise their function of management through
their s ecretariat (known as the Secretaries ' Office ) at head
quarters . Parts of this latter office are concerned with areas
not relevant here, such as personnel management, but one divi
sian which is significant here is known as the Stamps and
Taxes Division. It is to this Division that the Board look pri
marily for advice and recommendations regarding the general
administrative management of the Department. This same Di
vision also handles the day-to-day correspondence sent to the
Board and deals with important questions raised by the public
or by the various branches and offices of the Department.
On specifically legal questions the Board are advised by
their Solicitors ' Offices ( one in London, and another in Edin
burgh, required because of differences in the legal system of
Scotland and that of the rest of the United Kingdom) . The staff
of the Solicitors ' Offices are available to conduct litigation on
behalf of the Department .
The higher direction of the work of the local Tax Offices
is entrusted to the Office of the C hief Inspector of Taxes . The
Chief Inspector is the official head of the service in the field,
that is, the corps of Inspectors of Taxes and their supporting
staffs who man the local Tax Offices ; in his headquarters of
fice in London he is assisted by two Deputy Chief Inspectors
and by a number of other officials , drawn from the field service
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but posted to headquarters for various specialist functions . In
the main, these specialists have the task of furnishing guidance
about the application of tax legislation to particular situations
or particular classes of taxpayers thought to deserve separate
study, whether because of inherent complexity or for any other
reason. Illustratively, one small section of the Office contains
the expert adviser on the grant of double taxation relief by way
of credit when income derived by a United Kingdom taxpayer
from an overseas country has already suffered tax in that
country under the local tax legislation. Another example of a
class of taxpayers requiring such expertise are companies
which engage in life assurance busines s . But apart from those
readily understood cases of specialization, two sections of the
Chief Inspector ' s Office deserve particular mention here:

( 1) The Organization Group is concerned with all matters

of general organization, including the control of work
processes, in local Tax Offices, and contains the unit
which prepares periodic amendments to the code of de
partmental instructions supplied to those Offices and
mimeographed circulars supplying guidance on new
problems, including those arising from new legislation
or court decisions interpreting existing legislation. ,

(2) The Inspectors of Taxes serving in the Special Appeals
Section are available to present the Department' s case
in certain appeal proceedings before the Special Com
missioners when it seems useful to call them in. For
example, the appeal may relate to the income tax lia
bility of a taxpayer in a provincial town: had the appeal
hearing taken place locally the District Inspector in
charge of the taxpayer ' s local Tax Office might have
been expected to present the Department's case, but if
the taxpayer has asked for the hearing to take place in
London (because, for example , he has engaged a lawyer
practicing in London to present his own side of the
case), it may be more convenient to entrust the repre 
sentation of the Department to the London-based Special
Appeals Section.
One group of specialists at headquarters has long been
concerned with the part of the tax code relating to superannua
tion funds and other arrangements for the payment of retire
ment pensions . Until recently, these specialists operated as
part of the Chief Inspector's Office, but for a variety of reasons
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it has now been thought more convenient to reorganize the
group as a s eparate unit immediately responsible to the Board
through their secretariat. This change in formal responsibility
does not, however, imply any change in the work of the unit.
To conclude this survey of organization at national office
level, it must be recalled that (as previously pointed out) the
assessment of surtax is· in the hands of a single central office
for the whole country, the Surtax Office . That Office comprises
a number of executive s ections which examine the returns of
income made by individual taxpayers . The work of officials in
the executive sections is under the supervision of a hierarchy
of officials of senior rank; and the office also includes the
following:
( 1) An Organization Section which advises on office pro
cedures and the design of forms , and
(2) An Intelligence Division which keeps a record of im
portant decisions of general application and assists the
top management with advice on the technical content of
the instructions to be issued to the staff of the execu
tive s ections .
1 . 3 Organizational framework, regional office le ve l
A noteworthy characteristic of the organizational frame 
work of the Inland Revenue Department, s o far as the adminis 
tration of income tax and profits tax is concerned, is the
absence of any formally constituted regional offices standing
between the national headquarters and the various local Tax
Offices . The creation of any such regional offices would be
contrary to the deliberate policy of delegating the maximum
degree of responsibility to District Inspectors in charge of
local Tax Office s. There is no room for any larger degree of
delegation to an intermediate authority. The District Inspector
is responsible to the Department for the efficient running of
his Tax Office , and although he has to conform to the general
instructions issued from headquarters, his independence is a
real one .
It is, nevertheles s , recognized that some aspects of the
work of local Tax Offices make desirable a link between those
offices and the Chief Inspector at headquarter s . This is pro
vided by the appointment of Inspecting Officers, each having
the oversight of a particular group of local Tax Offices . Through
the Inspecting Officers, the Chief Inspector can keep himself
informed of the general progress of work in the local Tax
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Offices .
To provide this information, the Inspecting Officer
makes regular inspection visits to the Offices in his group and
H e also
keeps in close touch with the District Inspectors .
plays an important part in the machinery of promotion by means
of reports on the staff in his area. But he does not displace
the headquarters specialists as the source to which the District
Inspector would normally look for technical guidance in resolv
ing substantive interpretative tax questions (though he might
well be brought into consultation if the resolution of such a
question gave rise to problems in ensuring that a c ommon poli
cy was adopted on a matter affecting several Tax Offices in
the same locality) .
It has already been noted that the separate legal system in
Scotland accounts for the existence of a separate Solicitor' s
Office in Edinburgh which handles any legal problems requir
ing familiarity with the laws of that country .
Side by side
with this separate Solicitor' s Office there exists the Office of
the Comptroller of Stamps and Taxes . This latter Office has
a variety of duties (e.g., in connection with receiving and ac 
counting for tax payments) which are outside the scope of this
study, but for the purpose of the current discussion the feature
to be noted is that the Office undertakes, in Scotland, much of
the work that for the rest of the United Kingdom is undertaken
by the Stamps and Taxes Division of the Secretarie s ' Office .
It would, however, be misleading to categorize the Office of
the Comptroller as corresponding in any sense to a regional
office of the kind found in other government departments . The
C omptroller reports directly to the Board, and his office can
perhaps best be regarded as comprising a geographically de 
tached part of the Board 's central secretariat which, for con
venienc e , is placed in close proximity both to the Solicitor 's
Office for Scotland and to the Edinburgh headquarters of the
diverse organizations catering to Scottish needs .
1 . 4 Organizational framework, local office le ve l
In round figures there are 700 local Tax Offices . This
means that the average number of taxpayers whose affairs are
handled by any one Tax Office is in the neighborhood of 30 ,000
and that the average area covered by a Tax Office is about 130
square miles . But in a country like the United Kingdom where
the population density varies from less than one inhabitant per
square mile (in parts of Wales and Scotland) to well over 20,000
inhabitants per square mile (in the London area), these national
averages can conceal a considerable range of variation.
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Each Tax Office is headed by a District Inspector, who is
supported by one or more assisting Inspectors, together with
an executive and clerical staff which usually numbers between
40 and 50.
The bulk of this staff will normally be concerned with the
administration of the � 'Pay as you Earn " scheme under which
income tax is deducted currently from the wages and salaries
of persons in employment. Others will be engaged on work
connected with the determination of liability in respect of rents
derived from the letting of property or with repayment claims
lodged by taxpayers who have paid more tax, by deduction at
s ource from dividends or other investment income, than the
amount of their final liability (having regard to the reliefs
granted in respect of dependents and so on) .
The management of those blocks of work will be planned
by the supervisors after any appropriate consultation with mem
bers of the Inspectorate .
But apart from such consultation
about the general running of the Tax Office, the prime duty of
an Inspector who has undergone full technical training is the
examination of accounts of business concerns in order to com
pute the assessable profit and thus the amount of liability to
income tax and profits tax .
Section B.

Personne l Framework (Go ve rnmental
and Non -Go vernmental)

1 . 5 G overnmental professional personne l
To facilitate the reader's appraisal of the procedures dis 
cussed in Chapters XVIII - XX, it will be useful to supplement
the previously described organizational framework of the Inland
Revenue Department with a description of the prior education
and in-service training of the Departmental officials who play
a leading part in the determination of tax liabilities . For this
purpose, a superficial survey of the education and training of
the staff in all the various grades employed in the Department
probably would be less helpful than an account dealing more
specifically with those officials performing technical and pro
fessional functions, and attention will therefore be concentrated
on the following groups :
( 1) The professional staffs of the two Solicitors ' Offices;
( 2) The examination staff of the Surtax Office; and
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( 3) The members of the Inspectorate employed in local Tax
Offices and, at headquarters, in the Office of the Chief
Inspector of Taxes .
Recruitment of professional staff for the Solicitors ' Offices
is on the same lines as the recruitment for legal posts in other
government departments, that is, candidates must already pos 
sess a recognized legal qualification and have had some ex
perience in the practice of their profession. In other words,
at the point of recruitment, entrants to the Solicitors ' Offices
will have undergone the normal profe ssional education of a
member of one or other of the two branches of the legal pro
fession ( as described in 1 . 6 infra) .
On entry into one of the Solicitors ' Offices , a recruit
acquires familiarity with the work of his Office by actually tak
ing part in it, under the guidance of a more senior member
of the professional staff . He is not regarded as a trainee; the
responsibility allocated to him recognizes that he brings with
him professional qualifications and experience acquired outside
the s ervic e .
In contrast t o the system of recruitment to legal posts,
which takes place after acquisition of a professional quali�ica
tion and s ome outside experience, the recruitment of the In
spectors of Taxes and of the executive staff employed on
examination work in the Surtax Office takes place through com
petitions which do not require or assume any previous study of
the technical matters which will be involved in the candidates '
future work. The respective competitions are adapted to test
the attainments and capabilities of candidates who have com
pleted s ome particular step on the ladder provided by the coun
try 's educational system. Thus the competitions through which
recruitment to the Surtax Office ' s examining staff takes place
are framed for young people leaving school after a full second
ary education.
The competitions through which Inspectors of
Taxes are recruited cater to rather older candidates who have
undertaken higher studies (up to first degree standard) at a
university or similar institution.
New e ntrants to the Surtax Office are trained in the work
of surtax examination in a special training section attached to
the Office.
Training consists of lectures, discussions, and
practical work with revision courses and exercises, and in
cludes organized visits to a local Tax Office and to a meeting
of Appeal Commissioners. The basic training course normally
lasts six months and falls into two three- month periods . In
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the first period, lectures are interspersed with a certain amount
of practical work, . in the second period, the emphasis falls
mainly on practical work,, though s ome advanced lectures are
also included. At the beginning of the second three- month peri
od, the trainees move into a unit which is intended to form a
bridge between the lecture room and the normal working sec
tions of the Office . Here, still under the close supervision of
the tutorial staff, they undertake the actual duties of surtax ex
amination, though the volume of work allotted to two trainees
will correspond to the allocation handled by a single fully
experienced surtax examiner. The object of the scheme is to
provide trainees with a regular, but limited, flow of case work
in an atmosphere which is a close copy of that obtaining in the
main part of the Office to which they shortly will be trans 
ferred. The transition itself takes place in the last month of
the second three-month period; leaving the training section the
new examiner moves into the main part of the Office where he
completes his training under the guidance of experienced mem
bers of the staff of the unit to which he has been transferred.
New inspectors are attached immediately to a local Tax
Office, but time for study is allowed. They in fact undertake
a long and systematic training for their future duties , their
progress being tested by two Departmental examinations in
which problems of accountancy and tax law figure prominently.
As a general introduction to the Department, they pay a special
initial visit to one of the eight training centers throughout the
country . Thereafter, along with some members of the execu
tive staff of Tax Offices who have been selected for full tech
nical training and promotion into the Inspectorate, the cadet
Inspectors undergo a fifteen- month Preliminary Course during
which they attend a training center for two full-time periods
amounting to 10 days and for 40 half-day tutorials . The Pre
liminary Examination follows. Inspectors who are successful
in this examination then undergo the Final Course which lasts
1 6 months and again involves attendance at a training center
both for short full-time periods and for numerous half-day
tutorials . The course is followed by the Final Examination.
An Inspector who is successful in the Final Examination
has completed his basic training and may anticipate transfer
to an Office where, instead of being a trainee , he will be ex
pected to take an active part (under the guidance of the District
Inspector) in controlling the work of the Office. He is still, of
c ourse, broadening his experience and will have some additional
formal training. During the succeeding year he will attend two
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post-graduate courses, each of a week's duration, at a residen
tial center. This further training is designed in part to assist
him to fit himself for the management of a staff when he even
tually takes over an independent command, but the course cov
ers also s ome of the more involved technical problems en
countered by members of the Inspectorate in their individual
case work.
There is no separate channel of recruitment for the Inspec
tors on specialist work in the Chief Inspector ' s Office at head 
quarters . These officers are selected from the Inspectorate
at large on the basis of apparent aptitude for the duties to be
undertaken.
1 . 6 Private tax practitioners
A taxpayer who wishes to receive advice about the extent
of his tax liability or the steps which he ought to take in order
to establish a claim for a particular tax relief is free to obtain
such advice from any source that offers it. Thus many of the
companies carrying on branch banking have established depart
ments which, for a fee, will assist the banks ' customers in the
preparation of their returns of income and will conduct corre
spondence on their behalf with the Inland Revenue Department.
However, by far the greatest part of the work of advising tax
payers and representing them in their dealings with the Depart
ment falls to members of the legal and accounting professions .
In fact the only professional representatives who have general
statutory right to be heard on behalf of a client when the cli
ent 's tax appeal comes before the General or Special C ommis
sioners for adjudication are ( 1) lawyers and ( 2) members of
one of the incorporated societies of accountants . To comple 
ment the foregoing description of the education and training of
professional and technical staff in the Inland Revenue Depart
ment a brief account should therefore be given of education and
training for the legal and accounting professions .
At the outset, however, it must be explained that in each
of the component parts of the United Kingdom the legal profes 
sion is organized in two distinct branches .
( 1) The first branch consists of those known as barristers
(in Scotland, advocates), who have the exclusive right
of representing litigants in the higher courts and other
wise confine themselves to giving specialized advice on
legal questions laid before them, on behalf of clients ,
by members of the second branch.
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(2) The second branch consists of solicitors , to whom mem
bers of the public go for all kinds of legal advice . When
litigation is necessary, a solicitor may represent his
client in the lower courts . Where the presentation of
a client's case in any court is to be entrusted to a
barrister (or advocate) , the solicitor will make the
necessary arrangements for this and, in particular, will
supply a brief analyzing the legal issues at stake .
Admission as a barrister or advocate is in the hands of
the ancient Inns of Court in London or of the corresponding
body in Edinburgh or Belfast. The regulations are not entirely
uniform throughout the United Kingdom, but in general a candi
date must show that he has reached a prescribed standard in
his general education and must also pass one or more exami
nations in legal subjects . The prescribed examination subj ects
do not necessarily include tax law.
Before admission as a solicitor a form of apprenticeship
with a practicing solicitor for a prescribed period is normally
required under arrangements approved by the Law Society (for
England and Wales) or the corresponding Society in Sc otland or
Northern Ireland. A candidate must show that he has reached
a prescribed standard in his general education, must pursue a
suitable course of study in legal subjects , and must obtain a
pass in all the subjects required for the qualifying examination.
Tax law will usually be one of the subjects studied.
Almost all solicitors in private practice undertake a cer
tain amount of tax work (if only because the settlement of out
standing tax questions is an inevitable part of the business of
administering the estates of decedents) . Specialization in tax
matters , however, is not common among solicitors . Among
barristers , on the contrary, specialization is quite common,
especially at the English Bar . Any barrister possessing repu
tation as a tax specialist undoubtedly will acquire so much
business in that one area that he will have no need to go be 
yond it.
Without discussing those bodies concerned s olely with par
ticular fields -e.g., the financial affairs of municipal corpora
tions -there are four professional groups whose members all
are fully qualified accountants : i.e . , the Institute of Chartered
Accountants in England and Wales , the Institute of Chartered
Accountants of Scotland, the Institute of Chartered Accountants
in Ireland, and the Association of Certified and Corporate Ac 
countants .
Nevertheless, the membership requirements for
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these four groups are not entirely uniform. Normally, a candi
date first must have served an apprenticeship with an actively
practicing member of the body concerned, but in certain cir 
cumstances the Ass ociation of Certified and Corporate Account
ants accepts "as an alternative . . . practical experience in the
finance or accounting department of a commercial or industrial
company, in a nationalized industry or in local government . . ." 5
Candidates must also show that they have reached a certain
standard in their general education and must pass a series of
examinations in professional subjects . Taxation law and prac 
tice will always be one of the subj ects in which candidates are
tested.
The range of work undertaken by a firm of practicing ac
countants will vary to some extent with the size and connections
of the firm. But an important part of the work of the majority
of practicing accountants is the preparation and audit of the
accounts of business concerns of all kinds . This work natural
ly leads on to the discussion with local Tax Offices of the
clients' tax liabilities in respect of the profits shown by those
accounts .
Thus almost all practicing accountants undertake
s ome tax work. Within a large firm there is a possibility that
some of the partners and the supporting staff will specialize
in tax questions, leaving their colleagues to handle other branch
es of the firm's business.
.

5 H.M.S.O. ,

Choice of Careers: The Accountant 1 4 ( 3d ed. 1963) .

CHAPTER XVIII
ADMINISTRATIVE RULE -MAKING PROGRAMS
Section A.

Characte r of the Underlying Statute

2 . 1 The precision of the statute itse lf
Controversies arising from time to time about the precise
amount of the tax liability in particular cases, certainly are
not due to any paucity of legislative provisions indicating the
rules by which Parliament intended to govern the matter. There
is, indeed, a massive volume of guidance available .
The whole statutory code of income tax provisions was
consolidated last in 1 9 5 2 . The result was the longest single
Act of Parliament ever put on the statute book. This act con
tained 532 separate sections, together with 25 schedules . In
the legislative practice of the United Kingdom the term sched
ule nor mally is used to denote an appendix to an Act of Parlia
ment, supplementing the sections in the main body of the act
by setting out subordinate and ancillary provisions . The stand
ard edition of the statutes issued by the Queen's Printer has
5 1 1 octavo pages with upwards of 400 words to a page .
Since the consolidating Act of 195 2 embodied virtually the
whole of the code of income tax legislation then in force, it
necessarily contained some materials other than the statutory
provisions directly defining the amount of a taxpayer 's liability.
Nearly 30 percent of its sections related to administration in
the broadest s ense, covering a wide range of matters such as
the obligation to make returns of income, penalties for non
compliance or fraud, appeal procedures, and the enforcement
of collection. Only the remaining 70 percent related to sub
stantive questions of liability, specifying how taxable income
should be measured or what relief from tax should be available
and in what circumstances . The basic code of general appli
cation, after the 195 2 consolidation, numbered about 2 50 differ
ent sections, comprising roughly about two-thirds of this part
of the statute . The remaining one-third of this portion of sub
stantive provisions dealt with departures from the normal tax
pattern.
These departures do not-with two exceptions-cut
across wide groups of taxpayers . Instead they apply only to
special classes of taxpayers, such as estates in the course of
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administration, banks , insurance companies, charitable bodies ,
or nonresidents . The two exceptions to the general principle
of the English statute -that deviations of the type used in the
United States requiring itemization of deductions shall be avoid
ed in favor of round-sum allowances -are the deductions for
interest, available to all taxpayers whether businesses or indi
viduals, and for life insurance premiums , available to individ
uals under certain specific restrictions .
Since that consolidating act was passed, Parliament has
continued to occupy itself with income tax matters . In all, by
1964, fifteen subsequent statutes had been enacted, containing
over three hundred additional sections and schedule s . In part,
this activity represents a process of reform in which new legis 
lation entirely displaces the corresponding provisions of the
old, thus e nabling the superseded provisions to be repealed. On
balance , however, the result has been a considerable net in
crease in the size of the income tax code.
The corpus of legislation just described covers the surtax
as well as the income tax . Moreover, many of the basic prin
ciples which it sets out are applicable also to the computation
of a company 's income for the purpose of determining its prof
its tax. There is, however, a considerable number of supple
mentary substantive and procedural enactments not included in
the foregoing enumeration that do bear upon the ascertainment
of liability for the profits tax.
Information reflecting the volume of the applicable statutory
material does not, of course, afford any complete index of the
degree to which interpretative difficulties may be expected to
arise when the statute is applied to practical situations . This
will be affected, as well, by the character of the language used
by the legislature, and, in particular, by the extent to which it
sought to draw fine distinctions between one case and another
in a search for greater equity. On this aspect of the legisla
tive process, it is worth quoting from the Final Report in 1 9 5 5
of the Radcliffe Commission on the Taxation of Profits and In
come :
1085. The social and industrial structure of the United Kingdom

It comprehends a great variety of forms.
A
is intricate.
master tax, such as income tax has come to be, which has to
be applied with fairness to all the variety of forms , must re
flect to a large extent the intricacy and complication of the
underlying structure. Even if the social pattern is itself be
coming less complicated-an assumption which we do not make
the general extension of the r ange of the tax to new circles of
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taxpayers involves a complementary increase of detailed provi
sions .
1086. Secondly , the high r ate of tax brings certain consequences.
On the one hand , there is pressure for allowances , alleviations
and qualifications wherever a special case can be asserted or a
distinction claimed. Indeed, with a high rate of tax, a distinc
tion acquires a potential value which it would not possess in
other circumstances .
Moreover , the methods and process of
Parliamentary legislation, particularly , perhaps , as applied to
the annual F inance A ct , themselves assist in the multiplication
of special provisions .
On the other hand, a tax which has so
heavy a bearing on the lives and prospects of its citizens is
sure to meet with avoidance on a large scale: and the statute
book becomes encumbered with elaborate provisions against
avoidance , some of which rank among the least intelligible por
tions of English prose. . .
.

1088. In considering whether we can make any useful recom
mendation for the improvement of the present situation we must
distinguish between the two other major criticisms of the tax
code.
First, as to the complications of its conceptions and
structure. These can never be simple, as we have said. C an
they be simpler than they are today ? Such answers as we can
give to this are to be found in the other Chapters of our Re
ports. We were at one in starting our inquiry with an ardent
desire to leave the structure and the conceptions of the tax
simpler than we found them. If we have had only small suc
cess in the result , we have at least explained in most instances
why we have failed, and what were the reasons that have led
us on occasions to reject a seemingly attractive simplification.
Perhaps the most formidable s ingle obstacle is the fact that
hitherto the tendency both of Parliament and of the Inland
Revenue Department has been in the opposite direction. Scru
pulous regard has been paid to even small differences in in
dividual situation: and , while it is comparatively easy to ad
vance from a simple system to a more refined one by intro
ducing qualifications and differentials , it is very much more
difficult to retire from a refined system to a simpler one and,
by so doing, to ignore distinctions which hitherto have been
recognized and allowed for.

Here, then, is expert testimony to a s ignificant tendency in the
country's tax legislation: for some time it has been customary
to accord differential treatment on the basis of rather small
distinctions between one case and another . This process seems
likely to continue. It certainly must be conceded that the broad
and sweeping language of the earliest acts relating to income
tax gradually has become overlaid by refinements involving
elaborate definitions quite foreign to the original conception of
the code.
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It is almost inevitable that this modern elaboration should
prove a fruitful source of interpretative controversy. In prac 
tice, while no statistics are available, the accounts submitted
by almost every business enterprise give rise to one or more
interpretative controversies . On the other hand, it is unlikely
that such controversies will arise frequently in the returns of
wage or salary earners.
At the same time, it must be acknowledged that evidence
is lacking by which to judge whether the old style of drafting
tax legislation would have been any more successful in avoid 
ing such controversies had Parliament been constrained to con
tinue its use . Here it is possible to quote contrasting exam
ples of the old style and the new, leaving the reader to draw
his own conclusion on the matter . But first it may b e helpful
to quote another comment from the Final Report of the Rad
cliffe Commission bearing on what, after all, is one of the
central problems any legislature encounters on adopting an in
come tax law, namely, the problem of indicating the distinctions
separating taxable from nontaxable receipts. The report calls
attention to the strains that may well arise when a form of
definition that served well enough in former times must be ap
plied to more modern conditions :
28. The tax code contains no general definition of income.

It
is often said that it is impracticable or undesirable that it
should. We do not feel it necessary to subscribe to either of
those epithets. The codes of other countries have achieved the
work of definition without any known ill-effects. What seems
to us more important is that no real advantage could possibly
result from the introduction of a general definition that had to
cover so multifarious a subj ect as taxable income. If it were
expressed in very general terms the work of deciding how to
apply to particular instances would have to be done by deduc
tions drawn from other parts of the code' s framework or with
the help of general principles imported from without. To a
large extent the United Kingdom system itself has proceeded
by this method of interpretation. On the other hand , the more
particular the definition the more it tends to become a mere
list of different classes of receipt , and the anxiety not to ex
clude some class by inadvertence or omission leads to the
addition of a comprehensive " sweeping up" clause at the end
which , in effect, raises over again the problem of interpret
ing the general phrase in the light of a particular instance.
The United Kingdom code has in fact established the limits
of what it will regard as taxable income by formulating a list
of different classes of income , grouped under five Schedules:
and the interpretation of the wording and s ignificance of these
lists has been the subject of copious decisions of the C ourts
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of law during the course of some three generations . Their in
terpretation has been governed by the principle , in itself un
exceptionable , that income tax is a tax on income . . . .

30. Since the tax code identifies income by a process of classi
fication, a receipt , to constitute taxable income, must be capa
ble of being referred to one of those classes. The classifica
tion itself takes two forms: either it specifies a kind of receipt
which is regarded as being inherently of an income nature , e.g. ,
interest, annuity , public revenue dividends , or , more often , it
specifies a kind of source which is regarded as being inher
ently productive of income, e.g. , land, trade, profession, securi
ties , employment , and charges the income from that source.
The identification of a receipt of the first kind presents little
difficulty , once the material facts are ascertained. But very
great difficulty arises from time to time in deciding whether
a particular receipt is or is not to be r egarded as income of
the second kind.
For it has to be determined, fir st , whether
the recipient owns one of the specific sources to which the
receipt can be related, and , secondly , whether the relation of
the receipt to that source is such that it can be said to grow
The difficulties are
out of it by way of annual increment.
'
added to by the fact that in most cases the income to be taxed
is not receipts themselves but profits representing the b alance
between receipts and deductible expenses.
31 . We have here one of the basic conceptions of the tax coae,
that referability to a defined source is essential to permit of
a receipt being categorized as income , unless it falls within
the limited class of receipts that are identified as income by
their own nature.
The source provides the capital substance
Since the division of classi
from which income can emerge.
fiable income into five Schedules dates b ack to the Income Tax
A ct of 1803, the adaptation of increasingly complex forms of
income to the general structure of the tax code has not pro
ceeded without strain. For instance , though offices and em
ployments appeared in the original list of 1803 as a catego
rized source of income, it is not always easy to recognize
that it is the office or employment itself that constitutes the
source of income, not the services rendered or the contraqt
that secures the payment. While the fundamental structure re
mains s ignally unaltered, additions and alterations have, of
cour s e , been made from time to time either by changing or
enlarging the list of sources or by ad hoc provisions to the
effect that a particular kind of receipt is to r ank as taxable
income.
The need asserted above, to discern a classifiable source,
such as a trade, for the purpose of identifying particular re
ceipts as taxable , emphasizes the importance of the statutory
definition of trade. The manner in which the statute approach
es that term serves as our first illustration of the older style
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of definition (dating back to the Income Tax Act of 1 805} which
The present
in this instance survives almost intact today.
definition reads : " 'trade' includes every trade, manufacture,
adventure or concern in the nature of trade . " 1
While this is a sweeping description, the language still
leaves room for differences of opinion over the question wheth
er the purchase and profitable resale of property in any given
case does or does not amount to the carrying on of a trade.
Is the answer to be influenced, for example, by the precise
character of the property involved ? What is the significance
of the period that elapses between purchase and resale, wheth
er long or short? Can a single transaction of this sort amount
to an "adventure . . . in the nature of trade" or is it a requisite
that there be recurring transactions ? Does it tend to negative
the existence of a trade if the property is in no way altered
before it is s old ? Is there an opposite tendency if the proper 
ty is improved only to make it more marketable ? Does the
definition postulate that the surrounding circumstances show
that the person originally acquired the property for the pur
pose of making a profit, and would a case be excluded where
s ome different motive led to the acquisition ?
All of these
questions have had to be considered in litigation over many
years, to fix the proper interpretation of the definition itself.
The meaning of residence provides another illustration of
the older style of drafting. From the very earliest period,
Parliament has acted on the principle that income from sources
within the country should be taxed irrespective of the national
ity or place of abode of the recipient and that, in addition,
persons residing in the country should be taxed also in respect
of income which they received from foreign sources . Thus the
concept of a person's residence long has been of crucial im
portance in determining the basis of liability. Nevertheless,
Parliament did not specify any general definition of residence.
Instead, the word residing apparently was to b e viewed accord
ing to its everyday popular meaning, with such additional as 
s istance as might be derived from two particular rules (origi
nally enacted in 1799 and 1 803 respectively} directed to specific
situations . In their current form those rules read:
368, British subjects, etc.. , temporarily abroad. Every Brit
ish subject or citizen of the Republic of Ireland shall, if his
ordinary residence has been in the United Kingdom , be as
sessed and charged to tax notwithstanding that at the time the

1 Income

Tax Act of 1952, § 526.
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assessment or charge is made he may have left the United
Kingdom , if he has so left the United Kingdom for the purpose
only of occasional residence abroad , and shall be char ged as a
person actually residing in the United Kingdom upon the whole
amount of his profits or gains , whether they arise from prop
erty in the United Kingdom or elsewhere , or from any allow
ance, annuity or stipend (save as herein is excepted) , or from
any trade, profession, employment or vocation in the United
Kingdom or elsewhere.

3 7 5 . Position under Schedule D of temporary residents . A per
son shall not be charged to tax under Schedule D as a person
residing in the United Kingdom , in respect of profits or gains
received in respect of possessions or securities out of the
United Kingdom , who is in the United Kingdom for some tem
porary purpose only and not with any view or intent of estab
lishing his residence therein, and who has not actually resided
in the United Kingdom at one time or several times for a peri
od equal in the whole to six months in any year of assessment,
but if any such person resides in the United Kingdom for the
aforesaid period he shall be so chargeable for that year .
It will be observed that these two rules have one thing in
common; each deals with a situation constituting something of
an exception to a person's normal way of life . Since the gen
eral concept of residence is fairly well understood where an
individual is concerned, it could be said that Parliament has
given fairly clear guidance as to its intention to use the term
residing in that ordinary sense for normal cases, while taking
care to spell out a definite rule for the exceptional cases where
doubt might otherwise aris e . But the income tax must be ap
plied to corporations as well as individuals . Since the relevant
statutory provisions say nothing about a corporation' s residence,
the courts had to decide whether analogies could be developed
which would give some coherent meaning to the concept in the
case of a legal entity so materially different from a natural
person.
The contrast between the older statutory approach to defi
nitional problems as illustrated above, and the more modern
approach can be observed in one example taken from the con
siderable volume of modern legislation directed against the
avoidance of tax by the ostensible transfer of income from one
person to another . In 1936, Parliament provided that a settle 
ment by a parent who transferred income to a minor child
would not be effective for tax purposes (subj ect to certain con
ditions) unless the settlement had been made before the new
statutory amendment was first proposed and was then irrevoca
ble . Parliament in the same act set forth an elaborate definition
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of the term " irrevocable, " the current form of which as amend
ed in 1 9 52 follows :
399. For the purposes of this Chapter , a settlement shall not
be deemed to be irrevocable if the terms thereof provide(a) for the payment to the settlor or , during the life of
the settlor , to the wife or husband of the settlor for
his or her benefit, or for the application for the ben
efit of the settlor or , during the life of the settlor ,
of the wife or husband of the settlor , of any income
or assets in any circumstances whatsoever during the
life of any child of the settlor to or for the benefit
of whom any income, or assets representing it , is or
are or may be payable or applicable by virtue or in
consequence of the settlement; or
(b) for the determination of the settlement by the act or
on the default of any person; or
( c) for the payment of any penalty by the settlor in the
event of his f ailing to comply with the provisions of
the settlement:
Provided that a settlement shall not be deemed to be re
vocable by reason only( i) that it contains a provision under which any income
or assets will or may become payable to or applica
ble for the benefit of the settlor , or the wife or hus
band of the settlor , on the bankruptcy of any such
child as is mentioned in paragraph (a) of this section
or in the event of any assignment of or charge - on
that income or those assets being executed by such a
child; or
( ii) that it provides for the determination of the settle
ment as aforesaid in such a manner that the deter
mination will not , during the lifetime of any such child
as afores aid, benefit any person other than such a
child , or the wife , husband, or issue of such a child;
( iii) in the case of a settlement to which section thirty
three of the Trustee A ct , 1 9 2 5 , applies , that it di
rects income to be held for the benefit of such a
child as aforesaid on protective trusts , unless the
trust period is a period less than the life of the
child or the settlement specifies some event on the
happening of which the child would , if the income
were payable during the trust period to him abso
lutely during that period , be deprived of the r ight
to receive the income or part thereof.

At first glance, it might be supposed that a definition so
comprehensive would leave no room for argument about its ap
plication. A determined inquirer, however, would find room
for arguments as to whether particular cases are covered. In
connection with paragraph {a) , for example , can a settlement be
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justly said to "provide for" a payment to the s ettlor if a trust
does permit such a payment to be made but only at the discre 
tion of the trustees, there being no certainty that any such pay 
ment will be made ? Again, does a settlement provide for pay
ments to the settlor "during the life of" his child if the enabling
words are such that the payments, if made would not necessari
ly continue during the who le life of the child? Or, turning to
paragraph (b) , is there provision for the "determination" of a
settlement if it permits or requires the trust fund to be in
vested in shares of a company which the settlor so dominates
(e . g . , through his holding of shares with special voting and
liquidation rights) that he could neutralize the settlement by
winding up the company and thereby legally take possession for
himself of the entire assets ?
2 . 2 Legislative pre -enactment aids to inte rpre tation
When an Inland Revenue official or a private tax practi
tioner encounters a proble,m of interpretation arising out of a
statutory provision, he may well seek to enlarge his knowledge
of its background by studying the relevant passages in the pub
lished reports of the different Royal C ommissions and commit
tees of enquiry which have from time to time reviewed the
country's tax system. He knows that, as a matter of history,
many amendments of the tax law owe their origin to the recom
mendations of such bodies . In addition, he may decide to check
his tentative conclusions against statements made on behalf of
the Government when the proposal to enact the amending sec
tion was debated in the House of C ommons (though, as noted
under 2 . 3 infra, arguments based on such a statement could
never be decisive) . To this end, he can turn to the bulky vol
u mes of the Official Report of Parliamentary Debates for the
year concerned. This is a substantially verbatim report, pub
lished s ince 1909 under the authority of the House itself. Not
every provision of a finance bill attracts notice in the debates
on the second and third readings of the bill; the tendency at
that point is to concentrate on maj or issues of policy. But the
bill is also considered clause by clause in Committee of the
whole House; and at this stage, it is usually for the Chancellor
of the Exchequer or another member of the government to ex
plain the obj ect of each provision of the bill as it comes up
for discussion. There are further opportunities for debate on
points of detail when the bill as amended in c ommittee is re 
ported back to the House .
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It will thus be to those two different stages of debate in
the House of Commons that the inquirer will turn, for there is
no debate on points of detail in the House of Lords (which is
constitutionally precluded from amending a bill relating to tax
ation) . Nor are there any committee hearings, such as occur
under the legislative procedures of some countries, at which
evidence bearing on the provisions of the bill would be given
by officials or representatives of interested taxpayers .
Any interpretative guidance derived from a study of these
legis lative pre-enactment aids is a complete byproduct. An at
torney examines them to facilitate his own understanding of the
meaning of the statute ; they have no de jure weight in court.
The status of such aids is not peculiar to tax legislation; it is
common to all United Kingdom legislation.
2 . 3 Standards of construction followed by the judiciary in inter
pre ting the s tatute
While the reports of Parliamentary debates may afford a
valuable indication of the government's intentions at the time
the statute was enacted, the courts have regularly refused to
turn to Ministers ' statements in either House of Parliament in
order to explain its meaning. The courts proceed from_ a com
mon premise , that the language of a statute must be regarded
as the language of the whole legislature and, in consequence ,
that the meaning attached t o it by an individual member of
either House cannot govern the interpretation. Indeed, it has
been stated that if there is a difference between the language
of a statute and the declared intention of its framers, the prop
er inference is that this difference was not accidental but in
tentional.
In interpreting tax statutes , courts are accustomed to apply
the recognized rules of construction applied to statute law gen
erally. If, for example, a statute uses plain and unambiguous
language, the court will give effect to it; the court' s duty in
such case is not to make the law reasonable but to apply it by
reference to the usual sense of the words . Words will not be
read into a statute by implication unless it is necessary to do
so to give the language s ense and meaning in its context. If,
on the other hand, some apparent contradiction arises between
two passages in the same statute or in two related statutes
dealing with the same subject matter, the court will interpret
the actual words of the section under review in a manner which
best harmonizes with the subj ect and with the scheme of the
statute or statutes taken as a whole .
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In addition, courts tend to hold that tax statutes should be
construed strictly. This approach rests on the view that when
the legislature imposes a monetary obligation which, in some
sense, encroaches on the property of a citizen, it is reasonable
to expect it to manifest its intention in clear words, rather
than leave the matter to mere inference. This approach was
reflected in one judgment as follows :
In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said.
There is no room for any intendment.
There is no equity
about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is
to be read in, nothing is to be implied . One can only look
fairly at the language used. 2

Section B. The Regulations Program
2 . 4 Types and force of regulations
The United Kingdom tax code contains no general enabling
provision authorizing issuance of so-called interpretative regu
lations. Hence, a regulations program of the type administered
by the United States Treasury Department under the general
authority of section 7805 of the 1954 Internal Revenue C ode,
could not be and is not, carried out by the Board of Inland
Revenue .
However, in the tax code, as in many other United King
dom statutes, Parliament sometimes does delegate legislative
power . That is, it does provide that some specified authority
s hall have power to prescribe rules , having the force of law,
which amplify and otherwise carry into effect some particular
provision or group of provisions in the parent statute . These
rules take on different forms and go under various names (for
example, the instrument by which, after Parliamentary approval,
effect is given to a double taxation convention with another
country is an Order-in-Council), but it is convenient to refer
to them comprehensively as statutory regulations .
Some statutory regulations may be primarily or indeed
wholly concerned with matters of machinery. For example,
they might specify the form of notification to be given to the
Inland Revenue Department by a taxpayer who wishes to claim
the benefit of a relief provision in the parent statute, and they
2 c ape Brandy Syndicate v. Inland Revenue Commissioners , 37
Times L.R . 33 (1920) , [192 1 ] 1 K.R. 64, 7 1 , per Rowlatt, J . , aff'd on
different grounds, 3 7 Times L.R. 402 , [1921] 2 K.B. 403 (Aff'd Cas.) .
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might also go on to outline the procedure to be followed in re
solving a dispute between the taxpayer and the Department
concerning the applicability of such relief in a particular cas e .
But regulations also may deal with questions of substantive
liability . Such regulations sometimes define more specifically
than the parent statute the qualifying conditions giving rise to
a claim for relief, or prescribe the actual method of calculat
ing a result intended by the parent statute .
In 1945, for example, Parliament enacted a new code pro
viding a system of capital allowances for amortization of ex
penditures incurred after a given date on various types of
depreciable assets . The application of this new code to some
types of assets in existence at the initial date was fully worked
out in the statute. In the case of construction works connected
with mining operations, however, the statute merely set forth
certain general principles for determining the extent to which
any relevant expenditure incurred before the initial date would
qualify for amortization after that date, and then authorized
the Board of Inland Revenue to make regulations indicating how
those general principles would be applied in actual cases . 3
Again, in 19 56 the system of investment allowances (an in
centive device to encourage capital investment in certain busi
ness assets) temporarily was withdrawn. Parliament c:lecided,
however, to make an exception in favor of investments under 
taken in connection with the conservation of fuel. Since a very
wide range of industrial equipment was involved, the statute
did not attempt to catalogue the fuel- saving devices which would
continue to be e ligible for an allowance. Instead the Treasury
was authorized to make regulations prescribing the types of
equipment which would qualify. After obtaining technical ad
vice, the Treasury promulgated a list of qualifying equipment.
These two examples are typical of the degree to which
statutory regulations are used to complement a substantive
statutory tax provision.
The general objective was stated
clearly by Parliament; but, the subject matter being one of
s ome complexity, it was deemed advisable to delegate author
ity to develop the subsidiary specifications regarding applica
tion of the basic principles . Another typical feature is that
the power to make statutory regulations is granted on each oc 
casion for some more or less specific purpose; in the tax area,
3 The regulations made by the Board of Inland Revenue are print
ed and issued by H.M. stationery Office. They are available to the
public.
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Parliament would be most unlikely to grant a regulation-making
power which extended to a wide range of different matters .
Where a question of substantive liability turns on a provi
sian contained in statutory regulations, a court before which
that question arises will determine whether the body which pro
mulgated the regulation. exceeded the limits of the authority
delegated to it by Parliament in the parent statute . If, upon
review of the scheme of the parent statute and the actual lan
guage by which the power to issue regulations was granted, the
court s hould conclude that some part of the regulation goes
beyond the presumed intention of Parliament, a decision would
no doubt follow that, to this extent, the regulation was ultra
vires and therefore invalid. This is not, of course, a feature
peculiar to statutory regulations on tax matters; it reflects the
control which the courts exercise over all forms of delegated
legislation. For example, the "Pay as you Earn" system, under
which employers withhold income tax when paying employees '
wages and salaries, was put into force by virtue of regulations
authorized by legislation reading in part as follows :
The C ommissioners [i. e . , Board] of Inland Revenue shall make
regulations with respect to the assessment , charge , collection
and recovery of income tax in respect of emoluments to which
this A ct applies . . . and those regulations may , in particular,
include provision(a) for requiring any person making any payment of, or ac
count of, any such emoluments , when he makes the pay
ment, to make a deduction or a r epayment of tax c alcu
lated by reference to tax tables prepared by the Com
missioners of Inland Revenue and for rendering persons
who are required to make any such deduction or repay
ment accountable to , or , as the case may be, entitled to
repayment from, those C ommissioners ;
*

*

*

and any such regulations shall have effect notwithstanding anything in the Income Tax A cts . . . 4
.

For many years , the Bankruptcy Acts had provided that, in the
administration of a bankrupt 's property, there should be paid
in priority to his other debts certain preferential claims, in
cluding one year' s taxes and outstanding wages due to his
servants and workmen. An analogous provision appeared in
legislation relating to insolvent companies . Accordingly, the
statutory regulations for " Pay as you Earn" were drafted so as
to apply the same rules to the tax which an insolvent employer
4 Income Tax A ct of 1952. § 157 .
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had deducted but not yet paid over. In relation to bankruptcy
for example, the relevant regulation read:
There shall be included among the debts which under section
33 of the Bankruptcy A ct , 1914, are to be paid in priority to
all other debts in the distribution of the property of a bank
rupt or person dying insolvent , so much as is unpaid of the
employer' s liability for the period of twelve months next be
fore the date of the receiving order or of the death , as the
case may be.

Later, in the course of a dispute, the Law Officers of the
Crown indicated their opinion that this part of the regulation
was ultra vire s . While the language of the parent statute clear 
ly indicated that the authorized statutory regulations would be
deemed to override any inconsistent provision in the Income
Tax Acts themselves , it did not indicate that the regulatory
power could alter the separate bankruptcy legislation dealing
with preferential claims in bankruptcy. After the Law Officers '
opm10n was handed down, the Board of Inland Revenue rescind
ed this part of the regulation. 5
2 . 5 Precise purpose of statutory regulations
The Parliamentary practice of delegating legislative !'1-uthor 
ity may indirectly contribute t o greater clarity i n the affected
area. When the subject matter is especially technical and com
plex, statutory regulations issued under the specific authority
of a parent statute are likely to deal with the application of a
new measure in a more detailed fashion than Parliament would
have been willing to undertake if the entire matter had to be
compressed within the narrower bounds of the statute itself.
This consideration apart, however, statutory regulations do not
afford a means of resolving the interpretative problems which
e merge from all tax legislation. For, as has just been seen,
the ultra vire s test means that, in the United Kingdom, these
regulations are subordinate to, and controlled by, the parent
statute . Since the power to make regulations is granted only
for a specific and limited purpose, study of their language will
not throw much light on wider questions arising even out of the
parent statute itself.
5 In 1952 , however , Parliament itself enacted amending legislation
which directed that the priority rules in the Bankruptcy Act and other
analogous legislation should extend thenceforward to " Pay as you E arn"
tax not accounted for by an employer at the date of the receiving order
or other relevant date.
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As these regulations are not designed to interpret doubts
generated by the statutory language-recall that their purpose
is to complete the gaps left deliberately by Parliament-there
is no part in them designed to interpret the parent statute .
However, as the Inland Revenue fills in the gaps, the statutory
regulations indirectly come to serve an interpretative function
for they are more detailed than Parliament itself would have
provided in a statute. Although the process is a legislative
one, the completion of details, it must be emphasized again
that the regulations must not go beyond or vary the clear
meaning of the statute .
From time to time, even without a new Parliamentary en
actment, statutory regulations will be amended by whatever
agency to which Parliament originally delegated the legislative
authority. 6 Illustratively, an incentive allowance encourages
the installation of fuel economy devices . There is no general
language which permits such an allowance for any and all de 
vices insuring an economical use of fuel. Instead, the regula
tion lists specific devices with very precise engineering de 
tails . If a new device were to be invented, it would be added
to the list, with great preciseness as to its engineering fea
tures .
2 . 6 Manne r of processing regulations
In other countries where the primary tax legislation is
supplemented by a comprehensive system of interpretative regu 
lations, a regular procedure doubtles s will be developed for
drafting original regulations, as well as amendments should the
primary legislation itself undergo amendment. But, as has been
seen, statutory regulations, as used in the United Kingdom, have
a much more limited scope . Each such regulation has some 
thing approaching an ad hoc character ; in consequence , the
process of bringing them into existence has not been formal
ized .
Generally speaking, however, the Board' s s ecretariat takes
the initiative in preparing any given set of regulations. To
provide continuity, members of that office who are familiar
with the underlying problem, having looked after the Depart
ment's interests when the enabling statute was originally pro
posed to Parliament, normally continue to handle the matter at
the later point when the related regulations are to be prepared.
The staff of the secretariat are administrators, not trained
6 see 2 . 4 supra .
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lawyers. However, they may seek the advice and assistance of
the legally qualified staff of the Solicitor ' s Office . They also
usually keep in touch with the relevant technical branch of the
Department ( e . g . , with the specialist Inspectors in the Chief
Inspector's Office) as the draft of the regulations takes shape .
Whether interests outside the Department will be consulted
while the regulations are still in draft form and, if so, the ar
rangements to that end, will depend largely on the particular
subject matter . The s ecretariat ' s timetable, within which regu
lations must be processed, is also variable and depends on the
circumstances .

Section c . The Rulings Program

2 . 7 Formal advance written rulings to taxpayers

It is only in a few very special cases that the tax code
gives the taxpayer the right to obtain a formal written ruling
regarding the probable tax consequences of a transaction which
he proposes to carry out in the future. Parliament has been
extremely sparing in creating such a right. In each case where
it has done so, it was enacting unusually sweeping provisions
designed to counter avoidance of tax liability by artificial trans 
actions; and there was s ome risk that its broad language would
become a deterrent to normal business transactions unless the
affected persons could obtain a clearance beforehand .
The first example dates from 1 9 5 1 . In that year there was
a steep rise in profits tax rates, and antiavoidance legislation
,vas deemed necessary. It was designed to cover any transac
tion where the main purpose, or one of the main purposes, was
avoidance of or reduction of liability to profits tax. In such
cases, the Board of Inland Revenue was authorized to adjust
the liability in a manner which counteracted the avoidance or
r eduction. Further, the legislation provided that avoidance or
reduction would be presumed to have been the main or one of
the main, purposes in certain types of transactions (e.g. , on
the transfer or acquisition of shares in a company) if the main
benefit which might have been expected to accrue in the im
mediately succeeding years was avoidance or reduction of lia
bility for the tax. It was provided, however, that a company
c ould send to the Board full particulars of a projected trans 
action; and the Board, if satisfied that the transaction was being
entered into "for bona fide commercial reasons" and ought not
to be brought under the section, then must notify the company
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of its finding. In such event, the Board could not thereafter
invoke the statutory provision in respect of the transaction de
scribed to them (though such a clearance does not prevent fur 
ther action under the section if the particulars supplied did not
amount to a full and accurate disclosure of the material facts) .
Since this device of an advance clearance under these par 
ticular circumstances is considered as an exc eptional departure ,
one t o give swift c omfort to a business man, an oral confer 
ence i s not available . However, a refusal of advance clearance
does not preclude recourse to the courts should the transaction
be held by the Inland Revenue to fall within the thrust of the
statute.
In 1960, provision for advance clearances was again insert
ed in antiavoidance legislation-this time in the income tax and
surtax fields. For present purposes, it is enough to summarize
the two groups of avoidance devices to which this legislation
was directed:
( 1) The first group is illustrated by cases where the dis 
posal of a company' s stock-in-trade (inventory) was ef
fected indirectly by arranging for the intended purchaser
to buy, not the stock-in-trade itself, but the whole share
capital of the company holding it (so that the result was
a capital gain for the former shareholders instead of a
taxable profit for the company itself) .
(2) The second group involved the manipulation of holdings
of s ecurities , so as to bring about a tax advantage anal
ogous to that s ought to be gained by the operations
known as "bond-washing" and "dividend-stripping."
For the first group, the legislative remedy was, broadly,
to make the vendors of the shares liable for income tax (and,
if applicable, surtax) on an appropriate proportion of the tax
able profit which would have been realized by the company had
the disposition been carried out in a straightforward fashion.
But it was also provided that prospective vendors and purchas 
ers otherwise within the scope of the section might apply j oint
ly to the Board of Inland Revenue for an advance clearance .
T o obtain such, they are required in effect to show that the
company itself will eventually dispose of its stock-in-trade in
a manner which produces a realized profit to the company. If
the projected sale is carried out within six months of the clear
ance date, such a clearance again prevents the Inland Revenue
from invoking the statutory provision.
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For the second group of avoidance devices, the remedy (as
in the 19 5 1 precedent) was to authorize the Board of Inland
Revenue to require adjustments of liability sufficient to counter 
act the tax advantage sought to be obtained. The section did
not apply, however, to transactions carried out "for bona fide
commercial reasons , " obtaining of tax advantages not being a
main object. Here too, persons who intended to undertake one
or more such transactions were authorized to seek binding ad
vance clearances, by sending full particulars to the Board which
then had the duty to respond one way or the other .
No formal procedure has been prescribed with respect to
applications for a clearance under the three sections just de
scribed. A letter giving all relevant information is sufficient.
Before the Board will rule , the application is examined by the
secretariat in consultation, where appropriate, with the Office
of the Chief Inspector or the Surtax Office. The Board' s ruling
take s the form of a simple notification, that a clearance is
granted or, as the case may be, withheld.
The sole purpose
of the clearance system, as previously stated, is to prevent
the legislation from acting as a deterrent to normal business
transactions. Thus, if a clearance is withheld, there is no
reason why the applicant should be permitted to make elaborate
legal arguments regarding the precise technical application of
the legislation. Such argument would be more appropriately
he ld over to a later stage should the applicant, notwithstanding
denial of advance clearance , carry out his proposal and should
the Inland Revenue then take countervailing action under the
statutory provision.
While statistics regarding the number who apply for clear
ances are not available, in the case of mergers or reorganiza
tions involving issuance of shares to the public, it is not un
common for the published prospectus to state that clearances
have been obtained.
2 . 8 Informal technical advice to taxpayers on proposed transac
tions
The relatively restricted compass of the area within which
the United Kingdom tax code has given taxpayers the right to
obtain a formal advance ruling on the tax consequences of a
proposed transaction is matched by the absence of any general
custom of providing informal or oral technical advice on such
transactions . However, as to one or two areas of tax law, the
practice of the Inland Revenue Department does permit such
advice to be given, and this practice might be looked upon as
a partial rulings program.
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An outstanding example of this is afforded by the advice
which the Department is willing to give when a business con
cern decides to establish a superannuation fund -or to institute
s ome comparable scheme -for the payment of retirement pen
sions to its employees . The purpose is to give advice as to
whether a given plan will qualify for tax purposes if carried
out in accordance with the proposal submitted. The specialist
unit at headquarters is able at a preliminary stage to call the
e mployer ' s attention to any features of the proposal which
make it difficult for the plan to achieve recognition for tax
purposes and advises on the changes which would eliminate
points of difficulty. The matter can be handled by correspond
ence, or by a combination of correspondence and oral discus 
sion.
Since the advance informal advice is given by the echelon
of the Department which renders technical advice to the Board' s
secretariat o n recognition of pension arrangements when formal
ly constituted, as a practical matter employers can place great
confidence in the rulings they receive. It would be very un
usual for an employer ' s representatives to omit the precaution
of informal consultation before the proposed pension arrange 
ments become legally binding on the employer.
It should be observed that this exception to the normal no
rulings practice of the department involves a circumstance in
which the official who is consulted can obtain a complete pic 
ture of the proposed transaction. He can be supplied with com
plete copies of the proposed trust deeds and other legal docu
ments which establish the funds and regulate the rights and
obligations of employer and employees . The same is true in
the other principal area in which informal technical advice is
regularly given, namely, to charitable organizations . The tax
code exempts from income tax, subject to conditions, "a body
of persons or trust established for charitable purposes only ."
The Chief Inspector's specialists who give technical advice to
the Board' s secretariat on the recognition of charitable organi
zations customarily give informal advance rulings on the tax
effect of a proposed constitution (corporate charter and bylaws),
or change of constitution, in much the same way as the staff
of the unit which handles questions about pension arrangements .
2 . 9 Technical advice to fie ld offices
It is evident that the arrangements just described for g1vmg
formal advance rulings or informal technical advice on the tax
aspects of proposed transactions cover only a s mall proportion
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of interpretative tax questions which arise. It follows that, in
general, the key role in resolving such questions falls to the
local Tax Offices which must apply the abstract language of the
tax code to completed transactions in the course of making
yearly assessments . Consequently, the very greatest impor
tance attaches to the system adopted within the Inland Revenue
Department for giving them technical guidance in the interests
of uniformity and certainty .
The primary s ource of guidance upon which the local Tax
Office relies in performing its task is that afforded by the de
partmental instruction manuals and by the circulars ( mimeo
graphed or printed) sent out from headquarters . These can be
considered as a single medium because the instruction manuals
represent a consolidated version of those previous circulars
having permanent value, and also because the circulars use the
instruction manuals as the point of departure in explaining new
problems . Indeed, a circular may well take the form of a
textual amendment of the pertinent passage in one of the man
uals . It is convenient, therefore, to refer comprehensively to
the circulars and manuals under the single name of instruc
tions .
As a result of long experience, the conclusion has been
reached that the local Tax Offices will be best served, if edi
torial responsibility for instructions is placed on a single unit
in the Office of the C hief Inspector. Inte r alia, such consoli
dation helps to ensure use of uniform terminology and adequate
cross -references to other instructions dealing with cognate
problems. Because instructions often prescribe procedures as
well as give substantive technical advice, the Instruction Sec 
tion was made a part o f the Organization Group in the Office
of the Chief Inspector . 7
Though editorial responsibility for a new instruction rests
with the Instructions Section, that section necessarily consults
with the specialist or specialists interested in its subject mat
ter when preparing the text. To the extent the instruction at
tempts to resolve interpretative questions , the specialist pro
vides necessary guidance regarding the departmentally accepted
view of the law. In its final form, the instruction is sent out
under the authority of the Chief Inspector; but where the in
struction deals with a matter of substance (as distinct from a
purely procedural matter) , the text first will be submitted to
the Board' s secretariat to insure that the stated interpretation
carried their approval.

7 See

Chap. XVII, 1 . 2 supra .
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The circumstances which trigger new instructions vary
from one occasion to another. In one case, for instance, Par
liament may have amended the law, and the practice of the
Department must be altered to conform to the amended legis 
lation. Or a particular statutory provision may have been in
terpreted by a court decision. While local Tax Offices regu
larly receive the reports of tax litigation, a new instruction
may be needed to point out the extent to which the new court
decision appears to govern application of the code to situations
analogous to, but not identical with, the actual situation sub
j ected to litigation. Again, examination of some problem at
headquarters (for whatever reason) may have clarified views
hitherto held on a debatable question of interpretation, and it
may be thought desirable to communicate the result to local
Tax Offices . As a last example, headquarters may find that a
question previously deemed to have only academic interest has
begun to assume practical significance in a number of actual
cases, and thus merits specific guidance in an instruction.
Instructions, however, are only part of the story. It pre 
viously has been stressed that (subject to compliance with de 
partmental instructions) the District Inspector in charge of a
local Tax Office has an independent command in a very real
sens e . Indeed, he has discretion to arrive at a reasonable
settlement of controversies arising with taxpayers in his area.
Nevertheless, from time to time he may want technical guid 
ance on some specific point not adequately covered by the in
structions . He is entitled to submit his problem to the relevant
specialist at headquarters, though he will not do so lightly. In
making such a submission, which normally is in writing, he is
expected to provide , not only an adequate summary of the facts
of the actual case giving rise to his request, but also citations
to the statutory provisions and to any court decisions that ap
pear relevant, together with an indication of his own view as
to the correct solution. The obj ect at this stage does not go
beyond providing the District Inspector with an expert opinion
on the interpretative question. In consequence it is not cus 
tomary for the headquarter ' s specialist to meet with the tax
payer whose affairs are covered by the submission. Should the
specialist think it desirable, before reaching a decision, to have
a more complete understanding regarding the taxpayer ' s view
of his own affairs, he probably will leave it to the District In
spector to make the necessary contact.
Although the Surtax Office is not a field office in the ordi
nary sense of the term, since it assesses surtax centrally for
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the whole of the United Kingdom, it nevertheless resembles the
local Tax Offices in that it has direct contact (if only by cor
respondence) with the taxpayers whose liabilities it handles .
When the amount of a taxpayer ' s income from a given source
has been finally determined for ordinary income tax purpose s ,
that amount i s conclusive in calculating that particular source ' s
contribution t o the taxpayer ' s to tal income for the purpose of
determining his surtax for that same year. This often means
that interpretative questions affecting the assessable amount of
an item of income , if not resolved between the taxpayer and
his local Tax Office prior to the point the Surtax Office con
siders the surtax matter, continue to be the primary responsi
bility of the local Tax Office.
Nevertheless , interpretative
questions can arise for the first time in the context of the sur 
tax computation for a case where no ordinary income tax as
sessment was required. A simple example might relate to the
precise amount of an income item which was subject to deduc
tion of tax at source and for which, accordingly, no income tax
assessment was required. In this circumstance , the Surtax Of
fice bears the responsibility of upholding the departmental con
struction of the tax code ' s provisions . Since the Surtax Office
is a centralized branch of the headquarters organization, it is
not as dependent on instruction manuals and circulars as the
local office s , in trying to achieve uniform administration. Never
theless, even at this higher level, the use of branch instructions
has been found advantageous . The details of this s eparate sys 
tem of branch instructions need not be discussed here, however;
the procedures followed correspond generally to those associ
ated with the Chief Inspector 's instructions to local Tax Office s .
For example, the Board's secretariat will b e informed i n ad
vance regarding important newly proposed interpretations .
2 . 10 Publication of te chnical advice given taxpayers and local
offices
The question of whether the Department should or should
not publish what are sometimes termed Practice Notes in order
to alert the public to interpretations officially placed on tax
statutes was the subject of earlier debate . Some of the rele 
vant arguments were indicated in the Final Report of the Rad
cliffe Commission:
9 8 2 . The preparation of Notes of this sort is not free from pit
falls. In the first place the style and content of the Notes must
be adapted to the needs and understanding of the prospective
reader; and these must be supposed to differ from one case to
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another according to the branch of the tax code to which the
Notes relate. A gain, an official publication may well prove
embarrass ing if it does not state the whole law in complete
detail.
If minor qualifications of the main principles of the
code are omitted in the interests of simplicity , there is a risk
of misleading those taxpayers to whose affairs some such quali
fication is in fact relevant: on the other hand , if detailed treat
ment is resorted to , the Notes may be of little value except to
the skilled lawyer and accountant-whose training already fits
them to derive the same information at first hand from the
code itself and the r eports of decided cases. A further prob
lem arises when the legal provisions to be dealt with have not
Unless the Notes are
been the subject of any Court decision.
to give some account of the supposed construction of those
provisions they may be seriously incomplete; but if they do
enter upon the matter it can be objected that they lack author
ity. When in the past the Board have volunteered a public
statement as to the basis of liability which they themselves
suppos e to be applicable in a given set of circumstances their
action has sometimes been criticised as a usurpation of the
proper functions of the appeal Commiss ioner s and the Courts
and they have on occasion been accused of an attempt to over
awe taxpayers . We think that criticism of this sort is mis
conceived. The Inland Revenue Department must do what it
can to secure that the law is uniformly administered; there
must be therefore some view, officially received, as to the
right interpretation of each enactment that bears upon the com
putation of liabilities. This view may have to be a provisional
one in cases where the language of the statute has not been
judicially construed , but that is no good reason for not letting
interested taxpayers know what it is if it is regularly acted
upon by the Department in its executive work of computing
tax liability.
983. We ascertained from the Board that they were in favor of
adding to the existing series of pamphlets and that a certain
amount of preparatory work had already been undertaken for
that purpose. In spite of the difficulties to which we have re
ferred in the previous paragraph we think that the project ought
to be encouraged , and we recommend that it should be perse
vered with.
The kind of publication we have in mind is one
which would describe , preferably with illustrative examples , the
effect that a particular branch of the tax code is under stood to
have; the presentation in summary form of the facts of indivi
dual cases considered at headquarter s and of the decisions ar
rived at was also suggested by some witnesses , but we do not
think that a disconnected series of "rulings" of this sort would
have any real value.

The pamphlets in existence at the time of that report consisted
chiefly of a series explaining the postwar system of capital al
lowances for expenditures on different types of depreciable
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as sets . Following the above recommendation, the Board have
repeatedly added to their number . The subjects bear on such
matters as the arrangements for double taxation relief, main
tenance claims for relief in respect of expens es connected with
the ownership of real property, and the tax consequences when
company directors and executives receive benefits in kind or
expense allowances from their companies .
I n particular, the program has made a sustained effort to
issue pamphlets which provide technical guidance on major leg
is lative changes . For example , pamphlets have been issued
explaining respectively ( 1) the 1 9 57 tax reliefs for Overseas
Trade Corporations, (2) the 1962 extension of the income tax
to certain short-term gains , and (3) the 1963 comprehensive
reform of provisions governing tax liability in respect of rents,
etc . , from real property.
A typical pamphlet conforms to the general specification
suggested by the Radcliffe Commission, that is, as to some
distinct branch of the tax code, it seeks to cover, in outline at
least, the effect of the legal provisions on the whole range of
normal situations to which those provisions are directed. When
possible, definitions in general terms are illustrated by citing
concrete instances which would (or would not) be cove!"ed; and
simple numerical examples are added where this would help to
illustrate the mathematical aspects of particular provisions .
The emphasis throughout is upon final results deemed to follow
from the terms of the statute, rather than upon the legal rea
soning which could be advanced in support of the interpretation
adopted.
It is through this publication program, and not through any
system of published rulings on specific cases submitted for that
sole purpose, that the Inland Revenue Department seeks to pro
vide taxpayers with a starting point from which they may begin
the study of interpretative questions arising in connection with
their own tax affairs .

CHAPTER XIX
ASSESSMENT, RE FUND, AND ADMINISTRATIVE
APPEAL PROCEDURES
Section A.

Assessment and Audit Procedures

3 . 1 Introductory note
The assessment procedure adopted by the Inland Revenue
Department follows a common pattern, whether the tax involved
is income tax, surtax, or profits tax.
The taxpayer is re
quired by statute to furnish a return showing the sources of
his income and the amount of income derived from each
source. The local Tax Office or the Surtax Office then scruti
nizes the information supplied, calls for any further information
or explanation that appears necessary, and makes arrangements
for a formal assessment in the amount that appears to be war
ranted by the facts .
This common pattern extends beyond cases in which the
definitive action to be taken is an assessment. In a country
such as the United Kingdom, which applies tax deduction at
source- i . e . , withholding-to a wide variety of income sources,
cases in considerable numbers are bound to arise where the
aggregate tax deducted exceeds the amount of the recipient 's
true liability .
For example, consider an individual whose income is de 
rived primarily from investments, the income of which is sub
j ect to withholding at the source. This same individual may be
entitled to various personal allowances and reliefs with respect
to his dependents, or his business activities may have resulted
in a net loss which he is entitled to set off against income
from other sources . In such a case, this individual is entitled
to a refund and will not receive an assessment . The procedural
steps , however , are much the same as in the assessment situa
tion. Such a taxpayer presents the necessary information on a
return, and the initial examination is conducted in the same
way and, generally speaking, by the same Tax Office which
would have handled the matter if an assessment were required.
However, in the case where taxpayers derive their income
from wages and salaries, both subj ect to withholding at the
s ource, the making of a formal assessment on such salaries
399
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or wages is a prerequisite in the process of establishing what
ever adjustment may be necessary, whether the amount of such
an adjustment represents a refund or an assessment. 1
In view of the foregoing, it seems proper to regard the
making of assessments and the payment of refunds as alterna
tive aspects of a single process . This conclusion is reinforced
by the fact that the remedies open to the taxpayer when he dis 
putes the amount of the refund offered to him are fundamentally
s imilar to the remedies which a taxpayer can pursue when he
disputes the amount of an as sess ment. In either type of case,
he can make an oral argument before appeal Commissioners
having jurisdiction in the matter, and can then appeal, if need
be, to the courts on a point of law-as discussed in Chapter XX
infra.
The tax administration of some countries use the so-called
self-assess ment system, that is , the field office automatically
records as the assessment the tax liability calculated by the
taxpayer himself on the return he files . This initial taxpayer
determined assessment is then checked, but only in a selected
proportion of the cases, by a subsequent examination-described
as an audit-designed to verify the adequacy of the return. The
United Kingdom does not use the self-assessment syste!ll; some
degree of scrutiny is regularly applied to each return before
final assessment. Therefore, the audit process is not distinct
from the process of assessment.
Every taxpayer' s return is processed to establish the cor
rectness of the information stated thereon. For wage earners,
who have no other source of income, this is a matter of de
termining whether or not, in comparison with past years, the
taxpayer has reported his dependents correctly and whether the
employer has withheld the proper amount under "Pay as you
Earn. " The same type of verification is applied where a return
shows , in addition to earnings, income from another source,
i . e . , investments . An actual check of the mathe matical accura
cy to ascertain the totals (other than for incomes subject to
surtax) is not necessary because the withholding system will
have insured that a taxpayer will have been taxed correctly for
each source of income .

1 The tax withheld by an employer is calculated on a basis which
takes account of the employee' s personal allowances and reliefs, to
the end , hopefully , of collecting the correct final liability .
The sys
tem in fact achieves this in the great bulk of cases; and when it does
so , the law permits a formal assessment to be dispensed with unless
the employee requests one.
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Even incomes subject to surtax are given the same
When the case reaches the
processing at the local office .
Surtax Office for pr ocessing at that leve l , the Surtax Office
then concerns itself with the exact amount of any income sub
j e ct to withholding. 2
3 . 2 De tails of the assessment and audit procedures
Ordinarily, the assessment procedure takes as a point of
departure the taxpayer ' s own return of his income . A taxpay
er's written claim for a refund (including where appropriate
his statement of income) performs a similar role in the re
fund procedure . Even the "Pay as you Earn" system does not
depart completely from this principle. Under that system, a
return received from the employee in an earlier year, supple 
mented by any later information he may have supplied during
the current year, is used by the Tax Office to determine the
code number to be furnished the employer so the latter can de 
termine from official tax tables how much tax should be deduct
ed from any given wage payment. Thus even if the withholding
process is deemed equivalent to a species of provisional as 
sessment, it still is based upon a return by the employee .
When the employer, after the end of the year, reports the total
amount of tax deducted, the Tax Office 's provisional assump
tions about the employee ' s circumstances can be checked against
the employee ' s return for that year . Normally only if the two
differ (due, e . g. , to a midyear change of circumstances not
previously known to the Tax Office and not reflected therefore
in the code number whic h governed the employer 's action) will
it be necessary to make an assessment. Although the taxpayer ' s
return of income is tremendously important t o the Department's
procedures, a taxpayer is not allowed t o defer his liability by
neglecting to make a return. Where he fails to submit his re
turn or submits one which is incomplete or unsatisfactory, the
assessing authority is authorized by statute to make an assess 
ment according to its best judgment.
Where surtax or profits tax is also involved, a separate
return will not necessarily be obtained. When individuals have
incomes sufficiently large to render them liable to surtax, there
is a regular procedure by which photocopies of the income tax
returns they have delivered to the local Tax Office are passed
2 It will be recalled that a determination by the local office set
ting out an assessment of tax on any income not subject to withhold
ing is conclusive. See Chap. XVIII, 2 . 9 supra and 3 . 2 infra .
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on to the Surtax Office . Again, a company 's profits tax liabil
ity is handled by the inspector who handles its income tax lia
bility; the information supplied to him serves for both taxe s .
The typical income tax return form provides space for the
taxpayer to list all his different sources of income and the
actual amount of income derived therefrom in a stated twelve
months ' period. Space is also provided to enter claims for the
various personal allowances and reliefs . In other words, re 
turns are designed to give the Inland Revenue Department as
comprehensive a view as possible of a taxpayer 's situation.
Indeed, if the information requested was supplied with complete
reliability year by year, the local Tax Office or the Surtax Of
fice often could compute the proper tax solely by reference to
the information in the series of annual returns . To make the
computations for any given year may require examination of
more than one return in the serie s . While each return would
show the actual income of the tax year just completed, the as 
sessment for certain types of income is measured by the amount
received in a different year .
In making out his return, a taxpayer is not expected to re
solve interpretative questions . Rather he is expected to pre 
sent the raw materials which the Inspector will use in the
decis ion- making proces s . Thus the taxpayer is to record the
actual receipt of all kinds of gross income for a given period.
Where expenses incurred or other amounts are claimed as a
deduction from any one type of the several types of gross in
come from which the total gross income is derived, the tax
payer must show each class of deduction by a separate entry,
to enable the assessing officer to determine whether in fact
they are legally deductible . Similarly, in connection with the
allowances and reliefs for dependents, etc ., the return form
asks that the facts be stated, so that the assessing officer can
decide for himself whether those facts do confer a legal right
to the allowance or the relief.
This approach, however, would hardly be practical with re 
gard to business profits . Theoretically, only the net profit,
which is the only chargeable income, needs to be shown in the
taxpaye r ' s return.
As a practical matter, however, such a
taxpayer almost invariably will supplement his return by sup
plying the local Tax Office with his accounts . In the case of a
business of any magnitude, these will consist of a profit and
loss statement and balance sheet, both vouched for by a pro
fessional accountant. Detailed depreciation schedules will also
be included if the nature and scope of enterprise 's equipment
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suggests this may be ess ential to a proper assessment. Such
business accounts are freely supplied, although the Inspector
handling the case has no express statutory power to demand
them. One reason for such cooperation is that, if the Inspec
tor believes the information given t o him is inadequate, he
does have the power to assess the profits on the basis of an
estimate . Further, the taxpayer then would be obliged to con
test the matter at an oral hearing before the appeal Commis 
sioners . Where the Commissioners hear an appeal as to the
chargeable amount of business profits, they do have statutory
power to require, under penalty, submission of business ac
counts .
In examining taxpayers ' returns (and any supporting ac 
counts) , Tax Offices make methodical use of information returns
obtained from third parties . The degree to which an office
audits a return naturally varies with the types of income it
records . If, for example, a taxpayer earns interest from bank
deposits, there can be little room for debate about its effect
on his chargeable income . Again, if he is employed, there can
be little question about the amount of gross income he derives
from this source; correspondence may follow, however, regard
ing the merits of the taxpayer ' s claimed personal expenses
against the gross remuneration. The type of income which gen
erates most debatable questions is that arising from business
profits . In consequence, the Department follows the practice
of entrusting examination of business accounts to the senior
members of the local Tax Office, i . e . , to Inspectors who have
completed the technical training program.
An Inspector engaged in the examination of business ac 
counts takes due note of the professional standing of the per
sons responsible for their preparation. Should a trader submit
home - made accounts in support of his return, the Inspector
may invite him in for a conference, to obtain an oral explana
tion of the basis on which they were prepared. On the other
hand, he would no doubt place much greater reliance on ac
counts verified by a qualified professional accountant. Never 
theless, business accounts , however satisfactory, do not resolve
all tax questions . They reflect only a profit figure determined
according to accepted conventions of commercial accounting.
Rules for calculating profits for income tax purposes diverge
on some counts from those commercially accepted conventions .
For example, a s ound but conservative commercial approach
may justify deduction of a particular expenditure deemed to be
of doubtful value to the business, though for tax purposes the
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expenditure may be properly classified as a nondeductible capi
tal outlay. In examining accounts, therefore, an Inspector re 
views the possible areas of divergence. With one or more of
these in mind, he may ask the accountant to itemize particular
entries in the accounts to assist in arriving at a profit figure
adjusted to conform to tax rules . In some cases, responsibil
ity for valuation of inventory rests with the proprietor of the
business rather than with his accountant . In such cases, the
Inspector often requests a certificate from the proprietor speci 
fying the exact basis of valuation-i.e . , cost o r market-em
ployed. Professional accountants , on the other hand, can antici 
pate the points likely t o b e of interest to an Inspector, and
many try to shorten the question-and-answer process by sub
mitting suitable supplementary statements beforehand, when
the return is filed.
At any stage during an Inspector ' s examination of accounts
the taxpayer or his accountant may indicate an unwillingness to
accept the Inspector 's view of the law, either as it relates to
inclusion of particular receipts or deduction of an expenditure.
The Inspector is most willing to outline the reasons supporting
his contention and to take into consideration the taxpayer ' s
counter-arguments . In other words, an examination _involves
more than elicitation of information. The Inspector seeks to
arrive at a figure to which the taxpayer will agree if they can
reach an accord as to the manner in which the tax code-in the
light of the established view of the Inland Revenue -can be ap
plied to any interpretative issue of law arising from the tax
payer's case .
To avoid misunderstanding, it may be well to
say that the Inspector 's very full authority to reach a solution
locally of interpretative problems does not extend to giving up
or making a compromise settlement with regard to any issue
on which he believes , after weighing the competing strengths of
the two positions, that the law provides an answer in favor of
the Inland Revenue .
The processes described above also are normally applied
to income and supplementary statements supplied to a local Tax
Office in support of refund claims . When the assessment or
refund procedure reaches the point where a final figure is ac 
cepted by the taxpayer, the actual assessment or repayment is
handled without further formality. There is no comprehensive
system of review by officials superior in rank to the official
who made the actual decisions on behalf of the Department . In
dividing up the workload, the Department seeks to minimize the
need for any such review by allocating the work initially to a
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senior or junior officer according to its presumed degree of
difficulty. Settled cases are scrutinized on a sampling basis
by the Inspecting Officer during his inspection visits to a local
Tax Office . His purpose in such a case is to appraise both
the efficiency with which a particular staff member performed
his present duties and his prospective fitness for promotion.
The scrutiny is not intended as a countercheck of current work.
However, should there be a situation (whether arising from an
error in mathematics or interpretation) which is considered to
justify an assessment requiring the payment of an additional
tax, as long as the six-year statute of limitations has not run,
it is possible for such an assessment to be made. Under such
circumstances, the Inspecting Officer would call the matter to
the attention of the Inspector who then would make the addi
tional assessment-just as he would if he himself had noticed
the situation in question.
Much of what has just been said about the procedures
adopted in local Tax Offices applies also to the Surtax Office ' s
As previously noted,
asses sment and repayment procedures .
the Surtax Office is supplied with photocopies of returns sub
mitted to local Tax Offices though, if it seems desirable, the
office is legally authorized to ask the taxpayer for further de 
tails . Attention has also been drawn 3 to a rule which makes
the final determination of an income tax assessment conclusive
also for surtax purposes to the extent the taxpayer is subject
to both taxes . This rule extends also to certain deductions
from total income -for example, to the deduction allowed when
a net loss from business is set off against income from other
sources . Certain of the personal allowances and reliefs for
income tax purposes also have counterparts in the surtax
sphere-for example, the allowances for children and other de 
pendents . In consequence, it is standard operating procedure
for the local Tax Offices to notify the Surtax Office of all de 
cisions made locally which are relevant in calculating surtax
liabilities .
With all such information as the starting point,
examination of the returns for surtax purposes is conducted in
a manner corresponding to that used by local Tax Offices in
their assessment and repayment work. For example, if need
be, the Surtax Office will discuss with the taxpayer or his ad 
visers any problems of interpretation which arise in applying
the tax code to the particular case, and every effort will be
made to arrive at a legally and mutually acceptable result.
3 See Chap. XVIII, 2. 9 supra .
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Section B.

Administrative Appeals

3 . 3 Introductory note
For the efficient operation of any tax system, there must
be some ready means by which a dispute between a taxpayer
and an assessing officer can be resolved by a third party. Liti
gation in a country 's regular courts , however, may not provide
a sufficiently convenient method in the first instance, particu
larly with respect to the many small disputes which can arise
where tax liability extends to a large fraction of the total com
munity. In consequence, some countries have deemed it ad
visable to introduce an initial appeal, less formal in character
than regular litigation, and typically before an agency within
the tax administration itself, hence the characterization admin
istrative appeal.
In the United Kingdom, however, the existence of the Gen
eral Commissioners and the Spe cial Commissioners 4 has af
forded, from the earliest days of the income tax, a c onvenient
and relatively informal procedure for submitting disputes to in
dependent tribunals . Given the existence of these facilities, a
felt need for a system of administrative appeals has not evolved.
The law which governs appeals to the C ommissioners makes it
clear that the taxpayer ' s decision to file a notice of appeal
such notice constituting the commencement of the appeal-does
not mean that such an appeal must be carried forward to an
actual hearing. It is quite possible for the taxpayer and the
representative of the Inland Revenue to reach an agreed settle 
ment after the taxpayer filed his notice and up until the time
the matter comes to an actual hearing. The law provides that
the same consequences shall follow as if the Commissioners
had decided the appeal on the same basis as that reflected in
the agreement. This clearly implies that there is still room
for administrative negotiation even after the Inland Revenue has
made a formal assessment, to which the taxpayer objected (or,
in a refund case, after repayment has been offered of a lesser
amount than the taxpayer considers to be due him) . According
ly, although the United Kingdom has no formal system of ad
ministrative appeals , and though the belated negotiations de
scribed above are carried out by the assessing office itself,
the arrangement-as described in the succeeding subtopic - has
some of the earmarks of the more formalized administrative
appeal procedures in other countries .
4 See Chap. XX infra .
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3 . 4 Details of procedures analogous to administrative appeals
At that point where a taxpayer gives formal notice of ap
peal from the assessing officer's decision regarding his assess 
ment or repayment claim, another official, senior in rank to
the first, may be led to intervene in either of two ways .
First, the initial decision-making official may think it ap
propriate to consult higher authority before making arrange 
ments for the hearing on appeal. For example, a member of
the local Tax Office ' s staff may consult the District Inspector
in charge in order to seek confirmation of the position he has
hitherto taken. A staff member of the Surtax Office likewise
can consult his own superiors . Also on occasion, the District
Inspector in charge of a local Tax Office may s eek advice at
this stage from headquarters; and if an important point of in
terpretation is at stake, it is possible for the Surtax Office to
consult the Board through their secretariat. In any of the fore 
going cases, if the higher authority which was consulted advises
the lower decision-making official that his position was too ex
treme, the latter is authorized to make a further attempt to
s ettle the appeal, before a hearing, by direct negotiation with
the taxpayer.
Action along the above lines perhaps should be regarded
as an extension of the basic assessment procedure ; it bears no
very close resemblance to administrative appeals available to
the taxpayer himself in other c ountries. There is, however, a
rather clearer parallel when it is the taxpayer who takes the
initiative after giving formal notice of appeal. Such a taxpayer
may think it worth while to write to the headquarters of the
Inland Revenue Department, setting out his arguments and en
quiring whether in the face of those arguments , the position
previously adopted by his District Inspector is supported by
headquarters . In this quite informal manner, higher authority
within the Department can be asked to express a view of an
interpretative question about which the taxpayer and the local
decision-making official have hitherto disagreed.
Again this does not mean that the higher authority ever
urges the decision-making official to compromise an issue.
However, should the senior official, drawing on his years of
service and experience, consider that the lower -level official
has taken such an extreme position that, considering the facts
of the particular case , it is unlikely that the Inland Revenue
would prevail in court, he will suggest to the younger man that
it would be reasonable under these circumstances to yield to
the taxpayer.
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Again, the taxpayer may send his letter to his representa
tive in Parliament, asking the latter to approach the Chancellor
of the Exchequer (or one of the other Treasury Ministers as 
s isting him) in support of the taxpayer ' s view of the disputed
interpretative question. Often, of course, correspondence ad
dressed to this level goes beyond the mere matter of interpre 
tation. The taxpayer 's dominant purpose may be to urge that,
if the meaning of the tax law is indeed the one for which local
officials have been contending, the government ought to propose
an amendment to the law. This wider aspect of such corre 
spondence is obviously beyond the scope of the present study.
But to the extent that the correspondent also indicates his dis 
agreement with the departmental interpretation of existing law,
the report submitted by the Board of Inland Revenue to the
Treasury Minister, to enable him to reply to the member of
Parliament, will incorporate any necessary defense of that in
terpretation.
The Minister will not necessarily discuss the
technical aspects of the matter in his own reply.
He may
prefer to take the line that neither he nor his officials have
the last word on interpretative questions . By noting that tax
payers have a statutory right to a hearing before the appeal
Commissioners and that the correspondent had invoked that
right, he may excuse himself from consideration of the legal
arguments .
Nevertheless , the very fact that a responsible
echelon within the tax administration' s headquarters was put
on notice that a departmental interpretation is disputed will
lead appropriate officials to re-examine the question before
reporting back to the Minister for the purpose of facilitating
his reply. This total process may turn out in any given case
to be the informal equivalent of an administrative appeal.
However, the analogy of this and the preceding illustration
to administrative appeals in other countries should not be
pressed too far. There is no identifiable group of appeals of
ficers . The correspondence is handled simply as part of the
general correspondence reaching headquarters on the particular
topic concerned. Any disputed question is investigated on be
half of the headquarters office as such, and the departmental
reply is likewise sent in the name of the office . Since this
type of correspondence is not formally segregated from all
other correspondence handled at headquarters, no statistical
analysis of the process is possible . Moreover , there is no set
procedure; it suffices that the taxpayer or his representative
should raise the disputed question in correspondence . His analy
sis, no doubt, will cover the ground as extensively as he thinks
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advisable for the purpose of explaining his cas e . On occasion
a memorandum prepared by the taxpayer ' s legal advisers may
be included, but there is no obligation to do so. When the
taxpayer writes to seek intervention by headquarters, he may
ask for an oral conference there for the purpose of enlarging
on his arguments. In such case, if the disputed interpretation
is one which previously has been fully explored in the case of
other taxpayers, the headquarters office may indicate to him,
in his own interest, that it appears doubtful to the Department
that such an interview would serve any useful purpose . If,
however, he persists in his request, an interview normally
would be accorded . It is left to the initiative of taxpayers to
decide whether to bring their own expert advisers to assist in
developing the cases they wish to present.
In essence, these correspondents ask headquarters to in
tervene, by overruling the initial inte rpretative position taken
by the local decision-making official . In the nature of things,
the headquarters of the Department does possess the necessary
authority.
But the staff members at headquarters, no less
than the other officials of the Department, are bound by the
tax codes . C onsequently, they have no special power t o com
promise a case for the sake of avoiding litigation .
Every official handling a case is bound equally by the
same tax code . Hence no power at any level exists to split
or trade issues in an effort to reach a settlement.
The foregoing relates to disputed assessments and repay
ments claims generally. Mention should be made, however, of
two classes of repayment claims which are subject to a pro
cedural review which has s ome similarity to the administrative
appeal procedures of other countries .
The two classes of claimants include ( 1) persons who are
not resident in the United Kingdom or whose justification for
relief depends in some way on the claimant' s residence or
domicile, and (2) entities or trusts claiming charitable exemp
tion. Although their claims can be given final approval by the
local decision-making officer, the final rejection of any such
claim, by statute, must be made by the secretariat at head
quarters acting on behalf of the Board. This latter require 
ment automatically ensures re-examination at headquarters of
any claim initially rejected by the local decision-making offi
cer.
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Section c . Extent Administrative Processing of
Refund Claims Departs from Administrative
Processing of A ssessments
3 . 5 Introductory note
It previously has been indicated that normal repayment
claims, where based on overpayments made during the taxable
years usually through withholding-are subject to the same
procedure as that applied to assessments. Part One , relating to
the United States , indicated that there the refund procedure can
be used as an alternative method of contesting a controversial
question which arises in the setting of a proposed assessment.
In particular, it was noted that a taxpayer, afte r the close of
the taxable year in question, may actually acquiesce in an as 
sessment with which he disagrees and pay the tax so assessed
thus laying the foundation for a refund claim which he can then
litigate in a different judicial forum than that which he would
have used in contesting the proposed assessment itself. An
exact parallel to this does not exist in the United Kingdom.
The treatment accorded one class of repayment claims, how
ever, might be fairly compared to the situation which prevails
in the United States, but only in the sense that the procedures
governing this one class of refund claims are slightly� though
only slightly, different from those applicable to nor mal claims.
This class consists of claims asserted on the ground, as
the statute puts it, that "error or mistake" was made . The
typical situation which the statute seeks to accommodate is one
where, after an assessment has become final and it is no long
er possible to invoke an ordinary appeal, the taxpayer discovers
that, by inadvertence , he overstated the amount of assessable
income in the return he submitted to the Inland Revenue De 
partment, by failing, for example, to claim some expense which
Where he can show
legitimately could have been deducted.
because of his own "error or mistake" an excessive assess 
ment has been made, h e i s permitted t o apply for an appropri
ate adjustment of his liability for the year concerned.
-

3 . 6 "Error or mistake " claims: Refund procedures prior to an
administrative appeal
Subj ect to a right of appeal to the Special Commissioners
(and, on certain questions of law, to the courts) , final decision
on an "error or mistake" claim lies with the Board, at head
quarters . But to facilitate a preliminary examination, the tax
payer is required to submit his claim to the office which handled
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the assess ment in the first instance -the local Tax Office if
the claim relates to an income tax or profits tax assessment,
and the Surtax Office if it relates to a surtax assessment.
The preliminary investigation is not ordinarily a burden 
s ome one . The very existence of the claim implies that the
original assessment was based on a return made by the tax
payer or some supporting statement. Attention, therefore, can
be concentrated on the particular point on which the return or
statement is now said to have been erroneous . The extent of
the examination necessarily varies with the character of the
alleged mistake . A s imple arithmetical slip, on the one hand,
may be more or less self-explanatory. On the other hand, a
claim alleging that a deductible expense was overlooked in cal
culating the profits of a bus iness can give rise to a question
regarding the legality of any deduction for that expenditure- just
as such a question might arise during the procedure which
leads to an original assessment on such profits.
The official who considers the claim must concern himself,
however, with certain additional matters which need not be con
sidered when an original assessment is in question.
In the
first place , the legislation authorizing submission of "error or
mistake " claims excludes cases where the return or statement,
though now seen to have been erroneous, was in fact in con
formity with the practice generally prevailing at the time when
it was made. This limitation is designed to prevent the De 
partment from having to undertake a wholesale reopening of
closed assessments when, for example, a court decision belat
edly holds that some type of receipt, hitherto accepted on all
sides as taxable, is actually nontaxable . To illustrate a second
restriction on "error or mistake" claims, assume that the tax
payer mistakenly reflected an item of income in his return for
1963, but that the item should have been included in his return
for the earlier year 1962. Assume further that the assess 
ments for both years were made in conformity with the return
as submitted. It would be inequitable to permit the taxpayer
to profit from his mistake by allowing him to reopen the as 
s ess ment for the later year 1963 if, because of the lapse of
time, the assessment for the earlier year 1962 could not be re
opened. To prevent that type of inequity, the "error or mistake"
legislation permits the Inland Revenue to take due account of
income tax liabilities for years other than the single year to
which the claim relates.
If the official who undertakes the preliminary examination
of an "error or mistake " claim is satisfied that it is well
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founded and outside the limitations described above, he is em
powered to approve it and arrange for the consequent repay
ment.
3 . 7 ''Error or mistake " claims : Procedure equivalent to ad
ministrative appeal
It may be, however, that the relief offered by the initial
decision-making officer falls short of the amount claimed or
that, for one reason or another, he rej ected the entire claim.
If the claimant desires to contest that decision, the claim is
forwarded to the Board's secretariat for a formal determina
This decision will be transmitted to the
tion by the Board.
claimant in writing. The Board must formally act on the mat
ter before the claimant, if the Board's decision is adverse,
can invoke a yet further appeal to the Special Commissioners .
Since the secretariat re-examines these disputed claims before
seeking the Board 's authority to refuse or restrict the claimed
refund, the procedure has s ome points of similarity to the sys 
tem of administrative appeals found in other countries, for
there is a reconsideration by a higher echelon of a dispute be
tween the claimant and the decision-making official in the local
Tax Office or the Surtax Office . This is not, of course,, pecul
iar to "error or mistake" claims . As previously noted, cer
tain other claim procedures likewise involve a formal deter 
mination by the Board, as the final step before a disputed case
can be referred to the independent appeal tribunal .

CHAPTER XX
RESOLUTION OF INTERPRETATIVE INCOME TAX
QUESTIONS BY INDE PENDENT TRIBUNALS
4 . 1 Introduction
Prime responsibility for resolving disputes over income,
surtax, and profits tax has been divided between a group called
General Commissioners and another known as Special Commis 
sioners .
The Special Commissioners are a central body of full-time
tax specialists, with jurisdiction over the whole country. In
contrast, the General C ommissioners are locally oriented.
Each of the nearly 700 divisions, the areas into which Great
Britain is divided for purposes of tax appeals, 1 has its own
body of part-time General C ommissioners . 2
Responsibility is divided between the General and Special
Commissioners as follows:
( 1) The General Commissioners have jurisdiction over al
most all income tax questions . On some matters - e . g . ,
claims for personal allowances and reliefs for family
circumstances -they have exclusive jurisdiction.
(2) The Special Commissioners have exclusive jurisdiction
of a few income tax questions, notably relief claims by
charitable bodies or by persons s eeking exemption on
the ground of nonresidence as well as claims for dou
ble taxation relief by way of credit for taxes paid over
seas . (Presumably Parliament allocated these areas
to the Special Commissioners because of the difficulty
of the le gal questions which emerge and the desirabil
ity of securing uniform interpretations . )
1 In the main, these divisions correspond to the ancient areas of
local administration.
2 There are no General C ommissioners in Northern Ireland. The
Special Commissioners have jurisdiction to hear any appeal arising
there which, if it arose elsewhere , could be heard by the appropriate
General Commissioners .
However , a Northern Ireland taxpayer may
elect to have any such appeal heard by the local county court instead
of by the Special Commissioners .
413
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( 3) The two bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over a wide
range of income tax questions, with the taxpayer being
free to choose between the two bodies. Illustratively,
the right of choice exists with respect to appeals against
assessments on wages, salaries , business profits , inter
est, and income from overseas .
( 4} They also have concurrent jurisdiction with respect to
appeals against assessments for the profits tax.
( 5) The Special C ommissioners have exclusive jurisdiction
over appeals relating to surtax.
Because of the many areas over which the General and
Special Commissioners have concurrent jurisdiction, it is con
venient to describe them collectively as appeal Commissioners .
However complicated the distribution of responsibilities may
appear, the appeal C ommissioners do, nevertheless, provide full
coverage for all income, profits, and surtax disputes .
While the appeal C ommissioners constitute the main device
for resolving tax disputes, s ome questions arising out of anti
avoidanc e legislation can go to two other tribunals : the Board
of Referees (in existence for many years) and the special tri
bunal established for the purpose of the 1960 Act (see - Chapter
XVIII, 2. 7 supra) . Like the appeal C ommissioners, neither of
these s pecialized tribunals has any function outside the tax
area.
The appeal C ommissioners and the two specialized tribu
nals make their own independent findings of fact and draw con
clusions as to the applicable legal principles . Their decisions
on questions of law may be appealed to the ordinary superior
courts of the country possessing a general jurisdiction.

Section A.

Organization and Procedures:
Trial Le ve l

4.2a Organization of the Gene ral Commissioners
Each of the nearly 700 bodies of General Commissioners
holds sessions in a convenient town located in or near its rela
tively s mall geographical division.
In consequence , the tax
payer-appellant normally can expect the hearing to take place
within easy traveling distance of his home or place of busi
ness .
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There is no formal limit on the number of Commissioners
to be appointed for any division. 3 Two Commissioners are a
necessary quorum to hear an appeal, but typically more than
the minimum attend the sessions .
In England and Wales the C ommissioners are appointed by
the Lord Chancellor, 4 in Scotland by the appropriate city or
county council. The Commissioners are unpaid, but the clerk
they appoint to assist them is remunerated from public funds .
This clerk often holds a legal qualification although the Com
missioners themselves are not expected to be legally qualified
or possess special expertise in tax matters . 5 The Radcliffe
Commission stated the principles which should govern their
selection:
In our view the qualities to be looked for ar e , in essence ,
that he or she should be an honest and fair -minded person,
able to display some understanding of figures and of legal dis
tinctions , and ready to treat his work as an important form of
public service. It is desirable too , that the Commissioners in
a division should not all come from one section of the taxpay
ing community and that they should therefore include in their
number persons with incomes mainly dependent on personal
earnings as well as persons whose incomes are derived from
property.

4 . 2b Organization of the Special Commissioners
The Special C ommissioners, with their jurisdiction cover
ing the entire United Kingdom, are based in London. Many
hearings take place there, but to accommodate appellants they
also operate a circuit system visiting a number of the chief
towns in the country. 6
The eight Special Commissioners are appointed by the
T reasury. They receive remuneration and give their full time
to their duties . A quorum of two C ommissioners is required
to hear an appeal. The statute provides no particular qualifi
cations for appointment, but in practice they are drawn in
3 Formerly , there was a limit of seven on the number of General
Commissioners with provision for an increase if the work load re
quired it.
4 Under the E nglish legal system , the Lord Chancellor combines
the functions of a Minister of Justice and the head of the judiciary .
5 The role of the General Commissioners in the tax area is com
parable to that of lay justices of the peace in applying the general
law of the land.
6 Since the Special Commissioners act in place of General Com
missioners in Northern Ireland , their circuit coverage of those coun
ties is particularly thorough.
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roughly equal proportions from barristers and senior members
of the Inland Revenue staff. After appointment, members from
Inland Revenue have no further connection with their former
Department.
4. 2c Organization of the Board of Refe rees
The Board of Referees was created to deal with certain
questions arising out of the temporary excess profits tax im
posed during World War I. In theory, under certain circum
stances it can be asked to determine the depreciation rate for
any class of machinery, but in practice it only hears appeals
growing out of legislation relating to the surtax avoidance which
results when closely held companies fail to distribute their
profits.
This complicated legislation is applicable in cases where
the controlled company has retained more of its profits than is
required to meet the reasonable needs of its business . Since
this unreasonable accumulation deprives the Exchequer of the
surtax otherwise payable by individual stockholder on dividends ,
Parliament provided in such cases for the surtax to be as 
sessed as though a dividend had been in fact declared in an
amount equal to the total amount of the undistributeq income,
not just to the amount considered to constitute an excessive
accumulation. Failing payments by the stockholders, the sur
tax so assessed may be recovered from the company. Accord
ingly, the company has the right to appeal the determination on
the ground inter alia, that amount of the accumulation was not
unreasonable.
Since such an appeal concerns surtax, it lies within the
j urisdiction of the Special C ommissioners . There are in addi
tion two ways which enable the company to lay the case before
the Board of Referees :
( 1) When the Inland Revenue threatens such a determina
tion, the company 's directors may, in effect, challenge
the action of the Inland Revenue on the ground that
there is no prima facie case for action. The directors '
written statement and a written counter- statement on
behalf of the Inland Revenue are considered by the
Board of Referees which can either uphold the direc 
tor s ' contention o r rule that a prima facie case exists ,
in which latter event the company 's ordinary right of
appeal still remains open to it.
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(2) Where the Special C ommissioners have heard and de 
cided an appeal against a surtax direction concerning
the undistributed income of a controlled company, either
the Revenue or the company may require the appeal to
be reheard de novo by the Board of Referees .
In any such proceedings, it may be a crucial question as
to whether the company' s actual distributions were reasonable,
taking account of its business requirements, including those
necessary or advisable for maintenance and development. The
Board of Referees has the function of bringing to bear on prob
lems of this character a wider practical knowledge of business
conditions than the Special C ommissioners posses s .
For this reason there are eighty-odd members of the
Board of Referees, appointed by the Treasury from persons
experienced in industrial and commercial affairs . The Board,
located in London, has jurisdiction over the entire United King
dom. The members act without remune ration but there are
three salaried positions: a part-time chairman, appointed by
the Lord Chancellor from the ranks of senior barristers, a
deputy chairman for Scotland, and a salaried registrar. Each
case is considered by a s mall panel presided over by the chair
man. The members of a given panel are selected by the chair
man, account being taken of special expertise they may possess
regarding the particular industry with which the given company
is associated.
4.2d Organization of the 1960 Act tribunal
As discussed in C hapter XVIII, 2 . 7 supra, legislation passed
in 1960 empowered the Board of Inland Revenue to counter
certain avoidance devices designed, through manipulation of
securities held, to secure a tax advantage analogous to that
s ought through bond-washing and dividend- stripping operations .
There was , however, no intention to penalize a transaction
where it could be shown that it was carried out "for bona fide
commercial reasons, " the obtaining of tax advantages not being
a main object.
Parliament tried to avoid impeding normal
business transactions by setting up an arrangement which en
abled taxpayers to seek prior clearance for prospective trans 
actions, and by creating special rights of appeal to a new body
the so-called 1960 Act tribunal.
The functions given this tribunal, with respect to avoidance
through manipulation of securities, resemble closely those of
the Board of Referees in the surtax area:
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( 1) When a taxpayer is notified that the Inland Revenue is
contemplating counter-action under the relevant section
of the 1960 Act, he may submit to the tribunal a writ
ten statement seeking a summary ruling that there is
no prima facie case for counter -action. If the tribunal
s o rules on the basis of both the taxpayer 's statement
and any written counter - statement by the Revenue , the
Revenue cannot then proceed any further in the matter .
If, however, the tribunal does not so rule, the taxpayer
still retains his normal right of appeal against the
counter -action proposed by the Revenue .
(2) The exercise of that right of appeal will result in a
hearing by the Special Commissioners . When such an
appeal has been decided by the Special Commissioners,
however, either the Revenue or the taxpayer may re
quire the appeal to be reheard de novo by the new
tribunal .
The 1960 Act tribunal has a further function. As discussed
in Chapter XVIII, 2 . 7 supra, an earlier act of 19 5 1 , designed
to prevent profits tax avoidance, gave the Inland Revenue a
right to counter-action. The same act gave the taxpayer a
right to appeal such counter-action to the Special Commission
ers . When the 1960 Act tribunal was created, the opportunity
was taken to provide an additional right of appeal under the
19 5 1 statute . On demand of either the Inland Revenue or the
taxpayer, the new tribunal must undertake a rehearing de novo
of any future appeals .
The 1960 Act tribunal is a single authority for the entire
United Kingdom.
Its ex officio chairman is the chairman of
the Board of Referees : he is assisted by two or more members
appointed by the Lord Chancellor on the basis of their "special
knowledge of and experience in financial or commercial mat
ters ."
4.3a Processing appeals : The General Commissioners
In Chapter XIX, 3 . 3 supra, the point was made that the
taxpayer's easy access to convenient appeal tribunals independ
ent of the Inland Revenue Department had removed any need
for a formal system of administrative appeals within the De 
partment itself. The access is very easy indeed. No special
formalities precede an appeal to the General Commissioners .
The taxpayer notifies the Inland Revenue that he intends to ap
peal and indicates, in a general way at least, the grounds of
his appeal.
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Payment of the tax in dispute is not a precondition of the
taxpayer's right to a hearing. Indeed, if an appeal against an
assessment is pending, collection of the contested tax is sus 
pended until after the appeal is determined. 7
The Commissioners who hear an appeal against an assess
ment (income tax, profits tax, or surtax) have authority to in
crease or reduce it, depending on the evidence. In keeping with
this principle, once an appellant invokes their jurisdiction, he
cannot withdraw his appeal without the consent of the Inland
Revenue . Because of this ability to withdraw -subj ect to c on
s ent from Inland Revenue -not every appeal of which notice has
been given goes forward to an actual hearing. In addition, the
law specifically provides that if the appellant and a representa
tive of Inland Revenue can agree as to the proper resolution of
the dispute between them, 8 effect may be given to that agree 
ment as if it were a formal determination by the appeal Com 
missioners . Statistics are not available t o show precisely what
proportion of all appeals are disposed of ultimately by agree
ment rather than by decision, but there can be no doubt that
the great majority are resolved by such agreement. In fact
this is the normal result in certain types of cases, such as
those where an Inspector relied on an estimated assessment of
trading profits because the business accounts were not available
7 Of course, the portion of the assessment not disputed must be
paid.

8 The Income Tax A ct , § 510 (1) , provides as follows: " Subj ect to
the provis ion of this section, where a person gives notice of appeal
to the General Commissioners , the Special Commissioners or the
Board of Referees against an asses sment, or a decision of any kind
with respect to income tax other than surtax or surtax , and , before
the appeal is determined by the Commissioners or Board , the sur
veyor or other proper officer of the Crown and the appellant come
to an agreement , whether in writing or otherwise, that the assess
ment or decision should be treated as upheld without variation, or as
varied in a particular manner or as discharged or cancelled, the like
consequences shall ensue for all purposes as would have ensued if ,
at the time when the agreement was come to , the Commissioners or
Board had determined the appeal and had upheld the assessment or
decision, without variation, had varied it in that manner or had dis
charged or cancelled it , as the case may be."
However , it must be
stressed that the phrase "varied in a particular manner" does not
carry the connotation of settlement in the sense of adjustment or com
promise. It means , for example, that where both parties come to an
agreement that the assessment or decision was in error-as deter
mined by a closer scrutiny of the point or points in issue-in one or
more aspects , an alteration w ill be made to take account of such an
error .
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to him at the time when the assessment had to be made. Where
there is undue delay in producing the accounts, the Inspector
may ask the Commissioners to arrange an interlocutory hear
ing so the taxpayer can be questioned regarding the reason for
delay and warned that the Commissioners, at a later hearing,
may confirm the estimated assessment if the accounts are not
produced within some reasonable time limit which they specify.
Such a warning is often sufficient to get a delay case moving
again.
In the small minority of cases where, following notice of
appeal, issues of fact or law emerge which cannot be settled
by negotiation, the District Inspector in charge of the local Tax
Office has full authority to decide when to terminate the nego
tiations and allow the appeal to go forward for hearing. He
has no obligation to notify headquarters of appeals that are
going forward, though he might do so in a particular case, for
example, where he previously had sought advice from a head
quarters specialist.
In nearly all appeals heard by General Commissioners, the
Inland Revenue ' s case is presented by the District Inspector or
one of the other Inspectors assisting him in the local Tax Of
fice . 9 In appeals of special significance , however, a member
of the London or E dinburgh Solicitor' s Office may represent
the Department. l0
Taxpayers are entitled to present their appeals in person
and many do so. It is quite usual, however, for taxpayers to
be represented by a professional adviser-an accountant or
s olicitor or, more rarely, a barrister .
There are no written rules of procedure governing the
hearings , which tend to be informal, especially if the taxpayer
is appearing without the assistance of a professional adviser .
The degree of informality varies from one division to another ,
however, depending on the particular views of the local C om
missioners . The parties are not required to file formal peti
tions or other documents, but it is not uncommon for the two
s ides to draw up an agreed statement of facts to reduce the
ground to be covered in the oral evidence at the hearing.
In a typical appeal, the hearing is opened on behalf of the
appellant, who may submit oral evidence himself and call
9 The representation of the Department of Inland Revenue at ap
peals hearings is one of the matters covered in the training course
for members of the Inspectorate. See Chap. XVII , 1 . 5 supra .
10 Members of the Solicitors' Offices in both London and Edinburgh
are trained lawyers.
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witnesses. To the extent appropriate, he and his witnesses
are cross-examined by the representative of the Inland Revenue
and then re-examined . The Inland Revenue 's case follows : if
any witnesses are called on behalf of the Inland Revenue, they
too are subject to examination. The appellant ' s reply follows .
There is no simple answer to the question, which party
must shoulder the burden of proof. With respect to construc
tion of the statutory provision applicable to a particular case ,
as distinct from ascertainment of the actual facts t o which the
law must be applied, the general rule is that the Inland Reve 
nue must show that the item it claims to be taxable does come
within the scope of the words imposing liability . On the other
hand, once it has been demonstrated that an item comes within
a charging provision, a taxpayer who claims the benefit of a
relief provision must show that the latter provision does em
brace his cas e . As to questions of fact, normal rules associ
ated with other litigation apply, absent special circumstances .
The Commissioners usually announce their decision im
mediately after the hearing, though not infrequently they take
time for consideration and later communicate their decision to
the parties in writing.
The content of their decision, i . e . ,
whether it includes the reasoning they employed in reaching the
result or simply notes that the assessment is confirmed, dis 
charged, or modified (or that the claim to relief is allowed or
refused), depends on the discretion of the C ommissioners and
varies with the circumstances of the cas e .
Excluding the delay cases previously described, the 700
sets of General Commissioners decide about seven or eight
thousand appeals each year. The hearings are private; also,
the proceedings and decisions are not reported. Hence, these
decisions have no precedent value . Further, in theory, the de
cision the Commissioners reach on an appeal for a given year
is not res judicata should the same taxpayer appeal to the same
set of Commissioners on a similar question as to a later year .
As a practical matter, however, a local Tax Office no doubt
will attribute some significance to a General Commissioners '
decision when a later appeal on a similar point arises in the
same division.
4.3b Processing appeals : The Special Commissioners
In hearing appeals falling within their jurisdiction, the Spe
cial Commissioners exercise virtually the same powers and
functions as General C ommissioners.
The description just
given regarding procedures before the General Commissioners
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is equally applicable to the processing of appeals before the
Special Commissioners, with certain qualifications .
A surtax appeal may be settled by negotiation as readily
as an appeal relating to income tax or the profits tax. While
the taxpayer ' s adversary is the Surtax Office, not a local In
spector of Taxes, the prime difference lies in the matter of
representation. The Surtax Office staff does not present the
Inland Revenue ' s case at the oral hearing should one prove
necessary. On a surtax appeal, the London or Edinburgh Solici 
tor' s Office represents the Inland Revenue . But o n income or
profits tax appeals to the Special C ommissioners, typically
either an Inspector from the appropriate local Tax Office or a
member of one of the Solicitors ' Offices will represent the
government-as was true in the case of appeals to the General
Commissioners .
There is, however, one further alternative
here; sometimes the Special Appeals Section of the C hief In
spector 's Office presents the Department's case. 11
Further,
taxpayers themselves are much more likely to be represented
by professional advisers , including barristers, before the Spe 
cial Commissioners than before the General Commissioners.
For that reason the proceedings tend to be somewhat more
formal. The number of cases in which the Special Commis 
sioners reserve judgment at the close of a hearing and later
give a reasoned determination in writing also is proportionately
greater.
Excluding cases in Northern Ireland where Special C om
missioners also take the place of General Commissioners, be 
tween two and three thousand appeals are dealt with annually
by Special Commissioners . This figure, however, includes a
considerable number of delay cases where the hearing is little
more than a formality. The number of appeals in other than
delay cases probably cW! be put at less than one thousand.
4.3c Processing appeals : The Board of Refe rees
Attention previously has been drawn to the privilege ac
corded a closely-held company threatened with action under the
legislation dealing with unreasonable retention of profits . The
company can ask the Board of Referees for a summary ruling
that no prima facie case for such action exists . Oral hearings
are not held. The company' s directors simply submit a writ
ten statement setting forth the facts and circumstances on which
they rely in requesting the ruling. The Inland Revenue has a
l l see Chap. XVII,

1 2 supra .
.
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limited period to transmit this statement to the Board of Ref
erees , together with a written counter-statement setting forth
its competing view. The Board of Referees then circulates the
documents among the chairman (in Scottish cases, the deputy
chairman) and the panel of five members chosen because of
their relevant experience in industry. The members send their
respective written opinions to the chairman (or deputy chair 
man) . Usually, on the basis of the written opinions, he is able,
without a formal meeting of the members, to announce the
Board' s determination.
The Board of Referees has a second function under the
same legislation: to rehear de novo certain surtax appeals
arising when either party thereto is dissatisfied with the Spe 
cial Commissioners ' decision.
The dissatisfied party must
submit within a limited period a concise statement of the facts
and the grounds on which this further appeal is based. The
respondent party then submits a counter -statement. If any ques 
tion of fact is in dispute the chairman, at a meeting with the
parties , provides directions as to proof and procedure and fixes
a time by which the copies of documents intended to be used
at the rehearing must be in the hands of the Board's registrar.
By statute, the Board of Referees has the same authority at
the rehearing as the Special Commissioners had at the original
hearing, though otherwise the tax code does not prescribe the
procedures to be followed. In practice, the rehearing is heard
by the chairman (in Scotland, the deputy chairman) and four
members chosen from the panel. And the procedures generally
are similar to those followed at the original hearing before the
Special Commissioners . For example, as in other surtax ap
peals, a member of the London or Edinburgh Solicitor' s Office
presents the Inland Revenue cas e .
In recent years from ten t o twenty cases are handled an
nually under the summary procedure described in the second
preceding paragraph. Rehearings have been much more infre
quent . Over one recent four-year period for which statistics
are available, only one rehearing took place.
4.3d Processing appeals: The 1960 Act tribunal
Like the Board of Referees (with which it shares a chair
man) , the 1960 Act tribunal has a double role : it handles writ
ten applications for summary rulings where the Inland Revenue
has threatened counter-action under the legislation dealing with
securities ' manipulation, and it rehears appeals originally deter
mined by the Special C ommissioners where the Inland Revenue
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has taken counter -action. During its first three years, no re 
hearings took place. The tribunal, however , had dealt with fif
teen cases under the summary procedure, some involving appli
cations by more than one taxpayer . Since that procedure is
very similar mutatis mutandis to the corresponding procedure
adopted under the surtax legislation, it will not be described
further here.
Section B.

Organization and Procedures:
Appe llate Tribunals

4 . 4 Organization of the appe llate court syste m
The United Kingdom tax code provides that the decisions
of any of the independent bodies described in the previous Sec 
tion are subj ect to review, but only as to questions of law, be
fore the regular superior courts of the country. Thus, either
party has a right of appeal to a court from appeal decisions of
the General or Special C ommissioners and also from decisions
rendered by the specialized tribunals after rehearing cases
originally heard by Special Commissioners . 1 2
It is otherwise, however, i n the case of the summary pro
cedure by which the Board of Referees and the 1960 Act tri
bunal can be asked in the first instance for a ruling to termi
nate Inland Revenue ' s threatened action under the relevant
special legislation. This summary procedure was designed to
enable companies (or other taxpayers affected) to test quickly
and before an expert independent tribunal their ass erted grounds
for believing that the special legislation should not be applied .
As already indicated, a summary ruling in the taxpayer ' s favor
is conclusive against further action by the Inland Revenue . In
deed, in keeping with the limited purpose for which the proced
ure was designed, such rulings are not subject to any form of
appeal.
T he particular court which exercises appellate jurisdiction
varies from one part of the United Kingdom to another:
( 1)

In

England and Wales, jurisdiction rests with the Chan
cery Division of the High Court of Judicature, sitting
in London.
Proceedings take place before a single
judge of that Division; his decision may be appealed,

l 2 This right of appeal to a higher court extends also to cases where
a Northern Ireland taxpayer has elected to have his appeal heard by
the local county court instead of by the Special Commis sioners .
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however, to the C ourt of Appeal, in which event normal
ly three judges sit.
( 2) In Scottish cases, jurisdiction rests with the Court of
Session, sitting in Edinburgh, and is exercised by one
of the Divisions of the Inner House, usually with three
or four judges hearing the cas e .
( 3 ) In Northern Ireland, jurisdiction rests with the Court
of Appeal of Northern Ireland, normally with three
judges sitting together .
Throughout the United Kingdom, there i s a final appeal
(assuming leave is obtained, if necessary) to the House of Lords
sitting in its judicial capacity as the supreme court of appeal
Up to five
in civil matters for the entire United Kingdom .
members of the House commonly sit together on tax appeals .
These regular courts treat tax litigation as one part of all the
varied business which comes before them. Because they are
courts of general jurisdiction, their judges do not specialize in
tax matters . 13
4. 5 Processing cases through the courts
The right of appeal to a court is limited by statute to
questions of law, the decision of the trial tribunal being final
as to questions of fact. In addition to questions of fact where
the prime issue is one of substantiation, questions such as
whether a given course of activity involved carrying on a trade
or whether, given the periods and circumstances of an individ
ual ' s presence in the United Kingdom, he became a resident,
are deemed essentially to be questions of fact. On the other
hand, it is a question of law whether the evidence before the
trial body justified it in drawing the inferences of fact upon
which it relied in reaching its final decision. If a court con
cludes there was insufficient evidence on which the tribunal
reasonably could reach the conclusion it did, the reviewing
court would feel free to reverse.
While the taxpayer 's right of appeal to the courts is not
conditioned formally on his prior payment of the tax outstand
ing, the tax code does provide that the tax is payable on the
basis determined by the trial tribunal notwithstanding any ap
peal to a court. Therefore, the Inland Revenue can enforce
1 3 n is possible, of course, that a particular judge, did specialize
in tax matters as a barrister , before his elevation to the bench.
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collection while an appeal is pending. Tax paid while an appeal
is pending would be refunded, however, to the extent appropri
ate, should the court modify the trial tribunal's determination.
The taxpayer may, and occasionally does, choose to appear in
person to argue his own case; but if he is represented by an
adviser, he must employ the type of lawyer who has the right
to appear before the court in question-that is , a barrister in
England, Wales, or Northern Ireland, and advocate in Scot
land. 14
When General or Special C ommissioners or one of the spe 
cialized bodies decides an appeal against the Inland Revenue,
should the officer who represented the Department at the appeal
hearing believe further appeal to a court is advisable , he could
refer the matter to the Board ' s secretariat. To enable the
Board to decide whether to authorize resort to the courts, the
secretariat consults the Chief Inspector ' s Office in income tax
and profits tax cases or the Surtax Office in surtax cases . The
secretariat wants to learn whether these offices feel that the
decision in question is completely unacceptable or whether they
dislike the decision but do not consider it worth contesting, il
lustratively because of the unlikelihood that a similar fact situ
ation will reoccur or whether they feel they can live with the
decision. Sometimes, of course , these offices will urge that
the decision be appealed, even though an adverse decision on
appeal is anticipated, as the resulting clarification of the law
will permit the introduction of remedial legislation. In short,
the secretariat consults these offices to discover the adminis 
trative reaction.
For purely legal questions, the secretariat
has recourse to the Solicitors ' Offices, though time pressures
involved in the secretariat's decision whether or not to appeal
may well prevent such consultation at this early stage .
Where appeal to a court is authorized, the Board and secre-:
tariat keep in touch with subsequent progress of the cas e . In
land Revenue 's actual representative in court will be a barrister
or advocate , but the secretariat represent the Department in a
lay capacity, communicating with the barrister or advocate
through the appropriate Solicitor's Office . The latter office ,
however, prepares the brief for the barrister o r advocate who
represents the Department in court. And if a particular mem
ber of the Solicitor's Office handled a given case before the
trial tribunal, he typically handles the brief on appeal.
14 Advocates also may appear before the House of Lords on appeals
from the Scottish Court of Session.
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But the key document in appealing to a court is the so
called stated Case prepared by the trial body itself. On giving
due notice and paying the prescribed fee, either the taxpayer
or the Inland Revenue can obtain from the trial tribunal this
written statement setting out the facts of the case and the tri
bunal 's decision thereon. Documents produced in evidence can
be annexed to the stated Case as exhibits . The Case normally
is drafted in the first instance by members of the trial tribunal
(or, in the case of General C ommissioners, by their clerk) . It
usually is sent in draft form to the parties for their comments
and suggestions, but the trial tribunal which states the Case
bears the ultimate responsibility.
The actual court proceedings center around the stated Cas e .
During the oral argument-an integral part of all court pro
ceedings in tax controversies -the appellant's representative
advances oral arguments in opposition to the conclusions reached
by the trial tribunal. The respondent's representative, also
orally, supports it. The court commonly delivers an oral opin
ion. In s imple cases heard by a single judge, the decision is
delivered at the end of the trial. In more complicated cases,
especially those heard by the full panel of three judges , there
may be a delay of several days . In either case, a full trans 
cript is made available . The judgment by the court sets out
fully the legal reas oning in support of its decision.
The number of tax appeals -income, profits, or surtax
brought before all United Kingdom courts varies from year to
year, but twenty-five is an average annual figure . All the de 
cisions, together with the stated Cases, are published official
ly.
The precedent effect of court decisions can be summarized
as follows :
( 1) The House of Lords is bound only by its own decisions .
Its decision binds all lower courts .
(2) The Court of Appeal (England and Wales), the Court of
Session, and the C ourt of Appeal of Northern Ireland
are bound by their own respective decisions . Each of
these three courts treats the decisions of one of the
others with great respect. While not strictly bound to
follow them, divergency comes with cons iderable re
luctance .
(3) A judge of the Chancery Division is bound to follow a
decision by the House of Lords or the Court of Appeal
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( England and Wales ) . He is not strictly bound by a de 
cision of the C ourt of Session or the Court of Appeal
of Northern Ireland, but in practice almost certainly
would follow it, especially where the earlier decision
was unanimous .
Any member of the accounting and legal professions con
cerned with tax matters will pay close attention to all court
decisions . If a given appeal is decided adversely to the Inland
Revenue in a court of first instance and no further appeal is
taken to a higher court, this generally is taken to mean that,
in the absence of a statutory amendment, the Department will
follow the principle of the adverse decision. However, a single
decision may not always establish the precise limits of that
principle ' s applicability. Thus, a decision not to appeal does
not exclude the possibility of further litigation involving a some 
what similar but not identical situation. The Inland Revenue,
however, does not follow the practice of publishing statements
as to the presumed range of court decisions .
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CHAPTER XXI
ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONAL AND
PERSONNEL FRAMEWORKS
Section A. Adminis trative Organizational
Framework
1 . 1 Introduction

The Dutch administrative organization charged with the
levying and collection of taxes has three levels : national, re
gional, and local.
Prime responsibility for the assessment of taxes lies in
the local offices, i.e . , with the 103 inspectorates , authorized
by statute to make assessments and whose decisions cannot be
overruled by superior officials . Administrative appeal by a
taxpayer from assessments made by personnel working in those
inspectorates is to that same local inspector. There is no ap
peal to a higher administrative level. Differences of opinion
which cannot be settled locally must be taken to the courts .
Otherwise , however, the eight regional offices, headed by
district directors, do operate as administrative superiors of
the inspectors , inspecteur der be lastingen. In turn, these re 
gional offices are supervised by the National Office Directorate
of Direct Taxes, one of the seven directors responsible to the
Director-General of Taxes who, with his counterpart, the
Director-General of Tax Affairs, reports directly to the Under
Secretary of Finance , the actual head of the administrative
structure. 1
The subdivision of the national office, called the Directorate
of Direct Taxes, has five subdivisions . Two deal with the in
dividual income tax, the corporation income tax, and the wage
tax; three deal with c ollection and administration. The subdi
visions dealing with income taxes handle requests for informa
tion from local offices relating to interpretative matters or to
situations where an assessment was excessive but the time for
administrative appeal within the local inspectorate has expired.
This same division handles taxpayer requests for information
on the tax consequences of proposed transactions .
1 The

Minister of Finance is the titular head.
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1 . 2 Organizational framework, national office le ve l
Chart I, opposite, sets out the arrangement of the na
tional office . The portion of the national office responsible
for the levying and collection of all taxes is headed by the
Under Secretary of Finance . Reporting directly to him are
the two directors-general: the Director-General of Tax Affairs
and the Director-General of Taxes . 2
The staff of each of these two directorates is made up of
inspectors or chief-inspectors of taxes (who have served vary
ing lengths of time in local or district offices) supported by
lower level personnel.
The Director-General of Tax Affairs handles tax policy,
tax legislation, and international tax affairs . Reporting to him
are four directors . None of these directors is directly respon
sible for the resolution of interpretative problems in individual
cases, although the Director of Legislation for direct taxes is
indirectly concerned with such matters . His office drafts pro
posed legislation and prepares legislative regulations and di
rective s . Thus, whenever groups of affected taxpayers -i . e . ,
insurance companies, banks, shipping-unions , chambers of com
merce, trade -unions, agricultural societies -are dissatisfied
with a statute or with its interpretation and desire a change in
legislation, they contact this office .
Responsibility for the levying and collection of all taxes
rests with the Director-General of Taxes who has seven direc 
tors reporting to him. Two deal with administrative matters,
one with general and legal affairs, and the remaining four with
the several kinds of taxes : direct, customs and excise, death,
registration and stamp duties, cadastral, and mortgage . The
Director of Direct Taxes is the one concerned with income and
wage taxes , and as to these, his office performs varied func 
tions . Occasionally it informs the local inspectorates of deci
sions reached in certain tax cases with which they should be
familiar . It responds to requests from local offices for advice
regarding litigation policy positions . It also determines future
governmental policy regarding tax decisions reached by final
judicial authority . Finally, it handles so-called hardship cases, 3
2 Prior to 1950 the functions of the two present directors-general
were performed by a single D irector-General. The increasing impor 
tance of prepar ing tax legislation and the emergence of pressing in
ternational fiscal problems led to the division of the office .
3 In nearly every tax statute , authority i s conferred o n the Minis
ter of Finance to grant relief in situations where applications of the
statute , even with a flexible interpretation would constitute a case of
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presented to it by inspectorates through the regional directors,
although the Under Secretary of Finance actually announces the
official decisions . 4
1 . 3 Organizational framework, regional office

The eight regional directors ' offices are concerned primar 
ily with administrative matters . Each directorate contains a
number of organizational units as set out in Chart II, opposite.
A regional director heads a staff ordinarily composed of
four inspectors of academic level and of between thirty to fifty
lower-level technical and administrative personnel.
The prime responsibility of a regional director is admin
istrative supervision, to insure the smooth functioning of sev 
eral local level offices. He personally does not perform any
technical function with respect to the work of the local inspec
torates which carry out audit, assessment, and collection func
tions and also handle their own administrative appeals .
In addition to his administrative responsibilities, the re
gional director has certain collateral functions . He remits tax
payments in the case of insolvent taxpayers, and transmits so
called hardship cases to the national office, Directorate of Di
rect Taxes . Infrequently, a local inspector requests his advice
in the handling of a particular case which poses interpretative
difficulties or tactical questions . The regional director ordi
narily responds to those exceptional situations , by forwarding
the inspector 's report, together with his own opinion , to the
national office , Directorate of Direct Taxes . This same pro
cedure is followed where a local inspectorate proposes to ap
peal a lower court decision to the Supreme Court, with ultimate
approval regarding the appeal then resting with the national
office .
On occasion a taxpayer may complain to the regional di
rector with respect to an inspector 's conduct while handling a
(footnote continued)
hardship , that is , a case where a tax, although in conformity with the
statute , would be contrary to the intention of the statute. No statute
can provide a concrete solution for every factual situation which may
occur and interpretation will not always result in a reasonable con
clusion. Thus in such cases the Ministry can provide relief through
Taxpayers , however , cannot claim
remission or reduction of the tax.
such relief; it is wholly discretionary .
4 On some occasions , the national office , Directorate of Direct
Taxes , delegates subsequent decisions in like situations to the region
al or to the local offices .
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particular audit o r assessment. Should the director conclude
that the audit or assessment was incorrect, a theoretically pos 
sible but most improbable result, the director can recommend
a change. The inspector, however, is free to disregard the
recommendation; by statute he alone is empowered to change
an assessment, though as a matter of prudence he may decide
to shift his position. Should the inspector disregard the direc 
tor 's recommendation and the taxpayer decide to contest the
assessment, the taxpayer can, of course, address the national
office for hierarchic measures toward the disobedient inspec 
tor, though procedurally, he must lodge an administrative ap
peal with the same inspector . If the appeal is rejected, the
taxpayer then can turn to the courts .
1 . 4 Organizational framework, local office le ve l
As Chart II, supra, indicates, regional directors perform

administrative functions with respect to eight different types of
offices. Of these, however, only two deal with the income tax:
the tax-audit or tax-accountant offices, and the inspectorates
for direct taxes, inspecties der belas tingen, who bear ultimate
responsibility for all assessments .
There is wide variation in the size of the geographical
area serviced by an inspectorate. Some cover as many as 800
square kilometers ( 480 square miles) some as few as 80 5 ( 48
square miles) . There are about one hundred inspectorates for
direct taxes . Eighty deal only with individual income taxes and
wage taxes . The remaining twenty deal with corporate income
5 The area of the Nether lands is about 32 , 5 00 square kilometers ,
with 1 square kilometer equalling two-fifth of 1 square miles . There
is a population of 12 million inhabitants , with an average population
density of 37 0 per square kilometer . The provinces of Noord- and
Z uid-Holland , which make up the western part of the Netherlands , have
The population of that
an area of about 5 ,200 square kilometers.
western part equals 5 million inhabitants with a population density of
960 per square kilometer. By way of comparison, note the following:
State of the
United States

Area*

Rhode Island
3 ,150
New Hampshire
24,000
Michigan
148 ,000
District of
Columbia
181
*
Square kilometers .
**
Per square kilometers .

Population

Population
Density **

0.9
0.6
7.0

million
million
million

280
25
47

0.9

million

500

ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZA TION

437

taxes , as well as individual income and wage taxes .6 There
are also approximately twenty tax audit offices . Their prime
function is to audit the more complex income tax returns , usu
ally those of corporations . Returns involving simpler, less
complex issues are audited within the inspectorates by their
own audit divisions . The twenty tax audit offices are staffed
by chartered accountants who are considered equal to those of
a university level, since they have passed several examinations
in accounting, financial arithmetic, etc .
Inspectorates vary in size, from large, to medium, to
s mall. The three large ones are located in Amsterdam, Rot
terdam, and The Hague .
There are between forty and fifty inspectorates , respec
tively, in the medium and small categories .
Despite variations in size, all inspectorates have the same
basic structural organization, headed by chiefs who have identi
cal legal authority but whose titles and salaries vary depending
on the importance of the inspectorate . Such persons are ulti
mately responsible, apart from supervision of subordinates, for
assessments, hearing administrative appeals , and representing
the inspectorate in litigation arising out of assessments it has
made . To these ends, each inspectorate has either four or
five divisions, the two most relevant here being the assessment
and audit divisions . Except in s mall inspectorates, an assess 
ment division will include several inspectors with a university
background, and a number of less well educated controleurs
and commiezen. In contrast, controleurs head up the staff of
the audit divisions , and, in the case of small inspectorates,
also the assessment divisions .
The assessment division performs the most important
duties, concentrating on the income tax though also responsible
for assessment of the tax on capital. E ssentially, the other
divisions are auxiliary to the assessment division; their func 
tion is to promote an optimal accomplishment of the entire as 
sessment process ( i.e., ordinary assessmenta, deficiency as 
sessment, handling of administrative appeals) . For example, the
audit division has no power to review an assessment made by
the assessment division. It simply collects information outside
6 As of 1967 , there were about 100 inspectorates for direct tax
es , dealing only with individual income taxes .
E ight inspectorates
deal with corporate income taxes . No inspectorates deal with both
individual and corporate income taxes .
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the office and makes routine audits, both inside and outside the
office, primarily of uncomplicated income tax cases . 7
The following table shows that the number of assessments
typically completed by an inspectorate varies depending on its
siz e :
Type of Inspectorate

Number of Assessments

6 ,000- 20 ,000
20 ,000- 5 0 ,000
1 5 0 ,000-200,000

Small
Medium
La;rge

While inspectors , with a university background, handle the
more complex cases, the table below from one recent year in
dicates that lower level personnel handle the greatest number :
Number of Assessments 8

Levels of personnel
performing assessments
Inspectors (with educa
tional background at the
university level)

(Hoofd) controleurs
Commiezen

Income Tax
Average
number
per man
Total

1 ,000
2 ,200
3 ,7 00

Corporation Tax
Total

200 ,000 ( 8%)
600 ,000 (24%)
1 '700 ,000 ( 68o/o)

36 ,000

Other data of that same year show within the inspectorates the
annual number of administrative appeals .
Type of Tax
Corporation Income Tax
Individual Income Tax
Wage Tax

Annual Number of
Administrative Appeals

3 ,000
230 ,000
120 ,000

7 A separate administrative division also performs a variety of
supporting functions , such as maintaining up-to-date files for each
taxpayer. On the basis of the income established by the audit divi
sion, the administrative division computes the tax or , more accurate
ly as of the present , forwards the data to the national computer cen
ter . This division also oversees the payment of the wage tax withheld
by employers . A yet separate external services division, sometimes
known as the active service because of its non-sedentary activities ,
accumulates other data pertaining to the assessment process .
8 The entire income tax of a majority of taxpayers ( in 1963 , about
2 ,900 ,000) is withheld from their wage payments . In consequence,
there is no assessment in the case of this maj ority.
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Section B. Pe rsonne l Framework (Go ve rnmental
and Non -Go ve rnmental)
1 . 5 Gove rnmental professional pe rsonnel

The Dutch Internal Revenue Service recruits its personnel
from two distinct educational levels : those who have completed
the course of study at a school of s econdary instruction which
prepares for admission to the university 9 and those who have
completed or attended the later years of a school of extended
primary education. 1° From the first group are drawn the fu
ture inspectors and their superiors, from the second the per 
sonnel at lower levels .
Graduates of the schools of secondary instruction apply to
the Ministry of Finance for admission to a competitive exami
nation covering general ability and character. If they pass this,
they enter the training program. Prior to 1964 this took place
at the State Academy of Instruction and Education for the In
ternal Revenue Service, Rijksbelastingacademie , 11 which was
under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance . 12 The insti
tution granted no degrees but a number of students secured
master's degrees in law or economics from a university while
enrolled in the Academy.
The R ijksbe lastingacademie had a five-year course . The
first half concentrated on public and private law and commer 
cial economic s ; the second on taxation law and theory, with
9 A fter attending a primary school for six or seven year s , a child
can enter one of the two main types of schools of secondary instruc
tion: one w ith a five-year course stressing mathematics , modern
languages , and /or economics and a six-year course which adds Latin
and Greek.
10 After attending a primary school for six or seven years , a child
can enter a school of extended primary education which gives four
years of study in general courses , mathematics , and French, German,
and English.
11 The Rijksbelastinga cademie was created by the Ministry of F i
nance in 1939 . It was designed to supersede the then-existing prac
tice of preparing in private institutions for admission after examina
tion to the higher echelons of the Internal Revenue Service. E ither
these admission examinations or s imilar screening devices had been
in existence for a considerable number of year s . The administration
dealing w ith death duties had introduced them in 1 82 2 , the Internal
R evenue Service in 1910.
12 A lmost no inspectors between 1939 and 1964 entered the Internal
]{evenue Service other than through the Rijksbelastingacademie . The
exceptions arose from a shortage in qualified personnel because of
insufficient applicants .
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particular emphasis on the income tax, both individual and cor
porate . In addition a few months were spent at an inspectorate,
concentrating either on income taxes or on turnover, customs,
and excise taxes . Practically all students finished this course
of study and all who completed it entered the Service. The
esprit de corps. based on corps traditions dating from the early
nineteenth century, was an enormously cohesive factor and one
of the major elements which prior to 1945 held all but a very
few Rijksbe lastingacademie graduates in the service. The post
war period, however, saw a marked change, in part because of
the more attractive salaries and opportunities available in non
governmental service .
The difficulty in retaining trained personnel a s well a s in
securing qualified applicants (partly because training did not
tak.e place within a university) led the Ministry of Finance to
alter the training program for future inspectors . Since 1964
applicants who qualify for the training program have enrolled
with the Law Faculty at one of the state universitie s . While
the course of study is substantially similar to that provided by
the R ijks be las tingacademie, on completion students now receive
a master's degree in tax law and theory. This is followed by
a short period of practical experience. A student enrolling in
the program receives a government subsidy during his training
period, but commits himself to remain with the Service for a
certain number of years. Otherwise, the subsidy must be re 
turned.
The corps of Dutch inspectors which is formed by the
training program is not outstanding in terms of learning or in
tellectual qualities . Rather they are trustworthy and honest
men, stolid and reliable in the performance of their duties .
In contrast to the extended academic preparation required
of and provided for personnel who hope to become inspectors,
most e mployees are hired at 17 or 18 years of age, directly
after completion of all or part of the curriculum of a school
of extended primary education and commence their duties im
mediately.
Such a young man enters a local office 13 where he is
taught how to do the simplest work in the administrative divi
sion. Later more difficult but still elementary work is assigned ,
to him. Within two or three years, he is eligible to commence
13 Theoretically , there is no distinction in the recruitment pattern
for this type of employee for whatever level of office; in practic e ,
personnel in the district, and more particularly the national, office
have served previously in one or more local offices .
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a three -to-four year in-service training program, primarily
involving study at home of various texts, the tax statute, and
regulations . During some of this time, he also has oral in
struction for about three hours a month. No complex subjects ,
such as corporate accounting, are studied. Upon completion of
the course and passing of the final examination-which frequent
ly is not accomplished upon the first attempt-these persons
are promoted to adjunct commies, some six to seven years
after entering the local office. 14
Two lines of promotion are available to an adjunct com 
mie s . He may prefer to remain in the administrative division
or in the lower levels of the assessment or audit division of
his local office . In such a case, after service in one o f these
divisions for some time, he is eligible for promotion, upon
recommendation, I 5 to the rank of commies, later to be fol
lowed by promotion to hoojdcommie s .
Under no circum
stances, however, will he perform important work comparable
to that of a controleur. 16
If an adjunct commies believes he is capable of perform
ing more demanding work than that performed by a commies
or hoofdcommies, after two to seven years of competent serv
ice as an adjunct commies and at about age thirty, he may
apply for admission to the group of candidate controleurs . A
selection commission tests these applicants on their general
ability, education, intelligence, and character. If chosen-and
the chances of selection depend primarily upon the estimated
anticipated demand for controleurs in relation to the supply of
applicants -the candidate controleur attends a two-year in
service training school conducted by inspectors and located in
the town of Arnheim.
The course offers two tracks of instruction, enrollment de
pending in part upon the candidate 's wishes and in part on the
Service ' s needs . One combines direct taxes and death duties ,
the other direct taxes and the turnover tax.17
While in attendance, each student weekly receives a day
and a half of oral instruction, spends two days in a local office
1 4 within this time , such an individual will have fulfilled his mili
tary service.
15 Selection is made by a Commission, made up of inspectors under
the head of a district director .
16 A special in-service training program for the level of commies
has been instituted since 1964. It has about 26 meetings a year .
17 In the second of the two tracks , varying proportions of the two
year period are devoted to the subjects which follow:
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for practical training, and studies for the balance of his time .
Upon completion of this course, the candidate controleur is
eligible for promotion to the rank of contro leur and subsequent
ly to that of hoojdcontroleur. In most cases, he spends his
life in the assessment or audit division of a local office, but
in some cases he is transferred to a regional or to the nation
al office . However, such an individual can never reach the
rank of inspecteur, and hence can never head an inspectorate.
He will be, rather, a right hand of the inspectors .
1 . 6 Private tax practitioners

There are no restrictions in the Netherlands upon the giv
ing of tax advice. l8 In consequence, the types of tax advisers
range from a little bookkeeper to the tax expert, properly so
called, with a large number of individuals falling in the middle .
Legally trained men are found only among the relatively few
true tax experts . 19
An individual, seeking assistance in filling out a simple in
come tax return or calculating the profit of a s mall sole pro
prietorship, typically utilizes the little bookkeeper type of tax
adviser . The more competent advisers in this group also han
dle less difficult controversies with local inspectorates but
rarely, if ever, appear in the courts .
Somewhat above the little bookkeeper type of tax adviser
is an ill-defined middle group, without specific academic
(footnote continued)

Subject
Bookkeeping and accounting
C ivil law
General approach t o tax law
Income tax
Wage tax , etc.
C orporation tax
Tax collection
C apital tax
Turnover tax
Real estate tax

Approximate
Percentage of Total
Time Allocated

23 .0%
23 .0
4.0

19 .0
9.0

7 .5
1.5
5 .5
4.0

3.5

1 8 Excluded from any consideration o f tax practitioners are the
notaries , notarissen, who handle practically all death and gift tax
problems .
There are jurists , with specialized knowledge of these
taxes , appointed by the Queen.
1 9 While the middle range of tax consultants are known as be lasting
des kund, tax experts , their expertise is decidedly more limited than
their name suggests.
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training. 20 Its members deal not only with local offices but
also frequently represent taxpayers in judicial proceedings
Indeed the associations into
though they are not lawyers .
i
which they have organized themselves 2 require for member
ship only completion of an extended primary education. These
associations have joined into a federation which has set up
part-time training courses for the members .22 While the ex
aminations are kept at a fairly high level, successful comple
tion is no guarantee of professional expertise . At a minimum,
a member of such an association, upon completing the course
of study at a federation training school, would require several
years of practice before attaining the level of knowledge and
competence necessary to give reliable advice on relatively un
complicated tax matters.
In truth, the Netherlands possesses very few true tax ex
perts . Among these are former inspectors who will have grad
uated from the R ijksbe las tingacademie . Others are lawyers
who specialized in taxation. Frequently an office which con
cerns itself primarily with tax matters has a chartered ac 
countant, a lawyer, and a tax expert, all working in close co
operation.

20 A 1958 report by a Commission, instituted by the Under Secre
tary of Finance , advised the government to create a state examination
to insure more uniformity among this middle group of tax adviser s .
T o date , the government has taken no concrete action.
21 Some of these organizations have joined with others of compara
To in
ble status in an effort to insure some degree of uniformity .
crease a sense of professional status , the members may , after passing
examinations , identify themselves as Members of the Institute of Tax
Advisers or whatever is the name of the particular organization. A
1967 act makes it possible for a qualified individual to be registered
as a Registered A ccountant .
22 The courses offered by the federation provide some general in
struction in law , economic s , and bookkeeping, followed by a special
program in tax law which stresses individual and corporate income tax
law. Generally theory , public finance , and related subj ects are given
little if any attention.

CHAPTER XXII
ADMINISTRATIVE RULE -MAKING PROGRAMS
Section A.

Characte r of the Unde rlying Statute

2 . 1 The pre cision of the statute itse lf

The Netherlands does not have a tax code . Instead there
are several tax statutes, each dealing with a specific tax.
These statutes set out broad rules, generally applicable, with
almost no deviations . The term income tax statute refers col
lectively to three major laws :
a. The Income Tax Law, inkomstenbelasting, covering the
tax on the total net income of natural persons;
b. The Wage Tax Law, loonbelasting, covering the tax on
wages ; and
c . The Corporation Tax Law, vennootschapsbelasting, cav 
ing the t ax on the profits of corporations . 1
There is a fourth and less important statute dealing with the
tax on dividends . 2
A revision of Netherlands tax legislation, effective in 1966,
is designed to clarify rather than alter provisions . 3 Important
to this clarification process is the use of a Basic Statute ,
1 The corporation tax statute has a few paragraphs dealing with
specific institutions -i.e. , banks , insurance companies -but these con
stitute very minor deviations from the normal pattern.
2 The wage tax and the dividend tax both are withheld at the source
and afterwards credited against the income tax.
If income consists
exclusively or almost exclusively of wages and does not exceed a cer
tain annual amount ( currently fixed at about f. 10 ,000) , the wage tax
covers all taxable income and precludes any additional assessment for
income tax.
3 It was not felt there was a need for many substantive altera
tions in the legislation itself. However , it was felt that there was a
lack of organization and clarity , a consequence of the patchwork al
terations made during and after World War II. In 1964 , three statutes
were enacted: Wet op de inkomstenbelasting, income tax; Wet op de
vermogensbelasting, capital tax; Wet op de loonbelasting, wage tax. No
new corporation tax statute was enacted. While the examples in the
text are drawn from the pre-1964 legislation, both they and the com
ments about the Netherlands' statutory practices remain valid today .
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A lgemene wet, containing general principles relating to taxes
levied by the Netherlands , R ijksbe lastingen. 4 Since this statute

s ets out general statements dealing with subjects relevant to
all or to certain categories of taxes, comparable statements in
each of the several tax statutes may be deleted, thereby in
creasing intelligibility and producing greater uniformity. The
Basic Statute deals with such general subjects as domicile, 5
returns, 6 the levying of taxes by means of assessment 7 and
through withholding, 8 administrative and judicial appeal,9 repre sentation, secrecy, 10 and fines. 1 1
It is also important to remember that, in the Netherlands,
only the central government imposes income, wage, and cor
poration taxes . 1 2 Further, these statutes omit much detail, but
do delegate legislative power to fill in the gaps . The delega
tion is accomplished by specific statutory provisions authoriz 
ing issuance of complementary rules and regulations . These
regulations have the force of law when officially published in
the Staatsblad or the Staatscourant. In consequence, hereafter
the expression, substantive tax provisions, should be understood
to include these published regulations but not other administra
tive directives without force of law . 1 3

4 The Basic Statute was not changed in 1964. See note 2, supra .
5 Basic Statute, Chap. I.
6 Id. Chap. II.
7 Id. C hap. III.
8 Id. Chap. IV .
9 Id. Chap. V .
1 0 Id. Chap. VIII .
11 Id. Chap. IX .
1 2 In fact the lower administrative units (eleven provinces with
some thousand odd communities) possess only a very limited power
to levy taxes of any kind .
1 3 It should be noted that the limits on delegation of tax law-which
limits are reflected in the particular statute to which the delegation
relates-have been repeatedly the subject of substantial differences of
opinion, both in Parliament and among authors . Paragraph 1 88 of the
Dutch Constitution-" Taxation in behalf of the Kingdom can be effected
only by virtue of a law" -would be infringed upon if such delegation
were carried to excessive limits.
To date , however , both the legis 
lative and executive branches of the government have followed a rea
sonable middle-of-the-road course.
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The statutory enactments themselves, covering just sub
stantive income tax, include only 1 53 paragraphs and cover only
57 pages of about 400 words each. 14
A general description of how the net tax basis is estab
lished will illustrate the Dutch statutory approach. The income
tax is levied on net income which, broadly speaking, includes
only the total amount derived from several sources of income
likely to have some degree of permanence-e.g., rental on a
house, dividends from stocks, interest on bonds, wages and
salaries from e mployment, and profits from commercial or in
dustrial activities . Net proceeds from all sources of income
are added together to constitute the aggregate gross income,
from which are deducted items not directly related to any one
component of gross income (i.e . , interest on debts, premiums
on life insurance) . Operating losses resulting in a negative
gross income in any of the six previous years also are de 
ductible . l5 After computing the net income, allowance is made
for expenses from illness or other adversity 16 and for a lim
ited amount of charitable contributions .
A few relatively brief paragraphs set out the foregoing ex
planation of income, but many more paragraphs supply specific
details . Illustratively, gross income is defined as the total of
the net proceeds from three sources-(1) the taxpayer' s activi
ties in commerce, the liberal professions , or e mployment,
( 2) capital, and ( 3) certain life annuities . Each of these com
ponent parts of gross income is defined more specifically in
subsequent paragraphs, totalling about thirty. 17 In addition to
14
Tax Statute
Income
Wage
Corporation
Total

15 Included

I

Number of
paragraphs

Printed pages
of 400 words

68
49

28
17
12
57

2§.

153

Basic departures from
general tax pattern
( rough estimate of
percentage of sections)

10%
5
15

in this prov1s10n i s a deviation from the prevailing pat
tern, which permits the permanent carrying-forward of losses where
such are incurred during the first six years of a newly founded trade
or industry .
16 This is limited to those occurring in the taxpayer ' s immediate
family .
1 7 Trade and liberal professions require about fourteen paragraphs ,
employment seven. Proceeds of capital are defined in terms of mova
ble and immovable capital, requiring two and three paragraphs respec
tively .
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the statute, there are relevant paragraphs in the legislative
regulations .
The Wage Tax Statute analyzes in detail the several aspects
of the terms e mployment and wages. The Corporation Tax
Statute, in defining the term profit, refers extensively to perti
nent paragraphs of the Income Tax Statute (which defines profit
resulting from a natural person' s enterprise), and then takes
account of variations required for holding companies, manage 
ment trusts , insurance companies , etc.
On the whole, the statutory definitions of the net tax base
are not overly detailed. It is difficult to determine whether
this statutory approach tends to increase or reduce interpreta
tive difficulties, when compared to other more detailed statu
tory descriptions which inevitably include more variations from
a basic norm, with these additional variations creating the pos 
sibility of yet more interpretative difficulties . Be that as it
may, for other reasons the legislature which accomplished the
most recent statutory revision was probably wise in refraining
from any attempt to supply all details in a possibly vain ef
fort to reduce the number of interpretative difficulties . 18 While
general language in any law does create uncertainty, excessive
detail makes the statute needlessly complex and impractical, as
well as rigid and inflexible, and not easy to adapt to social and
economic changes , including changes in business expectations .
The meaning of general language, on the other hand, can be
evolved, through judicial science , to meet those changing cir
cumstances . Two illustrations will suffice to indicate the tend
ency of more recent legislatures to retrench from detailed
prescriptions .
The first involves the provisions which, from 1941 through
19 50, set out quite detailed rules for computing profit, whether
derived by an enterprise or from the exercise of a liberal pro
fession. For example, it provided for the calculation of profits
on stock, etc . , by comparison of the capital at the end and at
the beginning of the taxable year, as well as on the basis of
the turnover, after deduction of expenses, and so on. In 1 950
the legislature redefined profit and annual profit in the follow
ing general terms:
Profit is the aggregate of gains achieved, under whatever
name or form , from enterprise or liberal profession.

18 Such detailed paragraphs might operate as case law , involving
arguments a contrario when interpretation become necessary , to say
nothing of the obvious lack of flexibility under changing social condi
tions .
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Annual profit is calculated in accordance with good mer
chant ' s usage , with observance of a consistent line of conduct
(policy) irrespective of envisaged results , and which can be
altered only when justified by special circumstances . l 9

Observe that this definition does not address itself to details
relating, e.g., to the evaluation of stocks and merchandise , to
the effect on profit of an increase in the value of stocks aris 
ing from monetary depreciation or of an increase in reserves
because of such depreciation, to the point of time at which
profit is made (i. e . , when the goods are delivered or services
rendered, or when payment is received) , or to the circum
stances under which a merchant may change his method of
computing annual profits . Many of these matters have been
dealt with, however, by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands,
Hoge Raad der Nederlanden, in decisions which supplement
the written law, but which in hard cases need not lag behind
changing circumstances . While judicial decisions fill in the
gaps, the Dutch legal system accords no official precedent value
to any judicial decision. 20
A second illustration involves the costs deductible from
the proceeds of the several sources of income before totalling
these proceeds . 21 Whereas the old 1941 statute , after stating
a general rule, went on to list examples falling in six differ
ent categories , the new bill repeated the general rule but omit
ted most of the earlier stated examples . The former approach
had produced innumerable problems during the rapid post-World
War TI changes . For example, in the face of the long list of
examples, what treatment should have been accorded commuting
expenses ? Should the crucial point be the business interests
of the commuter, the housing shortage, or his personal prefer
ence for living in the country ? Ultimately the Supreme C ourt
19 Besluit op de inkomstenbelasting (1941) n 6 and 7 (superseded
by Wet op de inkomstenbelasting (1964) n 7 , 9) . The few additional
paragraphs (true also before 1950) defining depreciation and reserves
which may be taken into account in calculating profits are not rele
vant here.
20 A case may arise later involving the same issue and the Supreme
Court is free to overrule its earlier opinion, though in practice this<
occurs almost never . See Chap. XXIV , 4.4 infra . Many times in sub
sequent decisions dealing with the same issue, the Court will refine or
sharpen its position.
21 These costs are referred to in the statute as costs incurred for
the acquisition, cashing , and retaining (verwerving, inning et behoud)
of the proceeds , and the charges attributable to those proceeds.
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was able to develop standards from which emerged a workable
overall concept of the system to be followed, despite the hin
drance to logical interpretative development provided by so
many statutory details .
It is impossible to determine the annual number of inter
pretative controversies, especially those regarding questions of
law or mixed questions of law and fact. Many such :Eroblems
are resolved by the tax inspector and the taxpayer . 2 Also,
often an issue originally thought to involve a mixed question of
law and fact eventually proves to be entirely a question of fact,
and thus loses entirely its interpretative character. Finally the
decisions of the Chambers for Tax Procedures are published
only when considered to be of real significance to taxpayers
and tax experts . Hence the numbe r of the published decisions
bears no relation to the number of all decisions involving in
terpretative issues . Nevertheless , it is undoubtedly true that
pure questions of law arise much less frequently than questions
of fact or question::; of a mixed character.
2 . 2 Legislative pre -enactment aids to interpre tation

Once a government-sponsored bill has been drafted, 23 the
Queen requests advice from the Council of State . 24 Assuming
the Council approves, the Queen submits the bill to the Second
Chamber of the States General, 25 accompanied by an explana
tory note signed by the appropriate Minister (in tax matters,
the Under Secretary of Finance).
The Second Chamber refers the draft of the tax bill to
its Committee on Finance, the members of which have expertise
in tax matters . After thorough examination, the committee pre 
pares a Preliminary Report which sets out the members ' com
ments, criticisms, and suggestions, as well as questions . This
22 The number of such adjustments
23 Constitutionally , a bill may be

is unavailable.
presented by a member of the
Second Chamber on his own initiative. This right , however , is almost
never exercised.
The Second and F irst Chamber form the States General (Staaten
Generaal), a name which dates from 1464 although the institution it
self has been changed over the centuries . The Second Chamber con
sists of 1 50 members , elected for four-year terms directly by the
people in general elections . The First Chamber consists of 75 mem
bers elected by the Provincial states , which are elected directly by
the people.
24 The Council of state is a nonpolitical body of "wise men" whose
deliberations are not published.
25 See note 21 , supra .
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report is referred back to the Under Secretary of Finance who
reconsiders his draft bill and returns it with a written Note of
Answer, signed by the Minister of Finance , typically accom
panied by a Note of Alterations proposing modifications in line
with the recommendations embodied in the Preliminary Report.
At this point, an oral exchange of views frequently occurs be 
tween the Minister or Under Secretary and the Committee on
Finance . 26 This oral exchange is incorporated in a report, in
most cases with a second Note of Alterations . Frequently the
government prepares additional Notes of Alterations . Whatever
their number, the totality of these written documents are pub
lished officially without delay. They constitute a full record of
all proceedings prior to oral debate on the bill by the Second
Chamber itself.
During that debate, the bill is subjecte<;l to criticism by
representatives of the several political parties, the defense
being led by the Under Secretary of Finance. Circumstances
may lead the government to withdraw the bill. Or members of
the Second Chamber may only urge alterations in the bill as
presented, in some instances requesting that the government
reconsider certain points , in others proposing their own amend
ments.
Members proposing such amendments on their own
initiative will have already secured informal technical assistance
on the wording from the tax administration's Directorate ( Leg
islation: Direct Taxes) . If the Minister of Finance or Under
Secretary approves the proposed amendments , the text as pre 
pared by the tax administration will b e incorporated in the gov
ernment's own draft. 27 Alternatively, the amendments may be
placed before the Second Chamber for enactment or rejection.
26 It is possible that the Second C hamber will close the preliminary
work on the draft without an oral exchange. Such omission, however ,
is unusual in the case of a new statute or an important change in ex
isting law. It is usual where there is only a small change in an exist
ing statute. Sometimes where the change is very minimal , the Minis
ter makes only a Voorlopig Verslag and does not produce a Memorie
van Antwoord.

2 7 It is possible that a proposed amendment would make such a
structural or financial change in the original draft of the bill as to
render it unacceptable to the Minister of F inance and the Under Sec
retary.
Their conclusion, that a given amendment would make the <
bill unacceptable , may lead them to consider resignation should the
Second Chamber pass the amendment. In instances of major impor
tance , the entire Cabinet might consider resignation. However , it is
more likely that their bare statement , that the amendment is unac
ceptable , would lead to its withdrawal.

CHARA CTER OF UNDERLYING STATUTE

451

Not infrequently, a bill is altered substantially in the course of
legislative discussion.
A bill which passes the Second Chamber has survived its
prime challenge . The First Chamber cannot amend; it must
accept or reject any bill in its entirety. Very rarely does the
First Chamber fail to pass a bill enacted by the Second Cham
ber. However, the First Chamber subjects the bill to a process
roughly equivalent to that of the Second Chamber .
After enactment by the First Chamber and royal assent,
the new law is published in the Staatsb lad, and typically takes
effect within twenty days after publication unless the law itself
specifies another period.
All documents referred to above are published, as is also
a verbatim account of the treatment accorded the bill by both
chambers in the States General. Taken together, this legisla
tive history is most useful in interpreting the statute . This
utility, however, especially where interpretative issues are con
cerned, is a byproduct; the States General do not have a policy
here. On the other hand, traces in the sand frequently are left
very deliberately. The Minister may give some examples to
make clear his intentions about the law . If subsequent debates
show definitely that the legislature approves his interpretation,
the courts would be highly reluctant to disregard it.
The precise role of this legislative history is discussed in
the next subsection, but that role, it should be observed, is not
static . The law tends to establish a life of its own, for it
must deal with circumstances unforeseen or ignored by the
legislature . As time passes, both writers and the courts tend
to place less emphasis on the intention of the lawmaker and
more on the intention of the law, in the belief this is a more
objective criteria.28
2.3 Standards of construction followed by the judiciary in inter
pre ting the s tatute

Theoretically, the standards of interpretation used with
respect to tax statutes do not differ from those applied in the
2 8 This is a sound development. To look for the intention of the

lawmaker seems next to impossible , in view of all that is written and
(especially) said during the legislative processing by various people ,
not one of whom can be identified w ith the lawmaker , i.e. , the govern
ment and the people' s representatives , the States General. To consi.d
er as constant , the lawmaker' s intention throughout the constantly
changing life to which the law must be applied, is to misunderstand
the function of a statute. Admittedly , wise interpretation of particu
lar paragraphs of a statute may be assisted by examining what was
written or said about the intention of the government , the Chambers ,
etc .
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case of other nonpenal statutes . In fact, however, until after
World War I, the consensus of Netherlands opinion was that
tax statutes should be construed strictly to establish, if not a
literal interpretation, at least a barrier against loose interpre 
tation and a fortiori application of the law by analogy. This
conception now has been abandoned. 29 Concurrently with this
more recent trend in the direction of a more flexible interpre 
tation, there is a growing tendency to consider tax law as au
tonomous in at least one limited sense . A particular construc 
tion followed by the civil law is not deemed conclusive in
interpreting a word, expression, or concept also used in the
tax statute (e.g., immovable property, alienation, sustenance ,
nullities i n jiscalibus) . Instead various other factors are taken
into account to determine the tax meaning of the word, expres 
sion, or concept. 30 It is now believed that this approach is
not actually to be distinguished from the approach followed in
construing the civil law itself. Indeed the Supreme Court has
said that the tax law is to be approached "not in conformity
with some special method of interpretation, but in the same
way as in civil law, " 31 and thus "no literal construction, but
a construction on the basis, inte r alia, of the ratio legis . " 32
Thus, a reasonable application of the particular provision under
consideration is the cornerstone of its interpretation and deci
sion.
To this end, the courts now avail themselves of every pos 
sible device (historical, textual, teleological, etc . ) . The word
re chts vinding, finding the law, perhaps best indicates the ob
j ective of this open system of interpretation, to get at the pur
port of any given provision. Thus, no longer does it follow,
a priori, that questions bearing on the ineluctability of an item
in gross income should be approached in one manner while a
different approach is used in deciding whether a given expense
is deductible .
There is no official ranking of the weight the courts are
to accord various sources . Consequently, the courts may accord
29 This concept perhaps was buttressed by what is now generally
conceded to have been a misinterpretation of paragraph 1 8 8 of the
Netherlands Constitution.
30 In this respect , the Dutch approach is less narrow and dogmatic than those employed in France or Belgium.
3 1 Decision of the Hoge Raad, February 27 , 1935 , B580 1 , WPNR
3417 .
32 Decision of the floge Raad, June 1 5 , 1921 , N.J . 192 1 , 9 83 , PW
11561.
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consideration to whatever factors they consider most important.
Illustratively, at the beginning of a statute ' s life, the pre 
enactment materials will receive greater attention than will
later be true .
Section B.

The R egulations Program

2 . 4 Types and force of regulations

As noted previously, the Netherlands delegates legislative
authority in matters of minor importance . Under the authority
so delegated, legislative regulations are issued either by the
Crown or by the Minister of Finance and, when officially pub
lished, have the status of legislation. 33
The tax administration also issues many kinds of other
directives . In these, the tax administration reflects its inter 
pretation o f given statutory paragraphs . 3 4 Since these inter
pretations were carefully considered by the Finance Minister
and his staff, Tax Inspectors-as members of the hierarchy
are bound, hierarchically not legally, to follow the directives .
However, these do not bind taxpayers or judges, though the lat
ter, knowing the directives were carefully considered by the
administration, do not discount them completely. Not infre 
quently, however, the Supreme Court o r a court of appeal will
take a position contrary to the interpretation issued in a direc 
tive addressed to tax officials . Should this occur in a Supreme
Court decision, the Minister of Finance usually alters the tax
directive in question, and so informs personnel within the tax
administration.
2 . 5 Precise purpose of inte rpretative regulations

Apart from legislative regulations which a given statute
authorizes to fill in statutory gaps, so-called interpretative
regulations , having the stature and coverage of those used in
the United States, are not to be found in the Netherlands . The
33 Unlike the situation in the United States , neither the tax admin
istration nor the Under Secretary of Finance has either general or
specific authority to provide by regulation ordinary interpretations of
the statute . The inspectors are bound hierarchically to interpret the
statute in accordance with the instructions from the tax administration ,
but these instructions have no other binding force .
34 In preparing directives of this type-most usually when a new
statute has been enacted or an old one amended-the tax administration
uses every method of interpretation in trying to reach a proper inter
pretation.
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closest analogy is in the Dutch administrative directives pro
gram. These directives bind the tax inspector within the offi
cial hierarchy, without prejudice, however, to his right to
attempt to have the directives amended.
These directives
strive primarily to reword obscure statutory language, give
concrete examples of their application, or solve basic interpre 
tative or controversial problems . The more wide ranging scope
of this program, compared with the legislative regulations pro
gram, is evident in the following tabulation:
Number of Pages Covered-Average of 400 Words to a Page
Type of Tax

Uitvoeringsregelen
(Legislative Regulations)

Income
Wage
Corporation
Total

28
38
16
82

Leidraden
(Administrative Directives)

141
35
48
224

2 . 6 Manne r of processing regulations

Both legislative regulations which possess the force of law,
and administrative directives which bind only personnel within
the tax administration as a matter of hierarchical control, are
prepared in the department of the Director-General of Tax Af
fairs by staff members with an educational background at the
university level. However, legislative regulations are submit
ted for the approval of the Under Secretary and, following pub
lication, became an official part of the law.
There is no formal provision or recognized practice for
soliciting an expression of non-government opinion prior to
formalization of the regulations and directives . However, the
Minister on his own initiative may decide to consult with groups
particularly interested.
Section c.

The Rulings Program

2 . 7 Formal advance private written rulings to taxpayers

The Netherlands Internal Revenue Service does not issue
unilateral, binding, private written rulings to taxpayers cover
ing proposed transactions . Nor is it possible to enter into a"
legally binding closing agreement in such cases .
Repeatedly the Dutch Supreme Court has held that any
agreement between the tax administration and a taxpayer lacks
binding force and legally provides no certainty to either party.
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Indeed, even if an inspector and a taxpayer have agreed upon
the depreciation to be allowed for a particular piece of indus 
trial equipment in a given year, the taxpayer remains free to
argue for the use of another method in a subsequent-or even
the same -taxable year if he concludes that the agreed upon
method of calculation is contrary to the statute .
The only agreements which the Supreme Court will uphold
are those which establish a value at issue between the parties
and do not require interpretation of a statute. For example,
if the value of a parcel of realty in a given year is in ques
tion, the inspector and taxpayer may choose two experts, and
agree that the average of the experts ' estimates will bind both
parties .
The various limitations described above reflect theory,
however, not the actual practice . Daily, throughout the coun
try, agreements are made between the local offices and the
taxpayer or his practitioner, with a view to fix the exact amount
of tax liability. Many controversies over issues of fact or of
law are s ettled, i.e., compromised between inspector and tax
payer . This settlement has no legal status ; but since it is a
gentleman's agreement, the result is reliable and the system
has seemed to work well in practice . Usually the compromise
is developed between the taxpayer and the inspector, without
the interference of a higher official. However, prospective sit
uations involving more complex issues or greater amounts of
money (e.g., a proposed merger or corporate reorganization)
may lead a taxpayer to seek optimum certainty. After a writ
ten memorandum and all the relevant documents have been
presented to the local inspector and have been discussed with
him, the taxpayer may take the initiative in the mutual decision
reached by the inspector and the taxpayer to raise the matter
at the national office level. In that event, the national office ,
after consulting with the local office, will make a thorough
analysis of its own and may hold extensive discussions with
the taxpayer . In due course, the taxpayer will receive a let
ter from the Ministry, outlining the tax consequences of the
proposed transaction if carried out as described by the tax
payer.
This practice grew out of the administration's belief that
a taxpayer, who is interested in a complex and possibly con
troversial type of prospective transaction, ought not be forced
to abandon the transaction because of tax uncertainties. How
ever, since taxpayers have no legal right to such a decision
from the Minister or, for that matter, even from an inspector,
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there are no formal rules of procedure governing the practice .
Further the fact that there is such a practice does not mean
that just any taxpayer can raise just any issue directly with the
Minister. Indeed, an ordinary taxpayer who writes the Ministry,
requesting a decision on a dispute between him and his inspec
tor regarding an assessment normally will receive a prompt
answer to the effect that, if the taxpayer considers the assess 
ment incorrect, the matter is properly the concern of a Court
of Appeal. Again, should a tax expert or a corporation inquire
concerning the tax consequences of a contract seemingly in
spired by the tax avoidance possibilities, the national office 's
response is not likely to prove helpful. In other words, the
tax administration exercises complete discretion in deciding
whether to rule in advance in any given case, and whether it
will do so at the local or national levels .
The lack of statutory authorization for these rulings, settle 
ment, and compromise activities has not made them less ef
fective. Actions before the Court of Appeal rarely disclose
evidence that a compromise agreement-which the court would
be free to disregard-has been breached. This satisfactory, if
extralegal, state of affairs is the prime reason the Under Sec
retary of Finance declared a few years ago that he saw no need
for legislation authorizing and regulating formal closing agree
ments . That conclusion was clearly warranted, given the exist
ing practices, certain recognized qualities of Dutch character
and the high standards of the Internal Revenue Service inspec 
tors , and the difficulty of designing a regulatory statute which
would adequately respond to the many diverse aspects of which
account must be taken if the practices are to be implemented
wisely.
2 . 8 Informal technical advice to taxpayers on proposed transac
tions

It is not known how often taxpayers seek informal advice
from the local inspectors on the consequences of proposed
transactions . It is common practice, however, for both local
and national levels to discuss freely with taxpayers the alter
natives available in shaping a proposed business transaction, to
the end of helping the taxpayer achieve the most favorable tax
consequences. Should the inspector himself be in doubt about
a question, he is likely, particularly in the case of a substan
tial financial matter, to request advice from the District Direc 
tor, who in turn may refer the question to the Ministry. 35 In
35 In practice , only the important cases of large taxpayers are car
ried to the national level.
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the end, what began as an informal discussion may conclude
In either event, in actual practice , the
with written advice .
inspector will feel bound despite the absence in law of official
status for the advice . A gentleman's word has been given.
2 . 9 Technical advice to field offices

From the foregoing, it should be clear that local offices
are permitted-though not encouraged-to request the higher
echelon ( i . e . , the District Director) to indicate the appropriate
stance with respect to a specific situation. Should the Direc
tor, in turn, request such advice from the national office , the
response, commonly given in writing-not by telephone -is pre 
pared by the staff of the Director-General of Taxes .
2 . 10 Publication of te chnical advice given to taxpayers and local
offices

Interpretative positions taken by the Ministry in response
to requests for advice in specific cases are not likely to be
published except where the matter is one of general interest. 3 6
Illustratively, the Ministry would be likely to publish the an
swer to an inquiry by a life insurance company about the fiscal
consequences of certain clauses in an insurance policy . The
in-service publication will take the form of an administrative
directive to lower echelon personnel. Outside publication will
be accomplished by releasing the full text of the directive to
tax periodicals. Usually, a published directive will set forth
the underlying rationale .
Despite this practice of publishing the most important deci
sions, there is no formal publication program. Indeed there
is no formal system of administrative rulings . Substantive
technical rulings in the field of income, wage, and corporation
taxes probably total less than a hundred a year, with about
forty a year being published . This, of course, represents only
a very small part of all the Ministry 's decisions on matters
sent up by the inspectors . Many such decisions, however, owing
to the peculiar factual circumstances of the cases, have the
limited character of jus in causa positum .
Despite the limited publication program, the inspectors
very swiftly learn, albeit informally, the stance taken by the
Ministry in particular situations . There is a high degree of
cooperation and a continuing exchange of information as well
as views and opinions .
36 Publication would be in the form of an incidental bulletin.
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In addition to the important administrative decisions of
general interest, the national office intermittently informs in
spectors and tax periodicals also of decisions taken in so-called
hardship cases . The purpose is to alert taxpayers to the types
of hards hip cases where favorable decisions may be expected,
either from the national office, or if power is delegated, from
the local or district offices.

CHAPTER XX:lll
ASSESSMENT, REFUND, AND ADMINISTRATIVE
APPEAL PROCEDURES
Section A. Asse ssment and Audit Procedure s
3 . 1 Introductory note

As noted earlier the Netherlands income tax statute actual
ly consists of three separate though closely related laws ( indi
vidual income tax, wage tax on employees, and corporation
profits tax) .
The discussion below of assessment and audit procedures
focuses just on the income tax; then follows a summary of the
differences peculiar to the two other related taxes .
3 .2a De tails of the assessment and audit procedures re individ
uals (income tax)

Netherlands income tax legislation is not geared to the so
called self-assessment system. However, it does rely on a
taxpayer 's so-called tentative return in making tentative assess 
ments, and to this limited extent there is resemblance in fact
if not in theory. The ultimate assessment though is made by
an inspector in reliance, but only in part, on a yet different
final return which, in essence, is a questionnaire showing the
net income received during the pre ceding calendar year. But
at least part of the tax due for that calendar year normally
was paid in the course of that same year, on the basis of the
tentative or estimated assessment which generally was made at
some point between April and August. That tentative assess
ment was then payable in at least five monthly installments .
Also, during that calendar year, tax was withheld at the source
as to certain types of income, especially in respect to wages
and dividends .
To illustrate, this overall reporting scheme is triggered in,
say, 1966, when on or about February 1, the typical taxpayer
receives a form containing his final return for 1965 and the
tentative return covering income anticipated during 1966, both
of which must be returned by April 1, unless for good cause
the taxpayer is able to secure an extension.
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Should he fail to file by the due date without cause, a fine
of five percent is imposed on the tax due . And on complete
failure to file, the inspector is authorized to prepare assess 
ments based on his estimate of the taxpayer's income . 1 Fur
ther, for gross negligence in preparing the return or for de
liberately filing a false return, a deficiency tax can be imposed,
to a maximum of 100 percent. In addition, a deliberately false
return is ground for a criminal indictment, which can lead to
a heavy fine (or even a prison term), though this fine and the
administrative tax increase mentioned above are not both im
posed in the same case. 2
The tax form contains four pages, and is accompanied by
an explanatory booklet of approximately sixteen pages which
answer the most frequently recurring questions about the tax
law and the procedure to be followed in preparing the return.
The form itself is in effect a questionnaire, seeking data re
garding the taxpayer 's personal affairs, i.e., marital status,
number of children, sources and amounts of income, deductible
items, and the amount withheld on wages, 3 dividends,4 and cer
tain other types of income. Taxpayers carrying on a trade or
business must also attach signed copies of a balance sheet and
profit and loss statement. Also, if the taxpayer 's capital, how
ever invested, exceeds a certain amount, 5 he is liable for a
separate proportional capital tax, vermogensbe lasting, and must
fill in a form with two extra pages, covering both his income
and capital tax, to which he attaches a list of his investments
and the income therefrom.
To return to our illustration, the inspector upon receiving
the tax form on or before April 1 , 1966, typically does rely
on it to make the tentative assessment for 1966, and thereby
facilitates commencement of the installment payments . But the
final return covering 1965 is examined before the final assess 
ment for that year is made. 6 The information there is verified,
1 Since such an assessment is unlikely to err in the taxpayer' s
favor , such taxpayers usually lodge an administrative appeal.
2 Legally these are two distinct penalties that can be imposed for
the same offense .
The Under Secretary , however , has instructed the
inspectors that they must refrain from assessing the defic1ency tax in
cases where there has been a criminal indictment.
3 The tax on wages is withheld at a progressive rate.
4 withholding r ate as of 1967 is a flat 25% .
5 For a married taxpayer the free capital is f. 55 ,000 , raised for
each dependent child by f. 13 ,500. Thus , a married couple with three
dependent children would have free capital of f. 9 5 ,500.
6 The term inspector includes not only inspectors o f the academic
level, but also any member of the inspectorate' s personnel belonging
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first by reference to the files maintained in the inspectorate . 7
However, even with the aid of these files, the inspector will
not always know that a given taxpayer resolved a doubtful issue
in his own favor even though, in consequence, a certain item
was omitted in computing income, or a doubtful deduction was
taken. 8 Also, if the issue was exposed to light, the explanation
attached to the return may not be in sufficient detail to permit
the inspector to resolve the issue. Thus, as explained below,
the inspector's examination may be complemented by the audit
division' s verification of the taxpayer 's accounts, and in either
setting the taxpayer may be asked, by telephone or in writing,
for additional information as to matters set out in the return
or in an accompanying document. Should the taxpayer fail to
comply with any such request, the statute provides that if he
contests the assessment at a later date he will have the burden
of proof.
It is recognized that an examination based just on the in
spectorate 's files will not expose all errors in all returns, but
it is not feasible to undertake a more detailed examination of
every return. These competing considerations are compro
mised; annually a proportion of the returns are examined with
extreme care, primary attention being focused on those involv
ing high incomes or those which tend to involve complex tax
problems . Further, emphasis is placed on returns showing
profits from a trade or business, as distinct from those re
porting incomes from easily verified sources such as stocks,
bonds, or annuity contracts . Returns of the former type typi
cally are prepared by tax practitioners . While this fact is a
reasonable guarantee that the figures in the return and supple 
mentary records are accurate, it is no guarantee that the re
turn includes no doubtful issue s . While standards and instruc 
tions govern an inspectorate 's selection process, the inspector
has discretion to add any returns to those otherwise falling in
the full-examination category. Once in this category, the books
of the taxpayer will be examined by the Audit Division of the
(footnote continued)
to a group ( hoojdcontroleur, commies) authorized by legislative regu
lation to perform tasks assigned by the statute itself to an inspector .
7 The inspectorate maintains for each taxpayer a legger contain
ing the returns of previous years and a dossier which contains infor
mation of long-run value , such as reports from death duty inspec
torates , copies of pertinent contracts , etc .
8 The inspector sometimes discovers that a taxpayer has erred in
the government' s favor and paid more in taxes than was owing. Under
such circumstances , the inspector makes the correction.
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inspectorate . In particularly intricate cases, however, the Fis 
cal Audit Office takes over .
Either the Audit Division or the Fiscal Audit Office is free
to and will draw its own conclusions as to what the audited
records reveal. In the course of their audits, they will resolve
interpretative issues and recommend a course of action to the
inspector, giving their supporting reasons . It must be recog
nized, however, that their function is purely advisory. The
inspector alone makes the final decision as to whether or not
a deficiency assessment-or a refund-is in order .
Illustrating the foregoing is data pertaining to one recent
year. Out of the approximately two and a half million income
tax assess ments , 440,000 taxpayers ' books were examined. Of
these, the Fiscal Audit Office checked about 72,000 and the in
spectorates ' own Audit Divisions --composed of hoojdcontroleurs
and lower ranking staff members -the balance .
It should b e emphasized, however, that the statute empow
ers the inspector alone to make or refrain from making an
assessment. This power extends to the compromising of claims
or issues, including the splitting and/or trading of issues in
the course of reaching a settlement with the taxpayer over all
yes -or -all-no questions of law . 9
Higher echelons do not interfere with the inspectors ' han
dling of their work and this noninterference extends to the in
spectors ' settlement activity. No careful check is made on
the cases settled by the splitting or the trading of issues . In
part, this is because the inspectors are trusted, bribery being
nonexistent. In part, it is a realistic recognition that the tax
payer will litigate if he feels he is not receiving fair treatment,
the inexpensiveness and accessibility of the courts making such
litigation easy and available .
On the whole taxpayers (or their representatives) tend to
accept the position taken by inspectors as being correct ap
praisals of the situations in question. Typically, if an inspector
sees an item on a return with which he disagrees or which he
questions, he telephones the taxpayer to come in to discuss the
matter. At this initial point of contact, prior to :my definite
assessment, there can be and frequently is a settlement between
9 The Dutch term for this type of agreement is aading, the equiv
alent of the French term transaction . While the word is used in com
mercial dealings , in the tax area it means an act whereby the tax
administration consents not to institute proceedings on the basis of an
asserted deficiency in return for the payment of an amount of money
mutually agreed upon.
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the parties of outstanding points in controversy, including the
splitting or trading of issues . Moreover, at such a conference
the inspector is free to and from time to time will make sug
gestions to the taxpayer for the taxpayer' s benefit.
Only when the inspector himself concludes that he needs
advice will he consult the head of the inspectorate or a higher
echelon. Within the hierarchic setting, however, the Regional
Office does maintain a running check on the inspectorates under
its supervision. Incident to this, of course, the Regional Of
fice may sample the quality of an inspectorate ' s assessments,
including its handling of administrative appeals . 10 Should it
locate an error, whether in favor of the government or the
taxpayer, it will force a correction.
Though examinations do delay the final assessment, this
does not seriously prejudice the taxpayer, for most of his tax
will have been paid earlier, either through withholding or in
stallments . Further, there is a time limit within which the
final assessments must be completed; for example, final as 
sessments for 1966 must be made by July 1 , 1968. The in
spector 's notice of final assessment, addressed to the taxpayer
may indicate either that a refund 11 is in order or that some
portion of tax remains unpaid. The latter situation may arise
only because of a low tentative assessment, or because the in
spector concluded that both the tentative and final returns were
.incorrect, the final assessment being based on a higher net in
come. In such case, the inspector must explain the difference 12
in such detail that the taxpayer may decide whether to lodge
an administrative appeal within the allowed grace period which
commences to run from the date of the final assessment no
tice.
Although the inspector bases his notice of final assessment
on an examination of the taxpayer ' s final return, even that as 
s essment is not completely final. Under certain circumstances
a deficiency assessment is possible. Ordinarily, of course,
the preliminary contacts between the inspector and the taxpayer
prior to issuance of the notice of final assessment will have
resulted in satisfactory resolution of all difficulties and a
1 0 while this intermittent activity is useful , it does not insure uni
formity among the inspectorates .
F actors promoting , if not achieving
uniformity , are the statutes , the decisions handed down by the several
tribunals , the directives , the technical advice and other literature sent
out from headquarters .
11 See note 7 supra .
12 Required by an administrative regulation.
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correct assessment. However, whether advertently or inadver 
tently, the taxpayer may have omitted one o r more items which
should have been included in total net income and the inspector
may not have discovered the omission in the course of his ex
amination for that year. In such cases, a deficiency asses s 
ment, navorde ringsaanslag, is possible, if two conditions are
satisfied. First, such deficiency must be assessed within a
five -year period beginning with the close of the calendar year
in question. Second, there must be a novum, i.e., such an as 
sessment must be based on a newly discovered fact. A defi
ciency ass essment cannot be made where the incorrect final
assessment resulted from the inspector' s own error or omis 
sion or because the inspector changed his opinion on a matter
of statutory interpretation, for example because the Supreme
Court shifted its position.
This limited use of deficiency assessments , authorized by
statute and clarified by an extensive body of court decisions
dealing with the existence or nonexistence of a novum, balances
the taxpayer' s need for certainty and the tax administration' s
responsibility for determining tax liability in accordance with
the statute, not just in accordance with the taxpayer 's return.
The overall assessment arrangement applies to millions of
Dutch taxpayers, from men in high income brackets to those in
low brackets, such as the greengrocer. However, taxpayers in
the middle or lower income brackets who derive their income
primarily or solely from wages need not file a return. Their
income tax obligations are covered by the wage tax withheld
by their employers .
3 . 2b De tails of the assessment and audit procedures re lating to
corporations (corporations tax)

While assessment and audit procedures for corporations
are very similar to those for individuals , four differences do
exist.
The first and most important difference reflects the legis 
lature's recognition that many controversial questions develop
'
in the corporate s etting. When the inspector decides that he
will make an assessment which deviates from either the facts
or figures in a corporation's return, the statute requires that
he first give the corporation's board an opportunity to discuss
with him the points at issue. As shown later, this requirement
affects also the legal setting of any administrative appeal. Not
infrequently, this discussion results in a splitting or a trading
of all-yes -or-all-no issues of law. The inspector ' s power to
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enter into binding settlement agreements is as great in the
corporate as in the individual setting.
Another difference: withholding of taxes at the source ap
plies , in the corporate setting, only to dividends received by
the corporation on stock of other corporations which it owns .
A third difference is in the basis used for a corporation' s
tentative assessment. While the assessment of an individual
taxpayer is based on a current tentative return, the corporate
tentative assessment is based on the final return covering the
preceding year . This difference stems from the legislature 's
awareness that it is much more difficult to calculate future
profits of a corporation than for a natural person.
A final difference is responsive both to the relatively high
potential yield of each corporate return and to the intricacies
involved in ascertaining the profit and loss of most corpora
tions . In one recent year for example, just 36,000 corporations
paid almost one and a third billion guilders, whereas two and
a half million individual income taxpayers paid only two and a
half billion guilders, with a like number of wage taxpayers pay
ing another two billion. In consequence, the majority of cor
poration tax assessments are preceded by an audit of the
corporate records . And as to these, the Fiscal Audit Office
plays a more significant role than it does in the case of the
individual income tax. In a recent year, out of approximately
3 6,000 corporate returns , 30,000 were audited, 13,000 by the
Fiscal Audit Office, and 17,000 by the Audit Division of the
inspectorates .
3 . 2c Details of the assessment and audit procedures re individ
uals (wage tax)

Clues, suggesting that an e mployer has failed either to
withhold the proper amount of wage tax or to forward an amount
withheld, typically emerge as members of the inspectorate
(most often from the Audit Division), carry on their regular
investigations relating to other taxes (i.e., the turnover tax) or
to the payment of state old age pension premiums .
Should an employer fail to withhold tax or fail to forward
an amount withheld, the inspector can prepare an estimated
assessment, as to which the taxpayer may enter an administra
tive appeal. Further, a deficiency assessment can be asserted
where an employer failed to withhold an adequate amount of
wage tax even though no novum is present, and in such case
the tax can be raised by a maximum of 100 percent.
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Section B.

Adminis tra tive Appeals

3 . 3 Introductory note
The Netherlands tax statute makes no provision for a tax
payer to argue his case, formally or informally, before an of
ficial of the tax administration other than the lowest grade
decision-making official with whom the taxpayer first dealt
and with whom he disagreed . Since the legislature itself has
charged the local inspector of taxes with the task of making
the assessments in his geographical area, in theory no other
tax official, whether from the district or the national office,
has any legal power whatever either to make an assessment
himself or to annul an assessment made by the competent
authority.
In fact, however, a review procedure in the nature of an
administrative appeal does exist, though it is implemented in a
manner which preserves the ultimate authority of the inspector.
This procedure permits a taxpayer to secure a review only of
questions pertaining to his original final assessment; the pro
cedure is not available with respect to a deficiency assessment
of any kind-income, corporation, or wage tax. If a taxpayer
wishes to challenge a deficiency assessment, he must turn to
the courts .
3 . 4a De tails of the administrative appeal procedure re assess 
ments in income tax (natural pe rsons)

As noted previously, when an inspector 's notice of final

assessment differs from the taxpayer 's final return, the in
spector must include an explanatory note of any changes made.
The change may actually be quite acceptable, for the taxpayer
may have agreed to it earlier, during the informal exchange of
views with the inspector. Illustratively, the taxpayer may have
acknowledged he was in error or the change may represent an
agreement to split or to trade all-yes-or-all-no issues . It
also is possible, however, that the taxpayer, though aware from
the earlier discussion that the inspector planned to make the
change, decided either that the assessment was too high or that
he himself erred earlier in the government' s favor by failing,
for example, to take a deduction to which he believes he was
entitled.
Should the taxpayer decide to protest the assessment, he
has two months from the date of the notice of assessment to
file a written but informal petition, bezwaarschrijt, with the
inspector. And even where a petition is not filed within the
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two-month period, in limited circumstances a taxpayer who has
paid the assessment may secure a review by filing a claim for
refund, a matter discussed more fully in 3 . 7 , infra.
The statute does not require that the taxpayer ' s petition
set forth the arguments on which his protest rests, though this
obviously is desirable and usually is done in one degree or
another . Further, if the taxpayer desires to be heard by the
inspector before a decision is reached, a specific request to
this effect must be included in the petition; otherwise the in
spector is not bound to communicate with him.
Where a tax practitioner prepared the taxpayer's original
final return, that same practitioner usually prepares the peti
tion and handles the case in the inspector 's office, though the
taxpayer may accompany him. In any event, any correspond
ence or oral discussions are carried on quite informally.
The statute makes no specific provision regarding the en
tire burden of proof. However, the inspector may request the
taxpayer to supply "such books and documents as can serve in
support of the taxpayer' s contentions ." The statute also pro
vides that, on failure to comply, the assessment will be upheld
on the theory that there has been no proof the assessment was
erroneous . In short, the statute assumes that the taxpayer who
is asked to produce written documentation has these items in
his poss ession, unless the contrary is shown clearly. Thus a
taxpayer who withholds records or documents, claiming they
would reveal confidential relationships or professional s ecrets ,
would bear the burden of proof even though the confidential re
lationship or professional secret could be established legally.
The filing of the petition sets in motion a series of dis 
cussions and investigations which explore every aspect of the
case, with both sides exposing their evidence , rationale, and
arguments . Typically, the process involves much more than a
mere restatement of arguments presented earlier . It is entire 
ly possible for the parties at this time to enter into a binding
agreement to split or trade all-yes -or-all-no issues of law .
Should this occur, the taxpayer withdraws his petition and the
inspector notes the adjustments made in the original assess 
ment. The care taken through this entire process, including
that associated with the inspector's reconsideration of the ra
tionale behind the original assessment, has led the government
to compare the process -juridically a purely administrative
one-with that of a trial tribunal, though admittedly more in
formal. While the inspector who initially made the assessment
continues to represent the government, he is free to consult
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the head of the inspectorate before making a decision, but is
not required to do so.
A period of time , varying from some weeks to many months,
will elapse from the time a petition is filed to the point the
inspector will hand down his written decision. Whether he ac 
cepts or rejects, either in whole or in part, the taxpayer ' s
contentions, the rationale of the decision will b e set forth, in
part to assist the taxpayer in deciding whether to carry his
case to the courts .
Not all petitions will be followed by a formal decision,
however . In cases which raise a question of fact or a so-called
mixed question of law and fact, rather than a clear-cut inter 
pretative question of law, the inspector and the taxpayer, after
exploring all points of view, may reach an informal agreement
without actually resolving all of the potential legal arguments .
Under such an agreement, the taxpayer may withdraw his peti
tion, thus preventing an eventual recourse to the courts . On
his part the inspector, recognizing that the taxpayer has some
valid arguments, will have lowered the assessment. In short,
something resembling a compromise has been reached.
The reason this procedure is not available in the case of
deficiency ass essments is attributable to the nature of the ex
ceptional ground on which such an assessment must be based
and to the consequent initial procedure followed in making this
type of assessment. Such an assessment is permitted only if
there is a novum (new fact) . Further, the inspector must con
tact the taxpayer befo re making the assessment, and at that
stage there always is a full exchange of views and arguments .
In consequence, after that exchange, it would be superfluous to
file an administrative appeal before the same official. Such a
taxpayer can turn, however, to the courts .
About one hundred inspectorates deal with income tax mat
ters, though the actual number of individual inspecteurs handling
these administrative appeals is much larger. It has been es
timated that the number of such appeals approximates 230,000
annually.
3 . 4b De tails of the administrative appeal pro cedure re corpora 
tion tax assessments

As earlier noted, a corporate tax ass essment which varies
from the return is preceded by a full discussion between the
inspector and either the board of the corporation or its tax
adviser. This exchange of views, which may well lead to a
settlement of one or more outstanding issues, is comparable
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to those occurring during an administrative appeal from an in
dividual income tax assessment . For this reason, the statute
permits the corporation, with the written consent of the inspec 
tor, to bypass the administrative appeal procedure and appeal
directly to the courts . In practice, however, very few corpora
tions follow this route. Most prefer first to resort to an ad
ministrative appeal. In a recent year, 3,000 corporations filed
administrative appeals, the average being 130 for each inspec
torate dealing with the corporation tax.
3 . 4c De tails of the administrative appeal procedure re assess 
ments in wage tax (natural persons)

Theoretically, the employee who is subj ect to a withhold
ing tax has as much right to lodge an administrative appeal as
any other taxpayer . In practice, however, an employee is not
likely to lodge such an appeal. The wage tax is basically just
a method of payment, covering the tax due on e mployee wages,
with the total income tax to be computed later. Hence the
wage earner has no reason to use the administrative appeal
procedure . Should he succeed in reducing the amount of tax
withheld, the amount payable later, covering his total income,
would increase proportionately.
When an e mployer fails to withhold tax or to pay over taxes
withheld, he may receive an assessment or a deficiency assess
ment. Upon receiving an assessment, he may file a petition
for an administrative appeal. However, should he receive a
deficiency assessment, the administrative appeal procedure is
denied him and he must move directly into the courts .
Section c .

Extent Adminis trative Processing of
Refund Claims Departs from Administrative
Pro ce ssing of Assessments

3 . 5 Introductory note

Except in the limited circumstance described in 3 . 7, infra,
the processing of refunds is an integral part of, and not dis 
tinct from, the assessment procedure itself.
The tax statute, not the assessment, creates the source of
the Dutch taxpayer ' s liability. Essentially, the assessment is
a provisional consolidation 1 3 of the legal obligation created by
1 3 In the Netherlands taxability exists as an obligato ex lege as
soon as the circumstances set out in the tax statute have come into
existence: i.e. , a natural person has resided within the Netherlands
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law. Adjustment can be initiated either by the taxpayer 's time
ly invocation of an administrative appeal (with ultimate recourse
to the judiciary) or by the inspector 's imposition of a deficien
cy assessment. Either of these actions, though involving only
the assessment procedure, might disclose an erroneous assess
ment which could trigger an automatic refund of taxes previ
ously paid.
3 . 6 De tails regarding refund procedures prior to an adminis
trative appeal

Assume, for example, that the tax withheld from an em
ployee's wages in 1966 exceeded the total liability subsequently
s et forth in his notice of assessment. No special refund pro
cedure is required to accommodate this .
According to the
Netherlands ' statute , the employee's 1966 tax obligation is fixed
by the final assessment he normally will receive during 1967
or 1968 . If the taxpayer has overpaid, the notice of final as 
s essment will show a negative amount, i . e . , that he is entitled
to a refund. If he believes this negative amount should be
larger, a petition timely filed will assure an administrative ap
peal, subject to the same rules as if he had received an as 
sessment he believed to be too high.
A comparable situation arises where the taxpayer ' s tenta
tive return showed a higher net income than his actual income
proved to be. His final return will be followed by a final as 
s essment setting forth a negative amount. Again the taxpayer
can file a petition for review if he believes himself entitled to
a greater refund.
There is one circumstance, .however, where a taxpayer,
prior to his receipt of a final assessment, may seek to obtain
money previously paid in or withheld. Illustratively, a tax
payer' may have filed a tentative return for 1966, received a
tentative assessment based thereon, and discovered tater that
the estimate-and consequently the tentative assessment-was
too high. An administrative appeal is not available, because
no final assessment based on a final return has been made .
Nevertheless, in cases where a delay in refunding would work
(footnote continued)
and has enjoyed a certain net income , whatever the amount , during
the past calendar year . Illustratively , should a taxpayer die on J anu
ary 2 of a certain year , his estate would be legally burdened with a
debt arising from the tax on his income of the previous year. It is
immaterial that neither a final assessment or final return has been
made for that year .
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a hardship on the taxpayer, administrative regulations issued
by the Under Secretary of Finance authorize the inspector to
handle such claims for refund as if they were administrative
appeals . Accordingly, the inspector typically refunds an amount
he considers reasonable . However, a refusal by the inspector
cannot be carried to the courts . At most, if the inspector has
acted unreasonably, the taxpayer might request the Under Sec 
retary of State to exert his hierarchic power to change the in
spector 's mind.
3 . 7 De tails of the administrative appeal procedure re refund
claims

Normally, whether a final income tax assess ment shows a
negative amount ( a right to some refund being recognized) or
a positive sum, the taxpayer can contest the matter further at
the administrative level only if, within a period of two months
beginning with the date of the final assessment notice, he files
a petition for review.
Not infrequently, however, a taxpayer discovers more than
two months after the date of this notice that he did not deduct
an item he believes to be deductible . In some such cases, spe 
cial procedures are available to accommodate a refund. But
these procedures are less clearly defined than are those which
apply when the taxpayer has petitioned for review within the
allotted two-month period. This is because the statute itself
authorizes review only in the latter circumstances. The course
of action to be followed by our taxpayer depends upon whether
his failure to claim his deduction was due to his own negli
gence or was caused by circumstances beyond his control.
Where the taxpayer failed to claim a refund because of
negligence or trivial inconveniences, he has no right to relief.
Nevertheless, he may request the inspector to grant a refund
and the latter may do so without consulting his superiors, pro
vided less than five years have elapsed since the taxable year
in question. If more than five years have elapsed, the national
office , depending on the circumstances, might grant relief. It
is possible, of course, that an inspector might deny a request
in a situation where the equities were indubitably in the tax
payer's favor. The taxpayer would have but one recourse, i.e. ,
request the Under Secretary of Finance to exert his hierarchic
influence to the taxpayer' s benefit.
Where, during the allotted two-month period following an as 
sessment, a taxpayer failed, because of serious illness or other
circumstances beyond his control, to invoke an administrative
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review of a claimed refund, he may seek a waiver of the two 
month rule b y filing a written request with the President o f
the Chamber of Taxation at the Court of Appeal. This official
may extend the two-month period otherwise prescribed by stat
ute upon finding that the special circumstances did in fact pre 
vent the timely filing of the petition.

CHAPTER XXIV
RESOLUTION OF INTERPRETATIVE INCOME TAX
QUESTIONS BY INDEPENDENT TRIBUNALS
4 . 1 Introduction

Recourse to the Netherlands tax tribunals, whether to the
trial or appellate level, is inexpensive, and the procedures are
as informal as possible . Under a 1 9 56 statute, there is a sin
gle level of trial tribunals and one appellate tribunal. 1
Under the 1 956 statute, original jurisdiction over tax cases
at the trial level was given to special taxation chambers in
the regular appe llate tribunals, the Gerechtshoven, not to the
ordinary trial tribunals . 2 The tax chambers so created-which
replaced the Raden van Be roep staffed by nonprofessional
·

1 For years prior thereto , the need for reform had been acknowl
edged but there was considerable dis agreement as to the shape it
should take . Two proposals attracted particular attention. One advo
cated the institution of specialized courts for tax cases , with judges
drawn from tax specialists (former tax practitioners of the academic
level, former tax inspectors of the same level , lawyers with a high
degree of competence in tax problems) . The other advocated the use
of ordinary courts of justice to handle all tax cases .
2 The use of special chambers within the regular appellate tribu
nals was dictated by the government' s belief that tax cases should not
be given to a specialized tribunal . It argued that many tax cases not
only raised problems analogous to those arising in other areas of law
but also involved contract and property issues . At the same time, the
use of special chambers within a general court permitted the utiliza
tion of men with tax expertise. Jurisdiction was given to the general
appellate rather than to the general trial tribunals for these three
reasons.
First , the government argued that the administrative appeal
bore a strong resemblance to an action before a trial tribunal . Sec
ond , by the creation of special tax chambers in the five courts of ap
peal , Gerechtshoven, jurisdiction over tax cases would be confined to
a limited number of tribunals , thereby facilitating specialization by the
judges in tax matters and contributing to greater uniformity in deci
sions.
Third, the fact that the judges of these taxation chambers
would rank equally with judges of the appellate tribunals would more
nearly insure first-rate applicants for the new positions .
473
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jurist3 -are termed Be lastingkamers, Chambers for Processing
Taxation cases . 4
Decisions of the Be lastingkamers may be reversed by the
Supre me Court, on appeal by either the taxpayer or the inspec 
tor . However, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is limited
to questions of law.
Section A. Organization and Procedure s :
Trial Le ve l
4.2 Organization of the trial tribunals

The five Courts of Appeal are located at Amsterdam, The
Hague, and three provincial capitals . The Courts of Appeal
located at The Hague and Amsterdam have two Taxation Cham
bers , the other three , one apiece. 5
Each chamber consists of three counselors, Raadshe ren,
and a clerk, griffie r, who is a jurist. The counselors are ap
pointed by the Queen and hold their positions until they reach
age seventy. One has the rank of Vice President of the Court
and acts as President of the Chamber .
a The Raden van Beroep, established in the nineteenth century ,
were given a new legal status in 1914. This establishment terminated
the use of general jurisdiction for tax cases which had been the prac
tice since the Napoleonic period. There were 20 of these Raden van
Beroep . The statute required that their decis ions be written and in
clude rationale .
Appeal lay to the Supreme Court , Hoge Raad, but
only in case of " either violation or misapplication of the statute" or
" lack of motivation." The use of part-time nonprofess ional jurists as
j udges brought mounting criticism to the Raden van Beroep. Since the
judges were nominated to the post of honor from local and other jur
ists , or from economists , members of the Chamber of Commerce ,
municipal officials , lawyer s , etc . , there was no assurance they pos
sessed any real expertise in tax matters-a matter of increasing con
cern as the tax statutes multiplied in number and complexity . More
over , dockets became increas ingly clogged because of the limited
number of cases which could be heard by spare-time jurists .
4 Despite the fact that the institution of the Belastingkamers, with
the shift from nonprofess ional nonspecialist jurists , crf:ated a sharp
break with the past, the procedures employed actually changed very
In large measur e , this is because the Supreme C ourt , since
little.
the creation of the Raden van Beroep, has borne the responsibility ,
through countless decisions , of developing procedural rules as well as
interpreting the substantive provisions .
5 The greater population concentration in the western part of the
country accounts for the additional Taxation Chamber at Amsterdam
and The Hague .
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The intentions of the 1 956 statute indicated, first, that the
new tribunals were not to be isolated from the main stream of
the Courts of Appeal but, second, that the three counselors were
to be appointed from tax experts . Accordingly, every effort
was made to appoint to each chamber ( 1) one applicant with
previous j udicial service, usually in a trial tribunal, (2) one
applicant familiar with interpretative problems because of work
as a lawyer or as a secretary to a former Raad van Beroep,
and (3) one applicant with previous service as a chief inspec
tor or director in the Internal Revenue Service. Thus coun
selors of the Taxation Chambers fall into two categories : tax
experts who previously superimposed tax expertise on a general
legal background, and judges with relatively little tax expertise
upon appointment but who acquire this over their years of
service.
Further to insure their expertise and to stabilize these
Chambers, counselors appointed thereto are not entitled, con 
trary t o the practice followed as t o others, t o have requests
for a transfer to a non-tax chamber 6 honored automatically.
An initial dearth of qualified applicants, however, resulted
in one temporary modification in the 19 56 statute , to permit
appointment until 19677 of suitable individuals without academic
qualification. Specifically, instead of the required completion
of law studies at a Dutch university-this being the customary
requirement for judicial nomination-appointee s need only have
passed their examinations at the State Academy of Taxes or
equivalent earlier examinations .
Many tax cases do not actually involve a legal problem .
In consequence, the 19 56 statute empowered the President of a
Taxation Chamber to decide whether a case would be heard by
the full chamber of three members or before a unus iudex 
a single counselor assisted by the clerk. While there is some
variation in the practices of the individual c ourts, the Presi
dents have assigned a majority of the cases to unus iudex.
Only in rare instances has a party to the proceeding request
ed to be heard by a full chamber, and typically those requests
are honored.
Indeed, that the competence of the Taxation
Chamber judges has attracted far more confidence than did the
6 The practice among the Courts of Appeal , located at
provincial capitals varies .
Some use regularly, though on
basis , some only intermittently , counselors of the Taxation
in sessions of their civil and /or penal chamber s .
7 This cut-off date was extended in 1 9 6 7 for five year s ,
ably will be extended for another five-year period.

the three
a limited
Chambers
and prob
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nonprofessionals who sat on the earlier Raden van Beroep is
strikingly illustrated by the sharp rise in the number of cases
heard by a unus iudex, 8 and seems justified since also there
has been a sharp decline in Supreme Court reversals of trial
decisions . 9
Each Court of Appeal decides whether its Taxation Cham
ber, whether at full strength or in unus -structure , will go on
circuit or hold sessions only in the city where the court is
located.
4 . 3 Processing cases through the trial tribunals

Taxation Chambers have jurisdiction of all tax controver 
sies except those involving turnover taxes, import and excise
duties, registration fees and stamp duties . It is immaterial
whether the taxpayer has or has not paid the tax.
An appeal to a Taxation Chamber is an inexpensive and a
simple process. There are no court costs, witness fees are
paid by the court, and the taxpayer need not be represented by
counsel. The taxpayer must lodge his appeal within two months
following receipt of either the inspector's decision on an ad
ministrative appeal or a deficiency assessment, or receipt of
a corporation tax assessment. However, should the taxpaye r
fail t o file the petition within the allotted time, and if h e can
show such failure resulted from a force majeure , he may re
quest permission from the Taxation Chamber President to file
later .
The petition of appeal, beroepschrijt, prepared either by
the taxpayer or his representative, 10 should indicate both the
particular relief requested and the rationale upon which he re 
lies, attaching thereto any supporting documents . Taxpayers
are permitted, however, to file abbreviated petitions within the
statutory period, with the rationale being submitted at a later
date . Normally, upon failure to submit a rationale, the cham
ber itself will request that such be forwarded in writing. Even
so, it is not unusual for the President of the chamber, during
the oral hearing, to permit the taxpayer to supply it orally.
Copies of the petition and of any supporting records are
sent by the court to the inspector concerned. The inspector
8 A unus iudex heard about 2 8% of the cases when the Raden van
Beroep were the trial tribunals . Now a unus iudex hears about 58%.
9 The Supreme Court reversed about 40% of the Raden van B eroep's
decisions appealed to it. Presently , reversals occur in only about 17%
of the appeals from the Taxation Chambers .
1 0 The representative may b e a tax practitioner , an accountant , or
a lawyer .
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has one month-which the court may extend-within which to
file his written note of answer, vertoogschrijt, indicating both
his underlying rationale and his objections to the taxpayer 's
conclusions or rationale . If, as usually is the case, there was
an administrative appeal prior to this point, the inspector's
written answer usually is based on the opinion set out in his
earlier administrative decision. He is free, however, to add
new arguments , new facts, and submit additional supplementary
records. Also, he may alter his original opinion, reflecting a
conclusion that the taxpayer originally was right in part, or
even as to the whole, with new rationale being offered to justi
fy the amount of taxable income as re-determined. Illustra
tively, the inspector may acknowledge that he himself erred in
his treatment of one particular item in reaching his original
decision. However, as will be noted later, the inspector may
not wait until the oral hearing to introduce such a statement.
It is implicit in the foregoing that the inspector who re
ceives the taxpayer 's petition, prepares the note of answer, and
represents the administration at the hearing, is the same in
spector who made the original assessment and heard the tax
payer' s administrative appeal. There is, however, one excep
tion. An administrative regulation requires that, in a hearing
before the Court of Appeal, an inspectorate must be represent
ed by an inspector of academic level. If the official who ear
lier handled the taxpayer ' s assessment and/or administrative
appeal did not hold this rank, he will be superseded by a prop
erly qualified inspector.
The legislature attached great importance to the oral hear
ing. It anticipated that, in a typical case, submission of the
taxpayer 's petition and of the inspector 's note of answer would
complete the written phase of the trial. Upon request, however,
the President of the Taxation Chamber, may permit a second
round of memoranda to be filed by the parties . And this usual
ly occurs in the more intricate cases. l l
The interchange of memoranda sometimes leads the parties
to renew their contact, orally or in writing. Each may have
developed a greater appreciation of the other's position. Each
may be inclined to believe certain aspects of the case make
informal agreement preferable to court adjudication. Whatever
the reasons, informal discussions, of which the court officially
is unaware, may take place leading to a settlement. When such
11 There is , however , no direct exchange of documents between the
parties ; the court acts as intermediary .
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discussions are taking place, the court may receive notice
from the parties, requesting an adjournment of the oral hear
ing until they have had an opportunity for further consultation.
In these discussions, the inspector is free to exercise his own
judgment regarding a settlement, though he may decide to con
sult the head of his inspectorate. If the informal discussions
are successful, the court will receive a letter from the tax 
payer, reflecting his wish to withdraw his petition.
Over a fairly recent three-year period, almost 70 percent
of the taxpayer 's petitions were withdrawn, though this figure
is somewhat deceiving in present context, for it also includes
what relatively is a much smaller number of cases withdrawn
by taxpayers after the oral hearing.
Where a case is not resolved informally, the court fixes
a day for the oral hearing, and notifies the parties by a sim
ple registered letter . The taxpayer may be represented by
counsel, although the court may require the taxpayer himself
to be present. In any event, the taxpayer also is free to bring
such experts -e.g. , accountants -as he may wish.
Before the
court actually hands down its decree, it may request further
written information from the parties themselves or from others .
Such information must be turned over to the other party and
should either party request another oral hearing, it must be
provided within a reasonable time .
While the statute itself provides for an oral hearing, it
does not otherwise set forth formal rules governing a Taxation
Chamber's procedures . The draftsmen of the 1 9 56 act con
cluded that the numerous Supreme Court decisions fixing pro
cedural rules under the 19 14 statute would remain applicable.
In c onsequence, the decisions, arresten, of the Supreme Court
are of enormous significance in dealing with matters such as
the burden of proof, rules of evidence, rules of court, , etc. Only
the more important of these can be summarized here .
The court may not go beyond issues laid before it b y the
parties . Illustratively, if a point in controversy is whether a
particular amount of depreciation is allowable as to a particu
lar item, the court may not decide another issue on which the
parties are agreed, for example, whether a certain expense is
deductible or nondeductible. In other words, the court may not
re-examine uncontested questions associated with the taxpayer ' s
assessment.
By like token, even as to a contested item, the court may
not make a finding which increases the taxpayer 's income be
yond that determined by the previous administrative appeal or,
in other circumstances, by the assessment.
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There are no formal rules establishing the burden of proof.
The court has full freedom to select and rej ect evidence as
well as to determine the relative weight of the evidence offered.
In practice, inter alia, this means the court need not accept
the offer of a party to submit additional evidence in the form
of documents or yield to a demand by one of the parties to use
experts or hear witnesses. It also may decide whether evi
dence introduced by a given party is adequate, in keeping with
the Supreme Court's general policy that a person must prove
as much as may be expected reasonably from him under the
circumstances of the case. For example, if normal experience
in a given situation justifies the inspector 's assumption as to
a matter, the taxpayer will be expected to submit evidence if
he makes a contention to the contrary. Not infrequently, a de 
cision will include this type of comment " . . . that in [i. e., the
particular circumstances] a reasonable distribution of the bur
dens of proofs requires that the taxpayer [or the inspector]
should have proved that. . . . "
As a corollary to the court's control over the acceptance
or rejection of evidence, it has the same degree of control over
the obj ection by a party to the introduction of evidence. Occa
sionally in the course of the oral hearing, a party may present
an argument bottomed on facts not heretofore brought out in
the exchange of documents preceding the hearing. Typically,
the other party objects, on the ground the evidence comes as
a surprise, and that he has not had adequate opportunity to de 
fend against it. The court has power to rej ect or accept the
objection. Should the objection be rejected, and the party al
lowed to place the evidence before the court, the case usually
is adjourned to give the objecting party full opportunity to plan
his defense to the newly presented material and the arguments
based thereon.
If the hearing is before the full bank of the Taxation Cham
ber, the taxpayer usually is represented by a top-level tax
practitioner and rarely is unrepresented. Exactly the reverse
situation prevails where a unus iudex hears a case. This poses
a problem for the unus iudex, for lack of representation tends
to create uncertainty as to the reliability and accuracy of the
information presented.
Only the parties and the taxpayer ' s representatives appear
before the chamber members and the clerk. The public is ex
cluded, to the end of preserving secrecy regarding the taxpay
er's financial affairs .
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The president of the Taxation Chamber opens the hearing
by requesting the taxpayer or his representative to state his
case. This statement may be limited to a bare reference to
the petition of appeal itself, or it may involve a detailed and
complicated analysis . The inspector then makes his statement,
responding to that of the taxpayer . This interchange may be
followed by further discussion between the parties . The mem 
bers o f the Chamber also assume an important and positive
role ; they are free to raise questions, require further informa
tion as to certain aspects of the case, and may even take the
initiative in establishing the facts . The whole process is in
tended to be informal, with both parties and the court partici
pating fully, to the end of clarifying the points in dispute.
The president at his discretion closes the oral hearing.
Typically, this occurs when the court believes it has sufficient
information regarding the details to permit it to begin its own
deliberations . Sometimes, however, by the close of a hearing
the court does not have sufficient information and may request
that it be supplied. Finally, a practice has developed which
permits the judges to suggest an adjournment whenever they
conclude the parties might benefit by resuming discussions be 
A judge may believe that the parties
tween themselves . 1 2
themselves may be getting a feeling that the truth lies some
where between the two extremes . In such circumstances, the
president-speaking informally-may inquire if the parties have
any interest in further private discussions . If the parties in
dicate such an interest, the president adjourns the case and
asks that the Taxation Chamber be informed of further develop
ments . Sometimes an agreement is reached and, if so, the
Taxation Chamber is notified that the case is withdrawn. Some
times, while full agreement is not reached, the parties do agree
upon certain facts . The Taxation Chamber is infor!fied of this
limited agreement and told that the parties desire a decision
only on the remaining issues of fact and the issues of law.
The complexity of a case will determine whether the actual
decision is handed down several weeks or several months after
the hearing is officially closed. The statute requires that the
decision be written and contain an explanation for the conclu
sions reached. In practice, the judgment states the findings of
fact, explains the legal conclusions drawn from these facts, and
1 2 Though not based on a statute , this practice is cons idered as
being with the ratio legis because of the prudence and restraint with
w hich it is used.
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concludes by indicating whether it reverses or sustains, in
whole or in part, the administrative appeal decision.
Not all decisions of Taxation Chambers are appealed to
the Supreme Court. However, even unappealed decisions can
have some effect on similar cases coming before both the de
ciding chamber and other chambers . The precise amount of
effect, however, depends upon the strength of the underlying
rationale of the decision as reflected in the explanation set
forth in the opinion. Of course, some decisions have little
precedent value if only because of the peculiar factual circum
stances involved in the case.
Private tax publications print those decisions of the Taxa
tion Chambers which develop principles of major interpretative
significance and are likely, therefore, to have some future in
fluence. Where such a decision favored the taxpayer, there
usually is a footnote explaining why the Under Secretary of
Finance did not appeal to the Supreme Court. However, all
concerned realize that a decision by the Under Secretary not
to appeal does not mean that he is prepared to adhere auto
matically to the principle of the case. About 15 percent of all
Taxation Chambers decisions are published, with the remaining
8 5 percent falling into three categories: ( 1) those involving
primarily questions of fact, (2) those which dismissed the peti
tion because of formal defects, and (3) those raising such fun
damental issues that appeal to the Supreme Court is anticipated 
with ultimate publication of the Supreme Court's decision.
But even the published 1 5 percent is a fairly large abso 
lute number. For example, over a fairly recent three-year
period, Schedule I in the Appendix to this PART indicates that
the Taxation Chambers of the five Courts of Appeal decided in
those respective years 2065, 1 8 52 , and 1897 cases. However,
in addition to income, corporation, and wage tax cases, these
figures include cases involving inheritance duties, capital tax,
real estate tax, etc . Approximately 70 percent of the total fall
in the income, corporation, and wage tax areas, with 80 percent
of the 70 percent being true income tax cases.
Section B. Organization and Pro cedure s :
Appe llate Tribunals
4 . 4 Organization of the appellate court system

There is only one appellate tribunal, for tax as well as
other cases -the Supreme Court of the Netherlands ( Hoge Raad
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de r Nederlanden), which sits at The Hague . Each of the Court 's
three Chambers has five Counselors, highly qualified doctors
of law appointed by the Queen, with tenure until age seventy.
The 19 56 statute did not alter the Supreme Court's tax
jurisdiction; one of its three chambers has continued, as its
prime responsibility, to handle tax appeals . As is true of other
civil and penal cases, however, appeals are confined to errors
of law. However, as is not true of other civil and penal cases,
appeals in tax cases may be based on a lack of motivation
that is, the decision handed down by the court could not be
justified by the facts as found by the court.
In the case of the government, in theory it is the Under
Secretary of Finance who decides whether an adverse lower
court decision will be appealed. As a practical matter, how
ever, the choice is made by the Director-General of Taxes at
the national office, or by a senior member of his staff.
4. 5 Processing a case through the appe llate tribunal

Procedures associated with tax appeals to the Supreme
C ourt are even simpler than those pertaining to a trial tribunal.
Within one month after the lower court decision, the appellant
files with the Supreme Court's record office a petition of ap
peal, be roepschrift in cassatie, simultaneously paying a small
filing fee-f. 1 0.
This petition is usually, though not necessarily, prepared
by a well qualified tax practitioner. In those cases, the peti
tion itself, after identifying the legal issue, goes on to analyze
the legal argument on which the taxpayer relies. A much more
succinct, even defective, petition is legally sufficient, however,
in accordance with the Supreme Court's belief that the process 
ing o f tax cases must not be impeded by formal requirements . 13
A copy of the petition of appealis forwarded to the appel
lee who, in turn, files a written answer, ve rtoogsch:rijt. This
exchange of documents is usually all that the parties do, al
though each has a right to request an oral argument, a right
l 3 Jllustratively , a peasant , on receipt of an adverse decision by a

Raad van Beroep, sent a copy of the decision to the Supreme Court .

He wrote on the copy "My shield and trust art thou, 0 Supreme Court ,"
a variation on a line in the Netherlands national anthem , the "Wil
helmus ," which reads " My shield and trust art thou , 0 God , my Lord ,"
The Supreme Court accepted this appeal-couched in words both effec
tively eloquent and extremely vague-as one which fulfilled the statu
tory requirements . Obviously , this was an exceptional set of circum
stances .
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rarely exercised by the Under Secretary of Finance .
In a
small minority of cases, taxpayers do request an oral argu
ment, though it must be conducted by a lawyer whereas the
petition itself may be prepared by the taxpayer .
In the majority of cases, some months elapse before the
Supreme Court hands down its written decision. The decision
includes a statement of the facts as found by the Taxation
Chamber of the Court of Appeal, a summary of that lower
court's rationale, a summary of the petition of appeal, and
finally the Supreme Court's own conclusion. While the Court
is responsive to the petition, it also is free to go beyond it,
basing its decision solely on errors of law not raised by the
appellant.
The great majority of Supreme Court decisions constitute
precedents in fact, if not in law . This is particularly true
where the Court itself elaborates on the meaning of a provi
sion in the tax statute, as distinct from instances where heavy
reliance is placed on the underlying rationale of the lower
court. Today, many petitions and pleas in tax cases discuss
and cite as authority Supreme Court decisions in analogous
cases.
While a majority of Supreme Court decisions are truly
significant, some are not.
Illustratively, the appellant may
have alleged a violation of the law because the court below did
not supply a sufficient basis for its decision, that is, the facts
established in the course of the trial could not possibly justify
its decision. Under such circumstances the Supreme C ourt is
likely to use language such as the following " . . . that the
court, on the basis, of the facts as established, properly could
render the decision reached," or " . . . that in the given situa
tion the court did not act contrary to that which is reasonable
when it imposed on the taxpayer [or, alternatively, the inspec
tor] the burden of proof concerning . . . . " 14
More than 50 percent of all Supreme Court decisions are
published, with publication being handled by private editors .
The text of the decision often is accompanied by comments
from tax specialists. Schedule II in the Appendix to this PART
14 And , of course, an important precedent is unlikely to emerge
from a case in which the Supreme Court , without deciding the matter ,
remands it to the Taxation Chamber with a directive to re-open the
case to make additional findings of fact , and hand down another deci
sion "taking into consideration" the Supreme Court' s generally stated
views .
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indicates that, over a recent two-year period, the Court de
cided 486 tax cases, of which about 70 percent were income,
corporation, and wage tax cases, with the great bulk involving
the income tax.
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